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 ABSTRACT 
Rejuvenating Communism : 
The Communist Youth League as a Political Promotion Channel in Post-
Mao China 
Jérôme Doyon 
How does the Chinese Party-State renew its political elite and maintain its cohesion in 
the post-Mao era? This is a key question to understand the evolution of China’s political system 
and still the explanations one can find in the literature are far from satisfactory. Overall, the 
literature on transformation of the Chinese political elite focuses on the broad outcomes, the 
fact that since the 1980s officials tend to be younger and more educated, but it falls short in 
unveiling the mechanisms at play. It gives a limited answer to the elite renewal issue as it leaves 
politics aside. By focusing on educational levels and technical skills it forgets about the 
importance of political commitment.  
I approach these questions through a unique account of the role played by the Chinese 
Communist Youth League (CYL) in terms of cadres’ recruitment and promotion since the 
1980s. Using biographical data and a snowball sample of 92 interviewees I reconstructed the 
trajectories of CYL cadres. Beyond my focus on the central organization of the CYL in Beijing, 
I compared the situation of the CYL in the capital cities of two very different provinces and in 
four universities. Through this mixed methods approach, I could assess the evolution of the 
CYL as a path to power in post-Mao China. My main findings are as follows: 
First, due to post-Cultural Revolution politics and the need for leaders at the time to 
recruit loyal young cadres, a “sponsored mobility” system was developed to renew the Party-
State’s elite. College students are recruited and trained through the Party’s youth organizations. 
They are put then on a unique promotion path, which includes specific opportunities and 
 trainings, and which leads them to leadership position in the Party-State. This contrasts with 
what happened in the Soviet case in particular. Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the Soviet elite 
was renewed through the cooptation of professionals with technical skills rather than by 
recruiting young cadres who spent their whole career in the Party-State.  
Second, through the various steps of the sponsored mobility process, the young recruits 
develop a specific social role as future officials and transform their social circles. As a result, 
they cultivate a political commitment to their career in the Party-State and to the survival of the 
regime. Third, the decentralized nature of the Party-State and its youth organizations make it 
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Introduction 
A -  Elite cohesion and renewal in communist regimes 
“The Soviet bureaucracy is like all ruling classes in that it is ready to shut its eyes to the 
crudest mistakes of its leaders in the sphere of general politics, provided in return they show an 
unconditional fidelity in the defense of its privileges.”1 Trotsky depicted in 1936 the Soviet 
bureaucracy as a clientelist and cohesive elite. Only 14 years after the establishment of the 
USSR in 1922, the cadres were already pictured as cynical and self-interested rather than 
ideologically motivated.  
In light of this configuration, one is led to wonder how elite cohesion is able to last 
overtime. Coming back to Trotsky’s quote, how to make sure that a bureaucrat’s personal 
interests remain in line with the organization’s in an evolving society? Once the revolutionary 
generation gone (who built strong personal ties during years of military struggle), how do 
communist regimes maintain unity among a renewed political elite? How do the surviving 
communist systems manage to attract new recruits and guarantee their lifelong loyalty? These 
questions are at the heart of my research. They are particularly relevant in investigating 
evolving communist systems, such as post-Mao China, where the revolutionary ideology no 
longer functions as a key structuring element and where a liberalized employment market 
provides young people with many attractive career options beyond the bureaucracy.2 While 
                                                 
1 Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, trans. Max Eastman (Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2004), 206. 
2 On the decreasingly structuring role of ideology, see : Kalpana Misra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The 
Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng’s China (New York: Routledge, 1998); Martin K Dimitrov, “Understanding 
Communist Collapse and Resilience,” in Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian 
Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe, ed. Martin K Dimitrov, 2013, 3–39. 
 2 
numerous studies have described the flexibility and transformation patterns of communist 
regimes, the issues of elite renewal and cohesion remain highly understudied. 
1)  The transformation of communist systems 
Against the transitology literature, which argued for a necessary and linear evolution of 
communist regimes towards liberal democracy, 3  Jowitt developed one of the most 
comprehensive accounts of the transformation of communist party-states.4 He described three 
different phases that communist regimes tend to go through overtime in their relationship with 
society. First, a transformation phase, during which the Party takes over and destroys the old 
order. Second, a consolidation phase, which leads to the establishment of a new regime with a 
new leader and ideology. The consolidation, for Jowitt, goes together with a tendency towards 
isolation of the Party from a threatening society which is controlled through coercion. Third, 
the Party develops inclusive dispositions. It reaches the limits of its domination strategy and 
progressively integrates itself with the growing plurality of the non-official sectors of society, 
without losing the monopoly over political decision-making.   
For Jowitt, this evolution of the communist party-states implies a transformation of the 
Party leadership. According to him, the communist Party first switches from recruiting 
revolutionary cadres – risk-taking leaders capable of attracting political support and who are 
key for the transformation of the old society – to cultivating apparatchiks. The apparatchiks 
tend then to isolate themselves from society in order to better control it. This is part of the 
                                                 
3 See for example : Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York; Toronto; New York: 
Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992). For an argumentative 
criticism of the transitology literature, see: Michel Dobry, “Les voies incertaines de la transitologie : choix 
stratégiques, séquences historiques, bifurcations et processus de path dependence [Uncertain paths of transitology : 
strategic choices, historical sequences, bifurcations and path dependence processes],” Revue française de science 
politique 50, no. 4 (2000): 585–614. 
4 Kenneth Jowitt, “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes,” World Politics 28, no. 01 (1975): 
69–96; Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder. the Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992). 
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Party’s consolidation strategy, with the view of maximizing obedience within its ranks. 5 
Second, the inclusive tendencies of the Party imply both the extension of Party membership to 
groups previously politically excluded, as well as a professionalization of the Party leadership 
itself. This professionalization implies “a shift away from command, arbitrary, and dogmatic 
modes of action and organization, and a move towards leadership, procedural, and empirically 
oriented modes.” 6  While Jowitt underlined interesting patterns which are common across 
communist regimes, the mechanisms undergirding the transformations of the political elite and 
allowing it to maintain its cohesion, remain unspecified. 
Focusing mainly on the USSR and Eastern European Leninist systems, Jowitt presented the 
inclusive tendencies of communist regimes as the beginning of the end. According to him, the 
communist parties base their charismatic legitimacy on a combat tension, directed towards 
external or internal class enemies and vital to subordinate the elite members’ particular interests 
to the organization’s ones. But the inclusion phase implies the progressive end of this combat 
tension as the Party does not retrench itself from a threatening society anymore, and has 
officially defeated the internal class enemy.  For Jowitt, it becomes hard, without this tension, 
to guarantee the commitment of the political elite to the Party’s general goals. All in all, it leads 
to a corrupt routinization of the organization and its subsequent decay.7 Yet, after witnessing 
the survival of different communist regimes, such as in China or Vietnam,8 decades after the 
initiation of reforms characteristic of inclusive tendencies, I argue that Jowitt’s deterministic 
account should be questioned. 
                                                 
5 Jowitt, New World Disorder. the Leninist Extinction, 89. 
6 Ibid., 97. 
7 Kenneth Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime,” Soviet Studies 35, 
no. 3 (July 1983): 275–97. 
8 Dimitrov, “Understanding Communist Collapse and Resilience.” 
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A more recent study by Jean-François Bayart on what he called “Thermidorian situations,” 
strikes me as an interesting new take on the inclusive tendencies of communist regimes.9 Bayart 
drew a parallel between the contemporary situations that can be observed in different 
bureaucratized revolutionary regimes and the conservative turn the French Revolution took in 
1794 during the month of Thermidor, 10  leading to the downfall of Robespierre and the 
establishment of a new regime, the “Directory” (1795-1799). The concept of “Thermidor” 
which emerged from these events, has taken various meanings depending on authors’ 
perspectives. Trotsky, in particular, accused Stalin of embodying the “Soviet Thermidor.”11 For 
him, Stalin’s regime exemplified the end of the revolutionary impetus and the “triumph of the 
bureaucracy over the masses.”12 He therefore condemned it as the rise of a new ruling class.  
Bayart’s concept of Thermidorian situation contrasts with Trotsky’s normative approach 
and focuses on a different historical configuration, including the bureaucratization of the regime 
as rules are developed regarding political selection and succession, but also the liberalization 
of its economic policies, such as in contemporary China or Vietnam, by opposition to central 
planning under Stalin. Bayart sums it up as follows: “Contemporary “Thermidorism” […] is 
found all along revolutionary trajectories, whether communist or other, when the ruling class 
becomes professionalized, passes from the register of mobilizing utopia to managerial reason, 
and aims to reproduce itself as a ruling class by resorting to the ambiguous strategy of opening 
                                                 
9Jean-François Bayart, “Le Concept de situation thermidorienne: régimes néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation 
économique [The Concept of Thermidorian Situation: Neo-Revolutionary Regimes and Economic Liberalization],” 
Questions de recherche 24 (March 2008): 1–76. 
10 Thermidor was the eleventh month of the revolutionary calendar, used in France from 1793 to 1805.  
11 Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, 66. 
12 Ibid., 80. 
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itself up to the capitalist world economy, indulging in the primitive accumulation of capital, 
and also in perpetuating a revolutionary ideology, vocabulary and imaginaire.”13  
Bayart’s concept shares numerous common features with Jowitt’s inclusive tendencies, but 
it is also more specific in two main ways. First, it does not merely offer a description of the 
strategies developed by revolutionary regimes to survive, but identifies a specific situation, 
characterized by the interaction between a social context and the regime’s strategies. The 
regimes’ strategies are presented as both causes to the evolutions of society and reactions to 
them. Focusing on the interaction itself allows the author to take a step back from an approach 
purely focused on the survival of political systems, thereby avoiding a certain determinism. 
Second, the situation Bayart focused on is different and more specific than the context of the 
inclusive tendencies developed by Jowitt. While Jowitt had in mind the coming to power of 
Khrushchev after Stalin and the decades that followed, Bayart used the examples of 
contemporary Cambodia and Iran to describe the ways in which a revolutionary regime deals 
with a liberalizing economy and the socioeconomic changes it implies. He described a very 
different context, in which the revolutionary Party does not rule the economy through central 
planning nor has a complete control over social mobility anymore. In this context, Bayart 
stressed the ideological flexibility and overall adaptability of the bureaucratized revolutionary 
regimes.  
The political elites described by Bayart are adapting to a liberalizing socioeconomic context. 
Using a variety of methods, they try to remain in power by making the more out of the new 
situation that they contributed to shape. In fact, the concept of Thermidorian situation implies 
that while the socioeconomic context changes drastically, the political system and its elite 
                                                 
13 Bayart, “Le Concept de situation thermidorienne: régimes néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation économique 
[The Concept of Thermidorian Situation: Neo-Revolutionary Regimes and Economic Liberalization],” 58. 
Translated and quoted by: Françoise Mengin, Fragments of an Unfinished War: Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and the 
Partition of China (London: Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2015), 83. 
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remain largely the same. However, as developed by Andrew Walder, departure from central 
planning has deep political consequences: it creates alternatives to the reward and career paths 
formerly controlled by the Party organizations.14 In the Chinese case for instance, it implied the 
end of the job placement system managed by the Party-State.15 In this context, and when new 
lucrative career opportunities open up, how does the party keep attracting young educated 
recruits and guarantee their loyalty? Like in Jowitt’s work, the mechanisms explaining elite 
renewal and cohesion, and therefore the sustainability of the regime overtime in a changing 
context, remain to be explored. 
Building on the sociology of elites, I argue that the issue of elite renewal and cohesion, and 
how it is maintained overtime, must be at the heart of a study of revolutionary regimes’ 
evolutions.16 I, however, do not study the Party-State’s political elite as a homogeneous “ruling 
class”17 or “new class”.18 While this approach can yield interesting results in stressing the 
importance of elite cohesion for regime survival, the focus on the elite’s social background and 
homogeneity often obscures the organizational mechanisms through which it renews itself in 
light of a changing situation. In line with the approach developed by Suleiman in his study of 
contemporary French elites, I focus instead on the structures through which the political elite, 
                                                 
14 Andrew G Walder, “The Decline of Communist Power: Elements of a Theory of Institutional Change,” Theory 
and Society 23, no. 2 (1994): 297–323. 
15 On the direct job placement system and its liberalization, see : Yanjie Bian, “Guanxi and the Allocation of Urban 
Jobs in China,” China Quarterly, no. 140 (1994): 971–99. 
16 Elite theory has long emphasized the importance of elite renewal in order to prevent the decline of a ruling elite. 
The main idea is that a political elite which transforms itself continually, by absorbing talented individuals from 
other sectors of society, can survive indefinitely (Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica)., 
trans. Arthur Livingston (New York; London: McGraw-Hill book company, inc., 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise 
and Fall of the Elites; an Application of Theoretical Sociology. (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1968). 
17 Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica). 
18 Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957). 
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understood as the officials employed by the Party-State, is recruited and trained.19 While other 
elite groups might emerge in a Thermidorian situation and the liberalizing economy which goes 
with it, the ruling elite in a communist regime remains the Party-State officials and this is the 
group I focus on.  
To shed light on the specific mechanisms which allow a revolutionary party to stay in power 
by renewing its elite and maintaining its cohesion, it appears fruitful to focus on a single case. 
By opposition to the wide cross-national databases often used in elite studies,20 it allows to get 
into the details of the mechanisms allowing elite renewal in a specific setting. post-Mao China 
offers an ideal setting to study elite renewal in a Thermidorian context. In contrast to Jowitt’s 
statement that “the persistence of Leninist rule in China rests on the continued presence of old 
Bolsheviks,”21 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been able to outlive the revolutionary 
generation of cadres. The CCP remained in power while pursuing economic reforms 
characteristic of a Thermidorian situation, as well as promoting a whole new generation of Party 
cadres. 
2)  The Chinese case 
According to Cheng Li, the Chinese Communist party has, since the 1980s, underwent the 
“most massive, rapid change of elites within any regime in human history.” 22 It has been 
stressed that the CCP implemented a uniquely strict rejuvenation strategy, with no equivalent 
among other communist regimes, leading to a relatively peaceful elite change at every level of 
                                                 
19 On this issue, see : Ezra N Suleiman, Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 9–10. 
20 See in particular : Robert D Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1976); Joel D Aberbach, Robert D Putnam, and Bert A Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in 
Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
21 Jowitt, New World Disorder. the Leninist Extinction, 314. 
22 Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 34. 
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the Party-State hierarchy.23 If the uniqueness of the Chinese elite’s transformation is often put 
forward, so far no study has shed light on the specific mechanisms which made it possible.   
In line with Jowitt’s legacy, the literature on the inclusive tendencies of the Chinese Party-
State focuses on the extension of the CCP membership and the ideological innovations allowing 
it to coopt new elite groups. Bruce Dickson and Kellee Tsai, in particular, analyzed how the 
cooptation of entrepreneurs by the Chinese Party-State started in the 1980s and was officially 
recognized in Jiang Zemin’s theory of the “three represents” (sange daibiao, 三个代表), first 
introduced in 2000.24 They both showed that this Party strategy ensured the political support of 
entrepreneurs by giving them a stake in the regime’s survival and preventing them from 
organizing against it.25 Dickson showed that while only around 5% of the population was part 
of the Party in 2000, the proportion of Party members among entrepreneurs was then around 
20%.26 In parallel, the concept of Thermidorian situation has also been applied to the Chinese 
context in studies by Françoise Mengin, as well as Jean-Louis Rocca. Comparing the evolution 
of the KMT Regime in Taiwan and of post-Mao PRC, Mengin showed how from a similar 
revolutionary matrix they both evolved and survived through economic liberalization and elite 
                                                 
23 Mingming Shen, “A Policy-Driven Elite Transformation and Its Outcomes a Case Study of the New Local Elites 
in China.” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1994), 10. 
24 The “three represents” is a political theory introduced by Jiang Zemin in 2000. According to this theory, the 
CCP “must always represent the requirements for developing China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation 
of China’s advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people” 
(“Jiang Zemin's Report at the 16th Party Congress,” Xinhua, November 18, 2002; 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-11/18/content_633685.htm, consulted on 2 December 2015). In putting 
forward the necessity to represent the country’s “advanced productive forces” and the “majority of the Chinese 
people,” the theory led to a major shift in the Party’s recruitment policy, expanding it to businessmen from the 
private sector. On the “three represents,” see  Joseph Fewsmith, “Studying the Three Represents,” China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 8 (October 2003). 
25 Bruce J Dickson, Red Capitalists in China the Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kellee S Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: 
The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
26 Bruce J Dickson, “Threats to Party Supremacy,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 27–35. 
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bureaucratization.27 In parallel, Rocca highlighted the evolution of the regime towards state 
capitalism as well as less references to ideological principles, and the cultivation of a political 
elite which legitimizes itself through technical expertise.28  
These different studies have been very informative regarding the CCP’s ability to extend its 
control over a changing society. But focusing on other aspects of the revolutionary regime’s 
transformation, they only briefly touched upon the question of political elite renewal and 
cohesion. The cooptation of entrepreneurs – who by definition keep their professional status 
and are not employed by the Party-State – among the CCP’s 88 million members,29 has very 
little impact on the transformation of the Party-State’s political elite, constituted at its core of 
500,000 leading cadres.30 In a structured communist system such as China, the possession of 
an official position is what defines political elite status.31  While it is symptomatic of the 
regime’s evolutions, the cooptation of entrepreneurs should therefore not overshadow the 
evolution of recruitment mechanisms allowing the transformation of the actual ruling elite. In 
a nutshell, while several studies have noted that, after the revolutionary generation left power, 
the Party renewed its elite and recruited officials with more diverse experiences, they often fall 
short in explaining how elite cohesion has been maintained throughout all these years.32  
                                                 
27 Mengin, Fragments of an Unfinished War: Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and the Partition of China, 71–146. 
28 Jean-Louis Rocca, A Sociology of Modern China (S.l.: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2014), 105–132. 
29 “China’s Communist Party Now Larger than the Population of Germany,” South China Morning Post, June 30, 
2015. 
30 This figure dates from 2013 and includes the leading cadres from the county level up. I develop later in the 
Introduction the concept of leading cadre. Source: Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Le système politique chinois: un nouvel 
équilibre autoritaire [The Chinese political system: a new authoritarian equilibrium] (Paris: Presses de Sciences 
Po, 2014), 403. 
31 On this issue, see in particular : Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Cadre and Personnel 
Management in the CPC,” China: An International Journal 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 69–83. 
32 On this issue, see in particular : Cheng Li, “Jiang Zemin’s Successors: The Rise of the Fourth Generation of 
Leaders in the PRC,” The China Quarterly, no. 161 (March 2000): 1–40; Stéphanie Balme, Entre soi: l’élite du 
pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in contemporary China] (Paris: Fayard, 
2004), 300; Joseph Fewsmith, “Elite Politics: The Struggle for Normality,” in China Today, China Tomorrow: 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature on communist regimes’ 
inclusive strategies by placing the issue of the communist core elite’s renewal and cohesion at 
the center of the picture. Through an analysis of the evolution of the Party’s youth organizations 
since the beginning of the reform era in 1978, I unveil the key mechanisms that allow the Party 
to remain attractive for young educated recruits and maintain an overall cohesion of the cadre 
corps, while navigating a liberalizing economy in which it no longer holds a monopoly over 
social mobility, since alternative valuable career options have become available for ambitious 
young individuals.  
In this introductory chapter, I first review the literature on the recruitment and management 
of Party-State officials. Second, I introduce the conceptual instruments I intend to apply to the 
Chinese case in order to fill the gaps in the literature. Third, I explain why focusing on youth 
organizations and their recruitment function is the best choice to further my theoretical 
approach. Finally, I put forward three hypotheses regarding the evolution of the youth 
organization’s recruitment function in post-Mao China, and describe the research methods used 
to test them. 
  
                                                 
Domestic Politics, Economy, and Society, ed. Joseph Fewsmith (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2010), 149–64. 
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B -  Literature review: beyond formal and informal politics 
The literature on political elites in post-Mao China is divided in two broad categories. 
A first branch focuses on the Party’s institutionalization processes, understood as the 
routinization of political behaviors along commonly accepted rules and practices.33 A second 
branch of research puts forward the limits of this institutionalization and emphasizes the role 
played by so-called informal practices in the selection and promotion of Chinese officials. I 
now turn to an overview of these two branches and their subdivisions. I decided to endorse the 
distinction made between formal and informal politics in my literature review in order to best 
show how artificial this distinction is. Indeed, these two faces of Chinese politics are far from 
separated from one another, and I suggest instead that they are fundamentally consubstantial. I 
argue that we must go beyond the picture of the Chinese Party-State as an imperfect Weberian 
bureaucracy and take its political features seriously, i.e. what is often seen as informal. Finally, 
I also stress that the best way to do so is by changing our research perspective, giving more 
weight to the individuals themselves and how they are transformed by, but also transform the 
organization.  
1)  Formal politics in post-Mao China 
a)  The limited institutionalization of the Party under Mao  
For analysts focusing on communist regimes’ national leaders, China has been depicted 
until the late 1970s as an outlier in terms of elite renewal and Party institutionalization. While 
in the USSR and in Eastern Europe younger and better educated cadres were getting promoted, 
the Chinese revolutionary generation remained in the top Party positions for a very long period 
                                                 
33 Regarding this definition of institutionalization see: Steven Levitsky, “Institutionalization and Peronism: The 
Concept, the Case and the Case for Unpacking the Concept,” Party Politics Party Politics 4, no. 1 (1998): 77–92. 
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of time.34 However, tendencies towards the institutionalization of bureaucratic rules have been 
noticed at the local level since the 1950s. Oksenberg in particular has shown that, during what 
he called the bureaucratic phases of Mao’s era – that occurred in between major political 
campaigns such as the anti-rightist campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) or 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) – political  recruitment grew more codified and 
educational background became a more important selection criterion relatively to class 
background. 35  In the 1960s Vogel examined the regularization of commonly understood 
standards to evaluate cadres and train them, through a network of party schools.36  As a result 
of this process, Barnett argued that in the late 1960s, China’s cadre management practices had 
developed into a system in which performance was more important than personal factors in 
determining career advancement.37  
This initial phase of Party institutionalization, which stopped with the Cultural 
Revolution, can be understood as a transformation of Chinese officials from revolutionaries to 
semi-bureaucrats, to paraphrase Ezra Vogel’s title. 38  The Chinese cadre corps gradually 
became, after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, an organized 
bureaucracy with a structured ranking and wage system. In 1977, soon after Mao’s death, the 
                                                 
34 This was also true of the Cuban case. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 201–202. 
35 Michel Oksenberg, “The Institutionalisation of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on 
the Eve of the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, no. 36 (1968): 61–92. 
36 Ezra F Vogel, “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The ‘Regularisation’ of Cadres,” The China Quarterly 
29 (1967): 36–60. 
37 Arthur Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (London; New York: 
Columbia university press, 1967), 45. 
38 Vogel, “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The ‘Regularisation’ of Cadres.” 
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number of cadres, understood as the bureaucrats in Party-State administrations but also in 
public service units and state-owned enterprises, attained 16 million.39 
b)  The invention of Weberian bureaucrats in post-Mao China 
After Mao’s death and the reforms that followed, a whole branch of literature emerged 
regarding the institutionalization of cadre recruitment in China. It demonstrated how, starting 
in 1980 with Deng Xiaoping’s call for a “four-way transformation” (sihua, 四化), the cadres’ 
corps was transformed through the promotion of individuals who were “revolutionary, younger, 
more educated, and more technically specialized” (geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua he 
zhuanyehua, 革命化、年轻化、知识化和专业化). 40 Among the main changes identified 
were the fact that the CCP stopped relying on class background as a criterion for political 
selection and that new rules were developed in the 1980s regarding cadres’ recruitment, training 
and promotion.41 Numerous scholars have explored the effect of these new regulations on 
Chinese cadres’ corps.    
Various studies, and in particular Melanie Manion’s work, first stressed the role played 
by new retirement regulations on the transformation of the regime’s elite. From ministerial 
positions downward, new rules regarding retirement age and age limits were promulgated in 
1982 for every level. It was the end of the life-tenure system. For instance, the age limit for 
holding a ministerial level position was put at 65 years old.42 Parallel to these new rules, some 
                                                 
39 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China,” in Bringing the Party Back in: How China Is 
Governed, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Yongnian Zheng (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 60. 
40  Balme, Entre soi: l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in 
contemporary China], 170. 
41 On this process, see in particular : Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 
193. 
42 Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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studies have shown that unwritten norms were gradually established regarding the retirement 
of national party leaders. At the 15th Party Congress in 1997, an unwritten age limit of 70 was 
first applied to the election of Politburo members.43 Several authors stressed how these new 
rules led to a generational change in the cadre corps.44 According to national data, the overall 
ratio of cadres below 35 years old rose from 28,6% to 49,5% between 1979 and 1998.45 
Beyond retirement regulations, several scholars have examined the role played by 
emerging rules regarding term limits and step-by-step promotions in making the promotion of 
Chinese officials more stable and predictable.46 Finally, the CCP’s policy of promoting better 
educated cadres has been remarked for its impact on elite renewal in post-Mao China. In 1984, 
80% of the cadres promoted had a college degree and the ratio of college educated officials at 
the provincial and central levels grew from 43% in 1980 to 60% in 1986.47 According to 
Andrew Walder, such a rapid and fundamental change cannot only be explained by the increase 
in education at the national level of education. Rather, it indicates a real leadership 
transformation.48   
As a whole, these scholars emphasize the impact of these reforms on Chinese cadres’ 
                                                 
43 Gang Lin, “Leadership Transition, Intra-Party Democracy and Institution Building in China,” Asian Survey 44, 
no. 2 (2004): 255–75; Chien-Wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang, “Informal Politics Embedded in Institutional Contexts,” 
in Choosing China’s Leaders, ed. Chien-Wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang (London ; New York: Routledge, 2014), 1–
21. 
44 See for example: Shen, “A Policy-Driven Elite Transformation and Its Outcomes a Case Study of the New Local 
Elites in China.,” 32; Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 262. 
45 Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China,” 66. 
46 Kou and Zang, “Informal Politics Embedded in Institutional Contexts”; Brødsgaard, “Management of Party 
Cadres in China.” 
47 Xiaowei Zang, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 
61. 
48 Andrew G Walder, “The Party Elite and China’s Trajectory of Change,” in The Chinese Communist Party in 
Reform, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Yongnian Zheng (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 15–32. 
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corps, and points to the overall elite renewal process initiated by the CCP. Cheng Li and Lynn 
White noted that, from 1980 to 1986, more than 1,370,000 cadres recruited before 1949 retired 
while 469,000 college educated young cadres were appointed above the county level.49  
The branch of literature regarding the institutionalization of cadres’ recruitment and 
promotion reflects well the major elite change that took place in China from the 1980s onwards. 
It is also extremely informative about the new rules and procedures that governed this change. 
Yet, a major weakness of this literature is that by focusing on age and education as meritocratic 
criteria for the promotion of the new elite, it tends to forget that, from the CCP’s point of view, 
the issue of political reliability remains key. Numerous China experts have in fact argued that, 
as a result of this rejuvenation policy, the CCP cadre corps took a technocratic turn.50 Defining 
a technocrat based on one’s university training in applied science, Cheng Li shows that 76% of 
the CCP Central Committee members were technocrats in 2002.51 According to Hong Yung 
Lee, the Chinese officials went from being revolutionary cadres to Party technocrats,52 hence 
one step beyond Vogel’s assessment in 1967.  
Indeed, for the institutionalization literature, the CCP is developing meritocratic 
procedures to recruit its officials, who are progressively turning themselves into apolitical 
                                                 
49  Cheng Li and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: 
Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy,” The China Quarterly 121 (March 1990): 1–35. 
50 See on the topic of Chinese technocracy: Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist 
China; Cheng Li, “The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao China” 
(PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1992); Gongqin Xiao, “The Rise of the Technocrats,” Journal of 
Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 60–65; Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China: Joseph Fewsmith. 
(Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 2000). 
51 Cheng Li, “The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites,” Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (October 2009): 13–33. 
52 Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. 
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Weberian bureaucrats.53 This assessment has been highly criticized by Andrew Walder, for 
whom “a rise in emphasis on expertise and professional training does not mean, either logically 
or in practice, that the scope of political selection criteria is correspondingly diminished.”54 
Walder highlighted that loyalty, though less public, is still fundamental in officials’ recruitment 
and promotion in post-Mao China. He argued that an “ascriptive” form of political loyalty, 
based on class background or family ties, has been gradually replaced by a “behavioral” one, 
referring to the behavior and attitudes individuals display in their work.55 As demonstrated by 
Bruce Dickson, the Party constantly tries to find ways to prevent adverse selection in an 
environment with limited information. According to him, the CCP strives to avoid what 
happened in Hungary or Taiwan where the cooptation of reformist elements led to a revolution 
from within and to the ruling Party losing power.56 Following this idea, a sub-branch of the 
institutionalization literature has focused on the mechanisms through which the CCP keeps 
political control over its cadres and ensures that they follow orders.  
c)  The Party’s control over its cadres 
Unsatisfied with the literature presenting the institutionalization of the CCP as a linear 
path towards meritocracy, several authors have focused on the transformation of cadres’ 
management since the late 1980s and explored the techniques used by the Party-State to better 
control its officials. In line with the idea that ideology itself is not a key constraint to cadres’ 
                                                 
53 For Max Weber, the bureaucrat is in theory apolitical, as “bureaucratic administration means fundamentally 
domination through knowledge” (Max Weber, Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. (New 
York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 225.  
54 Andrew G Walder, “The Political Dimension of Social Mobility in Communist States: China and the Soviet 
Union,” Research in Political Sociology 1 (1985): 103. 
55 Walder, “The Political Dimension of Social Mobility in Communist States: China and the Soviet Union.”  
56 Bruce J Dickson, “Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” in China’s Deep 
Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006), 119–43. 
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behavior, these scholars examine both the maintenance of the overall nomenklatura system as 
well as the reforms aiming at making it more efficient.  
As analyzed by Brødsgaard, Burns and Manion in particular, the basis of the Party’s 
control over its cadres is the nomenklatura system inherited from the USSR. Party committees 
at every level have authority over a list of leadership positions. They control the appointment, 
promotion and dismissal of senior personnel, and the lower level is accountable to the next level 
up. Parallel to the nomenklatura,57 the bianzhi (编织) system delimits the authorized number 
of personnel in every Party-State administration or public sector units. Whereas the 
nomenklatura is a control tool over the leaders at every level, the bianzhi system includes all 
personnel on the State’s payroll.58  
As stressed by this branch of the literature, the State’s control over officials was further 
standardized through the development of a civil service system from the 1990s onwards.59 It 
included more specifically the establishment of a decentralized structure of civil service 
                                                 
57 In Chinese: ganbu zhiwu mingchengbiao (干部职务名称表). 
58 John P Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura,” The 
China Quarterly, no. 138 (1994): 458–91; Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System 
in China,” The China Quarterly, no. 170 (2002): 345–60; Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, 
Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly, 
no. 102 (1985): 203–33. 
59 See in particular : John P Burns and Xiaoqi Wang, “Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Servants’ 
Behaviour,” The China Quarterly, no. 201 (2010): 58–78; Brødsgaard, “Cadre and Personnel Management in the 
CPC,” August 2012, 69–83. 
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examinations (gongwuyuan kaoshi, 公务员考试), starting in 1993.60 Dedicated exams are now 
put in place for the specific positions advertised by various central and local administrations.61  
The civil service system also clarified the dualism between basic official and leaders 
that transpired from the distinction between the nomenklatura and the bianzhi system.  
According to Maria Edin, one of the most important developments of the new civil service 
system implemented since 1993 is the separation between the management of leading cadres 
(lingdao ganbu, 领导干部) and that of non-leading cadres (feilingdao ganbu, 非领导干部). 
The leading cadres are the highest ranked Party-State figures at every level of the polity, and 
within public sector units. The distinction between leading and non-leading cadre takes form 
within a structured ranking system. Leading cadres ranks start at the section leadership level 
(keji, 科级), the equivalent of a township leader or a department director in a county level 
government, and go all the way to the State leadership level (guoji, 国级).62 The leading cadres 
are managed through the nomenklatura system under the control of the Party’s Organization 
Department. The Party’s control is therefore mainly exerted on them. They are also recruited 
following different procedures than the non-leading cadres who take the civil servant exam.63 
                                                 
60 Following the Temporary regulation regarding civil servants of 1993, a system of civil service exam was 
implemented (“Temporary Regulation Regarding Civil Servants (Guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli, 国家公务员
暂行条例),” State Council, August 1993). The civil servant exam system was further developed by the “Civil 
Servant Law” of 2005 (“Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
gongwuyuan fa, 中华人民共和国公务员法),” National People’s Congress, 27 April 2005).  
61 Regarding the implementation of the civil servant exam, see: Frank N Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite 
Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
166. 
62 I come back to the ranking of leading cadres in Chapter Two. See: Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent 
Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly 173 (2003): 35–
52; Ibid., 31. 
63 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 166. 
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According to Brødsgaard, in 1998, 8% of the seven million cadres working in Party-State 
administrations were leading cadres.64  
The leading cadres are held responsible for the performance of their unit, on which they 
are evaluated.65 The literature on the cadres’ management system has stressed the development 
of precise guidelines to evaluate cadres based on specific performance criteria.66 Several studies 
at the county and township levels underlined the Party-State’s capacity to maintain control over 
its agents through a system of evaluation, exams, punishment and rewards. 67  A group of 
researchers tested this idea statistically and showed that economic performance is now a key 
factor explaining the promotion of local leading cadres.68 This view regarding the personnel 
management capacity of the local Party-State is shared by Pierre Landry who highlighted the 
importance of cadres control in what he described as a de facto decentralized polity. 69 
According to Landry: “the party may no longer be the revolutionary instrument of mass 
mobilization of the Maoist era, its cadres may no longer be strongly committed to its official 
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ideology, yet the institutions of the party operate as powerful filtering devices that help 
perpetuate the CCP’s political leadership.”70  
Political control is therefore particularly focused on leading cadres. For Edin, contrary 
to the idea that Chinese officials have become apolitical, it means that the CCP has established 
a de facto separation between two career tracks: a political one for leading cadres and an 
administrative one for ordinary cadres.71 Underlining the political feature of leading cadres, 
Pieke suggested that, in contrast to appointed bureaucrats, they hold positions which would be 
given to elected officials in an electoral democracy.72 This idea of a dualistic approach of the 
Party-State towards its agents, as well as the level of compliance expected from them, is at the 
core of another sub-branch of the literature regarding Chinese officials, which focuses on elite 
dualism from a quantitative perspective. 
d)  Elite dualism and sponsored mobility 
In the Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, György Konrád and Iván Szelényi 
argued that in the 1960s and 1970s, East European communist regimes, as well as the USSR, 
developed a stable compromise between the ruling elite the increasingly influential technocrats. 
The technocrats agreed not to question the political structure in exchange for policy concessions 
and incorporation within the decision-making process. The authors argued that communist 
regimes have established separate career paths, one leading towards political positions with 
power and privileges and one geared towards more technically specialized positions with less 
power. These two paths are expected to involve different biases in screening, leaning either 
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towards education credentials or towards political loyalty. This was particularly salient in 
Hungary where educated professionals were coopted within the regime but channeled mostly 
towards technical positions in the State apparatus and rarely placed in political positions within 
the Party.73  
In 1995, Andrew Walder took Konrád and Szelényi’s idea as a starting point and 
developed an elite dualism model applied to contemporary China. The main argument was that 
political recruitment had been segmented into two main paths: one leading to more technical 
positions within the Chinese government, and one ending in more political ones within the CCP. 
Analysis of career data showed that whereas education level in general, and scientific training 
in particular, had a positive effect on chances of recruitment, it was stronger for State positions 
than for Party ones. Political loyalty, measured through Party membership, was by contrast 
much more important for Party positions than government ones.74  
Party membership itself being very common among cadres,75 Li Bobai and Andrew 
Walder used instead the length of Party membership to account for political loyalty in a later 
study which refined the elite dualism model. Analyzing a sample of urban residents, they 
showed that early recruitment in the CCP was crucial for promotion to political positions. In 
contrast, Party membership obtained in one’s mid or late career did not provide career 
advantages in the bureaucracy.76 To conceptualize this variation, the authors relied on Turner’s 
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concept of sponsored mobility.77 As opposed to a framework in which competition is based on 
one’s abilities, sponsored mobility favors a more controlled selection, in the sense that some 
individuals are selected early-on for elite status. For Turner, sponsored mobility is a way to 
cultivate elite values and manners among a set of selected individuals, as well as loyalty to the 
system. Following this logic, those who joined the CCP early-on became part of a pool of 
potential candidates for high positions in the organization, by opposition to those who got 
appointed into the government. 
Li Bobai added to this sponsored mobility logic the potential re-training of chosen elite 
members through adult education. According to him, people who have been selected and have 
proven their loyalty are re-trained to fulfill the education criteria. This provides both loyal and 
educated recruits to the CCP.78 Echoing this importance given to adult education, several 
studies have stressed the function of communist Party schools regarding elite homogenization 
and renewal. Frank Pieke has emphasized the transformative value of Party school training on 
the officials who take part in it. Adult education, he argued, functions as a rite de passage to 
become part of the Party-State’s elite. Through Party school training, “the party-state creates a 
highly specific power cult that turns bureaucratic administrators into an elite who embodies the 
charisma of the party and its ideology.”79 Departing from Pieke’s anthropological approach to 
the Party school and its focus on elite values, Charlotte Lee statistically assessed the positive 
effect of Party school training on a cadre’s chances of being promoted. Closer to Li Bobai’s 
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approach, she described the Party school as a tool for the CCP to screen and train its officials, 
in order to prepare them for future promotion.80 
The elite dualism and sponsored mobility frameworks were later applied specifically to 
the Chinese top political elite. After Walder and Li Bobai’s studies based on large samples of 
urban residents and therefore mostly on lower level officials, Zang Xiaowei used the same elite 
dualism model to account more closely for the career paths of top political elites, specifically 
cadres who held deputy provincial governorship or higher positions in the Chinese political 
hierarchy. He confirmed that education is more important for appointment to State positions 
than Party ones. 81  Parallel to Edin’s point on the separation between a political and an 
administrative career in the Party-State hierarchy, Zang described this elite dualism as an effect 
of the increasing functionalization of career paths. According to him, the Party still controls the 
political decision-making process, but, for the purpose of efficiency and economic development, 
it delegates administrative power to skilled professionals within the State apparatus.82 
The elite dualism literature, and its use of the sponsored mobility model, illuminates the 
diversity of Party-State officials, as well as the Party’s strategies to induce elite’s values among 
officials. Yet, while it emphasizes the idea that Party leaders are recruited because of their 
political loyalty, its appraisal of the issue of loyalty itself is rather shallow. This is particularly 
problematic in Zang Xiaowei’s transposition of the argument to top leaders. Focusing on lower 
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level cadres, Li and Walder had used the length of Party membership as a proxy for loyalty. 
They showed that a young entry in the Party was crucial to be promoted in the party hierarchy. 
Using the same proxy, Zang overlooked the fact that, while among local level officials a young 
entry in the CCP is rare, it is a very common feature among national leaders. Zang did not find 
any clear variation between State and Party leaders regarding the length of Party membership,83 
stressing that it was not a meaningful way to differentiate career paths in the first place. More 
broadly, the elite dualism literature shares a major limitation with the broader literature on the 
CCP’s institutionalization: it tends to portray the Chinese Communist party as a holistic actor, 
with a mind of its own.  
e)  Beyond the organizational emperor 
The literature on formal politics in post-Mao China tends to treat the CCP as a 
monolithic actor, with its own rationality. This is true even beyond the question of cadre 
management, as reflected in two books written by CCP specialists. In a 2006 piece, David 
Shambaugh presented the CCP as a holistic organization with its own logic, and capable of both 
adaptation and atrophy.84 Zheng Yongnian, in a 2010 book, anthropomorphized the CCP, 
describing it as an organizational emperor. 85  While this approach allows for a macro 
understanding of the CCP and its evolutions, by taking the perspective of the organization, it 
also leaves the actors’ perspectives aside, depicting them as mere puppets in the hand of the 
organization. Following Bourdieu’s account, I suggest we could gain analytical leverage by 
apprehending the Party-State as a field, or social arena, within which a variety of actors are 
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fighting or collaborating for their own goals depending on their position. While the field is 
relatively autonomous and the actors follow common rules, this perspective contrasts greatly 
with an approach of the CCP as a monolithic entity endowed with a single rationality and 
purpose.86  
By focusing on the Party’s goals, the different branches of literature I just reviewed 
disregard the perspective of the cadres themselves, both recruiters and recruits. First, one should 
question the reasons pushing the recruiters to implement the reforms and promote younger and 
better educated cadres, who might subsequently become competitors for power positions. 
Second and more importantly, in a socioeconomic situation in which the economic advantages 
of cadre status are not as clear as they were in the Mao China,87 and in which numerous other 
opportunities exist for these young and educated talents, why would they choose to become 
officials and remain loyal overtime?88 The recruits’ interests must be analyzed more carefully 
to tackle these issues. Focusing on informal politics, the subfield of the literature that I now 
turn to investigates the viewpoint of both recruits and recruiters, focusing on the personal 
relationships binding them and explaining why they would mutually support each other.  
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2)  Informal politics in post-Mao China 
a)  Family ties in post-Mao China 
The informal politics literature focuses on a variety of personal relationships which exist 
in parallel to the formal Party-State rules and which are presented as having a key effect on the 
recruitment and cohesion of Chinese political elites. In this literature, formal and informal refer 
to two ideal-types of interpersonal links. A collective book on this issue entitled The Nature of 
Chinese Politics has shed light on the debate over the precise implications of these terms, but 
also on the relative consensus regarding their definition: formal ties derive from the rules of the 
organization, while informal ties either preexist the relationships established through the 
organizational hierarchy, such as family ties, or stem from another type of links, such as 
friendship. 89 Taking the point of view of individual actors, and networks of actors, rather than 
that of the CCP as an organization, this literature emphasizes the variety of personal interests 
which govern the recruitment and promotion of cadres in China.  
Family ties among officials and the issue of the creation of a new communist aristocracy 
have been key points of interest within this literature. In particular, the creation of an unofficial 
hereditary elite would explain why the retiring cadres in the 1980s accepted the reforms, as 
their children would de facto largely inherited their status, which assured elite cohesion. Several 
studies have underlined the rise of princelings, the children of high ranking party and military 
officials, in the CCP leadership. As put by Stephanie Balme, in the 1980s they were a perfect 
fit for the new recruiting criteria: educationally, they had been to the best schools; politically, 
they had often entered the Party at a very young age and could use their parents’ connections 
to gain advancement. According to Balme, the merger of family background and university 
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diplomas made them both “red” and “expert,”90 therefore the best candidates for promotion.91 
Balme showed, for instance, that a large number of princelings became secretaries of high 
ranking officials while their parents were still alive.92 The position of personal secretary (mishu, 
秘书) has been largely recognized since the late 1980s as a way to access the highest levels of 
power.93 Aristocratic practices were noticed at all levels of the Chinese system. Lü Xiaobo 
suggested that the practice of dingti (顶替 ), implying the replacement in State-owned 
enterprises of an old employee by a family member, became very common in the 1970s.94  
According to Balme, these elitist practices quickly appeared as a double-edged 
phenomenon for the Party-State. It certainly pleased the incumbent leaders and allowed a 
peaceful transition to a new generation of leaders, but at the same time it made visible the 
aristocratic leanings of the Chinese state.95 Tanner and Feder also emphasized the bad public 
image of the princelings.96 According to Balme, the unpopularity of these aristocratic practices 
seemed to have pushed the CCP’s leaders to find institutional ways to curb them. In 1986, dingti 
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was officially forbidden.97 In 1989, Beijing and other provinces adopted measures preventing 
high level officials from interfering with appointments and promotions involving their 
relatives.98  As a result, cadres without familial connections to the CCP’s leadership have been 
increasingly promoted in the 1990s.99 Still, a recent statistical study conducted in the 2000s 
showed that blood ties remain an important criterion for promotion to top political positions100. 
This literature on family ties among the Chinese elite is valuable in the sense that it 
helps explain why the older cadres peacefully implemented the reforms which ultimately led to 
their demise: they were largely replaced by their children. However, its explanatory value is 
less obvious regarding the princelings’ motives. Considering the advantages they held in terms 
of connections within the State, they could have chosen any professional direction they fancied: 
why, therefore, did they opt for the political path? As noted by Bourdieu in his study of French 
elite administrative schools, social background cannot be the sole variable considered to explain 
one’s willingness to pursue an administrative career: even the heirs must be converted to their 
heritage, through education and rituals.101  
A parallel argument has been developed by Andrew Walder in his study of the Red 
Guards in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution. Walder argued against an approach in terms 
of groups and family backgrounds in order to explain one’s political trajectory. His study 
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showed that factional cleavages during the Cultural Revolution could not be explained based 
on these variables. Contrary to the common narratives of the period, the conservative faction 
was not particularly constituted of the cadres’ children, who would have had an interest in the 
perpetuation of the status quo, and the radicals were not distinctively coming from less 
advantageous family backgrounds, which would have pushed them to change the system. 
Instead, these two groups were found in both factions, their alignment depending more on 
personal encounters and strategic choices at different points in time than supposed preexisting 
group identities.102 This analysis should be kept in mind while we tackle the issue of elite 
renewal and cohesion in China: the effect of supposed preexisting identities, be it social 
background or else, should not be taken for granted.  
b)  Factionalism in the Chinese polity 
Beyond family ties, the debate over the existence of informal political groupings within 
the Party has been a main feature of the overall literature on Chinese politics. While often in 
disagreement regarding the type of groupings or their constitutions, many researchers have 
analyzed the struggles at the top of the CCP since its foundation in 1921. Andrew Nathan, in a 
seminal article published in 1973, argued for a factional approach towards Chinese politics. 
According to him, the CCP consisted of different factions, “mobilized on the basis of clientelist 
ties to engage in politics and consisting of a few, rather than a great many, layers of 
personnel.”103 Ensued a debate between Tang Tsou and Andrew Nathan regarding the nature of 
these factions, or informal groups to use Tang Tsou’s more extensive term, and of their 
relationships to one another. But both of them, and numerous other authors who adopted this 
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approach, had in common to give a lot of importance to these informal factors in political 
promotion.104 
Several authors also approached the lower echelons of the Chinese polity through the 
lens of informal politics. Ben Hillman’s 2014 book is a good example of this branch of literature. 
To best convey the idea that cadres are not necessarily in a constant state of conflict among 
themselves and are mostly interested in promotion within the hierarchy, he used the term 
patronage rather than faction to qualify the networks of cadres he observed at the county level. 
He emphasized the role played by these networks in the promotion of local officials, both the 
ones at the county level and those elected at the lowest level of the Chinese polity. Against the 
argument made by Maria Edin regarding the Party-State’s capacity to control its agents at the 
local level, 105  Hillman suggested that loyalty to these patronage networks undermines the 
nomenklatura system. 106  Graeme Smith also emphasized the weakening of the local state 
structures by what he called a “shadow state,” constituted of Party leaders and their affiliates 
and which mirrors the official hierarchy.107 This overall literature on factions and informal ties 
is very important as it incites researchers to go beyond the institutions’ face value and get into 
the CCP’s internal struggles.  
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c)  The limits of the formal and informal dichotomy 
A recent article by Shih et. al. reopened the debate on informal politics in China. Using 
a database including all the Central Committee members of the CCP from 1921 to 2002, the 
authors statistically assessed the influence of informal ties on promotion. According to them, 
the Party leaders promote officials with whom they are personally linked, even if they are less 
educated or less efficient in their work. While the data they use is impressive in its volume, this 
study is a good example of the problems this branch of literature faces in separating so-called 
formal and informal politics. The authors used different measures to proxy for factional ties but 
overall heavily relied on the idea that cadres who studied in the same university, or worked 
together, belong to the same faction.108 A major concern with this measure is that it could also 
be interpreted in terms of formalized promotion paths, underlining that they were promoted 
through the same institutional channels. This criticism follows a long standing methodological 
debate regarding the tendency to overemphasize factionalism in the Chinese system. In 1973, 
William Parish made a similar argument against a study explaining promotion in the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) based on factional ties. According to him, bureaucratic rules should 
have been taken more seriously into account since they accounted for the promotions better 
than factionalism.109   
Beyond this methodological point, the implicit logic behind the informal and formal 
dichotomy is problematic. The basic idea is that informal practices are resilient traditional 
behaviors which impede the modernization of the political system. Hence, full-blown 
institutionalization should eventually make informal ties irrelevant in terms of recruitment and 
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promotion.110 Jean-Louis Briquet, in his study of clientelism in Corsica, argued that this view 
of a linear modernization of politics towards less and less informality stems from an 
appropriation by the researcher of political actors’ narratives. He showed that far from a 
traditional practice, clientelism is both shaped by the evolution of the political system and 
shapes it. But to legitimize themselves and claim formal political abilities, politicians publicize 
a discourse regarding the modernization of politics that contrasts with such practices.111 
Furthermore, an approach in terms of informal politics is often tainted with culturalism, 
especially in the Chinese case. Some authors argue that guanxi (关系 ), or interpersonal 
relationships, are at the foundation of contemporary Chinese politics, due to constant cultural 
features.112 However, as stated very clearly by Andrew Walder, the contemporary practices I 
described cannot be explained by referring to a specific culture: “a cultural tradition cannot 
explain its own continuity (or lack thereof) without resorting to tautology: the continuity of 
culture itself must be explained by its relation to institutional structures that serve to perpetuate 
it.”113  
Following Lucian Pye, I think that the dichotomy between formal and informal, which 
was developed for the study of organizations and administration, is not adequate for the study 
of politics. While I strongly disagree with Pye’s culturalist approach towards Chinese politics, 
I think his intuitions about politics more broadly are valuable. When he wrote that, due to its 
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specific culture and history, “the ‘informal’ is very nearly the sum total of Chinese politics,”114 
he should have seen that this is a common trait of politics everywhere. He implied it himself 
when he wrote: “Politics, however, is not administration, and there are no neat boundaries 
between what might be thought of as official and unofficial politics. When the American 
president ‘works the phones’ to get critical Congressional votes, or when lobbyists walk the 
corridors of the Capitol to persuade legislators to support their interests, such activities are just 
ordinary politics, neither formal nor informal.”115 Pye’s approach is based on the Weberian 
distinction between politics and administration. For Weber, while the appointed bureaucrat’s 
function is to carry out orders and follow the rules, the elected politician only relies on himself, 
and not on rules and orders, in the competition for power over the State.116 
Following this distinction between politics and administration, it turns out that the 
literature focusing on informal ties we just reviewed is basically assessing that there is a 
political element to officials’ appointments in China, and that it is not pure administration. We 
are, as a result, getting to the very definition of a Leninist system, which is ruled according to 
“democratic centralism.” It implies that the Party is both in charge of policy making and policy 
implementation, and that there is no difference between bureaucrats and politicians.117 There is 
no politically neutral cadre:  at the end of the day the Party is in control, as already shown by 
the literature on the cadre management system.118 For this reason, I refer in the dissertation to 
the cadres’ political careers rather than depicting them as pure bureaucrats. 
                                                 
114 Pye, “Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour,” 39.  
115 Ibid., 37. 
116 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, ed. David S. Owen (Hackett Publishing, 2004), 45. 
117 On democratic centralism, see: Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 118–128. 
118 Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura”; Brødsgaard, 
“Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC,” August 2012. 
 34 
Interestingly, this lack of separation between administration and politics has been 
described even beyond Leninist regimes. Studies on bureaucratic elites in democratic contexts 
have emphasized the increasing politicization of bureaucrats, as well as the bureaucratization 
of politicians.119 In his study on contemporary French bureaucracy, Eymeri showed that the 
politicization of top bureaucrats has blurred the difference between the administrative and 
political spheres. He stressed that through their advice and propositions on specific topics, high 
level bureaucrats do take political actions. 120  These parallels illustrate that a comparative 
perspective is crucial to better understand the interaction between politics and administration 
in China and to get out of debates which tend to overstate China’s uniqueness. Theoretical 
approaches developed in other contexts are hence at the foundation of my research. 
Overall, the two branches of the literature that I have reviewed, on formal and informal 
politics, constitute the two sides of a same coin, with at its heart the interaction between 
administration and politics. I propose to develop an approach towards elite renewal and 
cohesion in China that takes this interaction seriously. In order to do so, I suggest we move 
beyond the limitations of elite studies, as noted by Roderic Camp: rather than focusing on the 
shared characteristics of the ruling elite, i.e. the outcome of the mobility process, it is time to 
carefully examine the mechanisms that bring these individuals to the top.121  In the case of the 
CCP, the literature I reviewed tends to focus on broad outcomes, such as the fact that cadres 
became younger and more educated, but it falls short in unveiling the mechanisms at play. A 
change in perspective is necessary to allow us to follow the actors themselves through the 
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mobility process and to better grasp the processes that enable both renewal and cohesion of the 
Chinese elite.   
In the following section, I review the interactionist theoretical tools, developed by the 
Chicago school of Sociology and in particular Howard Becker or Erving Goffman, which I use 
to analyze these mechanisms. I show that an approach focusing on personal commitment and 
career trajectories puts at the forefront of the analysis the point of view of the actors themselves, 
beyond the organization’s goals. This enables me to demonstrate that the political and 
administrative features of the CCP are complementary rather than contradictory. 
C -  An interactionist approach towards political mobility 
1)  Loyalty, commitment and career 
Loyalty is a key concept in the literature on Chinese elites but, as shown in the literature 
review, it is also poorly developed. It is generally only apprehended through the lens of Party 
membership. In addition, the distinction that we discussed between formal and informal politics 
separates the issue of cadres’ organizational loyalty to the Party from their personal loyalties to 
one another. As argued earlier, I think that we should move beyond this distinction and focus 
on the cadres’ point of view, be they recruiters or recruits, instead of the organization’s 
perspective. The sociology of commitment strikes me as particularly useful to develop such an 
approach and question the often unspecified concept of loyalty. As defined by Howard Becker, 
commitment is “the process through which several kinds of interests become bound up with 
carrying out certain lines of behavior.”122 In contrast with a rather cognitive idea of loyalty, for 
instance based on adherence to ideology, the concept of commitment pays attention to the 
individual’s interests and trajectory. Focusing on the processes through which cadres’ interests 
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align with the Party line, and not to disobey orders or abandon their position, is a fruitful way 
to consider the organizational and personal factors which might come into play.  
Compared to an approach in terms of loyalty, the concept of commitment brings a 
dynamic aspect to the analysis. It goes together with an approach in terms of career, as analyzed 
by Howard Becker in the case of marijuana users. The concept of the career implies progressive 
steps, which bring new costs and benefits previously inexistent or irrelevant.123 Regarding drug 
users, Becker showed how every step forward into the practice makes the next steps possible 
or not: the users first have to learn the technique of drug using, in order to potentially learn to 
perceive its effects, and later learn to enjoy them.124 Becker borrowed this concept from Hughes’ 
study of professions,125 stressing both its objective and subjective features: a career is both a 
sequence of social positions, as well as the evolution of the individual’s perception over these 
positions and his trajectory as a whole. The individual’s view on his own options at every level 
is the focus of the analysis, which allows the researcher to consider the structural constraints 
over the actors’ actions but also how they perceive them. Applied to the political field, the 
concept of career helps us appreciate how recruits are progressively transformed by political 
organizations as well as how organizational socialization, through certain activities and 
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encounters, can lead to political professionalization,126 which is understood here as “living off” 
politics to borrow Max Weber’s famous expression.127 
An approach in terms of commitment and career which focuses on individual actors 
allows me to tackle several of the limitations I pointed in the literature on elite renewal in China. 
First, contrary to a non-dynamic multivariate analysis focusing on explaining the outcomes of 
political mobility, this approach focuses on the mechanisms which makes political 
professionalization progressively possible and desirable. It goes beyond an explanation of the 
actors’ tactical choices simply based on their supposed preexisting identity. Second, it accounts 
for the agents’ perspective without negating the structural effect of the organization. Beyond 
the idea of a monolithic and omniscient CCP, we can here analyze the organization through the 
eyes of the actors who inhabit it. Instead of focusing on the organization’s ability to guarantee 
the actors’ loyalty through ideology or coercion, which tends to forget the actors’ perspective 
and agency, I study how individuals deal with the organization’s internal constraints based on 
their personal interests and tactics, as developed through the various stages of their career.  
The notions of commitment and career are particularly prominent in the literatures on 
social movements and religious groups. I now turn to these subfields of the literature to further 
define my approach and develop specific aspects of the concept of commitment. The 
mechanisms at play in the commitment of political activists or religious followers are partly 
transposable to the case of political professionalization and illuminate elite cohesion in 
contemporary China. 
                                                 
126 On the concept of career applied to political organizations, see in particular : Éric Agrikoliansky, “Carrières 
militantes et vocation à la morale : les militants de la LDH dans les années 1980 [Militant careers and moral 
vocation : LDH militants in the 1980s],” Revue française de science politique Vol. 51, no. 1 (March 2001): 27–
46; Muriel Darmon, “La notion de carrière: un instrument interactionniste d’objectivation [The notion of career: 
an interactionist tool],” Politix 82, no. 2 (2008): 149–67; Olivier Fillieule, “Propositions pour une analyse 
processuelle de l’engagement individuel - Post scriptum [Suggestions towards a processual analysis of individual 
commitment - Post scriptum],” Revue française de science politique 511, no. 1–2 (2001): 199–215. 
127 Weber, The Vocation Lectures, xlix. 
 38 
2)  The non-material incentives for political commitment beyond 
ideology 
Through the concept of commitment, and the rewards which go with it, one can analyze 
why Chinese cadres would choose a political career and carry on in that direction. A branch of 
the literature, very lively in French political sociology, enriched Olson’s analysis of the 
“collective action dilemma” in order to shed light on the rewards which go together with 
political commitment. Olson’s main idea is that “selective incentives” are the key to explaining 
one’s rational engagement into a collective action aiming at acquiring a public good, as opposed 
to free-riding on the efforts of others.128 Daniel Gaxie, in a seminal article of 1977, took this 
idea further and focused on the incentives, such as salary or career opportunities, leading 
militants to join political parties. When balancing the cost of being part of the organization and 
the profits based on these incentives, such militants find the cost of leaving is greater than the 
cost of remaining. 129 
In addition to the material enticements provided by political parties, Gaxie put the 
emphasis on the non-material incentives, which were only briefly mentioned by Olson.130 
Against the tendency to overemphasize ideology in order to explain political commitment, 
Gaxie put forward the personal symbolic and social incentives to elucidate the strong 
commitment of large numbers of voluntary militants in political parties.131 The parallel with the 
Chinese case is obvious as the literature reviewed above highlights the decreasing value of 
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ideology for the recruitment of officials but, at the same time, does not provide an alternative 
explanation to their enduring commitment to a political career. Still, Gaxie’s study focuses on 
parties’ militants in a democratic system and cannot be completely imported into the Chinese 
context. In particular, it cannot account for the high level of commitment expected from 
Chinese officials, who often sign up for a life-long career within the CCP. 
Communist parties have sometimes been qualified as “total institutions” due to the 
degree of commitment expected from their cadres. This concept was developed by Erving 
Goffman who defined a total institution, such as an asylum or a jail, as a living space, 
meticulously regulated, which separates the individuals from the outside world and from their 
previous roles in society.132 The concept of total institution was later used to describe reclusive 
institutions such as religious communities, seminaries,133 and also communist parties.134 While 
it is an imperfect fit, since in contrast to asylums or jails, people voluntarily choose to join a 
political party, the concept is relevant to emphasize the importance of social and cognitive 
factors in these extreme forms of commitment. As argued by Verdès-Leroux, the type of 
commitment that classical total institutions usually obtain by coercion, is, through rituals and 
manipulation, willingly conceded by the individual in the case of the French Communist Party 
in the 1940 and 1950s. In particular, if members do not challenge the official line nor exit the 
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organization, it is not because of any physical obstacle to do so, but above all because of the 
fear to be labeled as apostates.135  
In line with this concept of total institution, the literature on cults and sects further 
explored the social and cognitive features of commitment. This is exemplified by Kanter’s 
study of several American utopian communities of the 19th century, which can be seen as total 
institutions. Based on these cases, she highlighted three main kinds of commitment, which are 
linked to different personal relationships with the organizations and can be mutually reinforcing: 
cognitive-continuance commitment, cathectic-cohesion commitment, and evaluative-control 
commitment.136 
Cognitive-continuance commitment refers to commitment to social roles: the individual 
invests in the fate of a specific organization and in the role he developed in it. The actors think 
here in terms of sacrifice and investment and therefore, the more they invest, the less they will 
accept to exit and lose their investment. This type of commitment explains why they stay in an 
organization on the long run, but does not account for their behavior within it. For instance, 
individuals who have personally invested in an organization will remain members even though 
they sometimes do not follow its rules. Kanter illustrated this type of commitment through the 
example of teenagers who are personally invested in their family and will not run away, even 
though they do not always listen to their parents.  
Cathectic-cohesion commitment, is linked to social ties: the individuals get personally 
attached to other members of the group. Their commitment grows with the development of 
social ties within the group and the renunciation of relationships outside the group. It implies 
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that the individuals will remain part of this group even though the ideology of the organization 
changes for instance, because they value these relationships too much and do not want to risk 
breaking them. Kanter illustrated this phenomenon referring to the comradeship developed 
within a social movement or a religious group.  
Evaluative-control commitment refers to the values and norms which constrain the 
individuals. This can for instance refer to commitment to a certain ideology, embodied by the 
group. But in this case the commitment is linked to the norm rather than the organization itself. 
Therefore, if the norm changes, exit can occur. This type of commitment can hardly explain in 
itself the long term personal commitment to a group, but rather the lack of deviance within the 
group in case everyone strongly adheres to its norms. However, as underlined by Kanter, such 
strong level of adherence within the group is specific to total institutions. It implies a 
renunciation of personal interests in order to dissolve oneself in the group for maximum 
compliance. I think this cannot be applied to the study of individuals who freely start a political 
career and are continuously in competition with one another for further advancement in the 
organization, which sometimes implies bending the rules. We are reaching the limits of the 
parallel between total institutions, such as asylums, and institutions which are competitive by 
definition, such as political parties.  
Kanter’s article is valuable in developing these different, mutually reinforcing, 
mechanisms through which an individual can become committed to an organization. The two 
first types of commitment are of particular interest to the present research. They highlight the 
mechanisms through which a group can keep its members despite changing its norms and values. 
They are therefore highly relevant to understanding elite cohesion within a Chinese Communist 
Party decreasingly structured by ideology. The third type of commitment, on the other end, is 
based on commitment to the norm rather than the organization itself. As a result, it cannot 
account for elite cohesion in a time of ideological uncertainty. By focusing on social roles and 
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social ties, I also distance myself from a simplistic approach focusing purely on ideological 
motivations to explain commitment to an organization. Both the literature on social movements 
and cults have in fact shown that adherence to a group’s values is often a result of the first steps 
of commitment, and of the ties already developed with the group itself, rather than the other 
way around.137  
I now get into the details of the commitment to social roles and the commitment to social 
ties developed by Kanter in order to highlight how these mechanisms can be applied to political 
professionalization and help better understand elite cohesion in post-Mao China.  
3)  Vocation and commitment to political roles 
Kanter’s cognitive-continuance commitment refers to the idea that an individual’s 
commitment depends on how much one invests in an activity. One’s willingness to personally 
invest depends on the social roles one develops within an organization and the extent to which 
one learns to appreciate it. The importance of one’s social role and aspiration to join a certain 
elite is particularly prominent in studies of political professionalization.  
Building on Goffman’s analogy between everyday interactions and the interpretation of 
a variety of roles by an actor on stage,138 scholars have focused on the role politicians embody 
when taking up a position. As defined by Jacques Lagroye, the role is here understood as the 
set of behaviors which are linked to a specific position and which make it palpable to others.139 
The role is therefore made of the public expectations towards an individual in this position, but 
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also of the individual’s own views on what it implies. The role is progressively internalized by 
the actor: the expectations attached to it both constrain and enable his actions.140 As argued by 
Briquet, the role should not only be seen negatively as a constraint: it can also be used 
strategically, to legitimize one’s position in a group or organization.141  
The concept of role, both in its constraining and strategic aspects, is a key aspect of a 
political career. Commitment to the role itself is therefore crucial to understand someone’s 
decision to pursue a political life. We are getting to the question of vocation and to the classic 
distinction made by Max Weber between living off or for politics. If one lives for politics, 
beyond the material rewards one gets off it, one has to enjoy the role itself and has to develop 
a vocation.142 A vocation is developed through the professionalization process and further 
commits the individuals to this path. A study of young militants in contemporary French 
political youth organizations, for instance, highlighted that political ambition is often not a 
primary cause of political engagement but that career opportunities become reachable and 
desirable through the commitment process itself.143 As a parallel, Eymeri also put forward in 
the case of high level civil servants in contemporary France that their vocation as servants of 
the State is rarely what drove them to choose this path in the first place. While during their 
studies they mostly followed the path of good students in social sciences, aiming for conformity, 
they progressively developed a vocation which led them towards very competitive exams and 
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a career in the civil service.144 The development of a vocation is overall the result of a process 
through which the young political recruits internalize their life project as part of an elite and are 
given the idea that they are both competent and legitimate to attain these positions.  
Oddly, the issue of vocation is completely absent from the literature on elite renewal 
and cohesion in communist regimes. There is a propensity to portray the recruits as 
indoctrinated. I argue instead that the cadres’ perspective and their commitment to a political 
role should be taken seriously in order to explain why someone would pursue a political life, 
especially in a regime like post-Mao China where political career is not the only upward social 
mobility channel.  
4)  The social dimension of commitment 
a)  Personal ties and group dynamics 
In addition to the commitment to the role, or what we have qualified as a vocation, 
Kanter emphasized the importance of social ties in what she called a cathectic-cohesion 
commitment.145 The role played by social ties in order to explain political commitment has been 
particularly emphasized by the literature on social movements. It has put forward the 
importance of a multiplicity of social networks, both preexistent or developed through the 
commitment process, in order to explain why individuals take part in political activities and 
remain active overtime.146 In his study of the Paris Commune, Roger Gould analyzed for 
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instance the interaction between preexisting neighborhood ties and the ones created through the 
organization of the movement, in order to explain the high level of group cohesion during a 
crisis situation.147  
Following Gaxie’s emphasis on the non-material incentives for political commitment, 
the literature on individual’s commitment within political organizations has also indicated the 
important effect of social ties in explaining why one would become and remain a militant.148 In 
fact, Daniel Gaxie demonstrated how obvious the social function of a party organization is, 
given the large number of inefficient meetings: if the members keep on organizing so many 
practically useless meetings, it is that they value the fact of meeting itself.149  
The social features of the political party can be assessed through the transformation of 
one’s personal ties and networks. The most obvious is the shaping of friendly and romantic 
relationships. Focusing on political youth organizations in contemporary France, Lucie Bargel 
showed how organizations shape the relationships of their members. 150  It echoes the idea 
developed by Gaxie that parties are often considered as new families by their members, 
integrating them within a whole new social network. This development of personal 
relationships within the organization progressively reinforces individual commitment to the 
organization, as exit becomes socially and emotionally costly. This is true beyond political 
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organizations, as shown by this statement from Becker’s study on drugs users: “a drug addict 
once told me that the moment she felt she was really ‘hooked’ was when she realized she no 
longer had any friends who were not drug addicts.”151 
Studies in sociology of the military have also emphasized the effects of strong bonds 
among primary group members on the overall organizational cohesion, such primary groups 
being generally understood as platoon-size fighting units. According to this literature, primary 
group level social dynamics explain the cohesion of the organization as a whole, beyond 
ideology or selective material incentives.152 In a famous study, Shils and Janowitz argued that 
the Wehrmacht’s cohesion level and its combat efficiency were not the result of political 
convictions but of strong primary groups stable overtime.153 Bargel stressed the importance of 
such subgroups in the case of political organizations. In her study of contemporary French youth 
political organizations, she showed how the recruits are integrated within the whole 
organization through a variety of clubs and subgroups. These groups being smaller and made 
of people who know each other through face to face interactions, strong cohesion is easier to 
maintain.154 
However, an argument solely based on primary groups solidarity is questioned by 
Bearman who showed in a study of the Confederate troops during the American civil war that 
strong ties within the smaller units, in this case based on local identities, can also push soldiers 
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to desert in groups.155 This study raises the question of the primary groups’ level of autonomy 
regarding the broader organization. The primary groups imply another level of non-material 
rewards for the individual’s commitment, in addition to the overall structure. These two scales 
of incentives have to remain inseparable for the overall cohesion to be maintained. A recent 
article revisited this literature on army cohesion and examined the various mechanisms of 
organizational socialization which reinforce overall cohesion. Through the examples of the 
Wehrmacht and the US army in Vietnam, Paul Kenny showed that while primary group 
cohesion is important, it must go together with a strong discipline. To put it in another way, to 
reinforce the organizational integrity, cohesive primary groups cannot be too autonomous.156 
b)  Institutionalized group dynamics in contemporary China 
Martin Whyte has emphasized the importance of primary groups in the Chinese polity. 
He shed light on the CCP’s capacity to shape individuals’ socialization through the creation of 
a variety of small groups in every social organization. These groups are headed by Party 
members or officials in charge of monitoring them. The CCP does not coopt preexisting groups 
but creates them through its organizational structure. According to Whyte, this is a Chinese 
specificity compared to other Leninist systems such as the USSR, and it has proven effective 
in order to mobilize people during the mass campaigns of the Mao era. Individuals are 
surrounded by people who comply with the policies and it therefore becomes very hard for 
them not to comply.157   
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This idea of the CCP’s capacity to reorganize social ties to best mobilize the population 
is further developed by Andrew Walder in the case of factory workers. However, what Walder 
described is not a multiplicity of separated and cohesive primary groups but an overall 
clientelist network linking the workers to factory managers through lower ranked supervisors. 
As workers are dependent on this network for public goods and services, as well as for their 
personal career progression, it guarantees their compliance with the management’s orders.  
Walder argued that these clientelist ties replace the impersonal standards of behavior dictated 
by the Communist ideology, upon which the individuals are supposed to be evaluated. At every 
level of the organizational structure, the supervisor determines whom he thinks shows 
adherence to the regime’s ideology through their behavior. He therefore rewards the individuals 
who, according to him, display such commitment. Such a system tends to evolve into a personal 
patron-client relationship. 158  
Walder called principled particularism this “clientelist system in which public loyalty 
to the party and its ideology is mingled with personal loyalties between party branch officials 
and their clients.”159 It is not the conformity to ideals which is rewarded but the concrete 
compliance of the worker to the Party branch.160 Specific rewards for compliance and display 
of loyalty are instituted as organizational principles.161 
With the progress of marketization, Andrew Walder described the change in the nature 
of work relations in post-Mao China. He argued that the expression of political loyalty was not 
a central criterion for professional promotion anymore and that work performance was 
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becoming the new way to evaluate a worker’s commitment. 162 Still he noted that specific 
positions in the factory’s CCP leadership structure were still given based on political 
commitment.163  
An extension of Walder’s approach beyond the industrial field is warranted for the study 
of elite cohesion in post-Mao China. Interestingly, the principled particularism he described is 
a product of the organization, it is not formal nor informal. Clientelism hence does not exist 
separately from the Party-State organization but emerges from it. It is different from other types 
of personal ties, such as factions or cliques, which are competing with organizational loyalties, 
and are therefore a kind of unprincipled particularism, seen as illegitimate by the Party.164 This 
approach is interesting in that it links personal loyalties to organizational ones, but also in how 
it differentiates among a variety of personal ties. The development of strong unified factions 
endangering the survival of the party as a whole is opposed to the multiplicity of ties that affect 
positively the individuals’ commitment to the organization.  
To enrich Walder’s concept of principled particularism, and more broadly our 
understanding of elite cohesion in post-Mao China, it is also important to delve into the 
articulation of these various networks. Chinese officials, by going from one position to the next, 
develop their personal network within the Party-State. By following their career, we can then 
understand how these various ties interact in order to induce his commitment to different 
subgroups or to the organization as a whole. Do such ties lead to the development of autonomy 
primary groups or, by contrast, prevent it by developing ties across groups? Overall, an in-depth 
analysis of these various social ties developed through the organization can help us understand 
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the mechanisms guaranteeing one’s commitment to a political career and how it influences the 
overall cohesion of the Chinese political elite. 
5)  Commitment and youth organizations: a multi-level analysis 
 To develop an approach of political mobility in post-Mao China based on the concept 
of commitment, I chose to focus on cadres’ recruitment through the CCP’s youth organizations. 
While these organizations are not the only recruitment channel for political positions, they are 
an excellent observation point to study politicians in the making. This is true in a variety of 
contexts as highlighted by Lucie Bargel in her study of two major youth political organizations 
in contemporary France.165 In contrast to studies focusing on already established political elites, 
by looking at the first stages of one’s political career we can analyze in detail how officials 
cultivate a specific role and vocation. Youth organizations also provide a highly relevant 
perspective regarding the development of personal relationships and how it may influence one’s 
commitment to a political career. Within these organizations, the young recruits can develop 
relationships which will be important for the rest of their life. Departing from studies which 
simplistically dismiss the political commitment of young people as the result of an identity 
crisis,166 I take seriously the mechanisms occurring at the youth organization level, since they 
have a key influence on cadres’ future trajectories, and therefore on the overall cohesion of the 
elite in the context of elite renewal.  
Beyond the focus on the first steps of the commitment process, studying a specific 
organization within the Chinese Party-State, and the careers of its members, allows for an 
analysis combining multiple perspectives: micro regarding the agents’ perspectives, meso 
                                                 
165 Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young socialists and 
young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization]. 
166 Lewis S Feuer, The Conflict of Generations: The Character and Significance of Student Movements (New York: 
Basic Books, 1969). 
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regarding the evolution of the youth organization itself, and macro with regard to the 
transformations of the Chinese regime itself. 167  These three levels of analysis have to be 
understood in their articulation. By focusing on the young recruits, we can have a micro level 
analysis of the commitment process of officials in the making. However, the agents’ careers 
must be understood in the context of the youth organization’s rules and structure to go beyond 
a purely biographical analysis. The youth organization’s structure, in turn, also depends on the 
evolution of the regime and the configuration of political forces at the top of the Party-State. 
The organization cannot be analyzed independently from a macroscopic analysis of the regime 
itself and its dynamics. The macro perspective allows us to understand how the regime’s 
evolution can lead to various organizational configurations: certain profiles of recruits or 
organizations becoming more valued than others in terms of elite renewal for instance as the 
top leaders want to develop a specific power base. These changing political situations in turn 
influence the agents’ tactics. And finally, the evolution of the agents’ career and commitment 
influences the cohesion and trajectory of the youth organization but also that of the Party-State.  
The multi-leveled analysis I suggest allows to better grasp the interaction between the 
evolution of political configurations and individuals’ tactics. Before unveiling the research 
design, I make a last incursion in the literature and now turn to the scholarship on political 
youth organizations in post-Mao China. I highlight what a focus on these organizations could 
contribute to the literature on elite renewal. 
                                                 
167 Regarding these three levels of analysis and the study of political commitment, see : Frédéric Sawicki and 
Johanna Siméant, “Décloisonner la sociologie de l’engagement militant. Note critique sur quelques tendances 
récentes des travaux français [Decompartmentalizing the sociology of political commitment. Critical memo on 
recent trends among French studies],” Sociologie du travail 51, no. 1 (2009): 97–125. 
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D -  The Chinese Communist Youth League in comparative perspective 
1)  Youth organizations and elite renewal 
The role played by political youth organizations in terms of elite renewal may seem 
obvious but only a few studies focus on this issue. This is true in both democratic and non-
democratic regimes, as noted by Bargel in her work on youth political organizations in 
contemporary France. 168  Moreover, while some studies statistically show that numerous 
politicians come from these organizations, very few unveil the mechanisms at play.169 These 
organizations remain black boxes. In the case of European democracies, some studies stand out 
in the way they unveil the role played by student unions 170 or the youth organizations of 
political parties171 in cultivating a political vocation and specific skills among young recruits. 
Lucie Bargel’s work is the most comprehensive example, analyzing in detail contemporary 
French youth political organizations.172 
                                                 
168 Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young socialists and 
young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization]. 
169 See in particular the studies by Ecchi and Hooghe et. Al., respectively on Italy and Belgium : Ettore Recchi, 
“Politics as Occupational Choice: Youth Self-Selection for Party Careers in Italy,” European Sociological Review 
15, no. 1 (1999): 107–24; Marc Hooghe, Dietlind Stolle, and Patrick Stouthuysen, “Head Start in Politics: The 
Recruitment Function of Youth Organizations of Political Parties in Belgium (Flanders),” Party Politics 10, no. 2 
(2004): 193–212. 
170 See in particular regarding student unions : Sébastien Michon, “ Le syndicalisme étudiant : antichambre de la 
profession politique ? [Student Trade-Unions: Prelude to Political Professionalization?],” in La condition politique 
des syndicats. Approche comparée, ed. Nicolas Defaud and Aurélie Llobet (Paris: L’Harmattan, Forthcoming); 
Jean-Yves Sabot, Le syndicalisme étudiant et la guerre d’Algérie: l’entrée d’une génération en politique et la 
formation d’une élite [Student trade-unions during the Algerian war] (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995). 
171 See in particular regarding political parties’ youth organizations : Florence Moncourtois, “ Les jeunes dirigeants 
politiques français : le cas des responsables nationaux des mouvements de jeunesse politiques [The Young French 
Political Leaders: The Case of the National Youth Political Movements’ Heads]” (PhD dissertation, Université 
Paris 1 Sorbonne, 1997); François Audigier, “Les organisations politiques de jeunesse, des écoles d’éloquence? 
Les cas des JRI et de l’UJP [Youth political organization as eloquence schools? the cases of JRI and UJP],” in 
L’éloquence politique en France et en Italie de 1870 à nos jours: études, ed. Fabrice d’Almeida (Rome: École 
française de Rome, 2001), 231–46; Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation 
politique [Young socialists and young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization]. 
172 Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young socialists and 
young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization]; Lucie Bargel, “S’attacher à la politique. Carrières de 
jeunes socialistes professionnels [Becoming attached to politics. Careers of young professional socialists],” 
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In the case of communist regimes, several studies have underlined the importance of the 
Party-controlled youth organizations to supervise youth activities. Fainsod and Fisher in their 
respective studies of the Soviet All Union Leninist Communist Youth League, or Komsomol, 
put forward its major role in terms of youth indoctrination and control.173 According to Fainsod, 
Leninist regimes are unique in their level of organization and indoctrination of youth.174 In light 
of such an assessment, it is surprising to see that while the elite renewal function of these youth 
organizations is often stated,175 it has not been analyzed in detail yet. By taking the recruits’ 
perspective seriously, I distance myself from the tendency to picture these organizations as 
mere indoctrination machines, manipulating passive young people. Beyond the Soviet case, this 
is also how they have been largely depicted in other authoritarian contexts.176 
In addition to being seen as pure indoctrination organizations, the communist youth 
organizations are largely described as unchangeable remnants of the past. To my knowledge, 
not a single study explains the overtime evolution of the role they play in elite renewal and 
cohesion. In particular, comparing their role during the revolutionary struggle with what 
happens once the Party-State has hegemonic power, or even when it liberalizes the economy. 
One of the few studies approaching youth organizations from a dynamic perspective is 
                                                 
Sociétés Contemporaines 84, no. 4 (2011): 79–102; Lucie Bargel, “Apprendre un métier qui ne s’apprend pas. 
Carrières dans les organisations de jeunesse des partis [Learning a trade which cannot be learned. Careers in the 
parties’ youth organizations],” Sociologie 5, no. 2 (2014): 171. 
173 Merle Fainsod, “The Komsomols. A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship,” The American Political Science 
Review 45, no. 1 (1951): 18–40; Ralph Talcott Jr Fisher, Pattern for Soviet Youth : A Study of the Congresses of 
the Komsomol, 1918-1954, Studies of the Russian Institute (New York: Columbia University, 1960). 
174 Fainsod, “The Komsomols. A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship.” 
175 Regarding the Soviet case, see in particular : Ibid.; Frederic J Fleron, “Representation of Career Types in the 
Soviet Political Leadership,” in Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. Barry R Farrell 
(Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1970), 108–39; Jonathan Steele and Eric Abraham, Andropov in Power: From 
Komsomol to Kremlin (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984). 
176 See in particular : Gino Germani, “Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain,” in 
Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society; the Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed. Samuel P 
Huntington and Clement Henry Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 339–79. 
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Solnick’s Stealing the State. Solnick showed how Gorbachev experimented his reform ideas on 
the Komsomol, which led to its disintegration. The decentralization of the Komsomol’s budget, 
as well as of the control over its officials, to its local organizations in 1987-88 led to a “bank 
run” phenomenon. The local Komsomol officials started to use the organization’s resources to 
develop local businesses and progressively separated themselves from the control of the Party-
State.177 While it only touched upon the question of elite renewal, Solnick’s study is very 
interesting in pointing at the evolution potential of such organizations and how it can impact 
the Communist system as a whole.  
Focusing on the evolution of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL), the current 
study contributes to the thin literature on the recruitment and commitment formation functions 
of political youth organizations around the world and helps to put the Chinese case in a 
comparative context. The Chinese case is particularly relevant regarding the issue of 
commitment as membership in the CYL is not compulsory, by contrast with other authoritarian 
regimes, such as Nazi Germany.178 It is therefore important to understood why young people 
join the CYL and even become CYL officials, in the context of a liberalizing economy and the 
multiplicity of career options it entails. This study unveils the evolution of the role played by 
such organizations in the context of a reforming communist regime. Finally, it allows me to 
bring back to the center of the debate the agency of young people themselves in a literature 
which tends to take a top-down approach and to focus on how the Party-State, especially in 
communist systems, controls or harnesses young people through political youth organizations.  
                                                 
177 Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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178 Sibylle Hübner-Funk, “La génération des jeunesses hitlériennes. Transitions, transformations, transmissions 
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2)  The Communist Youth League in post-Mao China 
a)  The League as the Party’s core youth organization 
The Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi qingnian tuan, 中
国共产主义青年团; CYL) is the main youth organization of the CCP. Officially founded in 
1922, it is one of the biggest political organizations in the world, similar in size to the CCP,179 
with 87.5 million members by the end of 2015.180 Established after the model of the Soviet 
Komsomol, the CYL has been a key adjunct of the Party since its creation. Before 1949, it was 
a main tool in the CCP’s struggle for power. After 1949, it became a governing instrument to 
manage young people’s activities. The CYL was under attack during the Cultural revolution 
and stopped its activities in 1966. The provincial CYL committees were reestablished starting 
in 1973, followed by the national organization in 1978. The CYL can now be found at every 
level of the Party-State hierarchy and it is very active in units with numerous young people, 
such as schools and universities.181 The CYL also supervises the other youth organizations of 
the CCP, mainly the All-China Youth Federation (Zhonghua qinglian lianhehui, 中华青年联
合会), the All-China Student Federation (Zhonghua quanguo xuesheng lianhehui, 中华全国学
生联合会), and the Young Pioneers of China (Zhongguo shaonian xianfeng dui, 中国少年先
锋队) – dedicated to children from 6 to 14 years old.182 
                                                 
179 The CCP had close to 88.75 million members by the end of 2015 (“Chinese Communist Party’s Membership 
Growth Slows,” Financial Times, June 30, 2016). 
180 “Over 87 Mln Chinese Communist Youth League Members,” Xinhua, May 3, 2016. 
181 Chien-Wen Kou, “CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational 
Mission of Channeling Cadres,” Prospect Journal 3 (2007): 77–116. 
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Surprisingly, in the English literature, there has been no systematic study of the CYL 
since its reestablishment after the Cultural Revolution in 1978. Different studies from Western 
and Taiwanese scholars dealing with the organization from the 1920s to the 1970s brought 
important insights on the organization of the League and its relations with the Party, but 
obviously cannot account for its evolution since then.183 The few studies in English which 
touched upon the case of the CYL in post-Mao China only focused on the decline of the CYL’s 
indoctrination function. They argued that with the decreasing ideological hegemony of the CCP 
and the emergence of new channels of social mobility in the 1980s, the CYL has progressively 
lost its control over Chinese youth.184 This narrative regarding the decline of the CYL is very 
common: the CYL is either viewed as an anachronistic and conservative organization incapable 
of evolving in post-Mao China,185 or by contrast it is depicted as too much involved in the 1989 
movement and therefore politically weakened after its repression.186 As I demonstrate in this 
dissertation, these polarized views cannot account for the evolution of the CYL, especially after 
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1989. In particular, they cannot explain the steady increase in CYL membership over the period 
and the role it plays in terms of elite renewal. 
By contrast, the Chinese literature on the CYL after 1978 is very large. Most studies 
adopt a descriptive and historical approach of the organization’s activities. While very 
informative, these studies do not really develop an analytical framework explaining the 
evolution of the CYL in post-Mao China.187 Some other studies propose a more analytical 
approach of the organization and its ideology. The main issue is that they often develop a 
normative viewpoint on the CYL, from the perspective of the Chinese State or the organization 
itself.188 Most of these studies are actually conducted by former CYL cadres189 or by the CYL’s 
research centers themselves.190 These studies analyze only superficially the role played by the 
CYL in terms of elite renewal, even though the CYL is officially presented as the Party’s 
“reserve force” (houbeijun, 后备军).191 
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b)  The Party’s reserve force 
As the Party’s “reserve force,” the CYL has a dual role in terms of recruitment and 
training. First, it recruits members between 14 and 28 years old, screens and trains them so they 
can eventually become CCP members. But since CYL membership is now extremely broad, it 
has no major significance in terms of political career. The CYL had 87.5 million members in 
2015, equaling around a quarter of Chinese young people between 14 and 28 years old, among 
which only a small minority eventually become Party-State officials.192 The second function of 
the CYL as a reserve force, and on which I focus, is the recruitment and training of new cadres 
who generally become CCP officials. 
Since the first years of the CCP, the CYL has been an important promotion channel for 
Party officials. According to Zheng Changzhong, between 1921 and 2002, 22.76% of CCP 
Central Committee members had an experience as CYL cadres at various levels.193 This implied 
that they were not only members of the CYL but were appointed as officials within the 
organization. However, it is mostly after its reorganization in 1978 that this specific role of the 
CYL has been emphasized by specialists of Chinese politics. According to several studies of 
the early years of the reform era, the two groups of cadres which benefited the most from the 
reforms were princelings, children of revolutionary leaders, and former CYL officials.194 In fact, 
since the 1980s, the role played by the CYL in terms of recruitment and promotion of cadres 
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has been repeatedly put forward. But the mechanisms explaining this increasingly important 
role in elite renewal are surprisingly understudied. 
While the organization itself has not been the focus of recent research, several China 
scholars, in particular Cheng Li and Bo Zhiyue, have explained the rise of former CYL cadres 
through the lens of factional politics. According to this perspective, princelings have been 
facing since the early 2000s an increasing powerful tuanpai (团派) faction, constituted of 
former CYL officials and supposedly led by Hu Jintao, the former general secretary of the CCP, 
who was secretary of the CYL in the 1980s. 195 Cheng Li described it as a group of like-minded 
officials, particularly interested in social policy.196 
This pekinological literature is interesting in detailing the supposed personal 
relationships between a few Chinese top officials.197 Still, it remains mostly speculative. In the 
case of the tuanpai, the lack of data makes it impossible to capture the exchanges supposedly 
taking place between Hu Jintao and his followers. We do not know to what extent he used the 
CYL as a factional weapon to win power and in which way he helped the so-called tuanpai 
members to get promoted. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is problematic to rely solely on 
group identity, being familial or organizational, to explain political choices. In fact, why would 
princelings or former CYL officials necessarily have common interests? Overall, a study of the 
organization itself, and the actual content of these cadres’ experiences while working at the 
                                                 
195 See in particular: Bo, China’s Elite Politics Political Transition and Power Balancing; Cheng Li, “New 
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CYL, would be needed to understand the mechanisms at play and why they might develop, or 
not, common goals.  
In addition, the like-mindedness of CYL officials put forward by Cheng Li cannot be 
explained through a generational analysis. In Karl Mannheim’s definition of the term, a political 
generation is not a purely age-based phenomenon but it becomes “sociologically significant 
only when it also involves participation in the same historical and social circumstances.”198 
However, the whole post-Mao era saw a multitude of defining moments and historical 
circumstances, such as economic reforms, the Tiananmen movement and its repression, etc. 
While an analysis in terms of generation has been applied to the study of other groups of 
Chinese youth, such as the “lost generation”199 – constituted of the urban educated young 
Chinese sent to work in the countryside between 1968 and 1980 – or the “red guard 
generation,” 200  and used to demonstrate how a common historical experience transformed 
individual trajectories, it can hardly be applied to the CYL officials. Over the period, the variety 
of CYL officials cannot be grouped within one generational group. Even when using the 
political generations defined by the Chinese Party-State itself, these cadres can be found in 
several of them. Li Keqiang, PRC Premier since 2013 and former CYL leader, is for instance 
part of the fifth generation, while Hu Jintao who was PRC President between 2004 and 2012 
and leader of the CYL in the 1980s, is part of the fourth.201  
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The various articles published by Kou Chien-Wen on the political mobility function of 
the CYL stand as an exception as they focus on the organization itself.202 For Kou, two effects 
are playing at the same time and explain the rise of CYL affiliates: a factional effect and an 
organizational one. As the CCP’s reserve force, the CYL provides a continuous pool of talents 
which are potentially absorbed by the tuanpai faction.  
Kou’s “organizational effect,” however, remains unspecified. For him, it is mainly a 
matter of age:203 CYL leaders come out of the organization with an age advantage. Kou argued 
that due to the step-by-step promotion system and the limited number of positions, such an 
advantage is decisive to get to top positions in the Chinese system. While the age argument is 
important, and I come back to this issue on Chapter Two, Kou’s analysis has two major 
limitations. First, he does not explain the political rationale behind the decision to give such a 
career advantage to CYL cadres. It is unclear why the CYL became more important for elite 
renewal after the reforms, as compared to the Maoist era. He treats this evolution as a 
mechanical result of the institutionalization of rules in the CCP, whereas I argue that these rules 
reflect politically motivated decisions. Second, Kou never accounts for who the CYL cadres 
are, why they are given such an advantage early on, and what actually happens to them while 
in the CYL. Finally, Kou mainly focuses on the high level CYL officials, forgetting what might 
happen at the lower levels of the organization and during the earlier steps of their career, 
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wen Kou and Wen-Hsuan Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma 
in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” The China Journal 71, no. 1 (2014): 153–71. 
203 See in particular : Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age 
Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System.” 
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especially in terms of political commitment formation. More specifically, the massive presence 
of the CYL in universities is completely put aside, even though this is a key place for political 
recruitment in China.204 
c)  The Communist Youth League on campus 
Different studies have mentioned the importance of the first steps of political 
professionalization within universities for one’s future career in the Chinese Party-State.205 
However, no systematic study of this phenomenon, and the role played by the CCP’s youth 
organizations, has been written. The literature on youth organizations on campus has so far 
mainly focused on the control function of these organizations over students’ activities, and how 
this control capacity has fluctuated overtime, leaving aside the issue of political commitment 
formation on campus. 
Dingxing Zhao and Xueliang Ding have both written on the declining control capacity 
of the CYL and other youth organizations on campus before the Tiananmen movement. 
According to Zhao, the CCP’s youth organizations on campus became “amphibious” in the 
1980s: some officials “captured student control institutions to spread nonconformist 
ideologies.” 206  Ding also noted that campus branches of the CYL organized reformists 
conference and supported liberal journals.207 In addition to providing them with mobilization 
capabilities, according to Wasserstrom, as well as Francis, the youth organization on campus 
                                                 
204 On Party recruitment on campus, see : Gang Guo, “Party Recruitment of College Students in China,” Journal 
of Contemporary China 14, no. 43 (May 2005): 371–93. 
205 See in particular regarding Tsinghua University : Cheng Li, “University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua 
Graduates in China’s Leadership,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 32 (July 1994): 1–30; Balme, 
Entre soi: l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in contemporary 
China], 267. 
206 Dingxin Zhao, “Decline of Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student 
Movement,” Sociological Perspectives 40, no. 2 (January 1997): 170. 
207 Xueliang Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989 (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 99. 
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helped develop the students’ political culture. 208  All this eventually facilitated the 1989 
movement209. 
In a recent article, Yan Xiaojun showed that from the 1990s on, the CCP’s youth 
organizations retook control over students’ activities on campus. According to him the CYL 
and the student union exercise a thorough grip over students’ life on campus. 210  He also 
described that, in addition to the professional CYL cadres, universities count numerous “student 
cadres” (xuesheng ganbu, 学生干部) who work within the CYL or other youth organizations. 
While the value of such an experience for a future political career is mentioned by Yan for the 
current period, no systematic study of the matter has been done.211 
While the student cadres were not the focus of my initial research plan, I discovered 
during my fieldwork how important this experience is for a student’s political future and chose 
to integrate it. This first experience as a cadre, while in college, came out as a decisive moment 
in the development of a commitment to a political career. Focusing on the student cadres in 
college appeared even more relevant as, since the reforms of the 1980s, the large majority of 
officials go to university, 212  which makes it a determining arena in terms of career choice.213  
                                                 
208 Corinna-Barbara Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political Culture : Official Student Politics at 
Beijing University,” in Chinese Education: Problems, Policies, and Prospects, ed. Irving Epstein (New York: 
Garland Pub., 1991), 394–415; Jeffrey N Wasserstrom and Xinyong Liu, “Student Associations and Mass 
Movements,” in Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao 
China, ed. Deborah Davis et al. ([Washington, D.C.]; Cambridge [England]; New York: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press ; Cambridge University Press, 1995), 362–93. 
209  Zhao, “Decline of Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student 
Movement”; Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989; Wasserstrom and Liu, 
“Student Associations and Mass Movements.” 
210 Xiaojun Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng 
China,” The China Quarterly 218 (2014): 493–513. 
211 Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political Culture : Official Student Politics at Beijing University”; 
Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China.” 
212 Already in 1998, 80.5% of leading cadres had a higher education degree (Brødsgaard, “Management of Party 
Cadres in China,” 70. 
213 As most officials go to university, middle schools and high schools are not the political selection arenas they 
used to be during the Mao era. As I develop in the Second Part of the dissertation, they are less relevant to the 
issue of political elite renewal and I only superficially studied the role played by the CYL in these institutions. On 
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Overall, a comprehensive study of the CYL at different levels of the polity constitutes 
a novel way to shed light on the issues of elite renewal and commitment formation in post-Mao 
China. The different levels of analysis allow us to focus on the different stages of a cadre’s 
career, from the starting point of professionalization on campus to the beginning of a national 
career at the central level CYL.  
E -  Research Question and Hypotheses 
The main research question driving this dissertation is: how does the Chinese Party-
State renew its political elite and maintain its cohesion in the post-Mao era? By focusing on 
this specific issue, I address the gaps I mentioned in the literature on post-Mao Chinese politics. 
Relying on various strands of literature, both on post-Mao China and comparative cases, I bring 
out the political features of the communist bureaucracy at the nexus of formality and informality, 
and I highlight how it cultivates individual commitment beyond ideological attachment.  In the 
answer I provide, I unveil in particular the role played by the Party’s youth organizations. 
First, I hypothesize that the Party-State leaders created a sponsored mobility system to 
renew the Chinese political elite. Through the various steps of the sponsored mobility process, 
the young recruits develop a political commitment to their career in the Party-State and to the 
survival of the regime. The opposite hypothesis would be that the Party-State, instead of 
recruiting young people and progressively cultivating them for high level positions, renews its 
elite by coopting young professionals who already have a career outside the administration, and 
therefore takes advantage of the skills they have acquired from their previous experiences. This 
is for instance what happened in the USSR under Khrushchev (1953-1964). During that period, 
                                                 
high schools and middle schools during the Mao era, see : Jonathan Unger, Education under Mao: Class and 
Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Susan L Shirk, 
Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China (Berkeley: University of California 
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the Soviet elite was renewed through the cooptation of professionals with technical skills rather 
than by recruiting young cadres who spent their whole career in the Party-State.214 As a result, 
the Party’s main youth organization, the Komsomol, which role was to focus on the recruitment 
of young people, played a limited role in the elite renewal process. Gehlen showed that in the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, the number of central and local Party 
leaders who previously had a position in the Komsomol went from 34% in 1952 to 8% in 
1968.215  
To test my first hypothesis, which stands in contrast to the Soviet case, I analyze to what 
extent the Chinese Communist Youth League played a role in the renewal of the Party’s elite 
since the 1980s, and if it became more important than during the Mao era. In line with this 
hypothesis, I question the specific political configuration that led Chinese leaders, at the central 
but also local levels, to rely on a sponsored mobility process and the CYL for elite renewal, in 
opposition to Khrushchev’s strategy. Finally, I explore to what extent political commitment 
developed early in one’s career is rewarded in terms of future opportunities. By opposition to 
the idea that political considerations are not important in the selection of Chinese officials, I 
hypothesize that the recruits who developed a political commitment early on, through the 
Party’s youth organizations, are put on a specific promotion path, which includes specific 
opportunities and trainings, in line with the elite dualism theory. By acting as a career 
accelerator, the youth organizations attract young talents and at the same time allow the CCP 
to nurture the recruits’ commitment over a long time-period. 
                                                 
214 Frederic J Fleron, “System Attributes and Career Attributes: The Soviet Political Leadership System, 1952 to 
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who were Party secretaries at the central, republic or province levels. Michael P Gehlen, “The Soviet Apparatchiki,” 
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Second, I hypothesize that the Party’s youth organizations play a key role in the first 
steps of the sponsored mobility process starting from college, linking from the beginning the 
youth’s political commitment to the Party-State organizations rather than specific individuals 
or the universities themselves. This contrasts with other models of sponsored mobility in which 
the education institutions play the role of political promotions channels, separated from the 
Party and its organizations. This was the situation during the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
regime in Mexico (1929-2000). The key role played by institutions of higher education in terms 
of political networking and political recruitment, went with a decline of the Party’s role in this 
matter.216 To test this hypothesis, I analyze the importance of CCP’s youth organizations on 
campus and interrogate the role they play in commitment formation, political networking and 
political recruitment. I explore to what extent the students who go through these organizations 
at the university level develop a commitment to a political career by endorsing a specific social 
role as future officials and by transforming their social circles. I also study to what extent they 
have, or not, more opportunities than other students in terms of future political career. 
Third, I hypothesize that the decentralized nature of the Party-State and its youth 
organizations make it difficult for the young recruits to establish cohesive groups which could 
organize against the Party-State itself. This hypothesis contrasts with the idea that an overall 
faction is developed throughout the CYL, constituted of officials with common goals and 
interests. To test this hypothesis, I question the cohesion and autonomy of the CYL as a network 
of officials. I interrogate to what extent this network is constitutive of their career and lead them 
to develop common interests, or if it is only one connection among a multiplicity of crosscutting 
ties. 
                                                 
216 Roderic A Camp, “The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System,” Latin 
American Research Review 20, no. 1 (1985): 97–118. 
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To test these hypotheses, this research combines different levels of analysis, the one of 
the regime and its evolution, the one of the youth organizations and their rules, and the 
perspective of the recruits and recruiters at the different echelons of the Chinese polity. Rather 
than focusing on one set of independent and abstract hypotheses, and aim for a unidirectional 
causal inference, I get into the multiplicity of causes and influences in order to develop a holistic 
analysis of the role played by the CCP’s youth organizations in elite renewal and cohesion in 
post-Mao China.   
F -  Research Design 
1)  Research methods 
I relied on mixed methods to assess the evolution of the CYL as a path to power in post-
Mao China. In addition to primary and secondary written sources to account for the evolution 
of the organization since 1949, I combined descriptive statistics about the cadres’ professional 
trajectories with semi-structured interviews with the concerned actors to better reconstruct the 
careers, and the commitment formation process, of CYL officials since 1978. In total I spent 
fourteen months doing fieldwork in China between 2011 and 2015. 
a)  Career data 
To study the elite renewal function of the CYL, I relied on already compiled career data, 
such as the data base regarding the CCP Central Committee members put together by Shih et. 
al.,217 and developed my own datasets. Based on official resumes, I collected career data on 
CYL leaders at the national level from 1949 until 2015 (set of 74 cases). In addition, I gathered 
career information on the leaders of all the provincial CYL committees between 1978 and 2015 
                                                 
217 The data base can be found here: http://faculty.washington.edu/cadolph/index.php?page=61 (consulted on 
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(set of 356 cases). I also compiled biographical data regarding CYL secretaries in two 
universities based in Beijing in which I did fieldwork, Peking University and Tsinghua 
University (42 cases for the 1949-2015 period). Finally, I coded the career trajectories of 
student leaders at the national level (set of 140 cases for the 1979-2000 period) and the same 
two universities (128 cases for 1949-2013).  The name lists of these officials and student leaders 
came from a variety of official and non-official online sources,218 which I crosschecked with 
other lists and verified through interviews. The career data itself was found in official resumes, 
available on Xinhua.cn, or in the ones compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, 
at the condition that their positions were sourced from media reports and official websites. The 
data being missing for some individuals, I had to treat them as not having pursued an official 
career.  
Overall, this data was useful to trace the variety of careers youth organization leaders 
can go through and to provide an overall image on the extent to which they pursue a political 
career and get promoted to top positions. It was also key in addressing the issue of the evolution 
of the function played by these organization as promotion channels within the Party-State 
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hierarchy. However, such biographical data remains thin to understand the different 
mechanisms at play in terms of recruitment and promotion. The role played by a cadre’s 
personal network is for instance particularly hard to address. In addition, official resumes can 
often be altered strategically by an official or an organization to appear more legitimate, in 
particular in an authoritarian context. To reconstruct the individuals’ careers, this official data 
was compared with the information acquired through interviews. 
b)  Interviews 
A set of 121 semi-structured interviews with 92 actors constitutes the foundation of this 
study (I met several times with several interviewees). 219 I mainly interviewed current or former 
CYL cadres (44 cases) and student-cadres (24 cases). As much as possible, I targeted officials 
of different ranks within the organization and who have worked at different time periods during 
the post-Mao era. In addition to the cadres per se, I interviewed several academics (24 cases) 
either from the Central CYL School, who oversee the training of CYL cadres, or from the 
different universities in which I did fieldwork. These interviews have a specific status as these 
academics are not the actors I am directly interested in. Their comments and the information 
they may have shared with me was never used in its own right, unless it was related to the 
university in which they were working. While their thoughts on the CYL or officials more 
broadly were very useful, it was never taken for granted and always checked through the 
interaction with the actors themselves. In terms of gender, 22 interviewees are female, while 70 
are male. The age range is very large, from 20 to 80 years old, as some of my interviews were 
still student cadres in college while others were retired academics or officials. 
                                                 
219 See Appendix I for a full list of interviewees and dates of encounters. All the interviewees were anonymized. 
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Semi-structured interviews are an important device to establish the role of agency in 
recruitment and promotion processes. In addition to providing important and sometimes hidden 
information, they give access to the perceptions of officials themselves regarding their 
biography, beyond the flat information displayed in their resumes. It is therefore a perfect tool 
to analyze one’s career in the interactionist sense of the word. As argued by Becker, having the 
actors themselves describe their trajectory is a good method to get to the progressive way in 
which they developed their career, and how it was influenced by their perception of obstacles 
and opportunities.220 In particular, it offers a vantage point to analyze how they developed their 
individual strategies within the framework of their organization and how they perceived their 
options, including exit options, across different points in time. In addition, through the way they 
present themselves and talk about other cadres and non-cadres, we can appraise their role and 
status as officials or future officials and examine how they embody it. The description of their 
relationships with colleagues and non-colleagues overtime is also important to better grasp how 
their social circle evolved and how it influences, and is influenced, by their political 
commitment. 
However, we cannot stop the analysis at the actors’ narrative of their own trajectory. As 
underlined by Bourdieu, the “biographic illusion” leads actors to present their life as if every 
action made perfect sense and aimed at an overarching goal. To prevent such teleological 
approach to individual trajectories, the different steps of the careers must be analyzed in their 
own right, not as a necessary stage towards a predefined target. 221  The researcher has to 
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reconstruct the context surrounding the individual’s choices and contrast them with the choice 
of individuals in different situations, to identify their specificity and logic. 
To better understand how commitment to social role and to social groups influences 
political commitment, the trajectories of the most committed must be analyzed in contrast with 
those who chose a different path. Among my interviewees, several of them had an experience 
in the Party’s youth organizations, generally as student cadres, but did not pursue a political 
career. In addition to providing me with insights regarding organizations that they know well 
even though they do not feel committed to it anymore, such individuals constituted a sort of 
control group. The contrast in terms of social role and social practices highlighted the specificity 
of the politically committed individuals.  
To investigate the mechanisms at play and the context surrounding my interviewees’ 
life decisions, I made the choice of a site-intensive method with a snowball sampling strategy. 
It allowed me to get into the details of the young cadres’ recruitment and promotion process in 
the selected locales and to analyze how the characteristics of every local context influenced the 
actors’ tactics and commitment formation. Though the relatively small size of my sample limits 
the external validity of the study, a site-intensive approach is the best way to explore 
organizational mechanisms and actors’ perceptions. Across the different sites, the replication 
of interviews enabled me to distinguish an isolated act from a common one.   
To be sure, the choice of a limited set of fieldwork sites was also linked to the difficulty 
of accessing information. Yet, what I lose in quantity, I earned in quality. The repeated 
encounters with my interviewees in the same locale favored the development of relationships 
based on trust and enabled me to go beyond the official discourse on the organization.  
The interviews ran in average for an hour and a half and generally took part in the 
interviewees’ office if they had one, or in public spaces, such as coffee shops. To not rebuke 
the interviewees and get more out of them, I did not record the interviews but took hand-written 
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notes. It gave an informal flavor to the encounter and I had the impression that the interviewees 
spoke more freely as a result, sometimes even asking not to take into note a personal comment 
given almost as a confidence. During the interviews, I mixed precise questions, to get the actual 
information of interest, with broader, more abstract interrogations about their organization or 
my research questions, to gather overall impressions. On several occasions, my respondents 
gave me new ideas and directions, which I pursued in later interviews. Rather than following a 
basic sampling logic and asking the same questions to a representative portion of the studied 
group, I aimed for saturation. Each time, I built on the previous interviews to prepare the next 
and achieve an increasingly accurate understanding of the question at hand. 
I met my first group of interviewees mainly through academics and student cadres I 
contacted in different universities and in the Central CYL School. They were willing to help 
me because of preexisting personal connections, because they were interested in the research 
itself, or because they wanted to develop their personal network among foreign academia. They 
helped me to find several interviewees through their own contacts, which in turn introduced me 
to additional ones. Such introductions were important to get people to, at least partially, trust 
me and talk about their own career as well as their understanding of the recruitment processes. 
Some of the interviewees also allowed me to join them at official dinners or evaluation trips, 
where I could observe interactions among officials and meet more potential interviewees. This 
first encounter often smoothened things out when I formally asked them for an interview. 
Overall, I had to navigate the cadres’ network myself to study it. 
For around a third of the interviewees, we met repeatedly and had up to four interviews 
over the period of my fieldwork. In some cases, it was harder to develop such a relationship 
and several interviewees refused another meeting. More broadly, getting in touch with potential 
interviewees and getting them to accept the interview was not always easy, especially with 
higher ranked officials. As a result, my access to actors in the central level CYL administration 
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was largely limited to Central CYL School cadres and academics. Access was also limited due 
to circumstantial events such as the demotion for corruption of the Party leader of Nanjing City 
while I was doing fieldwork there, which made officials at all levels more cautious and less 
inclined to talk to foreigners, or the elections for student leaders in the various universities, a 
sensitive time during which university officials were less open to meet with me. 
Beyond access to interviewees, it was sometimes hard to make them talk about certain 
issues. It was in particular the case with the issue of their own social background, as well as the 
question of personal ties in the administration and how it plays on promotions. I had to approach 
these issues indirectly, either getting into other cases they knew, or questioning them repeatedly 
about specific instances of socialization, such as training programs. In addition, the truthfulness 
or accuracy of specific information acquired through interviews was sometimes questionable; 
it was therefore systematically checked through a triangulation both across interviews and with 
documentary sources. 
c)  Primary written sources 
In addition to interviews and official biographical data, the consideration of a numbers 
of written sources has proven important to this research. First, diverse official documents, 
including Party State regulations and policy documents (sometimes disseminated through 
official websites or social media platforms), but also organizational yearbooks and local 
gazetteers gave precious standardized information regarding the functioning of the CYL and 
other youth organizations at different levels of the Chinese polity.  
Second, internal documents regarding specific units were also useful to examine the 
most recent activity of the local units I studied, which was not recorded in the yearbooks yet. It 
also gave me a taste of the shape taken by the information flows within the organization and 
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how CYL cadres presented their activity to their superiors. Interviews were often the occasion 
to collect these documents, such as the cadres’ activity reports or the unit’s organigrams.  
Finally, looking at press articles gave additional information, even beyond the studied 
locales. In addition to media reports coming from a variety of Chinese newspapers and websites, 
I systematically analyzed the content of the CYL’s official daily newspaper, the China Youth 
Daily, between January 2012 and December 2015. The China Youth Daily articles were 
particularly useful to get information regarding the organization itself, at the central and local 
levels, including descriptions of meetings and activities, leaders’ speeches, membership data… 
In addition to this organizational data, some pieces about specific activities, locales or 
individual cadres allowed me to draw parallels with the information I could get on my fieldwork 
sites. Overall, the media reports helped me assess the generalizability of my localized findings. 
2)  Fieldwork sites 
Beyond my focus on the central organization of the CYL, I chose to account for the 
situation of the CYL since the end of the Cultural Revolution in two provincial capitals and 
four universities. First I focus on the capital cities of two very different provinces: Jiangsu and 
Guizhou. Jiangsu is the fourth richest province-level locale in the country with a GDP per capita 
of 24,950 USD (PPP) in 2015, whereas Guizhou is the last one with 8,463 USD (PPP).222 
Through the comparative study of these two provinces I can account for similarities and make 
general claims regarding the recruitment and promotion processes, but I can also see how the 
organization adapts to local specificities, in particular to gaps in terms of economic 
development. Moreover, focusing on the provinces’ capitals – Nanjing for Jiangsu and Guiyang 
for Guizhou – which centralize the province level and city level CYL committees as well as 
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some grassroots units of the CYL, I could get into the relations between the different sub-levels 
of the League, and see how officials get transferred, or not, from one to another.  
During my fielwork, I spent in total ten months in Beijing (two weeks in the winter 2011, 
two in the summer 2012, one month in the summer 2013, four months in 2014 and four months 
in 2015), more than three months in Nanjing (two weeks in the winter 2011, two weeks in the 
summer 2012, two weeks in the summer 2013, and two months in 2015), and one month in 
Guiyang (during the winter 2015). In addition to these specific locales, I did additional 
interviews regarding the situation of the local CYL committees in Chengdu the capital of 
Sichuan Province as well as Shijiazhuang, capital of Hebei Province. I went to these two cities 
as I had been introduced to local cadres through personal contacts. Such interviews helped me 
to compare my results to other local realities. 
To test my hypothesis regarding the role played by the CYL and its sub-organizations 
within universities, I focused on four universities during my fieldwork. First, the two best 
schools in the country: Peking University and Tsinghua University. I chose these two 
universities as they are the ones providing the most Party-State leaders, and therefore 
contributing to elite renewal. Since 1982, 9% of the CCP Central Committee members have a 
degree from Peking University or Tsinghua University, as well as 15% of the CCP Politburo 
members.223 Also, according to the website of the “Chinese Universities Alumni Association” 
(Zhongguo xiaoyou hui, 中国校友会), in 2007 Tsinghua University had the most alumni within 
the current political elite, with 41 officials within the CCP Central Committee or at the 
ministerial level and above. Peking University was second with 34 alumni in such positions.224 
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Still, these universities are highly specific in terms of the career prospects they offer to 
students and are based in Beijing, close to the central administration. For the purpose of 
comparison, I chose to include in the sample two universities outside Beijing: one highly ranked, 
Nanjing University, and one of lesser rank, Nanjing Normal University.225 Overall, these four 
universities remain part of the “211 Project,” which includes the one hundred or so best 
universities in the country. 226  I chose to focus on these elite schools as I am interested 
specifically in the recruitment of high level officials and the cultivation of their commitment. 
Students from other schools, and vocational ones in particular, have less political career 
opportunities. 227  To widen the scope of the comparison, I also did some complementary 
interviews in several universities in Beijing, Chengdu and Guiyang. 
In addition to universities, I conducted isolated interviews with CYL cadres in other 
units, in particular in four state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based in Beijing, Nanjing and 
Guiyang, and two high schools in Nanjing. These units are not representative of SOEs or high 
schools throughout the country but these interviews allowed me to have a general sense of the 
role played by CYL and its officials in such units and to put into perspective the role the 
organization plays in universities. The CYL also has cells in the People’s Liberation Army, 
however I did not manage to obtain access to these units. Furthermore, the CYL units within 
                                                 
225 According to the 2015 ranking of national universities by the CUAA-Team of China University Evaluation, 
Nanjing University was ranked 8th whereas Nanjing Normal University was 48th (Source: 
http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2014/1229/c391924-26293836.html). 
226 For a synthetic explanation of the “211 project” (211 gongcheng, 211工程), see the website of the China 
Education Center: http://www.chinaeducenter.com/en/cedu/ceduproject211.php (Consulted on 12 May 2016). 
227 In 2008, 14% of the graduates from all the “211 project” universities got directly a position in a Party-State 
Administration or an Academic Institution, which includes both official and academic posts. By contrast, only 5% 
from vocational higher education institutions did. Source: Cheng Changqun (成长群), “Research on the Issue of 
Employment of University Students: Survey on the Issue of Hubei University Student Employment as a Case 
(daxuesheng jiuye wenti yanjiu: yi Hubei daxuesheng jiuye diaocha weili, 大学生就业问题研究:以湖北大学生
就业调查为例)” (PhD Dissertation, Wuhan University, 2010), 98. 
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the military are not directly relevant to my study of political elite renewal, the political career 
and military ones being increasingly separated in post-Mao China.228 
My field sites’ selection strategy was targeting at having the best overall view on the 
role played by the CYL in terms of elite renewal and cohesion. Rather than selecting sites with 
very specific variations from one another to draw causal inference, I chose a “one-case multi-
field-site approach,” as presented by Maria Heimer. The idea is to treat the different sites as 
one case, which therefore allows a form of triangulation across sites in order to carefully analyze 
the mechanisms of interest. I could then play with the different sites, and administrative levels 
in each site, to cross check information and to rely on various networks of interviewees.229 
While I was not focusing on a specific variation, I chose field sites which were very different 
socioeconomically, for the sake of representativeness. Instead of basing my whole analysis on 
one specific site, I continually compared my observations in the different field sites in order to 
be able to separate singular contextual phenomena from shared mechanisms. Focusing on two 
cities and four universities offers a good balance in terms of breadth and depth of the study. It 
allowed me to contextualize my findings, but also to avoid what Hurst called, the “invalid part-
to-whole mapping.” 230 
G -  Outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is structured in three parts, themselves sub-divided in thematic chapters. 
The First Part is specific as its level of analysis differs greatly from the remaining of the text. 
                                                 
228 On this issue, see : Ji You, “The Roadmap of Upward Advancement for PLA Leaders,” in Choosing China’s 
Leaders, ed. Chien-Wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang (London ; New York: Routledge, 2014), 42–64. 
229 Maria Heimer, “Field Sites, Reseach Design and Type of Findings,” in Doing Fieldwork in China, ed. Maria 
Heimer and Stig Thøgersen (Copenhagen; Abingdon: NIAS ; Marston [distributor], 2006), 58–77. 
230  William Hurst, “Cases, Questions and Comparison in Research on Contemporary Chinese Politics,” in 
Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies, ed. Allen Carlson et al. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 162–77. 
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While in the later parts I focus on individual cadres and their commitment formation, I adopt 
here a macroscopic perspective focusing on the evolution of the organization itself since the 
creation of its first cell in 1920. I unveil the historical continuities in the Youth League’s 
structure and functioning since the Mao era. I also argue that despite these continuities, the 
League managed to evolve with the regime transformation by diversifying its activities and 
enlarging its domain of action through the development of sub-organizations. These 
adjustments allowed the organization to maintain its monopoly over the management of youth 
affairs. Overall, I argue that while the CYL organizational nature and relationship to the CCP 
did not fundamentally change, it played an increasing role in elite renewal since the 1980s, in 
a context of elite struggle and overall rejuvenation of the Party-State. Paradoxically, it is when 
the regime reforms itself and becomes less orthodox in its ideology that this classic communist 
organization gains in political importance, situating itself at the nexus of the Party-State’s 
sponsored mobility system. 
The second and third parts of the dissertation focus on individual cadres and their 
commitment formation. They are organized following the different steps of the political career: 
being recruited as a student cadre, being selected as a student leader, being appointed as a CYL 
official and promoted within the university administration, and finally rising to leading 
positions within the CYL at the central or local level. This sequence is not a necessary one since 
most student cadres never pursue a political career, and a lot of CYL cadres only go through 
part of these steps. However, these steps logically follow each other and represent an ideal-type 
of a rising trajectory within the Party’s youth organizations.  
In the Second Part, I unveil the mechanisms of political sponsored mobility in China 
starting with the key role played by the CCP youth organizations on campus. I show that 
becoming a student cadre and getting promotion within these organizations on campus is a key 
primary phase in a personal trajectory towards officialdom. Through this experience, the 
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students are subjected to different commitment building mechanisms. As they rise in the 
hierarchy, they learn to cultivate and enjoy their role as future Party-State officials, which 
strengthen their commitment to a political career. Most importantly, the student cadres’ 
experience transforms their social circles, which progressively reinforce their political 
commitment. The student cadre experience can also lead the cadres to stay on campus and 
become CYL officials. I underline how this first job on campus can also be used as a 
springboard for political office for the less risk-averse and the most ambitious recruits. Overall, 
by unveiling the different steps of the political commitment process which takes place on 
campus, Part II of the dissertation highlights the decisive role played by universities in political 
recruitment in China. 
After focusing on the first steps of the political career on campus, both before and after 
graduation, I turn in the Third Part to the local and central CYL officials themselves. I argue 
that the CYL is a key nexus in the political trajectory of an official, often in continuity with the 
first step of the career presented in the previous part of the dissertation. Focusing on CYL 
leaders in particular, both at the central and local levels, I show that the generalist feature of 
their job sets them apart from more specialized officials, working in sectorial administrations 
for instance. In the CYL, they learn to become generalist leaders. This accounts for the survival 
of generalist cadres in the Chinese system by opposition to the literature describing an overall 
technocratization of the regime. I also highlight the gap within the CYL between leading cadres 
and non-leading cadres, and the different personal trajectories it entails. The leading cadres can 
often use the Party-State’s rules to their advantage. They also develop particularly diverse 
personal networks as they rotate quickly from one position to the next. As a result, I argue that 
the multiple experience these cadres have lead them to develop various cross-cuttings personal 
ties, across administrations and locales, making it harder to organize in unit-based factional 
groups with clear common interests. 
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I.  “Au service du Parti” 
 
The First Part of this dissertation is named after a book by Jeannine Verdès-Leroux 
which argued that a major part of the French intellectuals and artists were, in the years following 
world war two, at the service of the French Communist Party.231 While the relationship of the 
intellectuals to the Communist Party can be highly debated, I stress that this level of submission 
to the Party qualifies more accurately the position of the Party’s own youth organization, and 
particularly in the Chinese context. By contrast to the Soviet Komsomol where decentralization 
of Party management led to the dismantlement of the organization’s resources in the late 1980s, 
I show that since the 1920s, the Chinese Communist Youth League has been under strict Party 
control, a situation that did not change overtime. 
This First Part has a specific place in this dissertation as its level of analysis differs 
greatly from the remaining of the text. While in the later chapters I focus on the individual 
cadres and the development of their political commitment, I adopt here a macroscopic 
perspective focusing on the evolution of the organization itself. Before underlining the 
mechanisms at play within the Youth League, making it a key recruitment and promotion 
channel for Party-State officials in post-Mao China, it is necessary to unveil the evolution of 
the organization and the various shapes it took since the creation of its first cell in 1920 and 
until my fieldwork in the mid-2010s. 
I argue in this First Part that while the CYL organizational nature and relationship to the 
CCP did not fundamentally change, its function of reserve force grew stronger since the 1980s, 
in a context of elite struggle and overall bureaucratization of the Party-State. Paradoxically, it 
is when the regime reforms itself and becomes less orthodox in its ideology that a traditional 
                                                 
231 Verdès-Leroux, Au service du Parti: 1944-1956 [For the Party: 1944-1956]. 
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Leninist organization made for youth indoctrination gains in political importance. I stress both 
the continuities between the Mao era and the post-Mao era, but also the flexibility of the Party-
State organizations that adapted to a new political context. 
Tracking the League’s changes and adjustments allows us to understand how the 
organization became even more important for cadres’ promotion since the 1980s, compared to 
the more orthodox Mao era. I show that the CYL became a key channel for early political 
professionalization, understood as the process through which one is recruited in a paid position 
within the Party-State administration.232 As seen in the Introduction, administration and politics 
is even harder to distinguish in the PRC than in other political regimes, making any career in 
the Party-State inherently political.  
The main questions driving this First Part are: did the structure and activities of Youth 
League changed since its creation? And why did it become more important for political mobility 
in post-Mao China? To tackle these issues, the two chapters which constitute this First Part 
focus on different aspects of the Youth League. The first one develops the history of the 
organization itself, and how its function of mass organization in charge of managing youth has 
evolved since 1920. The second focuses more precisely on its function as a promotion channel 
within the Party-State and how it was transformed by the political context. This echoes the two 
official functions of the League as the Party’s “assistant and reserve force”  (zhushou he 
houbeijun, 助手和后备军).233  
 
  
                                                 
232 A political activity becomes professional when someone lives off it. On this issue, see: Weber, The Vocation 
Lectures; Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young socialists 
and young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization], 65. 
233 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 20 June 2013 
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Chapter 1: Changing to stay the same: the Youth League 
as the Party’s assistant 
Through an historical overview of the CCP’s main youth organization, this chapter 
underlines that, while its structure and its activities did evolve with the context, its fundamental 
nature remained the same. Four years after its First National Congress of 1921, the official 
name of the organization became the Communist Youth League, symbol of its subordination to 
the CCP. Since then, the name and the structure of the Youth League evolved over time but it 
always remained the Party’s assistant, as written in its charter. This official catchphrase 
summarizes the Youth League’s dependence towards the CCP, as well as the role it plays in the 
implementation of CCP’s policies and in the management of youth affairs on behalf of the 
Party-State. 
In this chapter I unveil the historical continuities in the Youth League’s organizational 
framework and functioning since the Mao era. I also show that despite these clear continuities, 
the League managed to evolve with the regime transformation by diversifying its activities and 
enlarging its domain through the burgeoning of sub-organizations. These adjustments allow the 




A -  From a revolutionary organization to an established bureaucracy 
In the first part of this chapter, I review the early years of the Youth League. I put 
forward the process which led the relatively independent Socialist Youth League, established 
in 1920, to subordinate itself few years later to the CCP, and to become its main youth 
organization. During the years that followed and the civil war, the CCP’s youth organizations 
took several forms, but remained major political tools for the Party in extending its reach among 
young people and facilitating their adhesion to its revolutionary cause.   
With the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the Youth League was reestablished as the 
Party’s main youth organization, supervising various subordinated organizations. It became one 
of the CCP’s main mass organizations, along with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(Zhonghua quanguo zonggonghui, 中华全国总工会 ; ACFTU) and the All-China Federation 
of Women (Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui, 中华全国妇女联合会; ACWF).234 Officially, 
mass organizations are not Party-State administrations but as Barnett put it, “they form an 
essential part of the organizational matrix of Chinese Communist rule.”235  James Townsend 
identified four major characteristics of mass organizations, which are still true today. First, they 
are firmly controlled by the Party, with CCP members at key positions and with orders coming 
directly from the CCP. Secondly, like the Party, they are structured according to the principle 
of “democratic centralism,”236 which means in practice that they combine a mass membership 
                                                 
234 On mass organizations in the early years of the PRC, see : A. Doak Barnett, “Mass Political Organizations in 
Communist China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 277 (September 1951): 76–
88; Kuo-Chun Chao, “Mass Organizations in Mainland China,” The American Political Science Review 48, no. 3 
(September 1954): 752–65. 
235 Barnett, “Mass Political Organizations in Communist China,” 76. 
236  For Lenin, democratic centralism implies, “freedom of discussion, unity of action.” In reality the centralism 
has always trumped the democratic element. It is the ideological justification for the hierarchical ways in which 
functions all Leninist parties (on democratic centralism, see: Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist 
China, 118–128. 
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with a strongly hierarchical structure. Thirdly, they are greatly developed at the grassroots level 
to allow for their role of political mobilization and interests articulation.237 They have cells in 
all the structures where the targeted category of population can be found numerously. Finally, 
they have an official function as “transmission belts” for Party-State policies, expanding the 
power of the CCP towards specific sectors of society.238  
Far from the revolutionary organization it once was, the League became at the time a 
control instrument in the hands of the Party-State. It became a bureaucracy in charge of youth 
affairs. It was criticized as such during the Cultural Revolution and was temporally dismantled 
starting in 1966. Despite the parenthesis of the Cultural Revolution, I underline here how the 
early years of the PRC were crucial in establishing the League’s Party-like organizational 
structure that persists today.  




                                                 
237 By grassroots level, I mean all the cells below the county level, including within units such as enterprises and 
schools. By contrast the local level includes the county, city, and provincial echelons. 
238 James R Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1967), 151. 





















1)  The Youth League as a revolutionary tool (1920-1949) 
a)  The domestic and foreign origins of the Socialist Youth League 
After the fall of the Manchu Dynasty and the foundation of the Republic of China in 
1912, the country went through a period of profound instability. The revolutionary leader Sun 
Yatsen stepped down after a month as President of China in favor of the general Yuan Shikai, 
in an attempt to save the young Republic. Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor in 1915, 
sparking various rebellions and paving the way to the warlord era. In response to the rapid 
failure of the Republic, emerged an intellectual movement in urban centers looking for new 
ways to reform the regime. It was the New Culture Movement  (Xin wenhua yundong, 新文化
运动). The movement came to its apex with the demonstrations of May Fourth 1919. The news 
that the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had turned territories formerly controlled by Germany over 
to Japan triggered a patriotic march among students and intellectuals in Beijing. The students 
took the streets in Beijing to protest against the government weakness and the control of 
imperialist powers over Chinese territory. The movement spread to other major urban centers, 
leading for instance to a general strike in Shanghai.239  
The May Fourth Movement is largely presented as a founding political moment in China. 
Jeffrey Wasserstrom showed for instance how it constituted a blue print for future youth 
activism, both as a historical precedent and in terms of repertoire of contention. 240  The 
movement brought into the political sphere a new generation of politicized students into the 
political sphere who would eventually join either the nationalists of the Kuomintang (KMT) or 
                                                 
239 On the May Fourth Movement, see : Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in 
Modern China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960); Jeffrey N Wasserstrom, Student 
Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 
51–71. 
240 Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai, 295. 
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the communists. As showed by Sofia Graziani, it turned emerging cultural and academic 
associations into building blocks for political organizations. In particular it had a strong impact 
on the foundation of the first Chinese Communist Party cells, as well as units of the Socialist 
Youth League (Shehui zhuyi qingniantuan, 社会主义青年团 ; SYL), the ancestor of the 
CYL.241 In fact, Chen Duxiu who later became one of the founders of the CCP and the SYL, 
created in 1915 the Youth Magazine (Qingnian zazhi, 青年杂志). It was renamed New Youth 
(Xin Qingnian, 新青年) a year later, and became one of the important magazines of the New 
Culture movement.242 
The May Fourth Movement did not remain unnoticed abroad. Vladimir Lenin had just 
organized the First Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919. Its 
role was to push for the spread of communist organizations over the world. The establishment 
of the Young Communist International, under the leadership of the Comintern, quickly 
followed in November 1919. Reports from China indicated that the conditions were mature for 
the creation of a communist party and a communist youth organization. The Comintern 
therefore sent its agent Grigori Voitinsky to introduce the Leninist organizations to radical 
intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu. Voitinsky helped to establish the first communist cell in China 
in April 1920 as well as the SYL.243  
The Chinese communists were introduced to the organization and functioning of the All 
Union Leninist Communist Youth League, or Komsomol, which will serve as blue print for the 
CCP’s youth organization. The Komsomol itself was established in 1918, bringing together 
                                                 
241 Graziani, “Youth and the Making of Modern China.” 
242 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 25. 
243 On the Youth Comintern and its influence on the SYL, see :Graziani, “Youth and the Making of Modern China,” 
124–131; Kristin Mulready-Stone, Mobilizing Shanghai Youth: CCP Internationalism, GMD Nationalism and 
Japanese Collaboration (Routledge, 2015), 14. 
 87 
previously dispersed and autonomous youth organizations. It was directly brought under the 
patronage of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The establishment of youth 
organizations under Party control became a common feature of every Leninist organization. In 
addition, to the Soviet Union and the CCP, the KMT also established youth organizations and 
in particular the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps in 1938, which I come back to in the 
next chapter.244 According to Fainsod, these organizations allowed Leninist regimes to attain a 
unique level of organization and indoctrination of youth.245  
Overall, the CCP followed the organizational template set by the CPSU. However, it 
did so according to a different sequence, reflecting the revolutionary potential youth people 
represented in China at the time. The CPSU’s youth organization was established only after the 
soviets took power, in order to manage youth activities over the newly controlled territories and 
to train new communists. By contrast, the Chinese equivalent was founded directly after the 
first communist cell, underlining the major political role taken by young people in China 
following the May Fourth Movement.246 
b)  Loosing independence: from the Socialist Youth League to the 
Communist Youth League 
The Shanghai Socialist Youth League was founded in August 1920, three months after 
the establishment of the first communist cell, also in Shanghai. Chen Duxiu supervised the 
creation of the two organizations with the help of the Comintern agent Voitinsky. According to 
Graziani, the founders decided to coin their youth organization more broadly as socialist, rather 
                                                 
244 Jennifer Liu, “Indoctrinating the Youth: Guomindang Policy on Secondary Education in Wartime China and 
Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2010), 103–108. 
245 Fainsod, “The Komsomols. A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship,” 18–40. 
246 On the difference of importance given to youth organizations in the Russian and Chinese revolution, see : 
Montaperto, “The Chinese Communist Youth League and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth,” 15–21. 
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than communist, to attract a wider range of people from the variety of radical groups which 
emerged after the May Fourth Movement.247 Followed in September the creation of a Beijing 
Socialist Youth League initiated by Li Dazhao, and of another cell in Changsha in January 1921 
under the leadership of Mao Zedong. 248  Similar groups were also established in Tianjin, 
Taiyuan, Guangzhou, and so on.249 While there was some communication between the various 
local youth leagues, transmitting for instance the charter of the Shanghai organization in order 
to facilitate further creations, there was no nationwide organization or hierarchical relationship 
across units. Just like the first communist cells, the SYL units operated autonomously.250  
The First National Congress of the SYL took place in Guangzhou in May 1922.251 
Similarly to the First National Congress of the CCP in July 1921, it was the occasion to create 
a national organization absorbing the existing local cells, the Chinese Socialist Youth League 
(Zhongguo shehui zhuyi qingnian tuan, 中国社会主义青年团).252 Twenty-five delegates were 
assembled, representing fifteen local organizations and five thousand members, as well as the 
Youth Comintern representative Sergei Dalin. At the congress, the SYL formally joined the 
Youth Comintern. The congress approved the “Guiding principles” (gangling, 纲领) of the 
organization, aligned with the Comintern’s political line. In addition to setting age requirements 
for joining the SYL (from 15 to 28 years old), the principles stipulated several goals, such as 
                                                 
247 Graziani, “Youth and the Making of Modern China,” 126. 
248  Kristin Mulready-Stone, Mobilizing Shanghai Youth: CCP Internationalism, GMD Nationalism and Japanese 
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249 Li Yuqi (李玉琦), Short Story of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan shigao, 中
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the mobilization of young people to participate in the liberation from warlordism and 
imperialism as well as the dissemination of socialist principles to all youth. A major mission of 
the SYL was to develop its membership among young Chinese and to infiltrate other youth 
organizations, such as anti-Christian associations or student unions.253  
At the time of the League’s First Congress, there was no clear link between the SYL 
and the CCP. There was no mention of the CCP in SYL documents and no obvious presence of 
CCP leaders.254 The relationship between the two organizations was first put forward by the 
publication by the SYL, in September 1922, of the so-called Document 17 on “the relationship 
between the League and the Chinese Communist Party” (bentuan yu zhongguo gongchandang 
zhi guanxi, 本团与中国共产党之关系). The document described a relationship of cooperation 
but no clear hierarchy between the CCP and the SYL.255 Unsatisfied with the status quo, the 
CCP issued at its Second National Congress in July 1922 its own “Resolution on the question 
of the youth movement” (guanyu shaonian yundong wenti de yi’an, 关于少年运动问题的决
议案). 256 It stated that “the Socialist Youth League should be an independent organization as 
far as the struggle for the economic and educational interests of young workers is concerned, 
while it should restrain itself under agreement with the Chinese Communist Party when it 
comes to political movement.”257  
                                                 
253 Graziani, “Youth and the Making of Modern China,” 134. 
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For the CCP this was a response to the “second Party tendency” (di er dang qingxiang, 
第二党倾向) developing within the SYL. The SYL was bigger than the Party at the time and 
was very active in recruitment and propaganda, especially in areas where no Communist Party 
cell had been established. In May 1922, the SYL had 5,000 members while the CCP only had 
195. Therefore, the SYL was seen as a threat to the Party. Illustrating this tendency, Chen Duxiu 
wrote in Pravda in 1922 that the SYL was more influential than the CCP.258  
In 1923, as the CCP decided to join forces with the KMT in a “united front” against 
warlords and foreign imperialists, it further strengthened its control over the SYL following the 
Comintern’s instructions. At the Third National CCP Congress in June 1923, its relationship 
with the SYL went from one of “agreement” (xieding, 协定) to follow the Party’s line, to one 
of “absolute subordination” (juedui fucong, 绝对服从 ) to the Party leadership. 259  This 
hierarchical relationship was ratified by the SYL at its Second National Congress in August 
1923. At the same time, the Youth League developed its organizational structure and began the 
publication in 1923 of the magazine China Youth (Zhongguo qingnian, 中国青年), which 
became its main propaganda tool, supervised by CCP officials.260 The SYL also followed the 
CCP’s decision to join forces with the KMT and the youth movement was reorganized. A 
Central Youth Bureau was set up as the united front organization in charge of the youth 
movement.261  
From an organization initially detached from the CCP, the SYL was gradually placed 
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under the Party’s control. Symbol of this transformation, at its Third Congress, held in January 
1925 in Shanghai, the Socialist Youth League became the Chinese Communist Youth League 
(Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi qingnian tuan, 中国共产主义青年团; CYL). This new name 
clearly indicated the Party’s leading role.262 
c)  The multiplication and militarization of communist youth 
organizations 
During the first united front between the CCP and the KMT (1923-1927), the CYL was 
repeatedly criticized by the Party for cultivating a tendency towards “vanguardism” (xianfeng 
zhuyi, 先锋主义), seeing itself as more revolutionary than the CCP and trying to assume the 
leading role in the communist movement. However, they were brought together by a common 
enemy:263 when Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) turned against the communists in Shanghai in 
April 1927, the CYL members fought along with the CCP.264 It was the end of the first united 
front and the communist organizations were forced to go underground. Both in bad shape, the 
CYL and the CCP issued a joint statement in December 1927 pushing aside the competition 
between the two organizations. The massive anti-communist repression which followed the 
Shanghai massacre of April 1927, or “white terror”, eventually brought the CYL and the CCP 
closer together.265  
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The invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931 and the Sino-Japanese war that followed 
opened a new chapter in the life of communist youth organizations in China. In 1935, the CCP 
issued a “Decision about youth work” (guanyu qingnian gongzuo de jueding, 关于青年工作
的决定) announcing the transformation of the CYL in an inclusive organization for all patriotic 
young people, communist or not.266 In line with the second united front formed in 1936 between 
the communists and nationalists against Japan, the CYL was transformed into a broad 
militarized organization for national liberation. A meeting of representatives of the youth 
organizations which emerged in red bases was organized in April 1937 in Yan’an, and the North 
West National Salvation Youth Federation (Xibei qingnian jiuguo hui, 西北青年救国会) was 
established. The former CYL stopped its activities during this period.267 
During the war, multiple youth organizations emerged, linked either to the CCP or the 
KMT. These militarized organizations took an active role in the civil war. The CCP created 
youth work committees starting from May 1938, in order to supervise the organizations active 
in the territory it controlled. 268 Some of them were created by the CCP, like the National 
Salvation Youth Federation, others were later absorbed, like the Democratic Youth Alliance 
(Minzhu qingnian tongmeng, 民主青年同盟) created in Kunming in 1944.269  
After the Japanese defeat and the end of the second united front, the various youth 
organizations built for national salvation became useless. In October 1946, the CCP started to 
reorganize them in the territories under its control. Local Democratic Youth Leagues were 
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established under the leadership of the CCP youth work committees, in order to recruit and 
manage young activists. These local groups were an important tool in the CCP’s struggle 
against the KMT, and they served as base for the foundation of the new national communist 
youth organization in 1949.270 
2)  Becoming a bureaucracy: the League as the Party’s core youth 
organization (1949-1966) 
a)  The rebirth of the Communist Youth League as a control 
instrument 
The First Congress of the New Democratic Youth League (Zhongguo xin minzhu zhuyi 
qingniantuan, 中国新民主主义青年团) took place in Beijing in April 1949, two months after 
the CCP took over the city. Three hundred twenty-three delegates were representing the 
190,000 members of the organization. This was the result of a long development process of 
local Democratic Youth Leagues over the national territory since 1946, following the advance 
of the CCP’s military.271 During this process, the main propaganda tool of the League, the 
magazine China Youth, resumed publication in 1948. The  League’s principal newspaper, the 
China Youth Daily (Zhongguo qingnian bao, 中国青年报) was established later in 1951.272 
Also in 1948, the Central Youth League School (zhongyang tuanxiao, 中央团校) was created 
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and missioned to train its cadres.273 In 1949, the charter of the New Democratic Youth League 
was voted by the congress, setting up the overall national organization. It was the beginning of 
the League’s institutionalization process following the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China. 
After 1949, the rules of the organization at the different levels were progressively 
clarified and a new charter was issued in 1957. The League still follows this overall structure 
today. According to its fundamental text, the League is organized similarly to the CCP. National 
Congresses of the League are to be set every four years274 and Central Committee Plenums are 
to be organized every year. Lower level CYL units, provincial and ministerial, send a certain 
number of representatives to the CYL National Congress depending on their size.275 As the 
highest League institution, the National Congress’ main powers are: the evaluation of the 
League’s work since its last meeting, the establishment of the organization’s further direction, 
the modification of its charter, and the election among its members of the League’s Central 
Committee. 276  At the occasion of the Central Committee First Plenum, after the National 
Congress, it selects the Standing Committee and the secretariat. The secretariat is the main 
operational body of the organization, acting in the interim of the Standing Committee.277 It is 
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constituted of a first secretary (diyi shuji, 第一书记), an executive secretary (changwu shuji, 
常务书记) and around 5 additional secretaries278. Several functional departments are then in 
charge of the practical activities of the League. In 1957, 1,493 representatives were present for 
the Third Congress of the New Democratic Youth League. They elected a Central Committee 
of 116 full members as well as 35 alternate members, which in turn selected a Standing 
Committee of 19 and a secretariat of 6.279  
While developing itself as a bureaucracy, the Youth League was brought even more 
tightly under the CCP’s control. As stated in the New Democratic Youth League charter of 
1949, the Youth League is the CCP’s “assistant and reserve force”. This formulation illustrates 
the two official missions of the Youth League: on the one hand the implementation of CCP’s 
policies and the management of youth affairs on behalf of the Party-State, and on the other hand 
providing a training ground for potential CCP members and officials.280 In 1956, the CCP Eight 
Congress issued a new charter for the Party that integrated a section regarding the relationship 
with the Youth League.  It stated that at every level of its hierarchy, the Youth League 
committees were under the leadership of the CCP committee that is at the same level.281 As 
stressed by Funnell, from this moment on, the Youth League’s directives always came from the 
Party. As a symbol of this control of the Party over the youth organization, in 1957, the New 
Democratic Youth League was officially renamed again the Chinese Communist Youth League 
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(CYL).282 With the period of the Great Leap Forward starting in 1958, the CCP became even 
more dominant over the activities of the CYL: all the plans, activities and meetings were 
organized by the Party hierarchy.283 
b)  Laying the organizational basis of a bureaucratic Youth League 
In 1957 were established the organizational rules which are still the basis of the CYL’s 
functioning today. If the age range for membership evolved afterward,284 the process through 
which one becomes a CYL member was designed as a simplified version of the equivalent 
process within the CCP. Like in the CCP, to join the CYL, applicants need to be recommended 
by two CYL members and to formally apply to the CYL branch in their school or work unit.285 
They then go through a monitoring period during which the CYL cadres of the local branch 
investigate their familial and personal background. Regular meetings are therefore organized 
with CYL cadres so they can evaluate the applicants’ commitment. However, this investigation 
process is shorter and less thorough that in the case of the CCP. The overall selection process 
did not fundamentally change since 1957, but the criteria taken into account did evolved. In 
particular, class background is not a selection criteria anymore.286 Starting in 1958, an overall 
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system of archives was established at every level of the CYL in order to keep track of its 
members.287 
The 1957 charter also established the rules for the creation of CYL local units, which 
are still in place today. Following the CCP blueprint, grassroots branches of at least three 
members are the basic units of the organization. The branches (zhibu, 支部) are developed at 
every level of the Party-State hierarchy and in all the places of work and residence where young 
people are present, in particular in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and in schools. To manage the large number of League members, a 
pyramidal organization is constituted: the branches are brought together in general branches 
(zongzhibu, 总支部) when the membership exceeds fifty people, which are in turn organized in 
committees (weiyuanhui, 委员会) when they include more than two hundred members.288  
The charter also set the hierarchical linkages within the organization, and in relation 
with the CCP, which are still ruling the organization today. The different grassroots CYL 
committees are under the supervision of the local committees. These lower level committees 
imitate in their structure the League’s Central Committee.289 Similarly to the central level, the 
committee members are selected by a congress assembled every few years.290 The congress 
members are sent by lower level units of the CYL.291 At the township level, congress members 
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are sent by lower level committees of the CYL and they are set up in various units within the 
county proportionally to the number of their CYL members, such as firms, factories, and 
schools. Then the various township level CYL congresses send representatives for the county 
level CYL congresses which in turn send representatives to the city level congresses, and so on 
up to the National Congress.292 As stressed by Zheng Changzhong, this overall framework has 
been normalized countrywide only since the early 1990s.293  
The overall selection process for CYL congress representatives remains the same today. 
For instance the Peking University CYL Committee, being of the same rank as a CYL 
committee of a Beijing district, sent eight representatives for the Beijing CYL 13th Congress 
in August 2012.294 As shown in my interviews, in practice the name list of the representatives 
goes throughout the upper level CYL committee for acceptance.295 In addition, certain implicit 
quotas are now taken into account while selecting the representatives, in order to have a certain 
number of people from different nationalities, or genders for instance.296 Such quotas are also 
present in leading organs: the CYL committees at the local and provincial levels always include 
one female secretary.297 
Overall, the Youth League has fully integrated the principle of “democratic centralism” 
that characterizes the Communist Party. When the New Democratic Youth League transformed 
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into the Communist Youth League and developed itself as a bureaucracy in charge of youth 
affairs, it also became the core element of a web of youth organizations set up to control 
different sub-groups of young people. In this respect, it replicated the organizational hegemony 
the CCP developed over the different sectors of society within the field of youth issues, through 
its mass organizations and united front structures.298 
3)  The Youth League’s hegemony over youth work 
a)  Expending the Youth League’s reach through an umbrella 
organization 
Several youth organizations were established or reshaped in 1949 with the founding of 
the PRC. They targeted young people outside the reach of the Youth League. The main one was 
the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth (Zhonghua quanguo minzhu qingnian lianhehui, 
中华全国民主青年联合会). As the Youth League was targeting “politically advanced” youth, 
the CCP saw the need for a broader organization aiming at supervising young people more 
widely. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth was thus created as an umbrella 
organization encompassing other youth groups, including the Youth League but also the Young 
Pioneers and the Student Federation.299 Its First Congress was held in Beijing in May 1949. It 
then became in 1958, the All-China Youth Federation (Zhonghua qinglian lianhehui, 中华青
年联合会; ACYF) and still exists as such today.300 
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Since 1949, the CYL has been officially defined as the core (hexin, 核心) of the 
ACYF.301 As Barnett put it, in addition to helping the CCP in implementing its policies, the 
CYL members “function as a sort of secondary elite acting under the direction of the even 
smaller Party elite and extending the Party's influence throughout the entire web of youth 
organizations.”302 In practice, the ACYF Chairman is, since 1949, also the Executive Secretary 
of the CYL Central Committee, the number two of the League. Also, the ACYF Secretary-
General, in charge of day-to-day activities, is at the same time the CYL United Front Work 
Department Director.303 Local Youth Federations have also been established since 1949 at the 
provincial, city, and sometimes even at the county levels. It is then the local CYL secretary who 
chairs them. Also, the ACYF is financially dependent on the CYL.304 
The ACYF has functioned since its creation as a united front organization for the 
CYL,305 meaning that its mission is to coopt non-communist youth and to make them participate 
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in CYL’s youth work.306 The ACYF still plays this role today. The ACYF is a consultative body 
for the CYL. In practice the ACYF does not have its own activities or organizational life besides 
the one of the League. Its relationship with the CYL is often compared to the one of the CCP 
with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).307 This Conference is 
an advisory body. While it has no legislative power, it makes legislative suggestions and reports 
regarding different sectors of society. Local Political Consultative Conferences can also be 
found at every echelon of the Party-State. At the central level, the CPPCC Chairman is usually 
the number four of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, and its highest ranked Deputy 
Chairman is the United Front Work Department Director. This Conference embodies the 
Party’s united front strategy. It is a discussion platform between the CCP and non-Party elites, 
such as economic, intellectual or religious elites. It is constituted by representatives of the CCP 
as well as by representatives of the eight democratic parties and other civil organizations.308 
Since the 1990s, the CCP representatives do not exceed around a third of the seats.309  
The overall rules of the ACYF were set in the 1950s and still shape its present 
functioning. Just like the CYL, a ACYF congress is organized every five years to supervise the 
Federation’ work as well as to select its Central Committee, which include around 1000 
members. A Standing Committee of roughly 200 members is also selected. The selected Central 
Committee members can be up to 40 years old and the Standing Committee members up to 
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45.310 The ACYF congress takes place a few months after the CYL’s, which allows for the 
integration of its newest directives. 311  Just like for the CPPCC, the selection of potential 
committee members is far from transparent. 312  As explained to me by a national ACYF 
representative, the selection is highly controlled by the CYL’s United Front Department. At the 
level of a county, or a city district, the local CYL United Front Work Department suggests 
young people to become representatives. These candidates are generally elected without 
problem by the local Youth Federation. Following the CYL’s model, every district, county, or 
county level organizations send representatives to the city level Youth Federation, then again 
to the provincial and finally national level.313  
The ACYF Committee Plenums, which are assembled once a year, are presented as 
mostly ceremonial and with little content besides hearing the work report from the previous 
year. In my interviews, the ACYF is often portrayed as a public relations tool for CYL leaders. 
By presenting them as Youth Federation chairmen rather than Youth League secretaries, they 
can show a more neutral face to foreign visitors in particular.314 Also, as I develop in the Third 
Part of the Dissertation, with no real political influence, membership to the ACYF is mostly an 
issue of prestige and network building for its members. 
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b)  Controlling the schools through the Young Pioneers of China 
and the All-China Student Federation 
Two other major youth organizations under the umbrella of the ACYF are the Young 
Pioneers of China and the All-China Student Federation, targeting both specific subgroups: 
children and students. The Young Pioneers of China (Zhongguo shaonian xianfeng dui, 中国
少年先锋队) was created in January 1949 and soon became part of the Youth Federation. It 
was established in the continuity of previous children organizations under the tutelage of the 
Youth League, such as the Children Worker Corps (Laodong ertong tuan, 劳动儿童团) from 
the 1920s.315 In 1949, its members were between nine and fifteen years old.316 The age range 
has now changed to six to fourteen years old.317   
In addition to the organization’s membership to the ACYF itself, managed by the CYL, 
the Pioneers are under the League’s direct supervision. Since 1957, a section in the CYL charter 
has been dedicated to the Pioneers, explaining that they are to follow the League’s directives 
and that the CYL selects and trains the advisors in charge of managing the young pioneers in 
their schools318. This hierarchical relationship remains today. In 2004, around 4.8 million 
advisors oversaw more than 100 million pioneers, which included almost all children between 
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six and fourteen years old enrolled in schools.319 Young pioneers are potential future Youth 
league members. As Funnell put it, “if the League was a ‘school for the study of communism,’ 
then the Pioneers were the kindergarten.”320 
From the CCP’s perspective, the development of an organization specifically directed 
to students, as the future intellectual elite of the country, was also important to reach as many 
young people as possible. Therefore in 1949, an All-China Student Federation (Zhonghua 
quanguo xuesheng lianhehui, 中华全国学生联合会) was brought under the ACYF umbrella. 
The first national student association was created in 1919 in Shanghai, in relation to the May 
Fourth Movement. While it had relationships at time with the Youth League and the CCP, it 
also was in contact with the KMT. The Student Federation was in fact never clearly aligned 
with the communist organizations before the 1940s. Its 14th Congress in 1949, and its affiliation 
to the ACYF, constituted a big change for the All-China Student Federation.321  
The overall structure of the Student Federation was set in 1949, following the 
framework set by the CYL organization, and still shapes its functioning today.322 Just like the 
ACYF, the All-China Student Federation is constituted of smaller organizations rather than 
individuals: it is an umbrella organization for the student unions in the different high schools 
and universities across the country. It is present at the national, provincial, and sometimes city 
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or prefectural levels. 323 Student Federation chairmen are student leaders of the best schools of 
the country. At the national level, the chairman is, since 1956, alternatively the Student Union 
Chairman of Peking University or of Tsinghua University. At the provincial level, it is generally 
the student union chairman of the province’s best university who is in charge. 324  As part of the 
ACYF, the Student Federation is under the supervision of the CYL. In practice, the ACYF 
General Secretary, who actually manages the organization as the chairman is still a college 
student, is the Central CYL Schools Department Director. 325  In the Second Part of the 
dissertation I detail the functioning of student unions on campus.  
c)  Anti-bureaucracy: the Cultural Revolution and the 
dismantlement of the Youth League 
After the establishment of the PRC and until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution 
in 1966, the Youth League remained the main mass organization of the Party in charge of youth 
activities, as well as the core of its youth organizations. In May 1966, the movement of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was launched under Mao Zedong’s initiative. As 
described by Funnell, at every stage of the movement the Youth League suffered the same 
attacks as the CCP. The Beijing CYL Committee was purged in June 1966, few weeks after the 
Beijing CCP Committee.326  
                                                 
323 Lü Lili (吕丽莉), “Study on the Democratic Construction of College Student Organizations (gaoxiao xuesheng 
zuzhi de minzhu jianshe, 高校学生组织的民主建设)” (PhD Dissertation, Liaoning University, 2012), 29–30; Hu 
Xianzhong (胡献忠), The CYL in a transforming society (shehui biange zhong de gongqingtuan, 社会变革中的
共青团), 81. 
324 I come back in Chapter Four on the education and career history of ACYF Chairmen and their provincial 
counterparts (Source: the CVs of the former ACYF Chairmen, available on Xinhua.cn). 
325 Kou, “CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of 
Channeling Cadres,” 85. 
326 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949–1966,” 105. 
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In August 1966, the CYL Central Committee and secretariat were purged. Hu Yaobang, 
then CYL Central Committee First Secretary, was accused of revisionism and dismissed.327 
The actual demise of the CYL occurred in January 1967 as the Red Guards328 seized power 
over the organization. After that, the CYL only existed on paper: it was replaced by the Red 
Guards as the regime’s main political tool for managing youth.329 CYL local units only started 




                                                 
327 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 69. 
328 The Red Guards were a multiplicity of paramilitary youth organizations mobilized by Mao Zedong in 1966 and 
1967, during the Cultural Revolution. On the demise of the CYL by the red guards, see: Leader, “The Communist 
Youth League and the Cultural Revolution.” 
329 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 82. 
330 Graziani, “Youth and the Making of Modern China.” 
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B -  Neither a NGO nor a ministry: the Youth League in post-Mao 
China 
Reviewing the developments of the Youth League until 1966, we saw how it 
transformed itself from a revolutionary organization, into a bureaucratized mass organization. 
We also highlighted that, since 1925, it has constantly been under the Party’s control. In the 
second part of this chapter I focus on the reestablishment of the organization after the Cultural 
Revolution and its development until the time of my fieldwork, in the mid 2010s. Getting into 
the details of the organizational structure and its activities, I stress clear continuities with the 
previous period, especially regarding the CYL’s relationship with the CCP. The organizational 
structure of the League and the basis for its membership expansion established in the first years 
of the PRC have not fundamentally changed since. More precisely, I show that the CYL has, 
despite its enormous membership, little autonomy and decision-making power over youth work. 
The CYL cannot be compared to a Non-governmental organization (NGO), as it is too close to 
the Party-State and financially dependent on it. It is also not a Youth Affairs Ministry as it has 
no State power and it cannot initiate a policy or directly propose laws regarding youth affairs. 
Overall, it remains merely a mass organization under Party control.  
Tracing the League main activities back to the first years of the PRC until the mid 2010s, 
I highlight continuities in its working style. I show that, while some new activities were 
developed since the 1980s by the CYL and especially by the sub-organizations it established, 
in large part the practices inherited from the Mao period are simply recycled, framed and 
presented in a new way in order to keep attracting young people. It allows the League to 
maintain its hegemony over youth affairs management in the Chinese system.  
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1)  Back to the basics: a Party-like organization to manage Chinese 
youth 
a)  Rebuilding the Youth League to close the parenthesis of the 
Cultural Revolution 
After 1966, the Communist Youth League stopped its activities for the first years of the 
Cultural Revolution. It is only in October 1969 that the CCP launched its reconstruction. 
Between 1970 and 1973, CYL committees at the grassroots and the county levels were 
progressively reestablished and new members recruited.331 Starting in 1973, CYL provincial 
committees were rebuilt.332 During this period the CYL was under the control of the leftist 
faction of the CCP. As noted by Healy, one of the first CYL committee reestablished was in 
Hulin County in Heilongjiang Province, famous at the time for its leftist leadership.333  
With the end of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong’s death and the succession 
struggle that followed, the central organization of the CYL was reorganized in 1978. In October 
1978, the Tenth National Congress of the organization was convened, fourteen years after the 
Ninth.334 The central CYL was reestablished and a new charter was issued. Regarding the 
organization’s basic structure, it replicated by and large the rules established in 1957. Until 
today, no major change to the overall organization is noticeable. Figure 1.2 represents the 
organization of the central CYL in 2015. In addition to the Leadership organs which I 
mentioned earlier, we can here see the different sub-units of the CYL dedicated to specific tasks.  
 
                                                 
331 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 87. 
332 Leader, “The Communist Youth League and the Cultural Revolution,” 709. 
333 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 88. 
334 Rosen, “Prosperity, Privatization, and China’s Youth,” 4. 
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Figure 1.2: The central level Communist Youth League’s organizational structure335 
 
 
The central CYL has now nine functional departments in charge of the various missions 
of the organization. Five departments oversee specific activities of the organization, targeted at 
certain groups of young people or aspects of youth life. The Juvenile Department is in charge 
of children work and deals with the Young Pioneers of China. The Urban Youth Work 
Department and its rural counterpart oversee specific activities targeting these different groups 
of young people. The Schools Department is in charge of the relationship with CYL committees 
in high schools and universities. Finally, the Youth Rights Protection Department deals with 
juridical issues and serves as a communication platform with the legal institutions for cases of 
youth crime or youth mistreatment.336 
The four other departments are standard organs which can also be found in the CCP 
central organization. The Organization Department manages the inner workings of the 
organization and its human resources. The Propaganda Department deals with the circulation 
of the official message and the promotion of the activities of the CYL. The United Front Work 
                                                 
335 Wu Qing (吴庆), Guide towards League Spirit 2012 (tuanqing zhinan, 团情指南 2012) (Beijing: China Youth 
Press, 2012), 250. 







































Department oversees the relationship with the non CYL groups, and more particularly manages 
the All-China Youth Federation. Finally, the International Liaison Department supervises the 
relationships with foreign organizations. 
In addition to these functional departments, just like the CCP organization, the CYL has 
a General Office which oversees several smaller offices, for instance the office in charge of the 
organization’s finances or the one regrouping the leaders’ aids. With some local adaptations, 
this overall organization is reproduced at the CYL lower echelons, from the provincial level 
down.  
Beyond its own organizational structure, the central CYL is directly in charge of twenty 
other units controlling various services. For instance, just like the Party, the CYL has its own 
school, the Central Youth League School, which trains the organization’s officials,337 and its 
own press agency, the Chinese Youth press agency (Zhongguo qingnian baoshe, 中国青年报
社).338 This press agency, as well as the CYL’s publishing house China Youth Press (Zhongguo 
qingnian chubanshe, 中国青年出版社), are in charge of the printed propaganda of the CYL. 
Its two main publications are the newspaper China Youth Daily and the magazine China Youth. 
As the most important propaganda organs of the Youth League, they aim at systematically 
educate the younger generation according to the League’s directives, as well as conveying the 
organization’s instructions and policies to lower level units all over the country.339  
They both stopped publication in 1966, when the CYL virtually disappeared, and they 
started to publish again in 1978. The China Youth Daily is still one of the most important 
                                                 
337 I come back to the CYL cadres training in the Third Part of the dissertation. 
338 Ibid., 51. 
339 Regarding the content of the magazine China Youth during the Mao era, see : Townsend, The Revolutionization 
of Chinese Youth: A Study of Chung-Kuo Ch’ing-Nien. 
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newspapers in China, with a circulation of around one million copies a day.340 While their 
content progressively evolved with the market liberalization, 341  they remained the main 
propaganda organs of the CYL, diffusing information about its activities and its organizational 
life. With the economic reforms these publications have only partially evolved, similarly to the 
major CCP propaganda organs, such as the People’s Daily.342 The CYL organization overall 
follows the blueprint of the Party and its evolutions. I detail in Chapter Six how this can also 
be noticed at the lower levels of the organization and how it is tied to the transformation of the 
CYL cadres’ profile. 
b)  The more the better: the quantitative development of the 
organization  
After its reestablishment in 1978, the Youth League also pursued the expansion of its 
membership and local structures all over the country. The figures in Table 1.1 represent this 
quantitative expansion. While these official statistics remain questionable in their accuracy, 
they give us a glimpse of the large trends and evolutions within the League. Since 1949, the 
Youth League has constantly increased its membership as well as its local implantation with 
more cadres and grassroots units. While soon after the establishment of the New Democratic 
Youth League in 1949 its membership was still low, it then quickly surpassed the Party’s. In 
the 1950s, the Youth League membership was largely superior to the Party’s. The membership 
                                                 
340 See the official presentation of the China Youth Daily, on its website: 
http://www.cyol.net/home/english/intro/daily.htm (consulted on 17 February 2016). 
341 According to a systematic study of the content of the magazine China Youth between 1980 and 2009, its articles 
are less about politics and more about economic issues. It increasingly targets a urban and cultivated audience 
from the coastal parts of the country (Wang Xiaodao (王晓焘), “Evolution of the Characteristics of Youth Media 
(qingnian meiti xingxiang de techeng yu bianqian, 青年媒体形象的特征与变迁),” China Youth Studies 4 (2011): 
54–60. 
342  On the evolution of the CCP’s propaganda organs since the 1980s, see : Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing 
Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 
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expansion was particularly rapid at that time, going from three to twenty-five million members 
between 1950 and 1959.343 
But starting in the 1960s the increase has gone slower relative to the exploding numbers 
of Party members. Healy underlined that at that time the organization’s main goal was 
consolidation, and especially the strengthening of the League in rural areas, rather than 
membership expansion.344 Interestingly, local structures of the Youth League remained active 
during the Cultural Revolution and the organization membership did not collapse between 1966 
and 1978. Due to the recruitment waves of the early 1970s that I mentioned earlier, the figure 
increased over this period.  
                                                 
343 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949–1966,” 114. 
344 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 65. 
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Table 1.1: Quantitative evolution of the CYL organization (1949-2013)345 




 6th 1949 4.5 million 190 000 missing missing 
 7th 1953 6.4 million 9 million missing 380,000 
8th 1957 11 million 23 million 80,000 920,000 
9th 1964 18 million 32 million missing 1,300,000 
10th 1978 36 million 48 million 150,200 2,127,000 
11th 1982 39 million 48 million 184,716 2,265,000 
12th 1988 47 million 56 million 208,027 2,569,000 
13th 1993 53 million 56 million 227,546 2,700,000 
14th 1998 61 million 68 million 213,695 2,766,000 
15th 2003 68 million 69 million 183,000 3,157,000 
16th 2008 75 million 75 million 190,000 2,946,000 
17th 2013 85 million 89 million 250,000 3,590,000 
 
                                                 
345 The indicated figures are the ones officially released at the given year, which generally cover the actual statistics 
of the previous year. Some figures were not available regarding the number of CYL cadres or local units. Sources 
for the Table : “Collection of the yearly League statistics, (tuan linian shuju tongji huizong,  团历年数据统计汇
总 )”, CCP News website, available on : http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/242358/242770/17735465.html 
(consulted on 18 February 2016) ; “China's Communist Party Membership Exceeds 85 million,” Xinhua, July 1, 
2013 ; “Comrade Wang Zhaoguo’s Work Report at the 11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth 
League (Wang Zhaoguo tongzhi zai Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi qingniantuan di shiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui 
shang de gongzuo baogao, 王兆国同志在中国共产主义青年团第十一次全国代表大会上的工作报告),” 
Congress of the CYL, 20 December 1982 ; “Comrade Li Keqiang’s Report at the 13th Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Youth League (Li Keqiang tongzhi zai Gongqingtuan di shisan ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de 
baogao, 李克强同志在共青团第十三次全国代表大会上的报告),” Congress of the CYL, 03 May 1993 ; 
“Report at the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zai Gongqingtuan di shisi ci quanguo 
daibiao dahui shang de baogao, 在共青团第十四次全国代表大会上的报告),” Congress of the CYL, 19 June 
1998 ; “Report at the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zai Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingnian tuan di shiwu ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao, 在中国共产主义青年团第十五次全
国代表大会上的报告),” Congress of the CYL, 22 July 2003 ; Li Yuanchao, “Speech at the first Plenum of the 
17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zai Gongqingtuan shiqi jie yi zhongquanhui shang de 
jianghua, 在共青团十七届一中全会上的讲话),” China Youth Daily, June 24, 2013; “Report at the 16th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zai Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi qingnian tuan di shiliu ci 
quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao, 在中国共产主义青年团第十六次全国代表大会上的报告 ),” 
Congress of the CYL, 10 June 2008. Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949–1966,” 128; 
Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 66; Shaoguang Wang and Jianyu He, “Training Ground 
for Democracy : Associational Life in China,” in State and Civil Society the Chinese Perspective, ed. Zhenglai 
Deng (Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific, 2010), 271–310; Lance Gore, The Chinese Communist 
Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of the Market (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 3; Zhang Hua (张华), Studies on the functions of the Communist Youth League of China 
(Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan zhineng yanjiu, 中国共产主义青年团职能研究), 167. 
346  No data is available for the whole period regarding the number of part-time CYL cadres, who are not 
remunerated as CYL officials. 
347 The local units include the local CYL branches, general branches, as well as committees. 
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The CYL and CCP memberships eventually reached quasi equality in the 1990s, and 
since then they tended to evolve at a similar trend. As it only includes young people, the CYL 
membership represents a much large percentage of its targeted demographic than the CCP 
membership.348 Since 1982, the CYL membership has been more or less equal to 25% of 
Chinese young people between 14 and 28 years old.349 The organization hence expanded its 
coverage compared to the 1950s and 1960s when it represented around 20% of its age group.350 
In fact, since the late 1980s, the competition to enter the CYL is largely presented as less fierce. 
According to Rosen, entry in the CYL is less competitive as membership itself does not bring 
any advantages in terms of access to education or jobs.351 As I highlight in the different chapters 
of the dissertation, this is far from true for people who actually work for the CYL as cadres, 
and are not mere members. 
The CYL also followed the evolution of the CCP regarding its social composition. Gore 
showed that the number of workers and peasants drastically decreased within the CCP since the 
1920s. In 2008, the workers only amounted to 9.7% of its membership and the peasants to 
31.1%. The remainder includes mostly professionals from the service sector, Party-State 
officials and retirees.352 Following this same trend, in 2007 only 7.3% of the CYL membership 
                                                 
348 In 2015, the CCP membership only represented 6.54% of the overall Chinese population (Statistics regarding 
CCP membership can be found on the website Statista: http://www.statista.com/statistics/250090/share-of-
chinese-communist-party-ccp-members-in-chinese-population/ (consulted on 10 August 2016)). 
349 “Comrade Wang Zhaoguo’s Work Report at the 11 th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth 
League (Wang zhaoguo tongzhi zai Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi qingniantuan di shiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui 
shang de gongzuo baogao, 王兆国同志在中国共产主义青年团第十一次全国代表大会上的工作报告),” 
Congress of the CYL, 20 December 1982 ; Sofia Graziani, “A Study of China’s Communist Youth League 
Adaptation in the Reform Era (1978-2011)” (New European Research on Contemporary China Conference, 
Beijing, 2012). 
350 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 50; Pringsheim, “The Functions of the Chinese 
Communist Youth Leagues (1920–1949),” 15. 
351 Stanley Rosen, “Students and the State in China: The Crisis in Ideology and Organization,” in State and Society 
in China: The Consequences of Reform, ed. Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 167–191. 
352 Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of the Market, 
133. 
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came from the industry sector and 26.9% from young peasants. The service sector stood for 
14.4% of the total membership. Most of the CYL membership was made of students (51.3%).353 
By comparison, in 1954, half of the CYL’s membership was constituted of rural youth.354 In 
addition, the gender proportion is rather balanced, with 46.2% of female members in 2007.355 
The expansion of the CYL membership went together with an increasing number of 
local units of the organization, and of CYL cadres. Still, starting in the 1990s, the number of 
CYL officials dropped. This is linked to the reforms of public-sector enterprises launched in 
1997, which led to the dismantlement of several SOEs and hence CYL units.356 It then started 
to increase again in the 2000s. It is important to note that the figures given here are for full-time 
CYL officials who manage the organization at its different echelons and get a salary for it. In 
numerous cases, in most State-owned enterprises for instance, the CYL units are fully or partly 
managed by part-time cadres who also have another position to which their salary is attached. 
This practice is extremely widespread and I come back to it in the Second Part of the dissertation 
in the case of SOEs. A study of county level CYL committees noted that, in 2008, they had on 
average only two full-time cadres, in addition to several part-time ones. 357  In 2013 the 
organization numbered overall 500,000 part-time cadres in addition to its 250,000 full-time 
                                                 
353 “The CYL Membership has Already Reached 75,439,000 (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan tuanyuan renshu yi dadao 
7543.9 wan, 中国共青团团员人数已达到 7543.9 万人),” Xinhua, May 4, 2008. It can be accessed here: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-05/04/content_8104045.htm (consulted on 18 August 2016). 
354 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 38. 
355 “The CYL Membership has Already Reached 75,439,000 (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan tuanyuan renshu yi dadao 
7543.9 wan, 中国共青团团员人数已达到 7543.9万人).” 
356 Research team of the CYL (tuan zhongyang ketizu, 团中央课题组), “Opportunities and Reactions Faced by 
the CYL Organization in a Liberalizing Economy (shichang jingji tiaojianxia Gongqingtuan zuzhi mianlin de jiyu, 
tiaozhan yu duice, 市场经济条件下共青团基层组织面临的机遇、挑战与对策),” China Youth Studies 1 (2001): 
39–46. 
357  Zhang Hua (张华 ), Studies on the functions of the Communist Youth League of China (Zhongguo 
gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan zhineng yanjiu, 中国共产主义青年团职能研究), 167. 
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officials.358 Still, these figures remain extremely low compared to the number of members these 
cadres are supposed to manage. It should be noted that for similarly high membership figures, 
the number of CYL cadres is particularly low compared to the CCP cadre corps. In 2013, the 
CYL had 250,000 full time officials to manage 89 million members, and the CCP had 27 million 
officials for 85 million CCP members. While these figures are not completely comparable as it 
is impossible to really dissociate Party and State officials, this gap highlights the CYL’s lack 
of organizational power.359 
Despite its very large membership base, I now highlight the ways in which the CCP 
maintains a tight control over its youth organization. The organization’s “lack of power and 
lack of funds” (meiquan meiqian, 没权没钱) was stressed by all my interviewees, from the 
different levels of the organization. 
  
                                                 
358 Li Yuanchao, “Speech at the First Plenum of the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zai 
Gongqingtuan shiqi jie yi zhongquanhui shang de jianghua, 在共青团十七届一中全会上的讲话).” 
359 The figure of 27 million given by Cabestan is based on official Chinese sources and includes the Party-State 
cadres (who are around 60 million in total) who are at the same time Party members. Based on a publication of the 
CCP Central Organization Department, Brødsgaard reported the figure of 40 million Party-State cadres in 1998, 
among which 15 million were Party members (Cabestan, Le système politique chinois: un nouvel équilibre 
autoritaire [The Chinese political system: a new authoritarian equilibrium], 403; Brødsgaard, “Management of 
Party Cadres in China,” 73.   
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2)  The dependence of the Youth League is engraved in its structure 
a)  The League ‘s “lack of power” 
The CYL’s activities, its leadership and its budget are controlled by the CCP.360 This 
relationship of dependence towards the CCP is well exemplified by the organization of the CYL 
National Congresses. Since 1982, the CYL congress always meets three to nine months after 
the CCP congress and its content mirrors the one of the CCP. For instance, the 18th Congress 
of the CCP took place in November 2012 and the 17th Congress of the CYL in June 2013. 
In addition to leadership change, the National Congress is the occasion for the CYL to 
incorporate the new political direction given by the CCP.  Since the 1980s, a CCP Politburo 
Standing Committee member, who oversees the relationship with the CYL, gives an opening 
speech presenting the Party’s expectations to the CYL representatives. This task fell to Hu Qili 
in 1988,361 to Hu Jintao in 1993362 and 1998,363 to Wu Guangzheng in 2003,364 to Li Changchun 
                                                 
360 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 20 June 2013. 
361  “The 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi 
qingniantuan di shi’er quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十二次全国代表大会),” Website of the 
central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
362  “The 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi 
qingniantuan di shisan quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十三次全国代表大会),” Website of the 
central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
363  “The 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi 
qingniantuan di shisi quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十四次全国代表大会),” Website of the 
central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
364  “The 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi 
qingniantuan di shiwu quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十五次全国代表大会),” Website of the 
central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
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in 2008365 and to Liu Yunshan in 2013.366 The short delay in-between CCP and CYL congresses 
also allows the CYL to integrate into its charter the new Party’s political theories and slogans. 
Jiang Zemin’s theory of the “three represents” (sange daibiao, 三个代表),367 ratified by the 
16th Party Congress in 2002,368 was for instance included within the CYL’s charter at its 15th 
Congress in 2003. 369  Also, Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng, 中国梦 ), 
popularized since the end of 2012,370 was added to the CYL’s charter at its 17th Congress in 
2013.371  
In addition to controlling its agenda, the CCP selects the CYL leaders at every echelon 
of the organization. At the central level, while the CYL secretaries are formally elected by its 
Central Committee, it is in practice the CCP leaders who select them as these are key positions. 
The decision is made at the level of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, and largely 
                                                 
365  “The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi 
qingniantuan di shiliu quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十六次全国代表大会),” Website of the 
central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
366  “The 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi 
qingniantuan di shiqi quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十七次全国代表大会),” Website of the 
central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
367 The “three represents” is a political theory introduced by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The theory led to a major shift 
in the Party’s recruitment policy, expanding it to businessmen from the private sector. On the “three represents”, 
see : Fewsmith, “Studying the Three Represents.” 
368 “Synopsis of the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party” (Zhongguo gongchandang di shiliu 
ci quanguo daibiao dahui jianjie, 中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会简介),” Website of the central CCP 
(http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/6346418.html, consulted on 2 December 2015). 
369 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 26 July 2003. 
370 Besides mirroring the idea of an American dream, this formula put forward by Xi Jinping remains unclear in 
its practical implications. On the “Chinese Dream” and the debate regarding its implications, see:  “Xi Jinping and 
the Chinese Dream,” The Economist, May 4, 2013. 
371 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 20 June 2013. 
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influenced by its member in charge of the relationship with the CYL.372 The CYL lower ranked 
cadres, the department directors and below, are managed by the organization itself.  
This configuration is reproduced at the lower levels of the organization, in local CYL 
committees, such as at the provincial or municipal level, but also within units, such as firms or 
schools.373 A local CYL committee is under the “leadership” (lingdao, 领导) of both the upper 
level CYL committee and the CCP committee at the same level. 374 The CCP committees 
actually manage at every level the CYL committees, on a similar pattern as at the central 
echelon. A CCP deputy secretary at the local level oversees the relationship with the CYL375 
while the CCP committee is responsible for the promotion of the local CYL secretary and 
deputy secretaries.376 The latter are treated just like local CCP department directors. According 
to the “one level downward” cadre management system (xia guan yi ji, 下管一级 ), the 
department directors - being one full rank below the Party committee secretary - are under the 
leadership of the CCP secretary who makes appointment and promotion decision with the help 
of the Organization Department.377 
  
                                                 
372 Interview with cadre 9, also see : Kou, “CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations 
or Organizational Mission of Channeling Cadres,” 90. 
373 The CYL also has cells in the People’s Liberation Army. The situation is there partly different as in addition to 
the dual control of the CCP committee and the upper level CYL committee, it is also under the power of the Youth 
Section of the PLA’s Political Department. The activities of the CYL in the military are therefore highly controlled 
by the PLA itself (Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949–1966,” 123. 
374 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 20 June 2013. 
375 Interviews with cadre 28, cadre 37, cadre 42. 
376 Kou, “The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and Their Paths to the Top,” 144. 
377 On the “one level downward” cadre management system, see :Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in 
China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era, 88; Qingjie Zeng, “Democratic 
Procedures in the CCP’s Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences,” The China Quarterly, 
November 2015, 1–27. 
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While the upper level CYL unit has a supervision function, it has very little power. 
According to my interviews, the main channels through which the upper level CYL committee 
can influence the units below is by transmitting to the relevant CCP committee a bad evaluation 
of the CYL cadres or by limiting the exceptional funding it can give for specific activities. If a 
local CYL committee must choose between conflicting orders given by the upper level CYL 
committee and by the local CCP committee, it will follow the Party.378 I come back to the 
evaluation procedure of CYL officials and the role played by the upper level CYL organ in 
Chapter Six. 
At the level of the CYL officials themselves this control is palpable. The CYL leaders 
are both CYL and CCP members. Since 1982, the maximum limit of 28 years old for CYL 
                                                 


















membership is officially not applicable to CYL cadres.379 As long as they work in the CYL, 
they remain members and have to pay their membership dues. Since the same year, the CCP’s 
charter stipulates that at the local level, including within enterprises or service units, the CYL 
secretaries must be CCP members.380 It guarantees the Party’s control over the CYL leadership. 
This dual affiliation system also exists for CYL members who enter the CCP: until 28 years old 
they can retain membership in the CYL along with Party membership. Past 28 years old they 
are not CYL members anymore, unless they are CYL cadres.381 
A reform was proposed in the 1980s in order to change this situation of dependence of 
the League from the Party. A wider reform proposal put forward by Zhao Ziyang, in 1987 then 
the Party Central Committee General Secretary, included recommendations for a greater 
autonomy for mass organizations. In 1988, it took shape into a plan for a reform of the CYL, 
involving more internal democracy and decision power over its own activities.382 The reform 
plan was set aside after the repression of the Tiananmen movement in 1989.383 The repression 
of 1989 had in fact a strong impact on the CYL.  
                                                 
379 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 24 December 1982. 
380  “Charter of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng, 中国共产党章程 )”, 
Congress of the CCP, 6 September 1982. 
381 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 20 June 2013. 
382  “Basic Considerations Regarding the Systematic Reform of the Communist Youth League (guanyu 
Gongqingtuan tizhigaige de jiben shexiang, 关于共青团体制改革的基本设想),” Central CYL, 30 August 1988. 
383 This document in particular called for the strengthening of Party control over the mass organizations: “Notice 
of the Central CCP Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the Party’s Leadership over the Work of the 
Trade Union, the CYL and the Women Federation (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang he gaishan dang dui 
Gonghui, Gongqingtuan, Fulian gongzuo lingdao de tongzhi,  中共中央关于加强和改善党对工会、共青团、
妇联工作领导的通知),” Central CCP, 21 December 1989. On the reform plan and how it was not implemented, 
see: Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 235; Graziani, “A Study of China’s Communist Youth 
League Adaptation in the Reform Era (1978-2011).” 
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The Tiananmen movement was seen as a symbol of the failure of the CYL’s control 
over the youth. It was particularly criticized as being indulgent towards the students and too 
loosely organized in the 1980s.384 Rosen noted that a conference on CYL work in 1980 admitted 
that 30% of the 2.2 million local units countrywide were badly organized or even paralyzed.385 
Ch’i reported that in 1984, only a minority of grassroots CYL secretaries were CCP members 
as it was in theory the rule.386 This lack of political control allowed certain League officials to 
attempt rather liberal initiatives. The publication in 1980 by the League’s newspaper, China 
Youth Daily, of a letter by Pan Xiao regarding the condition of young people in China was such 
an attempt.387 The letter was seen as critical of the current situation and Party-State policies. It 
triggered an intense debate as the newspaper received over 60.000 letters in the six months that 
followed, symbolizing the declining political orthodoxy within the CYL at the time.388  
As a parallel, Dingxin Zhao and Xueliang Ding highlighted the declining control 
capacity of the CYL on campus before the Tiananmen movement. According to Zhao, the 
CCP’s youth organizations on campus became “amphibious” in the 1980s: they were captured 
and diverted from their original role of student control.389 For example, campus CYL units 
organized reformist conferences and supported liberal journals.390 In addition to providing them 
                                                 
384 Li, “China’s Youth League Faction: Incubus of Power?” 
385 Rosen, “Prosperity, Privatization, and China’s Youth,” 15. 
386 Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 148. 
387 Pan Xiao is actually the contraction of the names of the two real young authors Pan Xiaoju (黄晓菊) and Pan 
Yi (潘祎) (interview with academic 6). 
388 For more details on the letter and the debate that followed, see : Rosen, “Prosperity, Privatization, and China’s 
Youth,” 12; Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 111. 
389  Zhao, “Decline of Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student 
Movement,” 170. 
390 Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989, 99. 
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with mobilization capabilities, the youth organizations on campus helped to develop the 
students’ political culture.391 This amphibiousness of the organizations eventually became a 
facilitating element towards the 1989 movement. 392  However, this relaxation of political 
control was only a parenthesis during which CYL units won some autonomy in practice. The 
Repression of 1989 brought it back to its former situation, under the CCP’s rule. 
b)  The League’s “lack of money” 
Another feature of the CYL’s organizational weakness is its lack of funds. As 
acknowledged by the CYL’s own researchers, it is considered a poor organization.393 When 
comparing with another of the Party’s mass organizations, the 2015 budget of the central CYL 
(583 million RMB) stands for only 26.4% of the 2015 budget of the All-China Federation of 
Trade Union (2 billion RMB).394 As noted by Zhang Hua, the ACFTU has a large source of 
revenue protected by the Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China. 395  Every 
                                                 
391 Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political Culture : Official Student Politics at Beijing University”; 
Wasserstrom and Liu, “Student Associations and Mass Movements.” 
392  Zhao, “Decline of Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student 
Movement,” 161; Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989, 99; Wasserstrom 
and Liu, “Student Associations and Mass Movements,” 362–93. 
393 Research team of the CYL (tuan zhongyang ketizu, 团中央课题组), “Opportunities and Reactions Faced by 
the CYL Organization in a Liberalizing Economy (shichang jingji tiaojianxia Gongqingtuan zuzhi mianlin de jiyu, 
tiaozhan yu duice, 市场经济条件下共青团基层组织面临的机遇、挑战与对策),” 42. 
394 “2015 Budget of the Central CYL (Gongqingtuan zhongyang 2015 nian bumen yusuan, 共青团中央 2015年
部门预算),” Central CYL website, April 17, 2015 (http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201504/t20150417_738048.htm, 
consulted on 22 February 2016); “Explication of the ACFTU’s Budget (Zhonghua quanguo zonggonghui bumen 
yusuan shuoming 中 华 全 国 总 工 会 部 门 预 算 说 明 ).” ACFTU website, April 17, 2015 
(http://www.acftu.org/template/10001/file.jsp?cid=809&aid=90506, consulted on 22 February 2016). 
395 On this topic, see: Zhang Hua (张华), Studies on the functions of the Communist Youth League of China 
(Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan zhineng yanjiu, 中国共产主义青年团职能研究), 170.  
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workplace has to direct the equivalent of 2% of the overall salaries of its employees towards 
the ACFTU.396 There is no legal equivalent for the CYL.  
The CYL has only few sources of revenue. The day to day functioning of the 
organization relies on the membership dues it collects as well as funds from the Party-State. At 
every echelon, the CYL premises and the salaries of its officials are funded by the State, just 
like a government office.397 For instance, a CYL city level committee has around thirty officials 
on its payroll398 (this figure is higher at the provincial level).399 The possibility to increase 
recruitment on its own payroll being extremely limited, the local CYL committees also recruit 
a large number of officials through its service units (shiye danwei, 事业单位).400 This practice 
is not unique to the CYL and is largely among by Party-State administrations, it allows more 
flexibility in recruitment. 401  For example, the Guizhou Province CYL Committee has 40 
officials on its own payroll but almost 200 additional cadres actually work in its structures.402 
They are officially affiliated to units under the control of the CYL, such as the provincial level 
                                                 
396 “Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa, 中华人民共
和国工会法),” National People’s Congress, 27 October 2001. This is the law’s official English name. 
397 The situation is more diverse for CYL committees within work units, such as firms or schools. As I describe in 
the Second Part, only few of the CYL cadres in such units are full time officials and a majority of them fulfill this 
function in addition to the actual position they get a salary for. 
398 This figure varies depending on the city’s size and wealth, as well as its administrative ranking. The Nanjing 
CYL Committee, the wealthy capital of Jiangsu Province which has a vice-provincial ranking, has now 39 officials 
on its payroll. The Guiyang CYL Committee, the poorer capital of Guizhou, has only 25 (interviews with cadre 
29 and cadre 37). 
399 At the county level, the number of officials on the CYL payroll is much lower, between three and five according 
to my interviews (interviews with cadre 2, cadre 27, cadre 42, cadre 43). 
400 See the entry “civil service system” in the glossary regarding the difference between cadres working in service 
units and civil servants, as well as on the status of CYL cadres.  
401 Yuen Yuen Ang, “Counting Cadres: A Comparative View of the Size of China’s Public Employment,” The 
China Quarterly 211 (2012): 676–96. 
402 Interviews with cadre 27 and cadre 29. 
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CYL school or volunteering center.403 These service units have their own budgets and payrolls 
that are also funded by the Party-State at the relevant echelon.404 Their budgets can be highly 
superior to one of the CYL’s unit they are affiliated to.405  
In addition to the funds it gets from the State, the CYL can rely on the monthly due paid 
by its members. The due is collected at the very grassroots unit and is in part transmitted to the 
higher-level CYL units, up to the central level.406 The amount of the CYL membership due 
(tuanfei, 团费), depends on the member’s salary. 407 An actual figure for the total amount 
collected every year is hard to estimate. Still, the collection of membership dues does not 
represent a major source of funding for the CYL. According to my interviews, it remains a 
funding channel of lesser importance than the money coming from the State.408 Research done 
by the CYL itself underlines the difficulty it has in collecting membership dues.409 
Beyond the funding of its day-to-day activities, the CYL can collect additional resources 
for specific activities. It can for instance get additional funds from the State in order to organize 
                                                 
403 As I stress later in this chapter, the CYL manages large numbers of volunteers though these local agencies. 
404 Interviews with cadre 27 and cadre 29. 
405 The Haidian District CYL Committee, in Beijing, had in 2012 a budget of around one million RMB while the 
volunteering federation under its supervision had a budget close to two million RMB (interview with cadre 2). 
406 The grassroots units keep 50% of what they collect and then transmit it to the upper levels. The county level 
CYL units, and other units of equal rank, hence are supposed to receive 50% of the total amount. They keep half 
of it, 25% of the total, and transmit the rest to the upper level. The city level units receive 25% of the total, they 
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they keep 9,5% and the central level ends up with 3% of the total sum of membership dues (“Regulation Regarding 
the Payment and Management of the CYL Membership Dues (guanyu tuanfei jiaona he guanli shiyong de guiding, 
关于团费交纳和管理使用的规定),” CYL Central Committee, 8 March 1994). 
407 If the CYL member has no income, as a student for instance, he only has to pay 1 RMB per month. If his salary 
is below 400 RMB a month, the due represents 0,5% of it. If his salary is above 400 RMB, the due amounts to 1% 
of it (“Regulation Regarding the Payment and Management of the CYL Membership Dues (guanyu tuanfei jiaona 
he guanli shiyong de guiding, 关于团费交纳和管理使用的规定),” CYL Central Committee, 8 March 1994). 
408 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 7, academic 19, and cadre 33.  
409 Research team of the CYL (tuan zhongyang ketizu, 团中央课题组), “Opportunities and Reactions Faced by 
the CYL Organization in a Liberalizing Economy (shichang jingji tiaojianxia Gongqingtuan zuzhi mianlin de jiyu, 
tiaozhan yu duice, 市场经济条件下共青团基层组织面临的机遇、挑战与对策),” 152. 
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major activities, such as recruiting numerous volunteers for the 2008 Olympic Games,410 or it 
can ask for private sponsorship for charity activities such as the construction of “Hope primary 
schools”, which I develop at the end of this chapter.411 The sponsorship can come from very 
diverse sources, and is managed at various levels of the organization. 412 For the activities 
organized by local CYL committees, at the county or city levels for instance, such sponsorship 
can easily come from the various firms linked to the CYL, such as the publishing house China 
Youth Press for cultural activities, or the “youth travel agencies” (qingnian lüxing she, 青年旅
行社) for projects with touristic implications. Still, these funds can only be used for specific 
activities and not for the day-to-day functioning of the organization.413   
To conclude, the CYL is highly dependent on the Party-State for its funding. In that 
respect the situation did not change with the reestablishment of the League in 1978 or with the 
economic reforms that followed. In addition to being organizationally dependent, the CYL does 
not set the agenda regarding the development of its own activities. As I develop in the section 
below, it responds to the Party’s needs rather than developing its own projects. 
  
                                                 
410 The recruitment and management of 1.7 million volunteers for the 2008 Olympic Games was in large part 
supervised by the CYL (G. Pak Lei Chong, “Volunteers as the ‘New’ Model Citizens: Governing Citizens through 
Soft Power,” China Information 25, no. 1 (March 2011): 33–59). 
411 Interviews with cadre 2 and cadre 33.  
412 I come back to this question of the sponsorship of CYL managed student activities in the Second Part. 
413 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 7 and cadre 33. 
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3)  Old wine in a new bottle: the League’s modes of action 
a)  The League’s activities evolve with the Party’s needs 
Since the founding of the PRC, the CYL has been active in a variety of sectors, from 
economy to education, depending on the Party-State’s needs. With the first PRC five-year plan 
issued in 1953, the CYL became focused on the development of agricultural and industrial 
production as evidenced by the sending of 2,500 volunteers from Beijing to Heilongjiang 
Province in an operation starting in 1955 to “reclaim wastelands” (kaihuang, 开荒) for local 
agriculture. Between 1955 and 1956, 210,000 young volunteers from the coastal provinces were 
sent by the CYL to the North-West provinces to participate in its local industrial 
development. 414  Taskforces of young people managed by the CYL were created to help 
establishing local factories. Around 7,500 of these groups were active during the first five-year 
plan, equaling to a total of 135,000 participants.415 The League also established supervision 
teams in factories and mines to support the CCP and the local Trade Union units in monitoring 
labor discipline, avoiding accidents, and limiting resource waste.416 
Parallel to these production-oriented activities, the CYL was also very active in the 
development of education and cultural activities. It participated in a large-scale alphabetization 
campaign launched in 1955, sending educated young people to villages as teachers.417 A joint 
directive from the Youth League and the Ministry of Culture, issued in 1956, also pushed for 
the development of cultural activities in rural areas. In every county, the Youth League 
                                                 
414 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 67. 
415 Ibid., 69. 
416 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 44. 
417 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 69. 
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therefore participated in the establishment of local newspapers, libraries, cinemas and other 
cultural organs.418 
After 1978, the Youth League resumed its activities. Interestingly, the economic reforms 
which started in the 1980s, did not transform significantly its overall functioning. The League 
continued to answer the Party’s needs in terms of education and production-boosting activities. 
It became active in the movement of the “four modernizations”419 launched by Deng Xiaoping 
from 1979 onwards. 420  The CYL organized numerous training programs or innovation 
competitions directed at rural or urban youth.421  
With the development of the reforms, new issues emerged and the Youth League had to 
adapt its activities consequently. For instance, in 1997, Beijing announced a reform of the State-
owned enterprises. It aimed at reorganizing the large SOEs to be able to operate following the 
market rules, while the smaller ones would be privatized. The reform created a major 
unemployment problem and the central Party-State called for diverse organs, including mass 
organizations, to help laid off fired? workers to find new jobs.422 As a result, the CYL launched 
in 1998 the “Chinese Young Entrepreneurs Operation” (Zhongguo qingnian chuangye 
                                                 
418 Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 47. 
419 Rosen, “Prosperity, Privatization, and China’s Youth,” 6. 
420 The four modernizations launched by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978 aimed at developing four major fields of the 
Chinese economy: agriculture, industry, defense, as well as science and technology. On Deng’s economic reforms, 
see: Ezra F Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 377. 
421 On these various projects, see : Luo Chengquan (罗成全), The Communist Youth League in the high tide of 
China’s reforms, 1978-1994 (Zhongguo gaige dachao zhong de Gongqingtuan, 中国改革大潮中的共靑团, 1978-
1994) (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 1996); Li Yuqi (李玉琦), Short Story of the Chinese Communist Youth 
League (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan shigao, 中国共青团史稿), 300–320; Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political 
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治学视野下的中国共青团), 92–99.  
422 Xiaobo Hu, “The State, Enterprises, and Society in Post-Deng China: Impact of the New Round of SOE 
Reform,” Asian Survey 40, no. 4 (2000): 641–57. 
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xingdong, 中国青年创业行动). It provided training and financial help to many entrepreneurs 
as a way to curb unemployment. Between 1998 and 2004, 2 million young entrepreneurs were 
trained and 200,000 received financial help.423 
The Chinese economy was also facing the issue of environment protection. Starting in 
the late 1990s, it became a major problem from the Party-State’s point of view. The State 
Environment Protection Administration was established in 1998 as a ministerial level 
government agency, taking over the function of the National Environmental Protection Agency 
which was of a lesser administrative ranking.424 As a result, the CYL became very active in 
environment protection. This is well symbolized by the “Mother River Protection Operation” 
(Baohu muqin he xingdong, 保护母亲河行动) launched in 1999 by the CYL and the central 
government to raise funds and recruit volunteers to protect the environment around the 
country’s main rivers. Between 1999 and 2005, 250 million RMB were collected and 300 
million young volunteers participated in the project, in reforestation activities among others.425  
This last example underlines a certain continuity in the content of the League’s activities, 
even though the framing changed. Reforestation was already a common practice of the CYL in 
the 1950s, and it reemerged in the 1980s, even before these new environmental projects. The 
main difference is that it was at the time considered as part of the agricultural modernization 
                                                 
423 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 112. 
424 In 2008, it became the Ministry of Environmental Protection (“SEPA Gets Stronger,” China.org.cn, March 10, 
2008). 
425 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 113. 
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effort rather than environment protection. 426  Focusing on specific programs of political 
education, I now get into the details and limits of this continuity in CYL’s actions.  
b)  From Lei Feng to volunteers 
The continuity in the CYL’s modes of actions, though the framing has changed in the 
context of the reform era, is perfectly exemplified by the filiation between the “learn from Lei 
Feng campaign” and contemporary volunteering operations. In 1993, the CYL launched the 
“Young Volunteers Operation” (Qingnian zhiyuanzhe xingdong, 青年志愿者行动). The goal 
was to recruit young volunteers at various levels of the organization and to direct them at 
various projects, aiming for instance at poverty alleviation, education assistance, or 
environment protection. In 1994, a new association under the CYL’s supervision was created 
to manage the operation, the China Youth Volunteer Association (Zhongguo qingnian 
zhiyuanzhe xiehui, 中国青年志愿者协会). The operation implied several projects over the 
years, such as the “Chinese Youth Volunteers Poverty-Elimination Relay Project” (Zhongguo 
qingnian zhiyuanzhe fupin jieli jihua, 中国青年志愿者扶贫接力计划) initiated in 1996 to 
channel urban young volunteers to provide education and medical assistance in the country’s 
poorest counties, or the “One-helps-One” (yizhuyi, 一助一) project, which has been aiming 
since 1994 at providing regular assistance to the elderly and disabled in local communities.427  
As noted by Sofia Graziani, the Young Volunteers Operation also gained momentum as 
part of the emphasis on socialist morality and the construction of an “Harmonious Society” 
                                                 
426  In 1955 and 1956, one hundred twenty million young people managed by the CYL participated to the 
reforestation efforts across the country. Again between 1984 and 1991, two hundred million young people 
participated in reforestation work across the country (Ibid., 99). 
427 Hu Xianzhong (胡献忠), The CYL in a transforming society (shehui biange zhong de gongqingtuan, 社会变革
中的共青团), 41; Graziani, “A Study of China’s Communist Youth League Adaptation in the Reform Era (1978-
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(Hexie shehui, 和谐社会) under Hu Jintao.428 Since then, other large scale projects have been 
put forward, such as the “CYL Volunteering Operation in Taking Care of the Children of Rural 
Migrant Workers” (Gongqingtuan guan'ai nongmingong zinü zhiyuanzhe xingdong, 共青团关
爱农民工子女志愿服务行动) initiated in 2010. More than 5 million volunteers have been 
mobilized at the county level to help in various forms and around 200 million RMB have been 
collected for this project. Volunteers have also been called for disaster relief operations and 
large international events, such as the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008 that mobilized more than 
4 million volunteers. In 2008, 1.7 million volunteers took part in the Olympic Games, and they 
were largely recruited and managed by the CYL.429 In 2010, more than 2 million volunteers 
took part in the Shanghai World Expo. Overall, since a formalized registering system for 
volunteers has been established in 2001, more than 40 million have been recorded.430  
The Young Volunteers Operation was launched as part of a larger CCP policy aiming 
at regaining control over young people after the evolution of the 1980s and the Tiananmen 
mobilizations.431 Already in the early 1980s, the CYL officials were stressing how their work 
became harder due to the increasing influence of “western concepts” over young people.432 In 
1993, Li Keqiang, then CYL Central Committee First Secretary, launched the Volunteering 
Operation to tackle this issue. According to a senior academic of the Central Youth League 
                                                 
428 The Harmonious Society campaign, launched by Hu Jintao in 2005, has been largely described as a new 
approach toward governance in the Chinese context emphasizing social welfare policies and social stability. On 
the Harmonious Society campaign, see: Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, 118–
119.  
429 G. Pak Lei Chong, “Volunteers as the ‘New’ Model Citizens: Governing Citizens through Soft Power,” China 
Information 25, no. 1 (March 2011): 33–59. 
430 “Report on the 20 years of the China young Volunteers Operation (Zhongguo qingnian zhiyuanzhe xingdong 
20 nian baogao, 中国青年志愿者行动20年报告),” China Youth Daily, December 5, 2013. 
431  On the broader conjuncture, see : Rosen, “Students and the State in China: The Crisis in Ideology and 
Organization,” 167–191. 
432 Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, 149. 
 132 
School who was active in the central organization of the CYL at the time, it has largely been 
seen as a very clever way to attract more young people within the League’s grasp. It mixes a 
liberal framing, giving the young people the impression that the idea to be useful to the 
community comes from them, with classical references to socialist morality.433 The reference 
to the “Learn from Lei Feng” campaign (xue Leifeng, 学雷锋 ) of the 1960s is in fact 
omnipresent in the new volunteering program. The document initiating the operation stated that 
the “Young Volunteers Operation is the enrichment and development of the Learn from Lei 
Feng campaign under the conditions of a Socialist market economy.”434 
The Learn from Lei Feng (xue Leifeng, 学雷锋) campaign was launched by Mao in 
1963 and largely managed by the CYL. It was named after a soldier of the PLA who died in 
1962. He was presented as a national hero, characterized by his selflessness and his devotion to 
the Party and the country.435 The People’s Daily published his dairy in 1963 and an exhibition 
about his life was organized. It attracted 800,000 visitors.436 The campaign pushed for young 
people to give some of their time to take care of elderly, to teach people how to read, and other 
types of social work. May 5th officially became the Learn from Lei Feng day when people 
should be particularly active in such voluntary activities.437  
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Lei Feng later reemerged as a nationalistic emblem in the 1980s and even more clearly 
after 1989.438 In 2012, an “Opinion on deepening the development of the learn from Lei Feng 
campaign” (guanyu shenru kaizhan xue Leifeng huodong de yijian, 关于深入开展学雷锋活动
的意见) was issued by the CCP. Highlighting that this campaign was far from dead, the 
document called for a strengthening of the propaganda regarding Lei Feng at the grassroots 
level, including, for instance, the installation of exhibitions in schools, the creation of artistic 
work about Lei Feng, the construction of memorial halls in various cities, or the establishment 
of an academic research center on Lei Feng. It also called for a widening of volunteering 
activities, underlining the filiation between the two campaigns.439 
The continuity between the Learn from Lei Feng campaign and the contemporary 
Young Volunteers Operation goes beyond rhetoric. This filiation is also apparent in the way 
the campaigns are managed by the CYL. As shown by Reed, the different campaigns have in 
common to be based on role models, putting forward the personal history of Lei Feng or of 
exemplar young people in various locales.440 Also, in both cases, the voluntary activities are 
highly controlled by the CYL.441 A CYL cadre who managed the volunteers in a Beijing district 
for the 2008 Olympic Games, stressed this control. The CYL set up centers in charge of 
controlling the volunteers at every echelon of the organization in order to supervise the 
recruitment and training of the volunteers. For major activities such as the Olympic Games, the 
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agencies also have to report directly to the Party committees, which supervise their work.442 In 
addition, organizational incentives are put forward to push young people to volunteer. In the 
Second Part of the dissertation I show for instance how students’ grades can be influenced by 
their participation. Such continuity between the Mao era mass campaigns and the contemporary 
“managed campaigns” has been highlighted by Elizabeth Perry.443  
Overall, while the framing of CYL activities evolved to fit with the new context, the 
content of the activities, and most importantly the control over them, did not fundamentally 
change. However, some studies have noted a progressive “NGOization” of the Chinese mass 
organizations. 444  I question this assertion by looking more precisely into the new service 
oriented organizations created by the CYL. 
c)  The multiplication of sub-organizations and the extension of the 
League’s domain 
After the 1980s, a branch of literature has described the evolution of mass organizations 
in a newly competitive environment. For instance, Jude Howell showed in her various articles 
on the All-China Women Federation how it has been forced to evolve in the 1980s by the 
bourgeoning of study groups and associations - semi-official or underground - on gender issues. 
For Howell, the ACWF had to find new ways to interact with women under a new competitive 
situation. To survive, it began to develop its own issue-oriented organizations, and research 
centers on gender issues. As a result of such evolutions, the mass organization has been, for 
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Howell, getting more autonomous and closer to a non-governmental organization. However, 
she also highlighted the limits of this emancipation process, which are particularly clear in the 
case of the CYL.445 
The CYL has also been attracting new members and multiplying its activities through a 
web of sub-organizations which it has created or sponsored. In 2002, among the 8 million social 
organizations officially registered in China, 2.47 million were linked to the CYL.446 The China 
Youth Development Foundation (Zhongguo qingshaonian fazhan jijinhui, 中国青少年发展基
金会 ), is a good example of this diversification of the League’s activities through sub-
organizations. Founded in March 1989, the China Youth Development Foundation quickly 
launched its “Project Hope” (Xiwang gongcheng, 希望工程) aiming at improving primary 
education in the poorest provinces of China. The project sponsored the reconstruction of a 
primary school in Anhui Province, which became the first Hope primary school (Xiwang 
xiaoxue, 希望小学). The project then started to gain momentum and to attract considerable 
private funds.447 According to official statistics, between 1989 and 2007, the China Youth 
Development Foundation raised 3.5 billion RMB to help fund the education of 2.9 million 
students. It participated in the renovation of 13,000 primary schools, 13,000 libraries and 
trained 35,000 rural teachers.448  
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Lu Yiyi showed how the relationship between the CYL and the China Youth 
Development Foundation has been mutually beneficial. The China Youth Development 
Foundation used the protection and the networks of the League to raise funds and to develop 
projects, which were sometimes opposed at first by local administrations. At the same time, the 
success of the Project Hope helped improve the CYL’s image among the broader public.449 
Several of my interviewees, both CYL cadres and academics focusing on social organizations, 
underlined how this project has been a success for the League in terms of public image.450 
While the China Youth Development Foundation has been successful in its projects and 
has attracted large amounts of private funds, it remains hard to describe it as an NGO. It is 
under the direct supervision of the CYL leadership: the President of the China Youth 
Development Foundation has always been a CYL leader.451 This is also true at the local level, 
the branches of the China Youth Development Foundation being under the direct control of the 
local CYL secretaries.452 Overall, the Project Hope could be understood as an indirect welfare 
policy of the Party-State. With the economic reforms, the Party-State pushed mass 
organizations towards taking over welfare services it did not provided anymore.453 The Project 
Hope is a result of this political decision. By creating the China Youth Development Foundation, 
the CYL was following, as always, the direction given by the Party. This is a facet of what 
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Frolic called a “State-led civil society.”454  
Overall, these new developments do not translate into an NGOization of the CYL. The 
Party-State remains in control of the organization. Similar accounts have been made regarding 
the continuous control of the Party over other mass organizations, such as the All-China 
Federation of Trade Union and the All-China Women Federation.455 Instead, the diversification 
of the mass organizations and the increasing role they play in providing welfare services, 
directly or through sub-organizations, is part of what Howell called a strategy of “welfarist 
incorporation.” By financing these organizations and their welfare activities, the Party-State 
actually “purchases services” (goumai fuwu, 购买服务) from them so it does not have to 
provide them directly anymore. 456 
*** 
To conclude this chapter, I would like to come back to the continuities I have stressed 
regarding the nature of the CYL and its relationship with the Party. In particular, we have seen 
that the League has been brought under the Party’s control as soon as 1925, and this has not 
weakened overtime. It has clearly become and remained the Party’s assistant since the 
foundation of the PRC: it imitates the organization of the Party and is responsive to its needs. 
Even after the economic liberalization of the 1980s, its organizational structure and its 
dependence on the Party did not change. The CYL’s “lack of power and lack of funds” remain 
true over the whole period. Beyond these continuities in the structure itself, I underlined the 
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similarities in the activities of the CYL since the foundation of the PRC. If the framing has 
changed, the content of the activities remains in large part the same. At the exception of one 
major evolution: the extension of the League’s social work through the establishment of sub-
organizations. However, this is to be understood as part of the Party-State “welfarist 
incorporation” strategy and therefore in line with the League’s role as the CCP’s assistant.  
These organizational trends highlight what it means to be a mass organization. As noted 
by numerous publications by the CYL itself, or affiliated scholars, it is not a Youth Affairs 
Ministry, nor a NGO. It does not have the administrative power of the former, neither the 
autonomy of the latter. According to these publications, the CYL should keep its current hybrid 
status of mass organization, as becoming a State administration or a NGO would, in both cases, 
weaken its relationship with the CCP. Such transformation of its relationship with the Party is 
seen as a potential risk by the organization.457 CYL officials I interviewed also went in that 
direction, stating that the nature of the CYL as a mass organization under Party control, cannot 
be questioned.458 
From the Party-State’s perspective, maintaining such tight control is seen as a way to 
prevent a scenario similar to what happened to the Soviet Youth League, the Komsomol, in the 
1980s. Just like the CYL, the Komsomol was under strict Party control which dictated the 
activities to be organized in order to maintain the ideological status quo among youth.459 The 
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situation changed in the 1980s, under Gorbachev. The Komsomol was reorganized and gained 
a large autonomy at the local level. The local units of the organization became in charge of their 
own budgets, and were hence not anymore under the Party’s control. According to Solnick, this 
led to a “bank run” phenomenon in 1987. The local Komsomol officials started to use the 
organization’s resources in order to develop local businesses.460 With the development of this 
“Komsomol economy”, the young cadres increasingly distanced themselves from the control 
of the Party-State, which accelerated the disintegration of the organization. As they were among 
the first to profit from the USSR’s liberalizing economy, many of them later became major 
oligarchs.461 I have shown in this chapter that the Chinese CYL is far from such a configuration, 
and, as reflected in the League’s own research, the Soviet precedent pushes the CCP to be even 
more cautious with how it deals with the CYL in the context of a liberalizing economy.  
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Chapter 2: The Youth League and the politics of age 
As the Party’s reserve force, the CYL has a dual function regarding the recruitment and 
training of CCP members and officials. First, as described in the previous chapter, it recruits 
numerous members between 14 and 28 years old. After being screened and trained, some of 
them eventually become CCP members. However, CYL membership itself is so broad that it is 
largely irrelevant in terms of political engagement and political career.462  Second, the CYL 
recruits young cadres in charge of the life of the organization. As noted before, these cadres are 
generally considered equals to civils servants,463 and are both CYL and CCP members. Many 
of them later pursue their career in the Party-State. The CYL therefore brings new blood to the 
Party both in terms of members and officials. The focus of my research being political 
engagement and political elites, I study almost exclusively the recruitment of officials through 
the CYL.  
While the Youth League has been officially defined as the Party’s reserve force since 
1949,464 I show in this chapter that its role has varied greatly overtime. These evolutions are 
related to the Party’s policies regarding cadres’ age. I detail how the politicization of age - as 
the age of cadres became a key selection criterion - has allowed the CYL to play an increasingly 
important role in post-Mao China. I understand politicization as the process through which an 
issue enters the political debate and becomes the focus of struggle among groups with specific 
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interests.465 I underline how the recruitment of young officials became a key issue for certain 
fractions of the Party in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Recruiting and promoting 
young and educated cadres became a way to sideline competitors and their entourage.  
Politicization of officials’ age is far from unique to China or to the post-Cultural 
Revolution era. Bourdieu showed that it is quite common in political organizations to use young 
people as cannon fodder against more established cadres.466 Regarding youth organizations in 
France, Bargel also stressed how age can become a debated issue: changing age limits is used 
as a way to set aside certain factions and groups.467 What is rather unique to our case is the 
extent to which the CCP has gone in establishing age-related rules for recruitment and 
promotion at every level of the administration, which facilitated the promotion of young 
officials especially those coming from the CYL.   
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A -  The politicization of age in post-Mao China 
The CYL has a special place in the Chinese political system due to the ephemeral nature 
of its membership. As a youth organization, its members must exit the organization when they 
reach a certain age, 28 years old according to the current rule.468 It creates a constant turnover 
of CYL members that facilitates the organization’s function as a reserve force for the Party. 
Due to this specific feature, age-related regulations are of key importance for CYL members 
and officials. 
Since the early years of the organization, the age limits for CYL membership have been 
a highly conflicted issue. They varied several times before the current norm of 14 to 28 years 
old was fixed in 1982.469 At the organization’s Third Congress of 1925, when it was officially 
named the Communist Youth League to symbolize its affiliation to the CCP, the maximum age 
limit for CYL membership went from 28 to 25 years old. Lowering the maximum age limit was 
a way for the Party to ensure a better control over the CYL as it would be constituted of younger 
and less experienced members.470 The age limit was further lowered to 23 years old in 1927, 
when the CYL was highly criticized for putting itself in competition with the Party.471 Against 
the CYL’s tendency towards “vanguardism”, some Party officials even suggested to set at 18 
years old the maximum for CYL membership. It would have lowered its membership and 
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transformed it into an organization constituted only of inexperienced teenagers. 472 While this 
proposal was quickly abandoned, it highlights how age rules are a debated issue in the CYL-
CCP relationship.  
This politicization of age went beyond CYL membership age limits. I highlight in the 
first part of the chapter how in post-Mao China the age of Party-State officials in general 
became a key issue. As Ch’i pointed out, this can be traced to the Cultural Revolution, during 
which age started to become a relevant political factor as Mao used the younger Red Guards to 
overthrow established officials.473 The officials purged at the time, such as Deng Xiaoping, then 
tried after being rehabilitated to build a base of young supporters to establish their power. They 
developed new entry and exit mechanisms to accelerate cadres’ turnover and rejuvenate the 
Party. In the first part of this chapter I detail how, in the context of post Cultural Revolution 
politics, Deng and his allies used age-based recruitment to build their support base. As a result, 
it magnified the role of promotion channel played by the CYL as the organization brought an 
increasing number of new cadres to the Party leadership. The transformation of the political 
configuration and the decreasing need at the Party’s top level for the establishment of a new 
support base interestingly did not fundamentally alter the increasingly important role played by 
the CYL. It survived its political momentum. 
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1)  Rehabilitations and rejuvenation as political weapons 
a)  Purges and rehabilitations against the heritage of the Cultural 
Revolution 
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping came back to national politics in 1977 as CCP deputy 
chairman, and started to progressively establish himself as the PRC’s new leader.474 In order to 
impose himself as the national leader against Hua Guofeng, who was CCP chairman at the time, 
he accelerated the rehabilitation of officials who had been purged during the Cultural 
Revolution.475 At the same time, Deng also started a rectification campaign within the Party to 
set aside the officials who benefited from the Cultural Revolution.   
A large-scale rehabilitation process started as soon as 1977. Between late 1977 and early 
1979 about 100,000 officials were cleared from previous accusations, and often rehabilitated in 
their positions. The rehabilitation of numerous cadres who have been purged during the Cultural 
Revolution has been largely described as a way for Deng to bring back allies and expand his 
powerbase.476 This process was facilitated after the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 11th Central 
Committee in 1978, as several of Deng’s allies took up important positions in personnel 
management. Hu Yaobang became the Organization Department Director and Chen Yun was 
appointed as the First Secretary of the newly established Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection. This commission’s mission at the time was to review the crimes committed by and 
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against Party officials during the Cultural Revolution.477 As a result of the growing influence 
of Deng and his allies, the rehabilitation accelerated in the 1980s. By the end of 1982, the 
Organization Department declared that around three million officials had been rehabilitated.478 
 While he pushed for rehabilitation efforts to bring back potential allies to power, Deng 
Xiaoping also launched in 1978 a criticism movement within the Party against the “whatever 
faction” (fanshipai,凡是派 ). 479  Targeting beneficiaries from the Cultural Revolution, the 
campaign was very disadvantageous to Hua Guofeng as several of his allies were purged. This 
led to the turning point of the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 11th Central Committee in December 
1978, during which Hua Guofeng himself, as well as four of his key supporters - Wang 
Dongxing, Wu De, Chen Xilian, and Ji Dengkui – were forced to make self-criticisms.480  The 
purge expanded down to the local level, and especially to CYL committees as they were full of 
young officials who were promoted during the Cultural Revolution.481  
 In 1983, Deng Xiaoping launched a rectification campaign against the “three types of 
people” (sanzhongren, 三种人): the ones who gained power as a result of engaging in rebellious 
actions during the Cultural Revolution, those who accepted the ideological line of the “Gang of 
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From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 156. 
480 Shu-shin Wang, “Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party,” Asian Survey 22, no. 9 
(September 1982): 809. 
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Four,”482 and those who committed serious crimes during the Cultural Revolution.483 Deng 
Xiaoping was going after the remnants of the cadres who were promoted during the Cultural 
Revolution. According to Ch’i, such a crusade was particularly important for Deng as these 
cadres were often young and could become a “time bomb” if they were allowed to stay in their 
positions and potentially to reorganize their faction in the future.484 The question of age was 
therefore brought to the center of the picture.  
To maintain his leadership overtime, Deng had to establish his own powerbase, 
constituted not only of rehabilitated officials from the 1950s and 1960s but also of younger 
cadres. The rehabilitations and purges went together with a new policy for recruiting and 
promoting young cadres. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping called for a “four-way transformation” of the 
cadres’ corps. The explicit objective was to promote officials who were “revolutionary, younger, 
more educated, and more technically specialized”.485 New promotion rules were implemented 
and the CCP stopped relying on class background as a criterion for political selection. It was a 
way for Deng to promote people who did not advance their political career under the protection 
of the Gang of Four. The revolutionary qualities of the new cadres were highly emphasized as 
to recruit people following the current Party line. The young cadres who had links with the 
Gang of Four were denied promotion.486 
                                                 
482 The “Gang of Four” (sirenbang, 四人帮) was a political coalition which controlled the CCP top hierarchy in 
the later stages of the Cultural Revolution. It was constituted of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and 
Wang Hongwen. After Mao’s death in September 1976 they were accused of a coup attempt and were arrested in 
October 1976. This was the starting point of a massive national criticism campaign of the Gang and their allies, 
which culminated in their show trial in 1981 (Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng 
Xiaoping (Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1996), 27–47.  
483 Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, 46; Lee, 
From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 246. 
484 Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, 46. 
485  Balme, Entre soi: l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in 
contemporary China], 170. 
486 Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, 73–76. 
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 In the context of post-Cultural Revolution politics, such a push to rejuvenate the Party 
was not contradictory with the process of rehabilitating cadres attacked during the Cultural 
Revolution, which was still in progress until 1983. They were complementary from Deng’s 
perspective. First, he needed the support of experienced and loyal officials to minimize the 
chances that the younger cadres who emerged during the Cultural Revolution would become 
leaders. Second, as he could not rely only on rehabilitated cadres who would soon become too 
old to remain in office, he pushed for the cultivation of a new generation of cadres.487 He 
therefore developed a sequenced transformation of the cadre corps. The rehabilitated cadres 
would keep their positions for a few years, during which they would recruit their own successors, 
screen and train them. 488  This two-fold sequence was palpable at the national level: as 
underlined by Mill, while the 11th CCP Congress of 1977 was the “era of the returned veterans”, 
the 12th Congress of 1982 marked the “era of transition,”489 I now get into the details of the 
organizational tools which allowed such a transition.  
b)  Rejuvenating the Party to build a support base 
Deng’s push for a rejuvenation of the CCP implied a transformation of the rules 
regulating the recruitment and promotion of Party-State officials. Both entry and exit 
mechanisms evolved, through the implementation of retirement and age-related regulations, as 
well as through the promotion of a “third echelon” of cadres.  
In the early 1980s, rules regarding retirement age and age limits were promulgated for 
officials. While the idea to establish a retirement system for Party-State officials was raised in 
the 1960s, it was never implemented. Until the 5th Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee 
                                                 
487 Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests, 46–48. 
488 Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 233. 
489 Mill, “Generational Change in China,” 26. 
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in 1980, officials had a life-tenure. A retirement system was progressively established starting 
from lower level cadres upward. In 1982, a comprehensive system was formally adopted, 
retirement age being 60 or 65 years old depending on the cadres’ ranks.490  
Interestingly, retirement rules did not apply to the Party’s top leadership, who therefore 
created less resistance to their implementation. According to Manion, several dozens of top 
leaders were exempt from the retirement policy in 1982.491 Even when they did retire, it often 
remained only partial. Advisory committees were established in the early 1980s at the local and 
central levels so the leading cadres could keep a supervisory function in the political system 
and would accept the reform. The Central Advisory Committee was established in 1982 and 
offered a way for top leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, to apparently step down 
from office while they would remain in charge of key Party-State issues.492 Later on, unwritten 
norms were gradually established regarding the retirement of national Party leaders. At the 15th 
Party Congress in 1997, a limit of 70 years old was first applied to the election of Politburo 
members.493 The limit became 67 years old after the 12th CCP Congress in 2002.494  
If the implementation of retirement rules facilitated turnover, the establishment of new 
entry mechanisms was needed to push forward the rejuvenation process. As noted by Ch’i, there 
was a certain sense of urgency at the time, as Deng feared the remnant supporters of the Gang 
                                                 
490 On the establishment of the retirement system, see: Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist 
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of Four would try to retake power.495 For this reason, the rejuvenation policy went together with 
the rectification efforts. The campaign against the “three types of people” launched in 1983 also 
accelerated the process as the purged cadres had to be replaced.496 As a result, Hu Yaobang, 
then CCP Central Committee General Secretary and close ally of Deng, proposed in 1983 the 
idea of grooming a group of officials in their 50s or 40s to take up leadership positions. These 
younger officials became the “third echelon of cadres”  (di san tidui, 第三梯队).497   To 
paraphrase Balme, it equaled a generational structuring of the leadership by the leadership 
itself.498   
The “third echelon” policy diverged from previous CCP personnel policies in the way 
it was meticulously organized and scheduled. The idea was for young cadres to be promoted to 
leadership positions at all levels and to make them coexist with the older leaders until 1985, 
when they would retire. The plan was to promote 130,000 young leaders by 1985.499 Youth 
Cadre Bureaus affiliated to the CCP’s Organization Department were established at every level 
of the polity to supervise the implementation. For each echelon, lists of potential candidates 
were established. They were made of acting cadres from the level right below. When the time 
of promoting leading cadres came, they were selected from these lists. This “third echelon” 
policy established the basis of the “reserve cadre system” (yubei ganbu zhidu, 预备干部制度), 
which continues to work according to these rules today. The list system was further developed 
                                                 
495 Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, 71. 
496 Ibid., 74. 
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in the 1990s and 2000s on the basis of five-year plans. In 2010, the reserve cadre lists included 
50,000 officials at the different administrative levels.500 I come back to the reserve cadre system 
in Chapter Six. 
Age became an increasingly institutionalized criterion for the selection of reserve cadres 
from the 1990s onwards. The promotion criteria also evolved beyond the issue of age. Contrary 
to the Mao era, class origin was no longer emphasized whereas education became key.501  It 
was a political decision aiming at preventing the promotion of cadres who benefited from the 
Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, promotion criteria favored cadres coming 
from worker or peasant families who were rewarded for their activism but who generally did 
not receive a formal education, as educational institution were closed during the late 1960s.502  
All in all, the combination of retirement policies and the push for the promotion of a 
“third echelon of cadres” led to a transformation of the cadre corps during the first half of the 
1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, 469,000 cadres were promoted at the county level and above. 
Over the same period, the average age of the 41 ministers and deputy ministers declined from 
65.7 to 59.5 years old.503 We now turn to the role the CYL played in this transformation. 
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2)  Bringing the reserve force back in 
a)  Upgrading the Youth League’s official status as a promotion 
channel 
 With the CCP’s rejuvenation policy, the CYL’s role as the Party’s reserve force is 
brought back to the center of the picture. This official mission of the organization stated in the 
charter of the Youth League in 1949, had been removed in 1957.504 It is only in 1982 that this 
function is once again added to the CYL charter, emphasizing the role the organization had to 
play in the rejuvenation process.505  
 This evolution was first visible concerning the members of the organization. A 
framework through which the CYL should “recommend talented CYL members for Party 
membership” (tuijian youxiu tuanyuan rudang, 推荐优秀团员入党 ) was established in 
1982.506 The recommendation process became then crucial as anyone under 28 years old willing 
to enter the Party should be recommended by the CYL.507 It has become the main channel for 
                                                 
504 Liu Shaoqi, then deputy chairman of the CCP, explained this removal in 1957 by the fact that the term reserve 
force might let young people think that any CYL member would eventually become CCP member. He wanted to 
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中国共产主义青年团职能研究), 17–23.  
505 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 24 December 1982. 
506 Ibid. 
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the Chinese Communist Youth League 2012 (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan nianjian 2012, 中国共青团年鉴 2012) 
(Beijing: China Youth Press, 2013), 306. 
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becoming a Party member.508 In fact, among the 2.1 million new members recruited by the 
Party in 2002, 1.3 million were recommended by the CYL.509 This is very different from the 
Mao era: in 1957 for instance, only 20% of the new CCP members came directly from the 
CYL.510 More recently, between 2003 and 2008, 4.8 million recommended CYL members 
joined the Party.511 Interestingly, no official figure regarding this recommendation process was 
given at the 17th CYL Congress in 2013. According to a CYL official, this could be linked to a 
lesser increase in CYL and CCP memberships, due to the rectification campaign Xi Jinping 
launched when he took power.512 
 Beyond the mere members, the CCP’s rejuvenation policy had a strong impact on the 
careers of CYL officials. The CCP charter was amended in 1982 to add a new article devoted 
to the “relationship between the Party and the CYL” (dang he gongchan zhuyi qingniantuan de 
guanxi, 党和共产主义青年团的关系). It emphasized the CYL’s important role regarding the 
training and promotion of cadres. More specifically, it stated that at the county level and below, 
including within enterprises or service units, the CYL secretaries must be CCP members and 
that they should attend as observers (liexi, 列席) the meetings of the CCP committees and 
standing committees at the same level.513 I come back in Chapter Seven to the implications of 
                                                 
508 This does not mean that the other newly recruited CCP members have never been CYL members but that they 
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509 Gang Guo, “Organizational Involvement and Political Participation in China,” Comparative Political Studies 
40, no. 4 (April 2007): 465. 
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512 Interview with cadre 16. On the campaign, see: Jérôme Doyon, “The End of the Road for Xi’s Mass Line 
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513  “Charter of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng, 中国共产党章程 )”, 
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this last measure, particularly in terms of network building. These evolutions in the CCP charter 
were consequently inscribed in the CYL charter. A new article dedicated to “CYL cadres” (tuan 
de ganbu, 团的干部) was added in 1982, underlining the organization’s role in “continuously 
transferring officials to the Party-State.”514 As showed in the next section, the changes in 
official documents were largely echoed in the transformation of promotion prospects for CYL 
officials. 
b)  An upsurge of Youth League affiliates in the Party leadership 
as a result of the rejuvenation policy 
 Since the 1920s, numerous CYL cadres have become Party leaders later in their career. 
According to Zheng Changzhong, between 1921 and 2002, 22.76% of CCP Central Committee 
members had an experience as CYL official at various levels. 515  Still, such phenomenon 
increased since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Figure 2.1 illustrates this evolution. It 
represents the ratio of former central CYL officials in the CCP Central Committee and Politburo 
from the 8th CCP Congress of 1956, until the 18th Congress of 2012. Contrary to other studies 
focusing on officials with a working experience at the various levels of the CYL,516 I chose to 
only include officials with experience in the central administration of the CYL. In contrast to 
local CYL leaders who are managed by the local CCP committees, the promotion of central 
                                                 
514 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 24 December 1982. 
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CYL leading cadres is decided by central CCP leaders.517 The promotion or not of central CYL 
officials to leadership positions in the CCP therefore gives a clearer account of the decisions 
taken in Beijing at the time.   
518 
 Looking at Figure 2.1, the ratio of former central level CYL officials who made it later 
to the CCP Central Committee clearly increased in 1977 and even more significantly in the 
1980s. Although it declined in the 1990s and 2000s, the ratio remained higher than during the 
1950s and 1960s. The contrast is even clearer when looking at the ratio of former central level 
CYL officials who joined the Politburo. While none can be found during the Mao era, such 
appointments became common in the 1980s. In 1987, almost a quarter of the Politburo was 
constituted of former central level CYL officials. With some variations, the overall 
                                                 
517 See Chapter One regarding the decentralized way in which are managed the CYL officials. 
518 For the 17th and 18th CCP Congresses, I only have the data regarding Politburo members and not Central 
Committee ones. Sources: Data base compiled by Victor Shih et. Al., (which can be found here: 
http://faculty.washington.edu/cadolph/index.php?page=61, consulted on January 27 2016) and the website 








































Figure 2.1: Former central level CYL cadres in the CCP 
Central Committee and Politburo
Former Central CYL officials in the CCP Central Committee
Total of former Central CYL officials in the Politburo
Former Central CYL officials newly entering the Politburo
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phenomenon remains true today as at the last CCP congress in 2012 more than 15% of the 
Politburo members had an experience in the central CYL.   
 Looking more carefully at the former CYL officials promoted to top Party positions in 
the early 1980s, we can see that they were constituted of two groups of cadres: top CYL officials 
from before 1966 who have been rehabilitated, and younger cadres appointed to CYL 
leadership positions in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Mill noted that at the 12th CCP 
Congress in 1982, 21 elected Central Committee members had extensive experience in the 
Youth League before 1966.519 In addition, 11 post-Cultural Revolution central CYL secretaries 
entered the CCP Central Committee between 1977 and 1986.520 The sequenced phenomenon 
discussed earlier, coupling rehabilitation and promotion of younger officials, is therefore 
reflected in the case of CYL officials. These two groups of officials also had in common specific 
ties to Hu Yaobang. With his long experience in the CYL and his position as Deng’s right hand, 
Hu was a key protagonist in the promotion of these officials.  
c)  Is the fate of the Youth League linked to Hu Yaobang’s?  
Hu Yaobang (1915-1989) joined the CYL in 1930 when he was fifteen. In 1933, he was 
appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Youth Central Bureau. During the civil 
war against the Kuomintang, he worked under Deng Xiaoping’s order in the South West regions 
before being transferred in 1952 with Deng to Beijing and became the First Secretary of the 
CYL.521 Hu Yaobang was criticized at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution for being an 
                                                 
519 Mill, “Generational Change in China,” 35. 
520 These eleven CYL secretaries were: Han Ying, Wang Zhaoguo, Gao Zhanxiang, Li Ruihuan, Wang Jiangong, 
Wang Minsheng, Hu Qili, Liu Weiming, Song Defu, Hu Jintao, and Keyum Bawudun (the compilation was made 
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ally of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi. He was specifically accused of being too bureaucratic 
in his management of the CYL, and of recruiting members too widely, including from “bad” 
family origin.522 Dismissed from the central CYL leadership in August 1966,523 he was recalled 
to Beijing in 1972 under Zhou Enlai’s initiative. As a supporter of Deng, he was purged along 
with him for a second time in 1976. Then Deng and Hu were rehabilitated in 1977. In December 
1977, Hu was appointed Director of the Organization Department, and in 1981 became CCP 
chairman, replacing Hua Guofeng.524  
Along with Deng, Hu Yaobang pushed for the rehabilitation of officials attacked during 
the Cultural revolution. 525  Given his experience within the CYL, he helped to promote 
rehabilitated cadres who had served with him and who were purged from the League along with 
him. The best example of this is Hu Qili, who was All-China Student Federation Chairman in 
1966 and CYL Central Committee Alternate Secretary when he was purged. He came back to 
Beijing in 1977 and, when Hu Yaobang became the Director of the Central Organization 
Department, he was appointed as CYL Central Committee Secretary.526  
Hu Yaobang was also one of the main instigators of the CCP rejuvenation policy and 
he designed the “third echelon” policy. Pushing for the promotion of young cadres, he 
appointed promising officials to central CYL positions and helped their future promotions. 
Wang Zhaoguo is a good example of such trajectory. Wang was deputy foreman within a car 
                                                 
522 In Mao China, one’s class label was largely based on one’s family class origin before the land reform of 1948-
1950. To summarize, coming from a family without property put a person in a good class background while having 
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107. 
523 On the criticisms made towards Hu Yaobang, see: Townsend, The Revolutionization of Chinese Youth: A Study 
of Chung-Kuo Ch’ing-Nien, 65; Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979, 81. 
524 Wang, “Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party,” 807–809. 
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factory when Deng Xiaoping noticed him during an inspection tour in 1982.527 According to a 
senior academic from the Central CYL School who witnessed the CYL leadership operations 
at the time, Hu Yaobang took great care in screening and promoting cadres such as Wang 
Zhaoguo. The Deputy Director of the CCP Organization Department, Wang Zhaohua, who 
served with Hu Yaobang in the CYL in the 1960s, was put in charge of the process that led to 
the appointment of Wang Zhaoguo as CYL Central Committee First Secretary in 1982.528  
Overall, Hu Yaobang used the CYL to promote officials he could trust, within the 
framework of the rehabilitation process and of the rejuvenation policy. While these promotions 
were going into the same direction as Deng’s wish to transform the cadres’ corps, Hu also 
pushed for people with whom he built strong personal ties. According to Bachman, Hu faced 
the “dilemma of the successor”: he had to show his loyalty to the top leader, in that case Deng, 
but also to develop power bases of his own as the patronage of the old leader could not hold 
forever.529 According to Jing Huang, the constant emphasis Hu Yaobang put on to promoting 
young cadres was eventually interpreted by Deng Xiaoping as a threat. This weakened Deng’s 
support for Hu Yaobang and contributed to facilitate his purge in 1987 under the pressure of 
the Party’s conservatives.530 Confirming that such promotions by Hu Yaobang were perceived 
as an attempt to build a political base, Zhao Ziyang, who replaced Hu Yaobang after his fall as 
                                                 
527 Li, “China’s Youth League Faction: Incubus of Power?” 
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the Party’s head, mentioned in his journal that in 1987 Party elders internally criticized Hu 
Yaobang for forming a political faction constituted of former CYL leaders.531 
The fall of Hu Yaobang had a negative impact on several officials he helped to promote 
from the CYL. Wang Zhaoguo was demoted from the CCP Central Secretariat to a lesser 
position in Fujian Province. 532  Two years later, the death of Hu Yaobang triggered the 
Tiananmen movement that was heavily repressed.533 Hu Qili, known for his affiliation with 
Yaobang and who opposed the proclamation of the martial law, was purged in June 1989 from 
his position in the CCP Central Secretariat.534 Also, according to Li Datong, former journalist 
for the China Youth Daily, the CYL leadership appeared too favorable towards the student 
movement, and, as stressed in the previous chapter, it has been criticized for it.535 Against this 
background, Kou Chien-wen noted that between 1987 and 1992 there were no promotion of 
CYL leaders to ministerial level positions.536  
In the late 1980s, the promotion of CYL officials to top Party positions therefore seemed 
to have lost its political momentum. Still, coming back to Figure 2.1 we can see that the 
phenomenon did not stop with Hu Yaobang’s fall in 1987. While a decrease is visible at the 
time, numerous central CYL officials have been promoted to the CCP Central Committee and 
Politburo up to today. I now get into the mechanisms explaining such continuity. 
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B -  Age as the new basis of the cadre system 
In the second part of this chapter I develop the mechanisms explaining why the CYL 
remained a springboard to Party leadership, even after its political momentum of the 1980s. I 
review and question the factional explanations that have been suggested to account for the 
increasing number of CYL affiliates rising within the Party-State hierarchy. Factional 
arguments in this case over simplify the situation and I argue instead that the continuous 
promotion of CYL leaders to top positions within the Party can be understood as a result of the 
institutionalization of the CCP’s rejuvenation policy. The age-related policies implemented in 
the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, as part of their political strategy to build a 
support base, survived their short-term purpose and became the basis of an institutionalized 
cadre management system with age rules at its core.  
While the rejuvenation policy launched by Deng and Hu was a politically motivated 
move, the age-based rules developed a life of their own and survived their initiators. 
Implemented at every echelon of the Party-State, these rules structurally advantage CYL 
officials. As a result, early promotion and specialization within the CYL became increasingly 
valuable for young cadres, and the organization became a grooming ground for future CCP 
leaders. At every level of the polity, local Party-State leaders have power of nomination over 
CYL leaders and can use this springboard to promote potential followers. Instead of one unified 
faction emerging from the CYL, the decentralized nature of the polity allows for a multiplicity 
of networks at the various levels. All Party leaders, from the grassroots to the central level, can 
therefore use the League to their advantage. I therefore argue that the structural transformations 
brought by the rejuvenation policy, as well as the decentralized system of incentives, overall 
allow the CYL to remain on the long run a key promotion channel in the Party-State. 
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1)  Is there a Youth League Faction?  
a)  Beyond interest group politics 
A literature explained the high number of former CYL officials promoted to top 
positions in the Party by the formation of a Youth League Faction (tuanpai, 团派) in the 
2000s.537 This tuanpai is, according to several analysts, constituted of the former leaders of the 
Chinese Communist Youth League and led by Hu Jintao, the former CCP General Secretary, 
who has been the CYL Central Committee First Secretary in the 1980s. Cheng Li described the 
tuanpai as a group of like-minded officials, especially interested in social initiatives. In several 
articles, he overlapped the tuanpai with what he called the “populist coalition” in the Chinese 
leadership. He described this coalition as competing with the “elitist” one, represented mainly 
by the princelings, the offspring of Party and military leaders from the Mao era.538 
This literature implicitly developed a cyclical narrative of the CYL affiliates’ rise in the 
CCP leadership. The first phase included the 1980s, a period favorable to the promotion of CYL 
affiliates in the CCP, and ended with Hu Yaobang’s fall. The second main phase of the 
tuanpai’s rise then took place when Hu Jintao became the national leader. This second phase 
was then supposed to start fading when Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao.539 This cyclical narrative 
is not supported by the data regarding the promotion of central CYL officials to the CCP Central 
Committee and Politburo.  
                                                 
537 On the Youth League Faction, see in particular : Li, “The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling 
the New Elites”; Bo, China’s Elite Politics Political Transition and Power Balancing, 139–201; Huang, 
Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics, 350–410. 
538 Li, “The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites,” 25. 
539  Ai Yanghua (艾仰樺 ) and Chen Xiaoming (陳曉銘 ), The Power of the Communist Youth League 
(Gongqingtuan Shili, 共青團勢力) (Carle Place, N.Y: Mirror Books, 2009), 78. 
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Coming back to Figure 2.1, the main variation is between the Mao era (from 1956 to 
1976 in this figure) and the post-Mao one (after 1976): this distinction is much more significant 
than the differences within the post-Mao period that the factional struggle is supposed to explain. 
Regarding the 1980s, an increasing number of former central CYL officials were promoted in 
both the Central Committee and the Politburo at the 12th CCP Congress, when Hu Yaobang was 
in power. Still, over the whole period, the main upsurge of former CYL officials took place at 
the 13th Congress of 1987, around ten months after Hu Yaobang’s demise. Therefore, while we 
have seen that some cadres were indeed put in weak positions by the purge of Hu Yaobang, the 
overall trend was not reversed.   
Regarding the post Hu Yaobang period: while there was a decline after the 13th Congress 
in the amount of former CYL officials in the CCP Central Committee, it increased only slightly 
at the 16th Congress of 2002, following the nomination of Hu Jintao as Party leader. This is 
even more surprising when we look at the number of former CYL officials promoted to the 
Politburo at the 16th Congress: it is one of the lowest ratios for the whole post Hu Yaobang 
period. Moreover, while the amount of former CYL cadres was very high under Hu Jintao at 
the 17th Congress, a relatively high proportion of these cadres were also promoted at the 18th 
Congress of 2012, even if Hu Jintao was not in power anymore.  
In addition to this factual discussion of the tuanpai narrative, I think the approach itself 
is problematic. Witnessing the rise of Hu Jintao and of the people he brought with him from the 
CYL to top Party positions, some researchers have assumed the existence of a tuanpai. The 
existence of the tuanpai then becomes the explanatory factor for the promotion of any CYL 
leader. This reasoning is highly tautological. In addition, the arguments are rather thin as the 
only feature common to these officials is to have worked together at the central CYL. Without 
first-hand information, we cannot even know if they had good personal relationships while 
working together. The like-mindedness of the tuanpai affiliates, put forward by Cheng Li, is 
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extremely hard to assess. It is, for instance, far from obvious if they shared or not a common 
political agenda.  
It is also problematic to oppose the supposed tuanpai with the princelings, the offspring 
of leaders from the Mao era. Several researchers have noted that these two groups have emerged 
as major political forces in the 1990s and 2000s. 540  Alongside the CYL affiliates, the 
princelings greatly benefited from the rejuvenation policies in terms of promotion. As 
underlined by Balme, in the 1980s they were among the only ones who fitted the new recruiting 
criteria. They went to the best domestic and foreign schools. Politically, they often entered the 
Party very young and they could use their parents’ connections to get promoted.541  
While some princelings have been probably competing with CYL affiliates for positions, 
I think the view that these groups are fundamentally separate should be questioned. First, 
several key members of the supposed tuanpai faction also have a princeling background. This 
was true of Chen Haosu as well as He Guangwei in the 1980s, and later of Liu Yandong or Li 
Yuanchao.542 Second, while a statistical account of the CYL officials’ family background is 
missing, several of the cadres I interviewed noted that, since the 2000s, an increasing number 
of high ranked officials’ children started to work for the CYL, especially at the central level.543 
Taking these overlaps into account, as well as the difficulty to distinguish these groups’ 
supposedly competing political agendas, the clear separation between a “populist” tuanpai and 
a group of “elitist” children of officials should be questioned.  
                                                 
540 Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 284; Li, China’s Leaders: The New 
Generation, 25–50. 
541  Balme, Entre soi: l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in 
contemporary China], 169–174; Jean-Luc Domenach, Les fils de princes [The princelings] (Paris: Fayard, 2016), 
119. 
542 Bo, China’s Elite Politics Political Transition and Power Balancing, 195. 
543 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 24, and cadre 27. 
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Interestingly, Andrew Walder argued against a similar analysis of Red Guards 
factionalism during the Cultural Revolution. Through a careful analysis of the period, he refuted 
the common idea that the more conservative groups of Red Guards were constituted of children 
of officials eager to defend the current system, while the more radical groups included people 
with lesser familial status and with more to gain from the mobilizations. Walder showed that 
the situation was far more complex, and that every personal decision was to be understood not 
based on the preexisting group they were supposed to come from, but the sequenced interactions 
and decisions which shaped their trajectories.544 
Coming back to our question at hand, my goal is not to completely negate the potential 
factional elements in the rise of CYL affiliates to top Party positions, but to show that it does 
not explain the overall phenomenon. The presupposition that all CYL leaders since the 1980s 
constitute an overall faction with a common enemy has to be questioned. As highlighted by an 
academic who was close to Hu Yaobang, the idea of the tuanpai as a unified group is a 
construction of the observers themselves, who mechanically think in terms of factions and 
interest groups as it artificially clarifies the political field.545 We have therefore to analyze the 
other factors which, coupled or not to these factional ties, explain why so many CYL affiliates 
continuously became CCP leaders in post-Mao China.  
  
                                                 
544 Walder, Fractured Rebellion the Beijing Red Guard Movement. 
545 Interview with academic 20. 
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b)  Factions as trellises: comparing the Youth League and the 
Kuomintang’s youth organizations 
Focusing on the massive promotion of CYL affiliates since the 1990s, Kou Chien-wen 
argued that both a factional effect and an organizational effect were at play. For Kou, the CYL, 
as the Party’s reserve force, produces a talent pool from which the faction can recruit 
followers.546 Kou’s analysis tries to analyze the effect of the CYL as an organization on the 
promotion of officials without nullifying the factional approach. Still, it remains unclear how 
the two effects are interacting.  
Kou’s argument can be understood as an application to the CYL of Andrew Nathan’s 
point regarding factions developing like “trellises” on organizations. For Nathan, external 
factional networks, based on clientelist ties, can attach themselves to, or emerge from, 
organizations. This facilitates the development of the faction as it can use the communication 
and authority flow of the organization, and it can also recruit among its members.547 Like in 
Kou’s argument, the faction and organization are mutually reinforcing. The main issue is that 
such a configuration implies a certain autonomy of the organization itself, and therefore of the 
faction, from other political organizations and networks. However, as explained in the previous 
chapter, the CYL has no autonomy over the recruitment of its leaders. The CYL leaders are 
accountable to the relevant CCP committee at every level. Even at the central echelon, the first 
secretary cannot directly choose the other CYL secretaries. While he can influence it, the 
decision remains in the hand of the Party leaders.548 The trellis configuration does not perfectly 
fit the CYL case.  
                                                 
546 Kou, “CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of 
Channeling Cadres,” 77–116. 
547 Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics.” 
548 Interviews with cadre 9, cadre 28, cadre 37, and cadre 42. 
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A main issue with the literature on the tuanpai, which is also the case in Kou’s work, is 
an unclear definition of what this faction would be constituted of. Does it include only a few 
CYL leaders at the time of Hu Yaobang, and then some others who were promoted under Hu 
Jintao, or does it include all CYL leaders? When looking more carefully at Kou’s examples, 
one may realize he focused on a very specific configuration, under Hu Jintao. He underlined 
how after being the CYL Central Committee First Secretary in 1984-1985, Hu became in 1992 
the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of the relationship with the CYL, as well 
as in charge of personnel management. He was in a perfect position to appoint to the CYL 
leadership his potential affiliates, and to then promote them within the Party.549 Kou highlighted 
the correlation between this appointment of Hu Jintao and the rise of former CYL leaders at the 
14th CCP Congress in 1992. Coming back to Figure 2.1, we can see that a substantial number 
of CYL affiliates were promoted at that time to the Politburo. However, it remained lower than 
at the previous congress. Hu was then appointed as Party General Secretary in 2002, a position 
from which he was obviously able to promote affiliates through the CYL. 
 Kou focused here on a very specific sequence in which the CYL’s lack of autonomy 
played in favor of Hu Jintao. It is reasonable to think that Hu Jintao, while he was able to do so, 
promoted some people from an organization that he used to run, and within which he had 
personal relationships with several officials. Still, it does not show in any way that all CYL 
leaders are part of this tuanpai, especially the ones who were appointed after Hu Jintao stepped 
down from office.550 It does not imply that the trellis survives overtime. 
                                                 
549 Kou, “CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of 
Channeling Cadres,” 92. 
550 In addition, Hu Jintao’s links to the CYL should not be overestimated. Contrary to Hu Yaobang, who headed 
the CYL for ten years from 1957 to 1967, Hu Jintao remained CYL Central Committee Secretary and then First 
Secretary for less than three years combined. This in reflected in Bo Zhiyue’s work, who developed an index 
quantifying the time supposed members of the tuanpai worked together in the CYL. In fact, Hu Jintao stood at the 
second last in this index, as he spent little time in the same organization with his supposed affiliates. If this index 
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Comparing with the case of Chiang Ching-kuo’s network within the KMT’s youth 
organizations allows a better understanding of what would imply such a surviving trellis, and 
how it varies from the CYL’s situation. In 1938, amid the Sino-Japanese war, the KMT 
established the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps (Sanmin zhuyi qingniantuan, 三民主义
青年团) as its main youth organization. Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, became 
a member of its Central Committee and head of its Jiangxi branch. In 1944, Chiang Ching-kuo 
was put in charge of the Youth Corps’ Youth Cadre Training Class, which later became the 
Central Cadre School (Zhongyang ganxiao, 中央干校). Within the Youth Corps and the school, 
Chiang Ching-kuo could recruit followers who would remain key supporters in his later career 
in Taiwan, such as Lee Huan or Pan Zhenqiu.551 Due to its organizational features and to 
factional politics, the Youth Corps had a certain degree of autonomy from the KMT,552 contrary 
to the CYL from the CCP, which allowed Chiang Ching-kuo to recruit and promote the people 
he liked within the organization. 
While intra-party conflicts led to the demise of the Three People’s Principles Youth 
Corps in 1947,553 the network built by Chiang Ching-kuo survived and moved to Taiwan. The 
KMT established another youth organization in 1952, the China Youth National Salvation 
Corps (Zhongguo qingnian jiuguo tuan, 中国青年救国团), and Chiang Ching-kuo was put in 
charge of the organization. According to Jennifer Liu, besides his functions in the military, this 
organization was the only source of power in Chiang Ching-kuo’s hands, which eventually 
                                                 
does not tell us anything about the content of the relationship, it underlines that these relationships should not be 
overestimated (Bo, China’s Elite Politics Political Transition and Power Balancing, 148). 
551 On Chiang Ching-kuo and the Youth Corps, see : Liu, “Indoctrinating the Youth: Guomindang Policy on 
Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960,” 103–108. 
552  Mulready-Stone, Mobilizing Shanghai Youth: CCP Internationalism, GMD Nationalism and Japanese 
Collaboration, 124. 
553 Liu, “Indoctrinating the Youth: Guomindang Policy on Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar 
Taiwan, 1937-1960,” 103. 
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helped him to succeed to his father as the KMT’s leader.554 Chiang Ching-kuo headed the Youth 
Corps during twenty years in Taiwan, and used the organization to promote to leadership 
positions some of his former affiliates, as well as to cultivate a base of young supporters. After 
him, Chiang’s former allies Lee Huan or Pan Zhenqiu were alternatively appointed as Director 
of the Corps in the 1970s and 1980s. Lee Huan then became Premier of Taiwan in 1989.555  
Interestingly, after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, the China Youth National Salvation Corps lost 
of its importance as a promotion channel for KMT officials and increasingly focused on 
recreational youth activities.556 
The contrast in the ways the KMT’s youth organizations and the CYL functioned as 
promotion channels is revealing. In the first case, Chiang Ching-kuo’s personal faction survived 
the organizations themselves. As argued by Kou and Tsai, it was above all a personal network, 
using the youth organizations as instruments.557 On the contrary, the CYL as a promotion 
channel survived Hu Yaobang’s or Hu Jintao’s disappearances and has continuously brought 
new blood to the CCP.  
While factional networks exist in the organization, as we have seen in the cases of Hu 
Yaobang and Hu Jintao, the CYL’s lack of autonomy prevents the formation of a united faction 
attached to the organization that would be consistent overtime. As the Party leaders select the 
CYL leaders, whoever is in charge can use it to promote potential followers, they can all 
                                                 
554 Ibid., 110. 
555 Ibid., 108. 
556 On the Youth Corps in the 1990s, see : Thomas A Brindley, The China Youth Corps in Taiwan (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1999). 
557 Tsai and Kou, “The Party’s Disciples: CCP Reserve Cadres and the Perpetuation of a Resilient Authoritarian 
Regime,” 15. 
 168 
develop their own tuanpai.  This is also true at the local levels and I come back in Chapter 
Seven to the implications of the existence of this multiplicity of networks.  
It implies that when a new leader comes to power, it is in his interest to purge the CYL 
in order to sideline his predecessor’s affiliates and to once again use the organization to promote 
his own. It was true in the years following Hu Yaobang’s fall and it is repeating itself now that 
Hu Jintao is no more in power. The demise of Ling Jihua, arrested for corruption in 2014, is a 
good illustration of such political turnover.558 He served in the central CYL while Hu Jintao 
was heading the organization and later became his personal secretary.559  
In addition, investigation teams have been sent to the central CYL at the end of 2015 as 
part of Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign launched in 2013. As a result, the CYL was 
accused of “becoming more and more bureaucratic, administrative, aristocratic and 
entertainment-oriented” (jiguanhua, xingzhenghua, guizuhua, yulehua, 机关化, 行政化, 贵族
化, 娱乐化).560 Given the political nature of such anti-corruption campaigns, this cannot help 
being perceived as a sign that the central CYL cadres are directly targeted by Xi Jinping.561 
Wan Qingliang, Pan Yiyang and Yu Yuanhui, all former members of the CYL Central 
Committee, have already been purged during this campaign. 562  In August 2016, the CCP 
                                                 
558 On Ling Jihua demise and trial, see : Edward Wong, “Ling Jihua, Ex-Presidential Aide in China, Gets Life 
Sentence for Corruption,” The New York Times, June 4, 2016. 
559 Ling Jihua’s CV can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Ling_Jihua/career, consulted on 20 
February 2016. 
560 “The 2nd Central Inspection Team Gives Feedback Regarding the Circumstances of the Special Inspection of 
the Central Communist Youth League (zhongyang di'er xunshizu xiang gongqingtuan zhongyang fankui 
zhuanxiang xunshi qingkuang, 中央第二巡视组向共青团中央反馈专项巡视情况),” Website of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, February 4, 2016 
(http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201602/t20160203_73930.html, consulted on 20 February 2016).  
561 As it is still an ongoing phenomenon, no academic research studied Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign in 
comparison with previous equivalents. Still, some analysts have written on the topic, see in particular : Willy Wo-
Lap Lam, “China’s Anti-Graft Campaign in Review,” China Brief 15, no. 23 (December 2015). 
562 Daniel Ren, “Strike Two: Communist Youth League ‘aristocracy’ under Fire Again,” South China Morning 
Post, February 9, 2016. 
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Politburo Standing Committee adopted a project to reform the League: the “Proposal on the 
Reform of the Central Youth League” (Gongqingtuan zhongyang gaige fang’an, 共青团中央
改革方案). It emphasizes the Party’s control over the League and calls for a drastic decrease 
of CYL personnel at the central and provincial levels.563 This reform illustrates how Xi is taking 
full control over the organization. I come back in the Conclusion to these various evolutions 
that influence CYL officials’ trajectory in the Xi Jinping era, and to what it tells us about the 
direction taken by the regime. 
Looking at the whole picture, an analysis based purely on factional politics cannot 
explain the CYL’s resilience overtime as a promotion channel and how it survived the various 
networks that populated the organization. To do so, I consider the CYL as an organization rather 
than a faction, and I take seriously the type of opportunities it provides to young officials.   
  
                                                 
563 “Proposal on the Reform of the Central Youth League (Gongqingtuan zhongyang gaige fang’an, 共青团中央
改革方案),” Central CYL, 2 August 2016. 
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2)  How did the standardization of the cadre system favor Youth 
League officials? 
a)  The issue of age at the center of the Chinese cadre system 
After the reforms of the 1980s that we already mentioned, the CCP continued to 
transform its recruitment and promotion standards in order to improve the education level of its 
cadres and facilitate turnover.564 One of the key changes has been the implementation of rules 
concerning the age of leading officials. Quotas for young people and age limits above which 
cadre could not be appointed to leading positions, were progressively implemented at all levels 
of the polity. In line with Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang’s measures aiming at building a 
support base of young officials, the goal was to accelerate the rejuvenation of the cadres’ corps 
started in the 1980s and to constantly renew the Party leadership.565 
In 1995, the “Notice regarding the CCP’s control, cultivation and selection of talented 
young cadres” (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhuajin peiyang xuanba youxiu nianqing ganbu 
de tongzhi, 中共中央关于抓紧培养选拔优秀年轻干部的通知) underlined the evolution in 
terms of Party rejuvenation since the 1980s while emphasizing that progress should be made. 
To do so, it established specific rules regarding the age of officials, which were supposed to be 
met within five years. At the provincial level, Party committees should inluce a certain number 
of leading officials of around 50 years old and at least one of around 45. At the city level, the 
aim was to have at least two leading officials under 45 and one around 40. At the county level, 
                                                 
564 Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China.” 
565 On the question of age rules for leading officials, see : Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards 
Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” 153–170; Tsai and Kou, 
“The Party’s Disciples: CCP Reserve Cadres and the Perpetuation of a Resilient Authoritarian Regime,” 1–20. 
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committees should include at least one under 35 years old.566 In 2000, the rules became more 
precise in order to accelerate the process. The new objective for the coming years was to have 
five leading officials around 50 years old at the provincial level, four of around 45 years old at 
the city level, and one of around 35 at the county level.567  
Following this trend, numerous local rules were developed, including quotas and ages 
of ineligibility for leading positions. As highlighted by Kou and Tsai, age limits became a 
complicated system affecting promotions at every level of the Chinese polity. For instance, an 
official cannot be appointed as minister or provincial governor after 63 years old. For a bureau 
director, or the mayor of a medium city, the limit would be set at 55 years old.568 Going through 
the various local rules, the authors found an average age of ineligibility for leading cadre 
positions at the different ranks, reproduced in Table 2.1.569 As developed in the Introduction, 
ranks for leading cadres start at the section leadership level (keji, 科级), the equivalent of a 
township leader or a department director in a county level government, and go up to the State 
leadership level (guoji, 国级). 
At the same time as these age-related rules, regulated periods for cadre tenure as well 
as step-by-step promotions were implemented. The idea was to fix a minimum of years the 
cadres had to serve in every position they hold in order to prevent accelerated promotions based 
                                                 
566 “Notice Regarding the CCP’s Control, Cultivation and Selection of Talented Young Cadres (Zhonggong 
zhongyang guanyu zhuajin peiyang xuanba youxiu nianqing ganbu de tongzhi, 中共中央关于抓紧培养选拔优
秀年轻干部的通知),” Central Office of the CCP, 7 January 1995. 
567 “Opinion of the CCP Central Organization Department Regarding the Improvement of the Cultivation and 
Selection of Talented Young Cadres (Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu jinyibu zuohao peiyang xuanba 
youxiu nianqing ganbu gongzuo de yijian, 中共中央组织部关于进一步做好培养选拔优秀年轻干部工作的意
见),” Central Office of the CCP, 5 September 2000. 
568 Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP 
Cadre Appointment System,” 157. 
569 Leading cadres are the ones holding the top positions within a locale or a unit, such as a minister or a mayor. 
See the entry “civil service system” in the glossary for more details regarding the difference between basic cadres 
and leading cadres. 
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on favoritism.570 These regulations were progressively developed and the “Interim Provisions 
for Party and Government Leading Cadre Tenure” (dangzheng lingdao ganbu zhiwu renqi 
zanxing guiding, 党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定) of 2006 established that all Party-State 
leading cadres must stay a full five-year term in each position before they can be promoted. In 
addition, the cadres cannot skip ranks and must be promoted from one level up to the next.571 
If these regulations are not always fully implemented, they rule the overall cadre system.572 
It is interesting to note that when combined, these rules regarding promotion age, tenure 
period and step-by-step promotion, make an appointment to highly ranked positions almost 
impossible. To get to top positions one has to start his career very young or to use shortcuts. 573 
Kou and Tsai illustrated this phenomenon taking as an example a young university graduate 
who becomes at 30 years old a deputy section director and who is always promoted in his later 
career. They underlined that if he follows the rules he will never be able to become deputy 
minister. He would be 60 years old when rising to this rank while the age of ineligibility is 
58.574 In Table 2.1 below, the column “expected age of promotion based on regulated tenure” 
presents this phenomenon. 
The CYL is an organization where one can start his career very young, but it has also 
become in post-Mao China a shortcut in terms of age promotion. In 1982 and under Hu 
                                                 
570 On regulated tenure and step by step promotions, see : Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards 
Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” 158. 
571 “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres (dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 29 February 
1995.  
572 On the exceptions, see : Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the 
Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” 162–170. 
573 On the shortcuts, see: Ibid. 162–170. 
574 The age of 30 is based on the idea that it takes around 8 years after graduation from college to reach the rank 
of deputy section director (Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age 
Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” 157. 
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Yaobang’s initiative, the CYL established age limits for its own cadres, at the different levels 
of the hierarchy.575 The ages of ineligibility for promotion of leading cadres within the CYL 
can be found in Table 2.1.576 While the official reason was that as a youth organization its 
leaders should not be too much older that its members, it had a major impact on the promotion 
of its cadres. Starting in the 1980s, it forced them to look for promotion opportunities as they 
could not stay in the organization too long. It accelerated the turnover within the organization. 
More importantly, when the age rules were developed within the Party-State, the CYL 
leaders found themselves with an age advantage when transferring to Party-State positions. For 
instance, as a CYL Central Committee First Secretary cannot be older than 45 when appointed, 
he has to transfer while relatively young to a similarly ranked position within the Party-State. 
Between 45 and 50 years old he would therefore become a central minister or a provincial 
governor. Similar situations are found at lower echelons of the polity.  
  
                                                 
575 Rosen, “Prosperity, Privatization, and China’s Youth,” 28. 
576 “Opinion Regarding the Question of the Age of the CYL Committee Leading Cadres at the Different Levels 
(guanyu geji tuanwei lingdao ganbu wenti de yijian, 关于各级团委领导干部年龄问题的意见 ),” CCP 
Organization Department, 14 May 1982. 
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Table 2.1: Age rules for leading cadres and the CYL officials’ age advantage577 



















75 67 none Premier 
Deputy State 
Leader (fu guoji, 
副国级) 
70 67 none State Counsellor 
Minister (zheng 
buji, 正部级) 
65 63 45 Provincial 
Governor 
Deputy Minister 
(fu buji, 副部级) 
























35 40 30 Township Head 
Deputy Section 
Director (fu keji, 
副科级) 





                                                 
577 There is no State Leader level position in the CYL (sources for the table : Brødsgaard, “Management of Party 
Cadres in China,” 69; Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age 
Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” 157–161). 
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Against this background, the CYL cadres are promoted to relatively high ranked 
positions within the CYL while still young, and they have a clear age advantage compared to 
their counterparts from outside the CYL when they transfer to other positions. In fact, the CYL 
counts a lot of medium and highly ranked positions allowing such transfers. According to Kou, 
in 2013 it included more that 220 positions ranked as deputy bureau director and above.578 Still, 
such transfers can happen at very different moments in a cadres’ career and at various ranks.579  
Overall, under a system with strict age restrictions, such an advantage is very valuable 
in a cadre’s career and it highly facilitates the future career of CYL officials. Since the 1980s, 
this specific configuration has allowed the CYL leaders to be continuously promoted to top 
positions in the Party-State. Looking at the future career of central CYL secretaries, one can 
notice that the vast majority of them eventually became CCP Central Committee members. This 
is represented in Figure 2.2.  
                                                 
578 Kou, “The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and Their Paths to the Top,” 152. 
579 Looking at the members of the 15th CCP Central Committee (1997) who had a working experience in the CYL, 
Zheng Changzhong counted that half of them left the CYL at a position below deputy bureau director, on average 
between 25 and 32 years old, while the other half left while holding a higher ranked position, approximately 
between 38 and 46 years old (Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival 
– Analytical Perspective on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu 




In Figure 2.2, we can see that during the Mao era, the promotion of former CYL leaders 
to the CCP Central Committee varied between 20% and 40%. From 1949 to 1978 only a few 
leaders of the CYL made it to the Central Committee at all. Looking at the details of their 
careers only two CYL secretaries became CCP Central Committee members before the Cultural 
Revolution, Liao Chengzhi and Hu Yaobang. As described earlier, a few additional CYL 
secretaries from the 1950s or 1960s reached the Central Committee after 1978. This situation 
changed after the Cultural Revolution. Starting with the 10th Congress of the CYL, and 
especially after the 11th, almost all the central CYL secretaries made it later in their career to 
the Party Central Committee. Few exceptions aside, it became a pattern. For instance, of the 
eight CYL secretaries nominated at the 11th Congress of the CYL, only two did not make it, 
                                                 
580 For each CYL congress, from the 6th to the 14th, I went through the future career of the different central CYL 
secretaries, up to 2012, to see if they eventually became members of the CCP Central Committee. It includes the 
CYL Central Committee First Secretary as well as the rest of the team of CYL secretaries, which represents around 
ten people per congress (n=93). To prevent confusion, the congresses here mentioned are the CYL ones and not 
the CCP’s. Data sources: The name list for central CYL secretaries can be found here : “Previous sessions of the 
central CYL (lijie tuan zhongyang, 历届团中央).” The analysis is based on their career data which could be found 
in their official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on the ones compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of 







































Figure 2.2: Ratio of former central level CYL 
secretaries who joined the CCP Central Committee
CCP CC member CCP CC alternate members non CC members
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among whom one died at 44 years old, too young to possibly have reached the Central 
Committee.  
The same pattern holds for the 12th and 13th Congress. It clearly survived Hu Yaobang’s 
fall, before the CYL 12th Congress. Regarding the 14th CYL Congress of 1998, one should note 
that most of the concerned officials are still relatively young and might make it to the Central 
Committee in the future. I did not include the 15th Congress (2005), 16th Congress (2008) and 
the 17th Congress (2013) of the CYL to the current analysis for the obvious reason that most of 
the subsequent CYL leaders are still too young to be appointed to the CCP Central Committee.  
In addition to be promoted to these top positions, they are appointed earlier than other 
officials. Looking at the previous career of the youngest Chinese officials, the ones born in the 
1960s, who were holding a ministerial level position in 2013, Kou Chien-wen showed that 43% 
of them had a working experience in the CYL.581  The age advantage CYL officials have, 
compared with other high-ranking officials, structurally plays in their favor in terms of 
promotion pace. The CYL therefore became since the 1980s an institutionalized channel for 
promotion to the top Party positions. The consistency of the phenomenon overtime does not 
follow the cyclical factional narrative I discussed earlier.  
Comparing with other mass organizations, we can see that this function as promotion 
channel is specific to the CYL. In Figure 2.3, I look at the career of the former All-China 
Federation of Trade-Unions (ACFTU) leaders since 1978. As we can see, only a small ratio of 
them, generally around 20%, eventually made it to the CCP Central Committee during their 
career.  
                                                 
581 Kou, “The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and Their Paths to the Top,” 157. 
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582 
The CYL leaders are generally lesser ranked than the ACFTU leaders583 but they are 
younger and often have a brighter future ahead. Such difference was reflected in my interviews, 
as the ACFTU, as well as the Women Federation, were presented as “less political” 
organizations by various interviewees, in the sense that they are less relevant for one’s political 
career, both at the local and central levels.584 I now show how the CYL’s political features 
implies an early specialization of its leaders.   
                                                 
582 For each ACFTU congress, from the 9th to the 15th, I went through the future career up to 2012 of the different 
ACFTU Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen, around eight individuals per congress, to see if they eventually became 
members of the CCP Central Committee (n=67). To prevent confusion, the congresses here mentioned are the 
ACFTU ones and not the CCP’s. Data sources: Several name-lists for former ACFTU leaders can be found on the 
internet, I cross-examined them. See in particular: 
http://www.360doc.com/content/13/0209/10/7499155_264934298.shtml (Consulted on 15 June 2016). The 
analysis is based on their career data which could be found in their official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on 
the ones compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, at the condition that their positions where 
sourced from media reports and official websites.  
583 For instance, the CYL Central Committee First Secretary is a ministerial level official whereas the ACFTU 
Chairman is generally a Politburo member with a rank of Deputy State Leader (Source: The official CVs of the 
cadres found on Xinhua). 

































Figure 2.3: Ratio of former ACFTU leaders who 
joined the CCP Central Committee
CCP CC member CCP CC alternate members non CC members
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b)  The Youth League as a venue towards leadership positions 
As developed in Chapter One, the Youth League is very similar to the Party in the way 
it is organized. In addition, it manages a large range of activities encompassing various groups 
and objectives. In this regard, it can be described as a generalist organization, a kind of smaller 
version of the Party dedicated to a large range of issues, as long as they are related to youth. 
For this reason, when the CYL leaders leave the organization, they are largely transferred to 
specific positions within the Party-State that are not highly specialized or technical. 585 As 
shown in Figure 2.4, this functional specialization has both strengthened and changed over time. 
Looking at the kind of positions central CYL secretaries transfer to right after they leave the 
CYL, we can see that an increasing number of them are being appointed to generalist leadership 
positions (e.g. local Party secretaries or governors).  
586 
                                                 
585 Kou, “The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and Their Paths to the Top,” 144. 
586 For each CYL congress, from the 6th to the 15th, I went through the future career of the different central CYL 










































Figure 2.4: Types of positions the former central 
level CYL secretaries get right after they leave the 
CYL
organization propaganda education technical foreign relations military leadership
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In line with the elite dualism theory which argues for an increasing separation of 
officials between more political and generalist ones and more technically specialized ones,587 
we can see in Figure 2.4 a clear tendency towards an increasing specialization overtime of 
cadres’ careers. By contrast to more technocratic and specialized positions, within a functional 
ministry for instance, the CYL officials are increasingly promoted to generalist positions as 
local political leaders. Before the Cultural Revolution, career specialization was far from 
obvious. The central CYL leaders were promoted to positions in the Organization Department 
or the Propaganda Department, but also to technical, educational or military ones. Only a few 
were promoted to leadership positions, generally as local CCP secretaries. After the Cultural 
Revolution, the ratio of former CYL leaders being promoted to such positions has increased 
considerably. While some of them were still promoted to positions in the Propaganda 
Department or the Organization Department, which symbolize core Party work, becoming a 
local leader became usual. 
This trend towards increased specialization, clear at the central level, was also 
progressively developed at the local one. Looking at what kind of positions the provincial level 
CYL leaders (secretaries and deputy secretaries of CYL committees in provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities) were transferred to when they left the organization, we can see a 
similar trend. This is represented in Figure 2.5. 
                                                 
Committee First Secretary as well as the rest of the team of CYL secretaries which represents around ten people 
per congress (n=103).  I coded these positions in various categories depending on the administration they were 
working in. To prevent confusion, the congresses here mentioned are the CYL ones and not the CCP’s. Data 
sources: the name list for central CYL secretaries can be found here : “Previous sessions of the central CYL (lijie 
tuan zhongyang, 历 届 团 中 央 ),” Website of the PRC Government. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-01/27/content_173796_6.htm (Consulted on 15 June 2016). Their CVs can be found 
on Xinhua.cn. 
587 See the Introduction for more details on elite dualism theory. 
 181 
588 
As we can see in Figure 2.5, the type of positions provincial CYL leaders would get in 
the 1980s were diverse, ranging from agriculture to culture. The beginning of the specialization 
process is particularly clear in the 1990s onwards, as almost 80% of the provincial CYL leaders 
appointed between 1991 and 2000 directly became local Party-State leaders. This specialization 
went even farther in the 2000s. This trend had a large impact on the Party-State leadership as 
numerous former CYL cadres entered local leadership structures. Between 2001 and 2005, 
37.82% of the members of provincial CCP committees had a working experience in the CYL 
                                                 
588 I went through the future career of the different provincial CYL secretaries and deputy secretaries, from 1978 
to 2015, to see to what position they transferred to right after they left the CYL (n= 230). I coded these positions 
in various categories depending on the administration they were working in. Data sources: Several name-lists for 
former provincial CYL secretaries can be found on the internet, I cross-examined them and verified them with 
local CYL officials. See in particular: http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=pg3Z-
9wNGpnu_KwwZTp3JhPgnOVgF1PmAe8qKkHUy8OmhmITp3LgJeleRAxjb_CTQMSQ-
bFXmjl17HfGt2qS0LpY_NsSIf12N_SrCWVkvN7 (Consulted on 18 August 216). See for instance in the case of 
Guizhou Province: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_607ad7e80102w7j3.html (Consulted on 15 June 2016). The 
analysis is based on their career data which could be found in their official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on 
the ones compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, at the condition that their positions where 








Figure 2.5: Types of positions the former provincial level 
CYL leaders get right after they leave the CYL 
Leadership Economics and Agriculture
Organization, Propaganda and Safety Culture, Sports, and Tourism
Mass organizations
 182 
at various levels.589 More recently, 45% of the provincial Party secretaries and governors in 
charge by March 2015 had such an experience in the CYL.590  
Such high ratios show that the CYL has become a grooming channel for future local 
CCP leaders. I come back in the Third Part of this dissertation to the actual process through 
which these cadres are transformed into local politicians and how they qualify themselves. 
While defining such positions as generalist is here useful to highlight the evolution of the CYL 
officials’ careers overtime, the superficiality of this categorization should not be forgotten. 
Questioning the unicity of this category I focus in Chapter Six on the evolution overtime of the 
profiles of cadres going through the CYL and being appointed to leadership positions. 
*** 
In this chapter I have shown how the CYL’s function as a promotion channel to Party 
leadership evolved with the CCP’s rejuvenation policy. It was first used as a political tool by 
Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping in order to promote young supporters. The politicization of 
age within the CCP was therefore linked to a specific political context in the aftermath of the 
Cultural Revolution. Still, the rejuvenation policy, and with it the CYL’s function as a key 
promotion channel, survived its political momentum through the institutionalization of specific 
age-based rules which transformed the Party-State cadre management system. These rules were 
institutionalized at every hierarchical echelon of the Party-State and they developed a life of 
their own. They survived their initiators and the initial purpose of creating a personal power 
base. 
                                                 
589 Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical Perspective on 
the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo 
Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个
考察视角),” 147. 
590 Data sources: The official CVs of the cadres found on Xinhua. 
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The PRC became the only Leninist regime to develop such a strict system of age rules 
for its officials.591 The CCP’s rejuvenation policy was very different from what had been 
implemented before in the USSR for instance. In the post-Stalin era, Khrushchev (1953-1964) 
pushed for a higher turnover in the Party apparatus and for recruitment based on technical 
skills.592 This could appear similar to what happened after the Cultural Revolution. However, 
Khrushchev pushed for the cooptation of a specialized elite who often had a previous 
professional experience outside the Party, rather than recruiting young cadres who would spend 
their career in the Party-State as has been the case in China. He targeted a different support base 
than Deng Xiaoping.593 Clear age-based rules where not established for promotion at every 
level of the polity. In that configuration and by contrast with the Chinese case, the classical 
Leninist organizations such as the Youth League played a lesser role in recruitment. Gehlen 
showed that in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the number 
of central and local Party leaders who previously had a position in the Komsomol went from 
34% in 1952 to 8% in 1968.594  
Brezhnev (1964-1982) took another approach than his predecessor. He nurtured his 
support base among established Party officials, rather than promoting technical specialists. He 
therefore came back on the practices developed under his predecessor, but also did not choose 
to implement age-based rules or a rejuvenation policy. As a result, without even clear retirement 
                                                 
591 Pierre F Landry, “The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng China,” in Bringing the Party Back in: 
How China Is Governed, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Yongnian Zheng (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 
2004), 141–74. 
592 Carrère d’Encausse, Le pouvoir confisqué: gouvernants et gouvernés en U.R.S.S. [Confiscated power: rulers 
and ruled in USSR], 243. 
593 On the difference between coopted rather than recruited cadres under Khrushchev, see : William A Welsh, “The 
Comparative Study of Political Leadership in Communist Systems,” in Comparative Communist Political 
Leadership, by Carl Beck et al. (New York: D. McKay Co., 1973), 1–42. 
594 Gehlen referred to the apparatchiki in the Central Committee, who include the Central Committee members 
who were Party secretaries at the central, republic or province levels (Gehlen, “The Soviet Apparatchiki,” 143). 
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regulations, the Party leadership drastically aged under his leadership, leading to what have 
been called a “gerontocracy”. In 1980, 75% of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s 
Politburo had more than 60 years old and 30% had more than 70.595 This situation contrasts 
with the Chinese case. However, the Chinese uniqueness in the matter might be challenged on 
the long run with the evolution of the political context. It appears that the importance of age as 
a criterion in cadres’ recruitment and promotion has been decreasing under Xi Jinping, which 
could eventually lead to an overall aging of the cadres corps.596 The most recent development 
program regarding leading cadres has in fact noted that age limits should not be used too strictly 
for individual personnel transfers.597 However it is still too soon to clearly assess the actual 
impact of these measures, to which I come back in the Conclusion. 
Despite some potential changes to come, and in contrast to the Soviet case, we have seen 
how post-Cultural Revolution politics led to age becoming a key political issue in China. 
Against the young activists promoted under Mao, Deng had to cultivate his own support base 
of young officials. After ten years of Cultural Revolution he also could not rely solely on the 
promotion of intellectuals and technical specialists, largely older and purged. 598  The 
rejuvenation policy then initiated led to the development of a system of age-based rules 
managing recruitments at all levels. Besides the CCP, it seems that such developed system of 
                                                 
595 Carrère d’Encausse, Le pouvoir confisqué: gouvernants et gouvernés en U.R.S.S. [Confiscated power: rulers 
and ruled in USSR], 242. 
596 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 35, and cadre 36. 
597 “Development Program Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 2014-2018 
(2014-2018 nian quanguo dangzheng lingdao banzi jianshe guihua gangyao, 2014-2018 年全国党政领导班子
建设规划纲要),” Central Office of the CCP, 25 December 2014. 
598 On the purges during the Cultural Revolution, see : Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
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age limits for recruitment and promotion can only be found in military organizations. 599 
However, the rationale for age limits in militaries, largely based on the idea than the recruits 
must be physically fit for combat, is very different from our case.  
The unique age-based rules developed by the CCP give a structural advantage to CYL 
officials. At the same time, the decentralized nature of the Chinese polity allows for Party 
leaders to appoint the CYL leadership at the various levels and therefore to use it as a way to 
promote affiliates. Instead of a unified Youth League faction, CYL officials are included in 
multiple networks. I hence argue that the survival of the CYL as a key promotion channel is 
not the result of the emergence of an overarching Youth League faction. Rather, it is the product 
of the institutionalization of the CCP’s rejuvenation policy and its alignment with the personal 
interests of various Party leaders who can use this springboard to their advantage. I come back 
in Chapter Seven to the various networks created by CYL officials and what it tells us about 
the overall functioning of the Chinese Party-State.  
Since the 1980s, the focus on age has gone hand in hand with an increasing specialization 
of cadres’ careers. Officials take a specific professional path early in their career, choosing in 
particular between technocratic or generalist positions. Hence, political trajectories are 
increasingly separated from administrative ones, and the CYL is an early promotion channel 
towards the former. In line with the concept of elite dualism developed in the Introduction, the 
separation between careers as bureaucrats and politicians, fundamental in democratic systems, 
has been emerging as a clear feature of the Chinese political system. This echoes the literature 
                                                 
599 For example, the French military has a system of age limits for every rank of noncommissioned officers and 
officers. Regarding the rules, see: http://legimobile.fr/fr/lr/code/defense/20150131/sec6182637/ (Consulted on 22 
August 2016).  
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underlining the progressive normalization of the Chinese political system while it keeps its 
overall structure.600 
Against this background, the CYL became a channel for early political 
professionalization. Young officials specialize themselves early on as CYL leaders, and are 
eventually promoted to generalist leadership positions in the Party-State. The literature on elite 
dualism has focused on this kind of early specialization and highlighted that only officials who 
have become CCP members very early in their career actually have a chance to reach important 
positions in the Party. This is presented as an early commitment to the Party symbolizing an 
official’s loyalty.601 Similar analyses have been made in the case of western communist parties. 
Comparing such parties in Italy, France, and the US, Holt has, in the 1950s, showed that their 
leaders had been recruited very young by the organization. He hypothesized that this was linked 
to the type of loyalty this parties demanded from their militants. Still, he did not really get into 
the details of the commitment process.602  
At the end of this First Part, the CYL appears as an organization through which officials 
can commit themselves early on to a political career, and eventually be promoted to top 
positions in the Party-State. Still, the mechanisms through which this commitment is developed 
and sustained overtime remains unknown. What are the implications at the agents’ level of the 
CYL’s evolutions that we developed in this First Part of the dissertation? What are the 
mechanisms through which they become committed to a career in the Party-State and how does 
                                                 
600 See in particular : Jean-Louis Rocca, “Is China Becoming an Ordinary State?,” in Privatising the State, ed. 
Béatrice Hibou (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2004), 169–82. 
601 Li and Walder, “Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative 
Elite, 1949-1996.” 
602 Robert T. Holt, “Age as a Factor in the Recruitment of Communist Leadership,” The American Political Science 
Review 48, no. 2 (June 1954): 486–99. 
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it influence their future trajectory? These questions are the core of the Second and Third Parts 
of the dissertation, focusing on various stages in the career of youth organization cadres. 
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II.  “L’Ecole du Vice” 
 
In the First Part, I detailed the evolution of the CYL as an organization and examined 
how it became from the 1980s onwards a major channel for promoting young officials within 
the Party-State. I am now completely changing my perspective, switching from a focus on the 
organization itself towards an analysis of the recruits’ trajectories. I turn to the mechanisms 
through which they become committed to a career in the Party-State. 
Part Two is entitled “l’école du vice,” which can be roughly translated as “school of vice,” 
in reference to former French President François Mitterrand’s depiction of the youth 
organization in his own party.  Mitterrand saw it as a place where young people learned all the 
tricks and vices of politicians. Similarly, I demonstrate in the following lines that volunteerting 
for Party-related organizations while studying in a Chinese university implies diving into the 
world of officials. 
  Studies regarding different types of social mobility prove particularly useful to 
understand how the elite’s commitment is cultivated overtime. Turner developed the concept 
of “sponsored” mobility to describe the British educational system, in contrast to the “contest” 
mobility which is characteristic of the American one. Sponsored mobility is based on controlled 
selection rather than competition. Some individuals are selected and placed early on a mobility 
path towards elite status. They are trained and slowly inducted within the elite.603 This concept 
geared towards the description of educational systems can be transposed to analyze political 
professionalization. Sponsored mobility is commonly used in communist parties since it 
enables the promotion of people who have been educated within the party and have little capital 
                                                 
603 Turner, “Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System,” 855–867. 
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outside the system. Having few exit options, they tend to remain loyal to the organization.604 
The concept of sponsored mobility has been used by Li and Walder to describe political 
mobility in post-Mao China. They showed that early recruitment in the CCP was crucial to 
attain political positions.605 But no detailed analysis of the promotion process itself has been 
done so far.  
In this Second Part, I unveil the mechanisms of political sponsored mobility in China 
starting with the key role played by CCP youth organizations on campus. I argue that becoming 
a student cadre (xuesheng ganbu, 学生干部) in these organizations on campus constitutes a 
crucial primary phase in one’s personal trajectory towards officialdom. What I identify as “the 
student cadre experience” is characterized by recurring features, similar to the ones analyzed 
by Turner: a) an early selection of the future elite members which goes together with the 
individual internalization of elite’s codes and status; b) a club sociability among the recruits 
themselves; c) a strong involvement of elite members in the selection process through what is 
akin to a form of mentorship.606  
The student cadres are officially defined as the students who work voluntarily for CCP 
and CYL organizations, for the student union, as well as for student associations at different 
levels on campus.607 While these are voluntary positions and they are not paid officials, they 
play a key control function on campus and I argue that this experience can have a deep impact 
                                                 
604 Holt, “Age as a Factor in the Recruitment of Communist Leadership”; Bernard Pudal, Prendre parti: pour une 
sociologie historique du PCF [Choose your party: for a historical sociology of the French Communist Party] 
(Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1989), 51; Pierre Bourdieu, Sur l’État: cours au 
Collège de France, 1989-1992 [On the State: lectures at College de France, 1989-1992] (Paris: Raisons d’agir-
Seuil, 2011), 413. 
605 Li and Walder, “Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative 
Elite, 1949-1996,” 1371–1408. 
606 Turner, “Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System,” 855–867. 
607 “Plan for the Cultivation of University Student Cadres 2006-2010 (gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu peiyang guihua 
2006-2010, 高校学生干部培养规划 2006-2010),” Central CYL, 29 August 2006. 
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on their future career. Surprisingly, the student cadre experience is completely absent from the 
English or French literature on contemporary China.  
Despite their absence in the literature, student cadres in universities share common 
characteristics with the student “activists” (jiji fenzi, 积极分子), who were the kingpin of the 
Maoist education system. In Maoist terms, “activist” refers to the broad group of people who 
are not CYL or CCP members yet but actively compete for membership. They are the 
“progressive elements” (jinbu fenzi, 进步分子) on which Party members rely to implement 
policies.608 As showed by Solomon, the concept of “activist” emerged in the Soviet Union but 
became more widely developed in the Chinese context: activists could be found in every social 
organization.609  
Several studies have highlighted the role of activists in the Maoist schooling system. 
Starting from primary school, pupils competed to become “pioneers,” who were portrayed as 
an elite. As described by Chan, the best behaved, most enthusiastic and academically diligent 
were selected by their teachers. Among the pioneers, the most active ones became activists, 
serving as mediators between students and teachers. 610  Each class had four to seven 
hierarchically organized activists, according to Unger, and they were expected to help the 
teacher manage the other students and keep order in the class.611 
A similar system could be found in high schools, with students competing for CYL 
membership. According to Shirk, only half the students were admitted into the CYL during the 
                                                 
608 Richard H Solomon, “On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conceptions of Motivation and Political Role Linking 
State to Society,” The China Quarterly, no. 39 (1969): 97–100. 
609 Ibid., 76. 
610 Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation, 16–24. 
611 Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 90. 
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1960s, and they had to be outstanding activists.612 Political competition in high school was 
fierce at the time because political standing was a criterion to access higher education. The 
political competition was overall harsher than the academic one as it was seen as less 
transparent by the students, and it often implied criticizing one’s comrades for their lack of 
activism.613 This led to what Shirk called a “virtuocracy,” a system of social promotion based 
on one’s political virtue. The definition of political virtue remaining highly flexible, it gave 
leeway to teachers and school officials to put forward the students they valued.614  
While the overall system of Party-related organizations in primary schools and high 
schools remains the same, activism does not have the same value in post-Mao China. Class 
background, political performance and academic achievement were the three main selection 
criteria for entering higher education during the Mao era. With the suppression of class 
background as a selection criterion and the reinstitution of examination for entering higher 
education in 1977, academic performance became key.615 The student cadres and professors I 
interviewed underlined that high school students are now mostly concerned with their grades 
at the exams, and not really with activism. Reflecting this tendency, the term “activist” is not 
really used by students to refer widely to the “progressive elements” in the school or the CYL. 
Now “activist” generally refers to the more limited category of people who have applied to 
Party membership and are still in the first phase of selection, i.e. the “activist entering the Party” 
                                                 
612 Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 38. 
613 On competition among students in high schools, see : Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in 
Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 94–95; Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in 
the Red Guard Generation, 52; Ibid., 13. 
614 Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 11. 
615 Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 212. 
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(rudang jiji fenzi, 入党积极分子). 616 In turn, the term “student cadre” is employed to refer to 
the ones who hold leadership positions at the class level or the CYL branches in high school. 
In contrast to the Mao era, Party-State officials increasingly have a college degree. 
Between 1979 and 1998, the ratio of officials with a higher education degree rose from 17.9% 
to 46.5%. It became extremely common for higher ranked officials: 80.5% of leading cadres in 
1998 had a higher education degree. 617 It also became de facto a necessary condition for 
recruitment in the CCP Central Committee in 2002.618 This is a result of the education-related 
requirements developed since the 1980s along with the CCP’s rejuvenation strategy.619 Zang 
Xiaowei for instance noted that 80% of the cadres promoted in 1984 had a college degree and 
that the ratio of college educated officials at the provincial and central levels grew from 43% 
in 1980 to 60% in 1986.620 
As cadres have to go through higher education, universities, instead of high schools, have 
become the main competition arena for political status and the launching pad to start a career 
as an official. Yet, while leading officials largely have a university degree, they represent only 
a minority of college graduates.621 In 2010, according to the Ministry of Education, China had 
22.3 million undergraduate students.622 Students are so numerous that a certain selection has to 
                                                 
616 Interviews with academic 2, academic 3, student 6, student 7, student 8, and cadre 20. 
617 Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China,” 70. 
618 Shih, Adolph, and Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central 
Committee Members in China,” 175. 
619 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 32. 
620 Zang, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China, 61. 
621 There were 508,025 leading cadres in 1998 (Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China,” 67). 
622 Yan Xiaojun, “‘To Get Rich Is Not Only Glorious’: Economic Reform and the New Entrepreneurial Party 
Secretaries,” The China Quarterly 210 (June 2012): 493. 
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occur based on their willingness to follow such a path and their political reliability. 623 
Underlining a certain continuity with the activists of the Mao era, I show that the student cadre 
experience is one of the main ways to implement this screening process, which follows a 
sponsored mobility logic.  
In particular, I argue that the student cadre experience is crucial to the development of 
the young cadres’ commitment to a career in the Party-State. Through this experience, students 
are subjected to the different commitment building mechanisms reviewed in the Introduction. 
This includes material incentives, which can be used as a political career accelerator, but not 
only. Through their involvement, and especially as they rise in the hierarchy, students learn to 
cultivate and enjoy a role as future Party-State officials. Most importantly, the student cadres 
experience transforms their social circles, which progressively narrow themselves to other 
student cadres or officials. These social ties also reinforce the political commitment of the 
recruits, since choosing a different path would mean losing most of their friends and contacts. 
The Party’s youth organizations on campus play a major role in cultivating elite cohesion on 
the long run. 
As developed in the Introduction, my research focuses on four universities. It includes 
the two best universities of the country, Peking University and Tsinghua University, as well as 
two universities outside Beijing: Nanjing University and Nanjing Normal University.  
Part II is organized along three chapters, tracing chronologically three different stages in 
the trajectory of ambitious students on campus: becoming a student cadre; becoming a student 
                                                 
623 In 2008, only 14% of the graduates from all the “211 project” universities got directly a position in a Party-
State Administration or an Academic Institution, which includes both official and academic posts (The “211 
project” (211 gongcheng, 211工程) universities include the one hundred or so best higher education institutions 
in the country. For a synthetic explanation of the project, see the website of the China Education Center: 
http://www.chinaeducenter.com/en/cedu/ceduproject211.php (Consulted on 12 May 2016)). Source: Cheng 
Changqun (成长群), “Research on the Issue of Employment of University Students: Survey on the Issue of Hubei 
University Student Employment as a Case (daxuesheng jiuye wenti yanjiu: yi Hubei daxuesheng jiuye diaocha 
weili, 大学生就业问题研究:以湖北大学生就业调查为例),” 98. 
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leader; becoming a campus official (and jumping, or not, into politics). Building on Becker’s 
work, I suggest that it is useful to frame commitment building as a sequenced process in which 
every step and individual choice is linked to the individual’s past experiences.624 
After highlighting the overall student management system in universities and the key role 
student cadres play in it, I turn to a detailed description of the various mechanisms put in place 
to incentivize students to follow this path. Chapter Three is dedicated to unveiling the 
importance of the student cadre experience itself and the procedures meant to facilitate their 
potential future career as officials. Chapter Four focuses on the highest ranked student cadres 
and the cultivation of their commitment. They are the ones who remain student cadres during 
the several years of college and who are the most active in youth organizations. They are in that 
sense one step further than most student cadres in terms of commitment. I show that this 
experience transforms them and eventually leads them to develop a vocation for political office. 
In addition, their unique position on campus and the strong ties they develop with university 
officials can be extremely valuable when starting a career as an official. Chapter Five is 
dedicated to the student cadres who become university officials after graduation. In continuity 
with the student cadre experience, they are appointed officials in charge of student management 
on campus, a first job which is highly valued in itself in a situation where competition for 
employment is particularly fierce for graduates.625 It can also be used as a springboard for 
political office for the less risk-averse and most ambitious recruits. By deciphering the different 
steps of the political commitment process which takes place in campus, the Second Part of this 
dissertation asserts the key role played by universities in political recruitment in China.  
                                                 
624 Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, 41–58. 
625 In 2014, the unemployment was officially around 15% for graduates six months after they left university, and 
according to some reports it was in practice closer to 30% (Yojana Sharma, “What Do You Do with Millions of 
Extra Graduates?,” BBC News, July 1, 2014). 
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Chapter 3: Discovering political commitment on campus 
This chapter analyzes the political organization of Chinese universities and the role 
played by student cadres as the mainstay of the system. While the role of student cadres in high 
school does not have the social importance it used to, this chapter demonstrates that it remains 
a key formative experience at the university level for, but not only, future officials. Focusing 
on this experience, I explore both how the student body is managed by Party-related 
organizations, as well as the first steps of a commitment process for those who choose to take 
an active part in these organizations. I examine the reasons which push them to choose this path, 
focusing more specifically on the role played by the students’ social background and the career-
related incentives associated with the student cadre experience. The unwritten and written 
advantages coming with the experience can in fact facilitate their future education or help them 
find a first job. 
A -  A decentralized organizational hegemony 
In the first part of this chapter, I expose the functioning of the Party’s “organizational 
weapon” in universities.626 While life on Chinese campuses has changed since the Mao era, 
especially through the emergence of numerous student organizations, the Party and its related 
organizations are still very present and operate a hegemonic control over student activities on 
campus. Political control in Chinese universities has been reinforced since the rather liberal era 
of the 1980s, and especially after the student movement of 1989. I describe how the Party-State 
has reestablished its authority on campus through the reinforcement and diversification of its 
control organizations. Political control on campus is also enforced differently than during the 
                                                 
626 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1952). 
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1980s: it now uses modern tools like the Internet and the activities offered to students are 
increasingly presented as non-political. These developments aim at keeping up with the 
evolution of students’ social practices and are in line with the transformations of CYL work 
developed in Chapter One. I show that paradoxically the diversification of student organizations 
and activities on campus strengthens political control. 
Some studies have underlined the continuous, as well as evolving, control over student 
life in China. However, they did not emphasize the role played by the CYL and the student 
cadres.627 I argue instead that the Party’s control structure follows a decentralized framework 
with the CYL at the center. I also highlight the key role played by student cadres, in addition to 
the employed political workers on campus. Unveiling the work performed by student cadres 
and student associations supervised by the CYL allows to better grasp the breadth and depth of 
political control in Chinese universities.  
1)  The organizational weapon on campus 
a)  A League-centric organization 
On Chinese campuses, student life outside the classroom is managed through a 
hierarchical system of organizations with the Youth League at the center. This organization is 
mainly subdivided into three levels of control: the university level, the university faculty level 
(yuanxi, 院系) and the class level.628 The lower unit of organization on campus is the class 
                                                 
627 Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China”; 
Elizabeth J Perry, “Citizen Contention and Campus Calm: The Paradox of Chinese Civil Society,” Current History 
113, no. 764 (2014): 211–17. 
628 Faculty here refers to what is designated in Chinese as Yuanxi (院系). Transposed to American universities, 
this denomination would include both the schools, such as a university’s business school, and the departments, 
such as a university’s sociology department. 
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(banji, 班级), made of people from the same cohorts within faculties.629 At all these echelons 
the hierarchy is the same: the CCP committee controls the CYL, which in turn supervises the 
student organizations. This framework is presented in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 A League-centered control over student organizations630 
 
  
                                                 
629 Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 
494. 
630 The overall organization can vary slightly from one university to the other. For example, Tsinghua University 
has a Graduate Student CYL Committee in addition to the general one. This figure represents the most common 
set up. For more clarity, this figure does not include all hierarchical links across the various organizations on 
campus but only the main ones. Sources: Interviews with cadre 3, student 4, cadre 6, student 7, student 8, cadre 
10, cadre 11, and cadre 15. See also : Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University 
Students in Post-Deng China,” 499.  
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Student management is supervised at the top by the university’s CCP committee, with 
generally a deputy secretary specifically in charge of student affairs.631 It directly controls the 
university level CYL committee as well as the faculty level CCP committees. Following the 
framework developed in Chapter One, the control of the CCP over the CYL is reproduced at 
the faculty and class levels. At the faculty level, a CCP deputy secretary is also in charge of 
managing student affairs and the CYL. At the class level, the CYL branch is under the 
supervision of a university cadre, a “student counsellor” (xuesheng fudaoyuan, 学生辅导员) 
who serves as class director (ban zhuren, 班主任) and generally as the class level CCP branch 
secretary.632 “Student counsellor” refers broadly to a number of employees of the university in 
charge of student management. In addition to the class level, they can be found at the faculty 
and university levels, where they hold leadership positions in the Youth League committees for 
instance. Chapter Five is largely devoted to student counsellors.  
Like at the local echelons of the Party-State, the university CYL has only a limited 
power over the lower level CYL units.633 Every four to five years, representatives from the 
different faculty level CYL committees are sent to be part of the university level CYL congress 
and elect the CYL committee. In turn, the CYL committee appoints the CYL secretary and 
deputy secretaries. As described in Chapter One, the CYL is structured like the CCP and it 
largely relies on its leadership. In practice, the CYL congress and committee only validate 
choices already made by the university Party leaders. As a result, at the university and faculty 
levels, the CYL leaders are officials selected by the CCP. Lower level cadres at these two 
                                                 
631 Interview with cadre 17. This is also put forward in : Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political 
Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 499. 
632 Interviews with student 4, student 7, student 8, and cadre 10. On class directors, see also : Zhao, “Decline of 
Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student Movement,” 163. 
633 Some universities also have an intermediary level of CYL organizations between the faculty level CYL 
committees and the class level CYL branches, with cohort-based CYL general branches. Still they have a limited 
organizational function (interview with cadre 3, cadre 4, and cadre 15). 
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echelons, and class CYL branches secretaries, are student cadres.634 In addition, the CYL’s 
funding comes from the university administration under the control of the CCP.635  
 The CYL is in turn in charge of managing student organizations. At the university level, 
the CYL committee manages the student union (xueshenghui, 学生会) and the graduate student 
union (yanjiushenghui, 研究生会). As described in Chapter One, the All-China Students 
Federation represents the student unions which can be found in all universities. The student 
union is a mass organization supposed to function as a bridge between the CCP and the students. 
It oversees organizing students’ extracurricular activities. While similar organizations 
preexisted in various universities, the current student unions were established under the control 
of the CCP and CYL in 1949.636 The graduate student union is its organizational replica, 
focused on the management of graduate students. It was set up later in various universities, as 
a result of the increasing number of graduate students in the reform era. For instance, it was 
established in 1985 at Nanjing Normal University.637 Organizationally, it functions just like the 
student union. 
In all universities, the student union’s charter states that it “accepts the leadership 
(lingdao, 领导) of the university Party committee and the supervision (zhidao, 指导) of the 
                                                 
634 Interviews with cadre 3, cadre 6, cadre 11, and cadre 15. See also: Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student 
Political Culture : Official Student Politics at Beijing University.” 
635 A small additional share of funding comes from the CYL membership paid by the students. It is collected by 
the branches and centralized at the university level. If I could not find an actual figure, according to the cadres in 
charge, it did not amount to much as the collecting is far from thorough (interviews with cadre 3 and cadre 10).  
636 Tsinghua University and Peking University for instance developed student unions as soon as 1919, in the wake 
of the May 4th Movement (Lü Lili (吕丽莉 ), “Study on the Democratic Construction of College Student 
Organizations (gaoxiao xuesheng zuzhi de minzhu jianshe, 高校学生组织的民主建设),” 29. 
637 Feng Shichang (冯世昌), Local record of the Nanjing normal university 1902-1992 (Nanjing shifan daxue zhi 
1902-1992, 南京师范大学志  1902-1992) (Nanjing: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2002), 347. 
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university CYL.”638 In practice, it is the CYL which manages its activities. The student union 
is staffed by the students themselves, to the exception of its office secretary (mishuzhang, 秘书
长) who is an official of the university CYL.639 This ensures the CYL’s grip over the student 
union. Also, the student union’s funds are controlled by the CYL, which also must approve its 
main activities.640 Even if the students manage to obtain sponsorship from outside organizations, 
the funds have to go through the CYL. The CYL collects a share of this money for its own 
activities, for instance around 8% in Peking University.641 Overall, the Union is often referred 
to in my interviews as a mere “department” (bumen, 部门) of the university CYL.642 This 
control of the CYL over the student union is reproduced at the faculty level. At that echelon, 
the CYL secretary is at the same time the student union’s office secretary, to ensure better 
supervision.643 
At the lower level of the pyramid, the class CYL branch is in charge of recruiting new 
CYL members. It is fully staffed by students. It also manages the class committee (banji 
weiyuanhui, 班级委员会). The class committee is headed by a class leader (banzhang, 班长), 
                                                 
638 “Charter of Peking University Student Union (Beijing daxue xueshenghui zhangcheng, 北京大学学生会章程),” 
Peking University Student Union, May 2010; “Charter of Tsinghua University Student Union (Qinghua daxue 
xueshenghui zhangcheng, 清华大学学生会章程),” Tsinghua University Student Union, December 2010. 
639 Interviews with student 11 and student 12, and Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political Culture : 
Official Student Politics at Beijing University,” 398. 
640 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 10, cadre 11, and student 12. 
641 Interview with student 12. 
642 Interviews with student 4, student 7, student 8, cadre 10. 
643 Interviews with cadre 10 and cadre 30. 
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elected by the students. The role of this committee is limited to student life at the class level, a 
sort of smaller reproduction of the student union.644 
In addition to this holistic organization for student management, there are also 
autonomous student associations focusing on specific issues, such as sport, language learning, 
calligraphy, and so on. These associations emerged in the 1980s as a result of the reform and 
opening up policy. In Nanjing Normal University, the first associations were established in 
1981 and they were thirty in 1985.645 There are now around 150 such associations in Nanjing 
University, 180 in Tsinghua University, and 300 in Peking University.646 These associations 
are supervised by the CYL through a dedicated department. To create an association, students 
need to find a faculty member, generally a student counsellor, to endorse them and the CYL 
committee gives the final approval. Student associations generally have to go through an annual 
review of their activities by the CYL. Also, their resources are supervised by the CYL, which 
grants them funds as well as campus resources, such as meeting spaces.647 
The League being unable to monitor them all, the student union generally assists it in 
the supervision of student associations. 648  Some universities, such as Nanjing University, 
established in the 2000s a specific organization staffed by students, a Federation of Student 
                                                 
644 Interviews with student 7 and student 8. On the class level CYL branches and on class committees, see also : 
Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 23. 
645 Feng Shichang (冯世昌), Local record of the Nanjing normal university 1902-1992 (Nanjing shifan daxue zhi 
1902-1992, 南京师范大学志  1902-1992), 345. 
646 Interviews with student 7, student 8, cadre 10, and cadre 14. 
647 Interviews with student 2, student 3, student 4, student 7, and student 8. See also : Yan, “Engineering Stability: 
Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 504. 
648 Interviews with student 2, student 3, student 4, student 7, and student 8. 
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Associations (Shetuan lianhehui, 社团联合会), which has the same hierarchical ranking as the 
student union and is in charge of dealing with the associations.649  
Overall, far from autonomous student politics, the various organizations are part of a 
hierarchical system, with the CYL as a key actor linking the CCP and the student organizations. 
Rather than declining, the importance of the CYL on campus has strengthened since the 
beginning of the reform era, in particular as a response to the Tiananmen demonstrations of 
1989. 
b)  Strengthening political control on campus after 1989  
The CYL committees on campus followed the overall historical framework developed 
in Chapter One regarding the central organization. While some universities developed Youth 
League branches very early, as soon as 1921 for Peking University, most of them were set up 
under the control of the CCP in the wake of the foundation of the PRC in 1949. Like at the 
central level, most of the CYL committees on campuses stopped their activities in the first years 
of the Cultural Revolution. Some resumed them before the CYL Central Committee did in 1978. 
For example, the Peking University CYL held its 9th Congress in 1971.650  
The reform policy opened the way to a liberalization of control on campus. In the 1980s, 
the CYL and related organizations were still key actors on campus but were increasingly 
autonomous from the CCP and more liberal in their activities. Also, the student union was less 
controlled by the CYL and the CCP. In the 1980s, the student union chairman was usually 
directly elected by all the college students. The elections were highly contested as Francis 
                                                 
649 Interviews with student 7, student 8, and student 10. 
650 On the evolution of the Youth League Committee of Peking University, see : Peking University Youth League 
Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University (Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 358–
371. 
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highlighted in the case of Peking University.651 As I show in the next chapter, the elections are 
now generally indirect and highly controlled.  
The 1980s decade was special in that regard. As argued by Zhao, the decreasing number 
of cadres dedicated to student management made possible an increasing “amphibiousness” of 
youth organizations on campus. It means that they were diverted from their original role and 
developed activities rather contradictory with their official functions. According to Zhao, “some 
student control personnel and students in universities not only resisted cooperation with the 
state, but also captured student control institutions to spread nonconformist ideologies.”652 
From the Party’s perspective, this relaxation of student control was one of the main 
elements which made possible the uprising of 1989.653 Against this background, the control 
mechanisms were strengthened during the years that followed. One of the earliest decisions 
after June 1989 was to establish a mandatory military training for students. Peking University, 
as one of the most active schools during the protests, was made a test case and the whole class 
of freshmen of 1989 was sent to the Shijiazhuang Military Academy in Hebei for one year of 
military training. Some 140 other universities received funding for military trainings.654 The 
trainings were then reduced in length and short-term trainings of a few weeks became the rule 
in most universities across the country.655 
                                                 
651 Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political Culture : Official Student Politics at Beijing University,” 
307. 
652  Zhao, “Decline of Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student 
Movement,” 170. 
653 Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 
500. 
654 Rosen, “The Effect of Post-4 June Re-Education Campaigns on Chinese Students,” 318. 
655 Perry, “Citizen Contention and Campus Calm,” 212. 
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The 1989 events also triggered a long-term reflection within the CYL on how to improve 
its control over college students. This was first reflected in the publication by the central CYL 
administration in August 1989 of a document calling for a strengthening of the CYL’s position 
within campuses, and more specifically for increased professionalization of CYL cadres, which 
included a standardization of their training, status and salaries.656 The various universities then 
put into place broad recommendations from this document. In the case of Peking University, 
the student union chairman stopped from being directly elected after 1989, training programs 
were put in place for CYL branches secretaries starting in 1995, and clearer rules where 
established in 1998 regarding the creation and funding of student associations.657 The rank of 
the university CYL committee leaders was also raised in the various universities in the 1990s.658 
In most cases, the university CYL committee secretary was given the rank of division director 
(zheng chuji, 正处级).659 
The Document 15 of 2005 issued by the central CYL and the Ministry of Education 
further advanced the strengthening of the CYL on campus. It gave clear standards regarding 
the number of full-time CYL cadres a university CYL committee should have depending on the 
size of the school. If the university has less than 10,000 students, the CYL committee must have 
at least five officials. For universities with 10,000 to 25,000 students, the minimum is nine. And 
the universities of more than 25,000 students should have, at least, twelve officials. According 
                                                 
656 “Opinion Regarding CYL Work in Universities in the Current Period (guanyu dangqian gaodeng xuexiao 
gongqingtuan gongzuo de ji dian yijian, 关于当前高等学校共青团工作的几点意见),” CYL Central Committee, 
13 August 1989. 
657  Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 157–159. 
658 See Chapter Two regarding the cadres’ ranking system. 
659 This change was implemented in 1996 in Nanjing Normal University for instance : Da Zuoling (笪佐领), Local 
record of the Nanjing normal university 1993-2002 (Nanjing shifan daxue zhi 1993-2002, 南京师范大学志 1993-
2002) (Nanjing: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2002), 350.  
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to the text, the CYL secretary should have the same rank and salary as a department director of 
the CCP committee, which generally means the rank of division director. At the level of the 
university faculty, they all should have at least one full time CYL official.660 In the universities 
I studied, this standard is followed. For instance, Peking University and Nanjing University, 
which have both more than 30,000 students each, have twelve full time CYL officials at the 
university level and one in each faculty.661 In smaller and less prestigious institutions, the rules 
are not always followed that closely. A report regarding CYL work in the various institutions 
of higher education in Mianyang City, in Sichuan Province, showed that in 2008 the schools 
did not have on average enough full-time CYL officials with respect to Document 15.662 
Document 15 also established a minimum budget for CYL daily activities on campus 
depending on the size of the school. According to my interviews, elite schools tend to follow 
the rule,663 but the investigation in Mianyang showed that it is not always the case. 664 In 
addition, Document 15 clarified the relationship between the CYL and student organizations. 
It set as a rule that at the university level the student union and graduate student union office 
                                                 
660  “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the CYL Construction in Higher Education 
Institutions (Guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin gaodeng xuexiao gongqingtuan jianshe de yijian, 关于进一步加
强和改进高等学校共青团建设的意见),” Document 15, Ministry of Education and CYL Central Committee, 8 
April 2005. 
661 Interviews with cadre 3, student 4, cadre 6, and cadre 12. 
662  Ren Tongmei (任彤玫 ), “Research Report on the Youth League Construction Work in Universities in 
Mianyang (Mianyang gaoxiao tuanjian gongzuo diaoyan baogao, 绵阳高校团建工作调研报告),” Website of 
Mianyang CYL, January 2008. It can be accessed here: 
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663 Interviews with cadre 6 and cadre 12. Overall, it is very hard to obtain a clear figure for CYL budget in the 
various schools. If they replied, our interviewees only gave me vague figures, impossible to verify. The only 
documented budget I found was for the year 2002 in Nanjing Normal University, it amounted to 830,000 RMB. 
Da Zuoling (笪佐领), Local record of the Nanjing normal university 1993-2002 (Nanjing shifan daxue zhi 1993-
2002, 南京师范大学志 1993-2002), 350. 
664  Ren Tongmei (任彤玫 ), “Research Report on the Youth League Construction Work in Universities in 
Mianyang (Mianyang gaoxiao tuanjian gongzuo diaoyan baogao, 绵阳高校团建工作调研报告).” 
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secretaries must be CYL officials. Also, it emphasized the supervision function of the CYL 
over the various student associations.665 In parallel to these texts focusing on the CYL, others 
emphasized the strengthening of political work on campus, and especially the role of student 
counsellors. I come back to these in Chapter Five.666 
In addition to the strengthening of the control organizations themselves, the post-1989 
period also saw an increase in the recruitment of college students in the Party. As shown by 
Ch’i, as well as Rosen, the recruitment of CCP members on campus in the 1980s was extremely 
low.667 After 1989, the Party pushed for an increase in the recruitment of university students.668 
This trend is visible in Table 3.1 below: while the ratio of CCP members on campus nationwide 
was 1.5% in 1992, it reached 8.8% in 2013. 
Table 3.1: Ratio of CCP and CYL members among university students669 
Date 1956 1978 1980 1988 1992 2003 2013 
CCP 
membership 
8.6% 10.8% 4.4% 2.9% 1.5% 6.7% 8.8% 
CYL 
membership 
57.3% 60.4% 76.2% 86.9% 88.9% 68% 68.4% 
 
                                                 
665  “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the CYL Construction in Higher Education 
Institutions (Guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin gaodeng xuexiao gongqingtuan jianshe de yijian, 关于进一步加
强和改进高等学校共青团建设的意见),” Document 15, Ministry of Education and CYL Central Committee, 8 
April 2005. 
666  See in particular: “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the Political Education of 
University students (guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin daxuesheng sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu de yijian, 关于进一步
加强和改进大学生思想政治教育的意见),” Document 16, State Council, 14 October 2004. 
667 Ch’i, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, 142; Rosen, 
“Students and the State in China: The Crisis in Ideology and Organization,” 73. 
668 Stanley Rosen, “The Victory of Materialism: Aspirations to Join China’s Urban Moneyed Classes and the 
Commercialization of Education,” The China Journal, no. 51 (2004): 27–52. 
669 Sources: Educational Statistics Yearbook of China (Zhongguo jiaoyu tongji nianjian, 中国教育统计年鉴) 
(People’s Education Press, 1993), 171; Educational Statistics Yearbook of China (Zhongguo jiaoyu tongji nianjian, 
中国教育统计年鉴) (People’s Education Press, 2003), 2-40; Educational Statistics Yearbook of China (Zhongguo 
jiaoyu tongji nianjian, 中国教育统计年鉴) (People’s Education Press, 2013), 3-41. 
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The trends are less clear regarding CYL members. As underlined by Rosen, the CYL 
membership was particularly high in the late 1980s, at a time when its ideological appeal was 
also extremely low. There was very little screening in recruiting. 670 After that, the ratio of 
members among university students declined, and has stabilized around 68% since the early 
2000s. This decrease is concomitant with the reforms of the late 1990s which greatly increased 
the number of college students. While between 1978 and 1996, yearly enrollment of university 
students only gradually increased, from 0.86 to 0.97 million, with the reforms implemented 
between 1996 and 1999 it skyrocketed. In 1999, it reached 2.7 million. This tendency continued 
as enrollment in 2004 reached 4.47 million.671 It is during this period of transformation that the 
ratio of CYL members among university students decreased. The recruitment efforts were 
directed to the Party, 672 while CYL membership was not that relevant anymore to student’s life, 
as highlighted in Chapter One. But since then, the ratio of CYL members among university 
students is stable, indicating that CYL recruitment follows the continuous increase in students’ 
enrollment. 
 Rosen stressed in the 2000s that the CCP members have been largely recruited in elite 
universities, such as Tsinghua University. The ratio of CCP members has always been higher 
and remains very high in such institutions.673 This is also true about CYL membership. At 
Tsinghua University, 84% of the students were CYL members in 1963,674 and in 2014 they 
                                                 
670 Rosen, “The Effect of Post-4 June Re-Education Campaigns on Chinese Students,” 320. 
671 Limin Bai, “Graduate Unemployment: Dilemmas and Challenges in China’s Move to Mass Higher Education,” 
The China Quarterly 185 (2006): 128–44. 
672 Interviews with academic 6 and cadre 10. 
673  Rosen, “The Victory of Materialism: Aspirations to Join China’s Urban Moneyed Classes and the 
Commercialization of Education,” 43. 
674 Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class, 26. 
 208 
were around 90% according to CYL cadres.675 Similar ratios are true for the other studied 
universities.676 In elite universities, CYL membership is almost universal. 
 We have seen how the organizational control structure on campus strengthened since 
the early 1990s. I now focus on the activities of the CYL and the student union on campus, to 
show how they evolved as to keep their monopoly over extra-curricular student life. 
 
2)  Maintaining the monopoly over extra-curricular activities 
a)  New forms of (a)political education 
In the Post-1989 era, the CCP leadership has put forward the necessity of enhancing 
political control. As a result, the political education curriculum was completely rebuilt. Since 
the late 1990s, the college students are to follow compulsory hours of political education 
according to a system of “two courses” (liangke, 两课). It includes mandatory courses in 
Marxist ideology and morals, with, among others, regular classes on the CCP’s current 
ideological direction. 677  In addition to these compulsory classes, The CYL has been 
instrumental in developing political education among its large membership.678 It has established 
CYL schools (tuanxiao, 团校) in the various universities since the 1980s.679 These schools have 
                                                 
675 Interviews with cadre 17 and cadre 41. 
676 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 10, and cadre 35. 
677 Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 
501. 
678 Regarding the strengthening and evolution of political education in universities more broadly, see : Qinghua 
Wang, “Strengthening and Professionalizing Political Education in China’s Higher Education,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 22, no. 80 (2013): 332–50. 
679 The Peking University CYL school was established in 1982: Peking University Youth League Committee, The 
Communist Youth League in Peking University (Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 160. 
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been active since then in the training of CYL members and CYL branches leaders.680 
While it still promotes such classical political work among students, the CYL has been 
diversifying its activities since the 1990s. In particular, it started proposing more leisure 
oriented activities. Along with the student union, it increasingly organized large cultural events 
such as singing, sports or poetry competitions on campus.681 In addition, in 1989 was organized 
for the first time by the CYL a national competition of student scientific projects called “the 
challenge cup” (tiaozhanbei, 挑战杯).682 It became very popular and was later reproduced at 
the university level, such as in Peking University in 1994.683 Such leisure activities are set in 
place through the student union; the CYL mainly supervises and does not really organize itself 
the activities.684 A key role of the student union, beyond the actual organization of events, is 
also to make sure that a lot of students participate. Since the activities are not mandatory, the 
cadres sometimes have to rely on their personal ties to persuade them.685  
Following this logic, the volunteering activities developed by the central level CYL that 
I described in Chapter One, were largely implemented at the university level. In Peking 
                                                 
680 For an overview of the training sessions organized by the Tsinghua University CYL school, see : Fang Huijian 
(方惠坚) and Zhang Sijing (张思敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 清华大学志), 
1:885. 
681 Interviews with cadre 6, student 7, student 8, cadre 10, and cadre 35. 
682 Beijing Communist Youth League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), 
ed., Records and Documents of Beijing’s Youth Organizations (Beijing Qingnian Zuzhi Zhiwengao, 北京青年组
织志文稿) (Beijing: Beijing Press, 2007), 386. 
683  Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 143. 
684 Interviews with cadre 6, student 7, student 8, cadre 10, and cadre 35. 
685 On this issue, see: Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui 
yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角),” Chen Wei’s Blog, September 12, 2011. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/gqmq/2011/0912/45142.html (consulted on 24 May 2015).  
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University, the first of these volunteering activities was organized in 1996.686 Since the 1990s, 
college students got involved in the “Hope project” for instance, volunteering to staff the 
elementary schools established by the China Youth Development Foundation in the poorest 
provinces of China.687 Student volunteers also take part in exceptional events at the local or 
national level. The Nanjing 2014 Youth Olympic Games, for example, occurred at the time of 
my fieldwork in Nanjing. On this occasion, students from Nanjing’s various universities took 
part in the organization, among which 1600 volunteers from Nanjing University. 688  To 
publicize its activities, the CYL also developed new means of communication, focused on 
student life. The Peking University CYL Committee started to print in 1998 its own brochure, 
“Beida Youth” (Beida qingnian, 北大青年 ). 689  In the late 2000s, internet websites and 
applications became the CYL’s main information distribution channels.690  
While these diverse activities developed by the CYL appear as apolitical in content, they 
retain a clear political objective. It is a way for the organization to keep attracting students and 
to maintain its monopoly over student extracurricular activities. Studies on the political 
engagement of young people have shown the role played by recreational activities in order to 
foster membership. This has been emphasized by Abrams and Little regarding parties’ youth 
organizations in Britain in the 1960s and by Lucie Bargel in the case of contemporary France.  
                                                 
686  Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 149. 
687 On the “Hope Project”, see Chapter One. On its implementation on campus more particularly, see: Perry, 
“Citizen Contention and Campus Calm,” 214. 
688 “Description of the Prize-giving Ceremony for the Volunteering Service of Nanjing University at the Youth 
Olympic Games (Nanjing daxue qing’aohui zhiyuan fuwu banjiang shengdian shikuang, 南京大学青奥会志愿
服务颁奖盛典实况),” WeChat account of Nanjing University CYL, October 29, 2014. 
689  Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 157. 
690 Interviews with student 7 and student 8. 
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691 Bargel mentioned for instance that youth organizations’ militants find playful ways to carry 
even the most bureaucratic tasks, such as amending the organization policy proposals. They 
invent games to make the exercise fun and enjoyable. They, for instance, would give themselves 
compulsory, and often unfit words to insert into documents, thereby transforming a tedious task 
into a humorous challenge.692 These studies show that, in contexts where political activities are 
not valued by young people – just like in post-1989 China – familiarizing new recruits to the 
life of the organization through recreational activities is a particularly efficient strategy.693 
The transformation of the CYL’s approach towards students is also visible in the ways 
it allowed for a multiplication of student associations, as long as they remain under its 
supervision. To take Peking University as an example, there were 97 registered student 
associations in 1996, and around 300 now.694 Through the student union and these other student 
associations, the CYL guarantees that no independent organization can develop and contest its 
hegemonic control over extracurricular student life. This is why, as Perry puts it, “ironically, 
the increased associational activity among Chinese students today is working to underpin, rather 
than to undermine, the authority of the Communist party-state.”695 I now highlight how the 
diversification of CYL and student union activities transpire in their organizational evolutions 
since the 1990s. 
                                                 
691 Philip Abrams and Alan Little, “The Young Activist in British Politics,” The British Journal of Sociology 16, 
no. 4 (1965): 315–33; Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young 
socialists and young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization], 325. 
692 Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young socialists and 
young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization], 325. 
693 On Chinese students’ attitude during this period, see : Rosen, “The Victory of Materialism: Aspirations to Join 
China’s Urban Moneyed Classes and the Commercialization of Education,” 27–52. 
694 Interview with cadre 10 and Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in 
Peking University (Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 153. 
695 Perry, “Citizen Contention and Campus Calm,” 213. 
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b)  The League’s organizational diversification 
The evolution of the CYL’s and student union’s activities is reflected in the 
transformations of their organizational structure. In the case of Tsinghua University, in 1950, 
the university level CYL committee had only two departments, dedicated to organization and 
propaganda, the basic set up for a CCP-like organization.696 The Organization Department dealt 
with the CYL’s human resources while the Propaganda Department publicized its activities. 
This sharply contrasts with the situation of the CYL committee in 2014, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The figure depicts the internal organization of the university’s CYL committee, which includes 
its various departments but also the student union, itself subdivided in functional departments. 
 
Figure 3.2: The internal organization of the Tsinghua University CYL Committee and Student 
Union (2015)697 
 
                                                 
696 Fang Huijian (方惠坚) and Zhang Sijing (张思敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 
清华大学志), 1:881. 
697  While the departments’ denominations vary, the university level CYL committees overall have similar 

















































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to its general office and the student union, the university level CYL 
committee now counts five departments and five subsumed centers. I present the student union 
as a mere department of the CYL as it is the way it was portrayed by both cadres and students 
in my interviews. In addition, the student union is physically hosted in the CYL’s offices on 
campus. In some universities, the student union is even represented in the organigram as a 
department of the CYL: such is the case, for instance, in the office of the Peking University 
CYL Committee.698 The CYL also has a department dedicated to culture and sports, supervising 
the large events and competitions mentioned above. It has a Study and Social Practice 
Department, which monitors all the students’ extracurricular fieldwork activities, such as 
summer trips to various parts of China, meant for instance to raise students’ awareness on social 
issues. 699  Despite some reorganization among them, such departments already existed in 
1993.700 However, the creation since then of a department dedicated to the supervision of 
student associations is indicative of the tight control now exerted over the development of these 
groups. 
The CYL now also counts five centers that did not exist in 1993, highlighting the 
diversification of its management of student life. A center is dedicated to the supervision of 
volunteering activities, which are increasingly important on campus. A Center for the 
Improvement of Students’ Quality is in charge of training students to various professional 
domains and deliver advice regarding their professional plans. A center is also dedicated to 
                                                 
department specifically dedicated to manage activities for graduate students. It is not the case in Tsinghua 
University as it has another CYL committee specifically dedicated to them. Sources: interviews with cadre 14, 
cadre 17, and cadre 41. Also Tsinghua University CYL Committee’s website 
(http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/xtw/4837/), Consulted on 26 April 2016. 
698 Interview with cadre 10. 
699 Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, and cadre 41. 
700 For the Tsinghua University CYL organization in 1993, see : Fang Huijian (方惠坚) and Zhang Sijing (张思
敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 清华大学志), 1:881. 
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technological innovation: it helps students develop their own projects and monitors, for instance, 
the teams for the Challenge Cup scientific competition. A center in charge of information 
management oversees the various websites linked to student life on campus, underlining the 
expansion of CYL’s reach on the Internet. Finally, a Center for Research on Youth Work is 
dedicated to organizing surveys regarding students’ attitudes and to analyzing the student 
management practices themselves.701 The CYL hence developed means to be self-reflecting 
about its work in order to maintain its hegemonic position over student life.  
The student union followed a similar evolution. It features various departments 
dedicated to the actual organization of cultural or sport-related activities, as well as to support 
students in their daily life. While most of these departments have existed for a long time, the 
main change between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s was the introduction of a Liaison 
Department.702 Its mission is to contact organizations and firms outside campus to find sponsors 
for the student union and its activities. Such diversification of the student union’s funding 
became possible with the reform and opening up policy.  
Besides some marginal reorganizations since 1992,703 the key additional changes are the 
establishment of a Cultural Exchange Department, a Student Life and Right Protection 
Department and a Public Service Department. The first is a sign of the internationalization of 
Chinese universities as it oversees the relationships with student groups from other universities 
in China and abroad. The second focuses on solving daily life problems for students and 
channeling their complaints to the university management. It shows that the CYL is trying to 
                                                 
701 Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, and cadre 41. 
702 For the Tsinghua University Student Union organization in 1965 and 1992, see : Fang Huijian (方惠坚) and 
Zhang Sijing (张思敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 清华大学志), 1:900. 
703 For instance, the function of the former Propaganda Department is now within the hands of the Internal Liaison 
Department in charge of the flow of information within the organization, and the Study Department in charge of 
providing extracurricular study content and advice to students. Also the Female Affairs Department does not exist 
anymore, its content was absorbed by the different departments (Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, and cadre 41). 
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get closer to students through the student union in order to anticipate and manage discontent. 
Finally, the Public Service Department organizes various activities, such as debating contests 
or conferences, to foster students’ civic engagement, in addition to classical political 
education.704  
All in all, the organizational transformations of the CYL and the student union reflect 
the complexification of their approach towards student management. This is also true for the 
graduate student union, developed since the 1980s, which is organized along similar lines.705 
The overall structure of the CYL and the student union is also reproduced at the faculty level, 
with a lesser amount of departments.706  Their diversified range of activities and  decentralized 
structure - which includes the faculty level organizations as well as the supervised student 
associations - guarantees  that the CYL and its student union maintain a hegemonic control over 
student life. However, this would not be possible without the existence of a dedicated 
manpower which is mainly composed of students themselves. One of the limitations of the 
scholarship on student control in Chinese universities, is that it largely omits the key role played 
by student cadres.707 I now turn to a detailed explanation of their omnipresence on campus, 
which can be partly accounted for by the specific incentives that are put in place to encourage 
students to choose this path. 
                                                 
704 Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, and cadre 41. 
705 The activities of the graduate student union are more academically focused and far less numerous than the 
student union ones (Interviews with cadre 14 and student 18). 
706 Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, and cadre 41. On the faculty level organization, see : Jiang Zhibin (江志
斌), “A Research on the Instruction of College Student Cadres in the New century（xin shiqi gaoxiao xuesheng 
ganbu duiwu jianshe yanjiu, 新时期高校学生干部队伍建设研究)” (PhD Dissertation, Southwest University, 
2011), 82. 
707 See for instance : Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-
Deng China,” 493–513; Perry, “Citizen Contention and Campus Calm,” 211–217. 
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B -  Commitment is rewarded: the student cadre experience 
The second part of this chapter focuses on student cadres themselves as key actors in 
the university control system. In addition to underlining their significance, my objective is to 
question the reasons why students choose to become, and eventually remain for several years, 
student cadres. I put forward the instances of socialization that lead to such a choice, 
considering the complex effects that students’ family background might have on their trajectory, 
but also the role played by CCP membership as a political commitment process parallel to the 
student cadre experience. 
Highlighting the Party-State’s cooptation strategy on campus, I show that student cadres 
have a clear advantage over other students, both in their access to campus resources and 
graduate programs, but also when entering the job market. This is the direct result of specific 
policies aiming at valorizing the student cadres experience, in line with the Party-State’s 
rejuvenation policy developed in Chapter Two. It is also an indirect effect of the universities’ 
student management structure which places the student cadres at the center of a clientelist 
network.  
This advantageous configuration incentivizes them to nurture their commitment as 
student cadres. Such career advantages are particularly valuable for students in a highly 
competitive environment. The dismantlement of the system of guaranteed job assignments for 
university graduates in the 1980s,708 and the expansion of the number of college students since 
the late 1990s709 have led to a highly competitive job market and to massive unemployment 
among young graduates. While in 1999 the higher education system enrolled 8.8 million 
                                                 
708 See : Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 80–90. 
709 The reform of 1999 was particularly instrumental in expanding drastically the pool of college graduates. See : 
Bai, “Graduate Unemployment: Dilemmas and Challenges in China’s Move to Mass Higher Education,” 128–144. 
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students, around 10.5% of the age cohort, in 2014, this figure rose to 29 million, 30% of the 
cohort.710 In 2014, the unemployment was officially around 15% for graduates six months after 
they left university, and according to some reports it was in practice closer to 30%.711 
1)  Student cadres as key actors on campus 
a)  A hierarchy controlled by the Youth League 
The student cadres’ mission is to act as a link between the students and the university 
professors and officials. The official definition of student cadres in universities include the 
students who volunteer as cadres for the CCP and CYL organizations, for the student union, 
and for student associations at different levels on campus.712 Such a broad definition includes 
a very large number of students. While it is hard to obtain actual figures regarding the number 
of student cadres in various universities, there are, according to a campus official, around 2,000 
student cadres among Tsinghua University’s roughly 15,000 undergrads.713 According to a 
survey conducted among 3,000 students in 30 universities or so, 38.5% of students participated 
in student associations and 25.5% of them had an experience in the student union.714  
Being mostly interested in the students who actively take part in the student control 
structure itself, I focus here on the student cadres who are part of the CYL and student union 
organizations, which offer a lot of positions and opportunities. On the contrary, as its units are 
                                                 
710 Elizabeth J Perry, “Higher Education and Authoritarian Resilience: The Case of China, Past and Present,” in 
Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series, 2015, 14. 
711 Sharma, “What Do You Do with Millions of Extra Graduates?” 
712 “Plan for the Cultivation of University Student Cadres 2006-2010 (gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu peiyang guihua 
2006-2010, 高校学生干部培养规划 2006-2010),” Central CYL, 29 August 2006. 
713 Interview with cadre 10. 
714 Lü Lili (吕丽莉), “Study on the Democratic Construction of College Student Organizations (gaoxiao xuesheng 
zuzhi de minzhu jianshe, 高校学生组织的民主建设),” 45. 
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largely staffed with professional cadres, the CCP can only offer basic level cadre positions to 
students, who cannot, therefore, rise in the hierarchy. At the same time, student associations are 
generally small groups which cannot offer many positions to those who participate in it, and 
they remain marginal in the overall student control structure.715 In that case, students hold 
positions that are similar to those of volunteers in student clubs in Europe or the US.716 
By contrast, in the CYL and the student union, students can occupy a variety of positions, 
which are hierarchically organized. The student union is staffed by students, apart from its 
office secretary who is a CYL cadre. Hence it provides a large range of opportunities for 
students at various levels of the university hierarchical structure. In the CYL, the leaders at the 
university and faculty levels are professional cadres but many positions are hold by students. 
At the university level, basic cadres, as well as CYL department deputy directors, are generally 
students. Most universities also have a graduate student among the university level CYL deputy 
secretaries.717 At the faculty level, the CYL secretary and the executive deputy secretary718 are 
generally officials while the remaining positions are held by students. At the class level, the 
CYL branch is fully staffed by students. These various student cadre positions are presented 
hierarchically in Figure 3.3 below. The figure depicts the parallel hierarchies of student cadres 
within the student union and the CYL, which are both under the management of CYL officials. 
This figure aims at giving an idea of the various positions student cadres can hold in the CYL 
                                                 
715 Some student associations, such as the units of the Red Cross on campus, are big enough so they are given a 
specific place alongside the student union. The leaders of these organization have then a status similar to the one 
of student union cadres as they can rise up within the hierarchy and often end up in the student union of the CYL 
(Interview with student 17). 
716 Interviews with cadre 6, student 7, student 8, and student 16. 
717 The features of the position as university level CYL student deputy secretary change from one university to the 
other. In Peking University, it is generally held by a graduate student. In Tsinghua University it is held by a 
graduate student who is student counsellor at the same time. In Nanjing University, it is replaced by a position as 
aid of the CYL secretary (Interviews with cadre 3, cadre 12, cadre 14, and cadre 31). 
718 The executive deputy secretary is the most important among the CYL committee’s deputy secretaries.  
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and student union on campus and their hierarchical relations. However, as these students are 
not actual professional cadres, this hierarchy is not an official one and can vary slightly from 
one university to the next. 
 
Figure 3.3: A hierarchy of student cadres in the CYL and the student union719 
 
 
It is important to separate these two parallel hierarchies as my interviewees presented 
student cadre positions in the CYL and in the student union as quite different experiences. The 
student union cadres are presented as being closer to students as it is a student-run organization 
mainly focused on leisure activities. However, the number of activities they manage also 
renders their schedule busier. The CYL student cadres are, by contrast, presented as closer to 
the university officials, and especially the CYL leaders. They mainly help the CYL officials in 
                                                 
719 This figure is based on a cross analysis of all my interviews with university cadres and student cadres. I included 
the class committee cadres, and the class leader, in the student union hierarchy as it plays the same role at the class 








































































their work, rather than autonomously organize activities. The students who choose to become 
student cadres in the CYL are generally already Party members.720 
The issue of CCP membership is fundamentally linked to the student cadre experience.  
While most student cadres are CYL members, only of few are CCP members. A student cadre 
experience can help one to obtain CCP membership, as the selection process values 
involvement in Party-related organizations.721 While political criteria are still key for entering 
the Party, they evolved from an emphasis put on class origin in Mao China to a focus on political 
participation since the 1980s.722  
This is particularly important as CCP membership has been shown to be a clear 
advantage for one’s future career. It is a key factor in obtaining a position in the Party-State 
bureaucracy or a State-Owned enterprise, and more broadly CCP members earn on average 
better salaries than non-members.723 Obtaining CCP membership can therefore be one of the 
reasons pushing one to volunteer as a student cadre. 
The process to become a CCP member is long and selective. Candidates must first 
express in writing their desire to become Party members to the relevant Party branch, in their 
class for instance. To initiate the process, they each need two letters of support from CCP branch 
members. If the candidates are CYL members, the letters can come from their CYL branch’s 
leaders. At this stage, they are only “activists entering the Party” (rudang jiji fenzi, 入党积极
                                                 
720 Interviews with cadre 10, student 11, student 12, student 16, and student 17. 
721 Interviews with student 7 and student 8. 
722 Bian, Shu, and Logan, “Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics in China,” 805–841. 
723 On this issue, see : Hongbin Li et al., “Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence from 
Urban Chinese Twins,” The Economic Journal 117, no. 523 (October 2007): 1504–20; Andrew G. Walder and 
Songhua Hu, “Revolution, Reform, and Status Inheritance: Urban China, 1949-1996,” American Journal of 
Sociology 114, no. 5 (2009): 1395–1427; Bruce J. Dickson, “Who Wants to Be a Communist? Career Incentives 
and Mobilized Loyalty in China,” The China Quarterly 217 (2014): 42–68. 
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分子 ). As underlined by Duchâtel and Zylberman, this part is highly dependent on the 
candidates’ relationship to members in their CCP branch.724 For instance, I was surprised to 
learn that one of the student cadres I interviewed was not a CCP member while he was already 
in graduate school and very active in his faculty’s graduate student union. He had been delayed 
in his application to CCP membership because he did not know well the students in his class. 
After being assigned to a certain dormitory linked to his class, he had changed his major and 
ended up not having his classmates as roommates, as is usually the case for Chinese undergrads. 
As a result, he had grown closer to his roommates than his classmates. Since the CCP branch 
is attached to the class, he had more difficulty to find sponsors.725  
After the candidates become “activists,” they must prove their loyalty and commitment 
during a minimum period of one year. They must participate in the activities of the Party branch 
and follow Party classes (dangke, 党课). They must also regularly report their self-assessments 
(sixiang huibao, 思想汇报) to the CCP branch secretary. One or two CCP branch members are 
also in charge of monitoring each activist’s behavior and of reporting to the CCP branch about 
their progress. During this period, information about the candidates and their social circles is 
collected by the CCP branch members to judge their political loyalty. After a year, a vote is 
organized to determine if the activists can become or not “probationary members” (yubei 
dangyuan, 预备党员). The probationary members have the right to participate in CCP branch 
meetings but not to vote.  
After a maximum period of one year, another vote is organized in the CCP branch so 
they can become full members. If they do not commit any major mistake and participate 
                                                 
724 Mathieu Duchâtel and Joris Zylberman, Les nouveaux communistes chinois [The new Chinese communists] 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 2012), 108. 
725 Interview with student 15.  
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regularly in the activities and Party classes, the probationary members generally become full 
members at the end of the process. This process is more straightforward when the activists are 
CYL members as their records are easily available through their CYL branch’s files. It is also 
easier for candidates recommended by their CYL branch as they enter a separate category in 
the CCP branch’s yearly recruitment quota.726  
While being a lower level student cadre is a positive element to enter the Party, CCP 
membership is key to rise in the student cadre hierarchy. This is true in the CYL, as we have 
seen, but also to become chairman or deputy chairman of the university level student union.727 
The two experiences are therefore closely tied. As the student cadres climb up the hierarchy, 
most of them gradually become CCP members. Overall, being a student cadre and being a CCP 
member are two mutually reinforcing commitment processes: while at the beginning of the 
process having a student cadre experience can help one to obtain Party membership, this 
membership becomes later on necessary in order to rise in the student cadre hierarchy. 
b)  Social background and commitment  
As in the case of CCP membership, one’s social background is important to understand 
why one would become a student cadre. This is in line with the social aspect of political 
commitment I developed in the Introduction. More precisely, it echoes what Oberschall called 
“bloc recruitment” in his comparative study of social movements. He stressed how the 
organizations often recruit from within specific social groups, among the people close to their 
members.728 
                                                 
726 On this process, see : Bian, Shu, and Logan, “Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics in China,” 
814; Duchâtel and Zylberman, Les nouveaux communistes chinois [The new Chinese communists], 108–120. 
727 Interviews with student 7, student 8, cadre 10 and cadre 27 
728 Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements. 
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While class background is not an official criterion for university enrollment or even 
Party recruitment anymore, 729  one’s family background remains a determining factor on 
whether one becomes a student cadre. According to a survey among 680 ordinary students and 
127 student cadres from one of the best Chinese universities730 published in 2013, 19.7% of the 
sampled student cadres were children of “public sector managers.”731  By contrast, only 8.4% 
of the other students were included in this category. Furthermore, public sector managers only 
represent 2.1% of the overall Chinese population, underlining even more clearly the 
overrepresentation of their children among student cadres. While the white collar and urban 
families are also more numerous among student cadres compared to other students, the 
overrepresentation of children of cadres is this survey’s most striking result.732 I could not 
access such data for the universities I specifically studied, but I speculate that the results would 
be similar.  
These results indicate that student cadres are a minority within the already privileged 
minority that has access to university, and especially the high-level institutions I am focusing 
on. Consider the case of Peking University: between 1995 and 1999, only 35.8% of its students 
came from a family of peasants or workers and 39.2% from one of managers. At the time, these 
two categories represented respectively 80.2% and 1.7% of the Chinese population.733 It must 
                                                 
729 Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 213. 
730 While the name of the university is not given, it is a “project 985” (985 gongcheng, 985工程) university, 
meaning it is one of the forty or so best Universities in the country. For a synthetic explanation of the project, see 
the website of the China Education Center: http://www.chinaeducenter.com/en/cedu/ceduproject211.php 
(Consulted on 12 May 2016). 
731 The category of “public sector managers” (Guojia he shehui guanli zhe, 国家和社会管理者) includes the 
medium and high level cadres in public administrations and public service units. 
732 Zhu Xinzhuo (朱新卓), Shi Junhua (石俊华), and Dong Zhihui (董智慧), “The Impact of Family Background 
on Occupying Student Union Cadre Positions (jiating Beijing dui daxuesheng danren xueshenghui ganbu de 
yingxiang, 家庭背景对大学生担任学生会干部的影响),” Journal of Higher Education 4 (2013): 69. 
733 Liang Chen (梁晨), Zhang Hao (张浩), and Li Zhongqing (李中清), Silent Revolution (wusheng de geming, 无
声的革命) (Beijing: Sanlian Library Ed., 2013), 114. 
 224 
be noted, however, that the Chinese higher education system has progressed towards gender 
balance since the 1990s. In 2013, there was a majority of female students (51.74%) among 
undergrads across the country. 734  While no statistics on the gender of student cadres are 
available, my interviews established that no clear gender imbalance could be found among basic 
level student cadres.735 As I demonstrate in Chapter Four, this stops to be the case when one 
rises in the hierarchy, as female students become less and less represented. 
Coming back to the student cadres’ family background, the overrepresentation of 
children of officials implies a certain continuity between the Mao and post-Mao eras. In the 
1950s and 1960s, as shown by Unger as well as Shirk, students adapted their personal strategies 
to the opportunities offered to them based on their officially defined class label. Students with 
a “good” class background – meaning overall the children of officials, soldiers, peasants or 
workers – tended to maximize their political advantage and become student activists. This was 
especially true for cadres’ children, who were the most valued. Students from “bad” class 
background –  broadly meaning the students with property-class origins – could generally not 
access the advantages of being an activist.736 Such differences can still be found, albeit to a 
lesser degree, in the post Mao era where children of officials remain overrepresented among 
student cadres on campus. Such students could be inspired or even pushed by their relatives to 
pursue such a commitment. Being well-informed, they know that it can bring a career advantage 
to their children, especially in the administration, as I show in the following lines. Also, being 
                                                 
734 “Number of Female Students of Schools by Type and Level.” Ministry of Education’s website, December 2014. 
It can be accessed here: http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s8493/201412/181716.html 
(consulted on 22 August 2016). 
735 Interviews with student 1, student 2, student 7, student 8, and student 15. 
736 On the officially defined “good” and “bad class backgrounds in Mao China, see: Shirk, Competitive Comrades: 
Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 75–79; Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition 
in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 101–102. 
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potentially well connected, these students can make the most of/maximize their student cadre 
experience in their ascent towards an official career. 
However, the influence of one’s family background is multi-layered. According to my 
interviews in Beijing’s best universities, student cadres are mostly from well-off families with 
no background in the administration, and from families of low level and mid-level officials.737  
In the first case, they are pushed in this direction by their parents because, if they become 
officials, they can activate a useful web of relationships for the family business. Becoming a 
student cadre is therefore a substitute way of acquiring political capital for those who did not 
inherit it. In the second case, their choice is nurtured by the family’s taste for politics and family 
connections. The student cadre experience is akin to a consecration process for young people 
who were already socially predisposed to become part of the political elite. Such processes are 
key in converting the heirs to their own heritage, because, as Bourdieu puts it, “one is born 
noble, but one becomes noble.”738 
By contrast, according to the same interviews, the children of high level cadres tend not 
to choose to become student cadres, either because they do not need it for their future career as 
they can rely on their parents’ network, or because they are bored with politics and want to go 
into business.739 This is in line with the idea that they can use their parents’ influence to enrich 
themselves in the private sector. A recent quantitative study by Jia and Lan showed that children 
                                                 
737 Information provided by:  student 12, student 16, and student 21.  
738 Bourdieu here paraphrased Norbert Elias, in : Bourdieu, La Noblesse d’Etat: grandes écoles et esprit de corps 
[The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power], 157. 
739 Interviews with student 12, student 16, student 21.  
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of officials go in large number in the private sector, especially when government spending 
increases, which enables them to further capitalize on their family connections.740 
While family background remains a significant element, it plays in a variety of ways 
and the student cadre experience can therefore not be reduced to a reserved path for children of 
officials. Studies on political socialization in a variety of contexts have showed how young 
people’s political behaviors are largely influenced by the family background, but also how this 
influence is complex and multifaceted, far from being limited to the parents’ direct influence.741 
Other instances of sociability affect a student’s choice. The role of friends and roommates is of 
specific importance. Several interviewees have emphasized the role played by friendship in 
their decision to become student cadres and to remain so. Students in fact tend to join by small 
groups, mutually reinforcing their determination. The entry into the student union or the CYL 
is construed as a collective experience.742  
The friends they make in their dormitories are central in that regard. The importance of 
roommate ties and collective emulation was put forward by different student cadres.743 Dingxin 
Zhao already highlighted the importance of the dormitory environment in Chinese campuses 
with regards to political mobilization. He argued that in the years leading to the 1989 uprising, 
this dense living environment facilitated the spread of dissident ideas. He showed that different 
rooms developed specific features depending on their configuration, and especially the 
                                                 
740 Ruixue Jia and Xiaohuan Lan, “Capitalism for the Children: Entrepreneurs with Cadre Parents Under Big 
Government”, Working Paper, 17 August 2014. It can be accessed here: 
http://xiaohuanlan.weebly.com/uploads/1/9/1/3/19133549/entrepreneur_v140806.pdf (consulted on 2 July 2016). 
741 See in particular : Anne Muxel, L’expérience politique des jeunes (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001), 67. 
742 Interviews with student 12, student 16, and student 23.  
743 Interviews with student 12, student 16, and student 23. 
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personalities of their most charismatic occupants. 744  Such phenomena can also lead to a 
conservative turn if charismatic members push their roommates into becoming more active in 
the political organizations on campus, which appears to be rather common.  
One student cadre for instance explained to me how he started on this path in Peking 
University together with two of his roommates. One of the two was especially captivating and 
vocal. He pushed the two others in that direction. During their third year, they even considered 
running together for elections. In case of victory, the most charismatic one would have become 
the student union chairman and the others, deputy chairmen. Yet, being too outspoken, he was 
discouraged from running by CYL officials, who doubted his obedience and docility. As I show 
in the next chapter, CYL officials have a lot of power in selecting the potential candidates for 
the election of the student union chairman. The three friends therefore all remained mid-level 
student cadres during their fourth year.745  
Overall, the social circles of student cadres should not be forgotten when trying to 
understand their commitment process, and one should go beyond the issue of family 
background. Such phenomenon is not unique as organizations often recruit through the close 
networks of their members. In addition to the social aspects of recruitment, I now turn to the 
rewards linked to the student cadre experience and demonstrate that it is also particularly 
attractive for students navigating a competitive professional environment. 
                                                 
744 Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 101–22. 
745 Interview with student 13.  
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2)  Written and unwritten incentives for student cadres  
a)  Clientelism on campus 
Student cadres have a facilitated access to many university resources, from grants to 
graduate programs.  This is, first, a result of the key position they occupy as brokers between 
students, officials and professors. It provides them with a privileged access to the information 
about opportunities offered by the university. They meet with professors and officials on a 
regular basis to discuss activities or university policies. For example, the leaders of the 
university level CYL committee meet all the CYL branch secretaries, who are student cadres, 
once or twice a year at Peking University.746 Through these meetings, professors and officials 
get to know them and often deliver them information about grants, fellowships or travels abroad 
before they are publicized.747  
Beyond a privileged access to information, student cadres are more easily selected than 
other students for such grants or travels as they often develop a personal relationship with 
officials and professors. Such relationships are particularly important since the selection 
regarding grants and fellowships is generally made directly by professors. Having often relied 
on student cadres for several administrative tasks, it is a way for professors and officials to 
return the favor and reward students for their personal commitment.748  
Beyond these rewards based on favored relationships and access to information, student 
cadres are also at the center of a structured clientelist system within universities. In exchange 
                                                 
746 Interview with cadre 10.  
747 Interviews with student 2, student 3, and academic 23. This is also put forward by Chen Wei, a Renmin 
University Professor, in his blog :  Chen Wei (陈伟 ), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University 
(xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
748 Interviews with student 2, student 3, and academic 23. This is also put forward by Chen Wei in his blog :  Chen 
Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：
大学最阴暗的一角).” 
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for their services to the school administration, they enjoy a formalized preferred treatment over 
other students. This is clear with regards to the deliverance of personal awards to students. 
Many such prizes exist in various organizations in China. In universities, generalist awards 
include for instance: the “three goods students” award (san hao xuesheng, 三好学生)749 and 
the “excellent student” award (youxiu xuesheng, 优秀学生 ). These awards symbolize a 
student’s achievements in terms of grades, but also moral standing and involvement in the 
school. Being a student cadre is a key criterion in the selection process. Such awards exist at 
the different levels of the educational system and play a role in the graduation process. At the 
university level, these awards can be decisive in the selection to graduate school but also more 
broadly they are a positive feature on a resume. 750  
Some prizes reward students based on their political activities specifically; they can be 
granted to “excellent Communist Youth League members” (youxiu gongqingtuanyuan, 优秀共
青团员) or “excellent student cadres” (youxiu xuesheng ganbu, 优秀学生干部). While the first 
can be awarded to a large number of students, given that CYL membership is extremely 
widespread, the second is more specifically focused on student cadres and is, according to my 
interviewees, more valuable. Such awards, just like some of the general ones, are given at the 
faculty and university levels, but also at the local and national ones. The universities 
recommend candidates for local and national competitions.751 The national level awards are 
obviously the most prestigious ones.752  
                                                 
749 The “three goods” refer to good morals, good study abilities and good physical conditions.  
750 Interviews with student 11, cadre 12, student 15, and cadre 30. 
751 Interviews with student 6, student 11, cadre 12, student 24, and cadre 41. 
752 In 2011, 158 awards of “excellent Communist Youth League members” where given at the national level by 
the central CYL, to students but also young professionals. That same year, 124 national awards of “Excellent 
student cadres” were also delivered by the central CYL (Central Communist Youth League, Yearbook of the 
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In addition to being often selected for these awards, student cadres also have a 
considerable advantage in the “direct admission to graduate school” system (baoyan, 保研). 
This scheme allows some students to enter graduate school directly, bypassing the extremely 
competitive national admission examinations for graduate schools. The practice has been 
existing since the 1980s. Most of the “direct admissions to graduate school” take place within 
a faculty, but the best students have sometimes the opportunity to apply for a graduate program 
in another major. Universities and their faculties follow various procedures for selecting the 
college students who are directly accepted in their graduate programs. While the lists of 
admitted students have to be approved by the Ministry of Education, universities select the 
candidates internally. Overall, all universities give an important weight to the candidates’ 
participation to political activities on campus, and in particular to having an experience as 
student cadre.753  
There are two main types of “direct admissions to graduate school.” The first one is 
mostly based on a student academic performance. The student is generally evaluated through 
his grades as well as a written and oral exam specific to the university. Interestingly, among the 
grades taken into account, one is given each term by faculty level CYL officials and is dedicated 
to “social practice” (shehui shijian, 社会实践). The social practice grade is based on the 
officials’ perspective on a student involvement on campus and is therefore highly subjective 
and malleable. CYL officials can use the leverage they have on the grades in social practice to 
push aside a student they dislike and to favor others. 754 For instance, a student I interviewed 
who had the best grades in his class almost did not get selected for the “direct admissions to 
                                                 
Chinese Communist Youth League 2012 (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan nianjian 2012, 中国共青团年鉴 2012), 242–
246.  
753 Interviews with student 2, student 3, student 12, student 15, student 16, and cadre 35. 
754 Interviews with student 2, student 3, student 15, and cadre 10. 
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graduate school” as the CYL official in charge gave him the worst grade in social practice so 
as to keep the slot for one of his protégés. 755 Professors had to intervene and raise the issue to 
higher level university officials in order to allow this interviewee to obtain a better social 
practice grade and get admitted. Entertaining close relationships with CYL cadres, for whom 
they work and who see them as particularly active on campus, student cadres are often the ones 
who get the best grades in social practice. In turn it potentially helps them to obtain a “direct 
admission to graduate school.”756 
The second type of “direct admissions to graduate school” is related to “student work” 
and therefore especially relevant to student cadres. In that case, the students are selected 
according to their academic performance (in theory they must not have failed any class for 
instance), but most importantly their political involvement on campus. The selection process is 
rather opaque and, if not explicitly, it is in practice reserved for student cadres.757  
The students going through this “student work-related direct admissions to graduate 
school” (xuegong baoyan, 学工保研) do not get into the graduate programs directly: they first 
have to work for some time. The aim is to provide universities and schools with young graduates 
who will work in the student management structure. In general, two paths are available. The 
first is to stay on campus and work for a period of around two years as an official in charge of 
student management, most generally as student counsellors. The second option is to go to a less 
                                                 
755 Interview with student 14. 
756 Interviews with student 2, student 3, student 15, and cadre 10. 
757 Interviews with student 2, academic 2, student 3, cadre 10, student 12, and student 16. See also: Chen Wei (陈
伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最
阴暗的一角).” 
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economically developed part of the country and work in a school as a teacher or an official for 
a short period of time, generally one year. 758 
Some students prefer the second option as they can more quickly get on with the graduate 
program. However, my interviewees at Peking University underlined that to stay on campus as 
a student counsellor for two years was overall the most preferred option. Some students are 
simply not comfortable living for a year in a foreign and rather modest environment. More 
tactical students also envision a stay on campus as the most efficient way to strengthen their 
network within the university. The ones who stay on campus often become student counsellors 
and at the same time deputy secretaries of the faculty CYL committees.759 They are in a good 
position to meet a number of university officials. After two years, some students even stay in 
their positions in parallel to their graduate program, which is a valued option as it provides them 
with a regular income.760 These two years of working experience are also precious for students 
who want to take the civil service exam. Indeed, for most civil servant positions, two years of 
grassroots level work are required761 and this experience can count as such.762  
However, the choice between these two options does not only lie in students’ hands and 
highly depends on the officials in charge. The first type of “student work-related direct 
admissions to graduate school,” which implies to stay on campus for two years, is supervised 
                                                 
758 Interviews with student 2, academic 2, student 3, cadre 10, student 12, and student 16. 
759 Interviews with student 12, student 16, and student 24. 
760 The salaries vary depending on the universities and the faculties but at Peking University, it is around 6000 
yuan a month for a student counsellor (interview with student 34).  
761 Following the Temporary regulation regarding civil servants of 1993, a system of civil service exam was 
implemented. In order to apply to positions in provincial level administrations and above, the candidates need to 
have at least two years of working experience at the grassroots (jiceng, 基层), meaning county level and below 
(“Temporary Regulation Regarding Civil Servants (guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli, 国家公务员暂行条例),” 
State Council, August 1993). See the entry “civil service system” in the glossary for more details. 
762 Interviews with student 12, student 16, and student 24. 
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by the university CYL. Student cadres who have strong ties with university level CYL officials 
are therefore favored. It is in particular the case for the university level student union leaders. 
The second type is managed by the university administration, and more specifically by the 
Student Work Department (xuesheng gongzuo bu, 学生工作部 ). Managing the student 
counsellors present in the various faculties, this department is mostly in contact with the faculty 
level organizations rather than the university level ones. The student cadres with close 
connections with that level of administration are often favored, and in particular student union 
leaders and CYL student cadres at the faculty level.763  
Overall, such political selection in graduate school encourages students to become 
student cadres. As put by Chen Wei, “some students have very little interest in student work 
but as they reflect on the potentiality of a superior grade to enter a graduate program without 
exam, they join the student union.”764 When this incentive is not in the picture, the number of 
student cadres declines. There are, for instance, only a few student cadres in Peking University’s 
Cai Yuanpei College, which works like a liberal arts college and has no graduate program, and 
therefore no direct admissions. More traditional faculties, which include graduate programs, 
have by contrast many more student cadres.765  
There is a general trend of limiting the number of “student work-related direct admissions 
to graduate school” in universities, as they do not really need such programs to recruit student 
counsellors anymore. The decrease has been especially sharp at Peking University since a 
scandal broke in 2009 regarding the admission of certain students to graduate programs. In 
2009, a blog post from a Peking University student criticized the opaqueness of the “direct 
                                                 
763 Interviews with student 12, student 16, and student 24. 
764 Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 
学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
765 Interview with student 16. 
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admissions to graduate school.” It stated that some of the best students in Peking University 
Faculty of Economics did not get admitted through this system while two mediocre students 
did. More importantly, these students had failed several classes, which should have prevented 
them from accessing these admission procedures. The blogger explained this preferential 
treatment by the family background of the two students in question. They were both children 
of city level officials from Heilongjiang Province. In addition, the relatives of one of them were 
personally close to high level officials in the Peking University CCP Committee. 766 The two 
students also had meaningful experiences as student cadres. The blogpost was quickly deleted 
by the authorities but during the 36 hours it was online it was viewed 120,000 times, which 
highlights the attention paid to such issues. Before this scandal, the university did not respect 
the Ministry of Education quotas regarding these admissions. This case pushed the university 
leadership to respect them and limit admissions. While in 2009 around a hundred students were 
recruited through the “student work-related direct admissions to graduate school,” only less 
than fifty have been enrolled through this method between 2009 and 2015.767  
However, the recent decrease in the number of “student work-related direct admissions 
to graduate school,” which is especially remarkable at Peking University, does not completely 
eradicate the attractiveness of student cadre positions. Indeed, the increasing unemployment 
among graduates is sufficient to keep these positions very attractive.768 While it has decreased 
in scale, selection to graduate school based on political activism on campus still exists and can 
be found all over the country. The professors from Beijing and Nanjing I interviewed told me 
                                                 
766 “Shocking News: A Son of Official Who Did Not Pass Five Classes from Peking University’s Economics 
Faculty Still Gets Direct Admissions to Graduate School! (hairen tingwen: guanyuan erzi beida jingji xueyuan wu 
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http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2009/10/200910192326.shtml (Consulted on 6 June 2016). 
767 Interviews with student 12, student 16, and student 24. 
768 Interviews with student 2, student 3, cadre 6, cadre 10, student 15, and cadre 41. 
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that “student work-related direct admissions to graduate school” now generally amount to 
around one or two students per cohort in each faculty.769 This political selection for graduate 
school is the main advantage student cadres obtain on campus. However, being a student cadre 
also brings rewards in terms of future career prospects beyond the university walls. 
b)  A card to play on the job market 
The student cadre experience can be helpful when looking for a job after graduation. 
The skills student cadres cultivate are seen as practical and useful for future professional 
developments by both the students themselves and their potential recruiters. The experience is 
valued for a career in the Party-State, but also from the point of view of managers in the business 
sector. According to my interviewees, through this experience, the student cadres develop 
practical skills that they believe other students lack. They can put that forward in their resumes 
and during job interviews. Through the organization of projects and activities on campus, 
student cadres acquire valuable skills such as managing personal relationships and interacting 
with a wide variety of actors. My interlocutors also emphasized the “eloquence” (koucai, 口才) 
of student cadres as they had to develop their ability to talk to officials and convince their fellow 
students to join the activities they organized, or potentially to vote for them. More broadly, it is 
the “organizational” (zuzhi nengli, 组织能力) and “coordination” abilities (xietiao nengli, 协
调能力) of the student cadres which are always put forward.770 
Beyond these broad skills attributed to student cadres in general, specific positions are 
seen as a way to train certain abilities. As we have seen, student unions are made of numerous 
departments with various tasks. One’s position among these departments can lead to different 
                                                 
769 Interviews with academic 2, academic 22, and academic 24. 
770 Interviews with cadre 6, student 6, cadre 7, student 7, student 8, student 12, cadre 16, cadre 18, and cadre 31. 
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kinds of experiences for student cadres. Working in the Propaganda Department, the Liaison 
Department or the Culture and Arts Department activates different kinds of skills. A student 
cadre in the union’s Propaganda Department will be particularly socially active and develop 
communication skills, and even some technical skills, such as learning how to use a graphic 
design software or communication platforms. A student working in the Liaison Department can 
learn how to communicate with firms and actors outside the school, one of the department’s 
main function being to find external funding for union’s activities. In places where universities 
are numerous, such as the Haidian District in Beijing where, among others, Peking University 
and Tsinghua University are situated, firms are highly solicited. As a result, students have to be 
very active and convincing to attract funding. They also often have to use personal or family 
relationships in order to get what they want, which trains their networking skills. Finally, cadres 
in the Culture and Arts Department will mainly have to organize union’s activities themselves. 
They will mostly be in contact with CYL officials to obtain rooms and sometimes 
authorizations or funding, as well as with students in order to ensure their participation.771  
According to an opinion survey conducted on 100 student cadres in the city of 
Qinhuangdao in Hebei, the vast majority think that their work as student cadres allowed them 
to cultivate their skills. According to the survey, this is also by far the main reason why they 
became cadres in the first place.772 To be sure, the idea that practical skills developed on campus 
are valuable for a future career is hardly original and similar phenomena can easily be witnessed 
in universities all over the world. The specificity of student cadres in China is the opening this 
                                                 
771 Interviews with student 6, student 7, and student 8. 
772 Wang Xueting (王雪婷) et al., “Analysis on the Effective Role Played by Students Cadres (guanyu qieshi 
youxiao de fahui xuesheng ganbu zuoyong de yanjiu fenxi, 关于切实有效的发挥学生干部作用的调研分析)” 
(Collected works from the eleventh academic congress on Chinese youth information and management (dishiyi 
Zhongguo qingnian xinxi yu guanli xuezhe dahui lunwenji, 第十一届中国青年信息与管理学者大会论文集), 
Chongqing, 2009), 75–83. 
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experience grants them in terms of internships but also job opportunities, in relation with their 
close ties to university professors and officials. 
According to a survey among students from the Beijing area, the relationships 
established with professors and school officials are perceived as the most important when 
looking for a job, even more than family relationships.773 In the case of student cadres, the 
advantages obtained through these relationships can take several forms. In some cases, the 
university CYL proposes short-term internships to students in local level administrations during 
vacations. These internships are in practice largely offered to student cadres.774 This targeting 
of student cadres was put forward by the national “Plan for the training of university student 
cadres 2006-2010.” The goal advanced by this five-year plan was to send 10,000 student cadres 
to do such internships at the local level.775  
Beyond the internships organized by the CYL itself, the organization can be used as a 
platform by students to get in touch with potential recruiters, for an internship or a first job. 
Some companies and social organizations come to campus to scout for potential recruits among 
graduating students. Some of them, and especially State-owned enterprises (SOEs) or mass 
organizations, go through the university administration and the CYL when looking for specific 
profiles. The student cadres are often the ones put forward by university officials and the CYL 
as they are the ones closer to them. These profiles are also valued by recruiters.776 
                                                 
773 Wu Qing (吴庆), “2002 Report Regarding the Employment Situation for University Students in the Beijing 
Area (2002 nian Beijing diqu daxuesheng jiuye zhuangkuang diaocha baogao, 2002年北京地区大学生就业状
况调查报告),” Journal of China Youth College for Political Sciences 22, no. 2 (March 2003): 26–31. 
774 Interviews with student 4 and cadre 10. 
775 “Plan for the Cultivation of University Student Cadres 2006-2010 (gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu peiyang guihua 
2006-2010, 高校学生干部培养规划 2006-2010),” Central CYL, 29 August 2006. 
776 Interviews with student 1, academic 2, student 2, and student 3. 
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Student cadres are also in a good position to be recruited as university staff when they 
graduate. This is particularly true for the recruitment of student counsellors. While the system 
varies from one university to another (see Chapter Five), counsellors are often recruited among 
the student cadres who benefited from the “student work-related direct admissions to graduate 
school.” Even after their compulsory two years of work they often remain on the job while 
doing their graduate studies. Beyond this specific mechanism, student cadres have experience 
and contacts within the university, which puts them in the best place to remain in campus as 
student counsellors after graduation. Some of them built so close relationships with university 
officials that the recruitment process is oriented in such a way as to ensure their selection. While 
it is mandatory to openly advertise these positions, the recruitment criteria then become so 
precise that only one or two student cadres can actually fit the position.777  
However, these opportunities to “stay on campus” after graduation (liuxiao, 留校) are  
decreasing, which on the long run might have an influence on the students’ interest in student 
cadre work. The number of opportunities for graduates to stay on campus as counsellors has 
become more and more limited. For instance, at Peking University, only fourteen students could 
do it in 2013, while previously around forty had been selected. At Nanjing Normal University, 
the number shrunk from fourteen students selected as counsellors in 2011 to five in 2015. This 
was mainly due to a limited turnover, itself provoked by a rising unemployment on the job 
market.778 
                                                 
777 Interviews with cadre 6, student 7, student 8, cadre 10, student 16, and cadre 35. 
778 Interviews with student 16, cadre 16, and cadre 35. 
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c)  A first step towards officialdom 
Beyond the overall advantages student cadres have in terms of finding a job on campus 
or outside, some programs designed to train young Party-State officials specifically favor 
student cadres in their recruitment process. This is explicit in the “assigned graduates” system 
(xuandiaosheng, 选调生), sets in stone the benefits of being a student cadre. This system allows 
new graduates to enter a trainee program, under which they are sent to a grassroots position for 
generally two years before being promoted rather quickly in the local administration. While 
such systems have been developed at the local level since the 1980s, under the framework of 
the “third echelon policy,” 779  it has been formalized in 2000. 780  To enter the “assigned 
graduates” program, candidates have to take an exam organized by the CCP Organization 
Department at the provincial or city level depending on the position. They are then interviewed 
by the recruiting administrations. This program is reserved for former student cadres.781  
While young people can become civil servants through this program, several elements 
differentiate this trainee program from the civil servant exam itself.782 First, the candidates must 
have graduated recently, be CCP members, and have a background as student cadres. Second, 
they have to be recommended by the CCP organization of their university, which is generally 
not the case for candidates to the civil servant exam. Third, instead of starting directly in the 
position they were recruited for, they are generally first sent to a grassroots position, for instance 
                                                 
779 See Chapter Two regarding the “third echelon policy”. 
780 “Notice Regarding the Further Development of the Assignment of University Graduates to Grassroots Positions 
for Training (guanyu jinyibu zuohao xuandiao yingjie youxiu daxue biye sheng dao jiceng peiyang duanlian 
gongzuo de tongzhi, 关于进一步做好选调应届优秀大学毕业生到基层培养锻炼工作的通知 ),” CCP 
Organization Department, January 2000. 
781 While it now exists in most provinces, this program remains organized at the provincial or city level and some 
variations can be found in the recruitment process (Interviews with cadre 6, student 11, student 12, cadre 16, and 
cadre 30). 
782 On the civil service exam itself, see the entry “civil service system” in the glossary. 
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in a township level administration, for a minimum period of three months. Then, they are 
promoted to a low level leadership position, generally one ranked as section director (keji, 科
级).783  
Contrary to civil servants, they are directly managed by the provincial or city level 
Organization Departments, rather than at the level of the recruiting units. It implies that instead 
of applying to specific positions when taking the exam, they only select a locale. Also, they are 
managed by the upper level Organization Department because they are explicitly considered as 
“reserve cadres” (houbei ganbu, 后备干部) for local political leadership, generally at the 
county level. Being considered as the next generation of local political leaders they are usually 
appointed to CCP or CYL positions, rather than to State positions as most civils servants.784  
The “assigned graduates” program is overall reserved for undergrad student cadres from 
highly ranked universities.785 This program is very popular among students because the exam 
is seen as less competitive than the civil servant exam786 (only recent graduates can apply) and 
it also offers better prospects of promotion.787 Between 2000 and 2014, 200,000 graduates have 
                                                 
783 Since they generally do not have a previous working experience, they often spend two years at the grassroots 
as to complete the minimum experience required for civil service positions (Interviews with cadre 6, student 11, 
student 12, cadre 16, and cadre 30). Regarding ranks and the civil service system, see the glossary. 
784 Interviews with cadre 6, student 11, student 12, cadre 16, and cadre 30. On the difference between State and 
Party positions, see the development on elite dualism literature in the Introduction.  
785 The program targets the “211 project” universities, which include the one hundred or so best higher education 
institutions in the country. Under certain conditions, the “assigned graduates” program can be expanded to some 
other universities and to graduate students (interviews with cadre 6, student 11, student 12, and cadre 16). 
786 In 2013, 1.5 million candidates took the national civil service exam, competing for only 19,000 positions (“Has 
the ‘Civil Servant Fever’ Cooled Down?” Xinhua, October 16, 2014. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-10/16/content_33784854.htm (Consulted on 16 June 2016). 
787 Interviews with cadre 6, student 11, student 12, cadre 16, and cadre 30. 
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been through this program and official meetings have been organized in 2014 to further expand 
the recruitment.788  
However, some interviewees were cautious regarding the “assigned graduates” program 
and underlined the risk of being send for two years to a grassroots position far from decision 
making centers. They emphasized the importance of maintaining the relevant personal relations 
to ensure a subsequent promotion.789 In addition to personal relations, some interviewees also 
mentioned that the kind of experience the graduates acquired as student cadres is also an 
important factor in determining the jobs they might obtain through the “assigned graduates” 
program. If they had important positions in the CYL or the student union for instance, they 
would most probably get promoted to better positions.790  
Another program also aims at sending young graduates to grassroots positions for 
training: the “university graduate village official” (daxuesheng cunguan, 大学生村官 ) 
framework. Applicants take an exam supervised by the CCP Organization Department in order 
to become local village officials for two to three years.791 They generally obtain an assistant 
position for the first year and then move on to a leadership one in the village CCP committee. 
This later position is only short-term and they are not considered civil servants. Still, the 
experience can be rewarding for young graduates as it gives them additional points when 
applying to graduate programs. It can also be particularly enticing to the ones who want to 
pursue a career in the administration as it provides them with the two-year grassroots experience 
                                                 
788 “Preface to Youth is Blooming at the Grassroots (qingchun zai jiceng zhanfang xuyan, 青春在基层绽放序言),” 
Website of the assigned graduates program, September 14, 2014. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.cnxds.com/view-16603-1.html (Consulted on 12 May 2016).  
789 Interviews with student 11, student 12, and cadre 16. 
790 Interviews with cadre 6 and cadre 16. 
791 Most of them work part time at the village level and part time at in the upper level township administration 
(“This is How the Village ‘Number One Leaders’ are Cultivated (cunguan ‘yibashou’ zheyang liancheng 村官“一
把手”这样炼成)”, China Youth Daily, 2 June 2012),” China Youth Daily, June 2, 2012. 
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required for most civil servant positions.792 It is also a particularly valuable asset when recruits 
manage to obtain leadership positions at the village level.793 From 2008 to 2014, 248,000 
“university student village officials” have been recruited. Among them, 92,000 (36.9%) later 
became civil servants.794 
Similar programs preexisted since the 1990s but it is in 2008 that the “university 
graduate village official” framework started to take its current shape.795 It was then formalized 
by a 2009 text, which referred for the first time to “university student village officials.”796 While 
the program is not explicitly restricted to student cadres, most candidates have been, since it is 
valued by the local CCP Organization Departments, which manage the selection process.797 
The 2009 text explicitly stated that the main targets of this program are the graduates below 
thirty who are CCP members, as well as the “excellent student cadres.”798 
A third program follows a similar pattern of sending young graduates as trainees in 
smaller localities: the “plan for university graduates voluntary service to the West” (daxuesheng 
                                                 
792 Interviews with student 12 and cadre 16.  
793 In 2011, 24.1% of the university graduate village officials were part of the leadership of the Village Committee 
or the village level CCP branch (Liu Xizhong (刘西忠), “Research on the Construction of the College Graduate 
Village Cadres Policy System (daxuesheng cunganbu zhengce tixi jiangou yanjiu, 大学生村干部政策体系建构
研究)” (PhD Dissertation, Nanjing University, 2011), 41. 
794 “Nationally, Twenty Thousand University Student Village Officials Created a Business (quanguo 2 wan duo 
daxuesheng cunguan chuangye, 全国2万多大学生村官创业),” Website of the Chinese Government, July 7, 2015. 
It can be accessed here: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-07/07/content_2893239.htm (consulted on 12 May 2016). 
795 Liu Xizhong (刘西忠), “Research on the Construction of the College Graduate Village Cadres Policy System 
(daxuesheng cunganbu zhengce tixi jiangou yanjiu, 大学生村干部政策体系建构研究),” 48–50. 
796 “Opinion Regarding the Establishment of a Long Term System for Selecting University Graduates to be 
Appointed to Work in Villages (guanyu jianli xuanpin gaoxiao biyesheng dao cun renzhi gongzuo changxiao jizhi 
de yijian, 关于建立选聘高校毕业生到村任职工作长效机制的意见),” CCP Organization Department, 13 April 
2009. 
797 Interviews with cadre 6 and cadre 16. 
798 “Opinion Regarding the Establishment of a Long Term System for Selecting University Graduates to be 
Appointed to Work in Villages (guanyu jianli xuanpin gaoxiao biyesheng dao cun renzhi gongzuo changxiao jizhi 
de yijian, 关于建立选聘高校毕业生到村任职工作长效机制的意见),” CCP Organization Department, 13 April 
2009. 
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zhiyuanzhe fuwu xibu jihua, 大学生志愿服务西部计划). It was launched in 2003 and is 
managed by the CYL. It falls within the CYL’s broader objective of promoting voluntary 
service, as described in Chapter One. Under this program, graduates are sent for one to three 
years to the less developed parts of the country to serve as social volunteers. They can serve at 
the same time as CYL deputy secretaries in their host village or township. To be selected, they 
have to take an exam organized by the CYL. In contrast to the two former programs, this is a 
volunteering program and not an actual job, even though recruits are still financially 
compensated for their service.799  
The program is overall very popular, and between 2003 and 2013, 160,000 people 
participated in it.800 Under certain circumstances, a passage through the “plan for university 
graduates voluntary service to the West” can give graduates additional points to enter a graduate 
program or when taking the civil servant exam.801 In addition, this experience can also count as 
the two-year grassroots working experience needed to apply to most civil servant positions.802  
Similar programs were also developed at the local level. Since 2004, graduates from the 
main cities of Jiangsu Province are sent to the poorer northern part of the province for voluntary 
services. Around 500 volunteers are recruited through this program every year.803 Like the 
                                                 
799 “Notice Regarding the Implementation of the Plan for University Graduates Voluntary Service to the West 
(guanyu shishi daxuesheng zhiyuanzhe fuwu xibu jihua de tongzhi, 关于实施大学生志愿服务西部计划的通知),” 
State Council, 6 June 2003. 
800 “Report on the 20 years of the China Young Volunteers Operation (Zhongguo qingnian zhiyuanzhe xingdong 
20 nian baogao, 中国青年志愿者行动 20年报告),” China Youth Daily, December 5, 2013. 
801 “Notice Regarding the Implementation of the Plan for University Graduates Voluntary Service to the West 
(guanyu shishi daxuesheng zhiyuanzhe fuwu xibu jihua de tongzhi, 关于实施大学生志愿服务西部计划的通知),” 
State Council, 6 June 2003. 
802 Interviews with cadre 16 and cadre 30.  
803 Li Hongbo (李洪波), ed., Theory and Practice of the University Youth League Work in the new era (xin shiqi 
gaoxiao Gongqingtuan gongzuo lilun yu shijian, 新时期高校共青团工作理论与实践) (Jiangsu University Press, 
2009), 163. 
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“university student village official” framework, the “plan for university graduates voluntary 
service to the West” is not explicitly directed towards student cadres. However, the selection 
being made by the CYL itself, the student cadre experience is key in the recruitment process.804  
The various training programs I just reviewed are presented by Chinese scholars as a 
way to limit the pressure on the job market by giving special opportunities to selected 
graduates.805 Interestingly they are all directed, explicitly or implicitly, towards student cadres. 
They are therefore a perfect example of the preferential treatment student cadres enjoy in the 
Chinese system and of how their political commitment is rewarded. 
 
*** 
Student cadres are at the center of the student management system as well as key actors 
in the clientelist network built by the CCP and the CYL on campus. For this reason, the student 
cadre experience has been underlined by all our interviewees as highly positive in shaping 
students’ future careers. A survey conducted among 281 students in 2009 also highlighted the 
benefits of being a student cadre. Within the sample, student cadres had a much higher “success 
rate” than other students: after graduation, 91.2% of them secured a job or enrolled in a graduate 
program. This was only true for 53.2% of the other students. Student cadres were also more 
likely to find jobs in higher level units, in particular in the public sector. 806  As I demonstrated, 
these benefits are the result of the central role played by student cadres on campus, which 
                                                 
804 Interviews with cadre 16 and cadre 30. 
805 See for instance : Li Hongbo (李洪波), Theory and Practice of the University Youth League Work in the new 
era (xin shiqi gaoxiao Gongqingtuan gongzuo lilun yu shijian, 新时期高校共青团工作理论与实践), 161. 
806 Zhang Yanan (张亚男), Wang Jianmin (王建敏), and Zhen Hua (甄华), “Analysis of Student Cadres’ 
Employment Advantages (gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu de jiuye youshi fenxi, 高校学生干部的就业优势分析),” 
Journal of Guangxi Youth Leaders College 24, no. 6 (December 2012): 34–37. 
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enables them to develop strong ties with officials and professors, an instrumental asset when 
looking for a job or applying to a graduate program. In addition, I have shown that specific 
public service programs target student cadres for recruitment. It reflects the Party’s strategy to 
rewards these students’ early political commitment. As argued by Bourdieu, “the institution 
invests in the ones who invest in it.”807 
To conclude, the student cadre experience is especially useful if one wants to become 
an official. Even if student cadre positions are not explicitly made for political training, they 
facilitate an early political professionalization. However, one must keep in mind that this is a 
processual phenomenon. Student cadre is not a label one can win once and for all. It is the work 
student cadres perform over the years, as well as the relationships they build and the status they 
obtain within a school, that determine how the experience will influence their future. To enjoy 
the full benefits of the experience, one has to be fully committed to it and has to remain on this 
path for the several years of college. In this chapter, I have set the definitional boundaries of 
this experience and highlighted the various factors pushing students to choose this path, 
including leisure activities, social circles and career-related incentives. In the next chapter, I 
examine the contents of the experience itself and analyze how it transforms those who take part 
in it and remain committed to it. To do so, I focus on the most highly ranked student cadres, 
and in particular the student union leaders, since they are the most committed and have the most 
complete experience.  
  
                                                 
807  Pierre Bourdieu, “La représentation politique. Éléments pour une théorie du champ politique [Political 
Representation. Elements for a Theory of the Political Field],” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 36, no. 
1 (1981): 19. 
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Chapter 4: Becoming a student leader: a commitment 
cultivation process 
In this chapter, I get into the details of the student cadre experience in order to analyze 
the cultivation of their political commitment. I show that it is often the first step of a sponsored 
mobility towards officialdom. Becoming a student cadre is a gradual process, one that 
potentially ends with leadership in the student union or important positions in the CYL on 
campus. Those who manage to secure these positions during their last years of college are the 
most committed ones and have usually been student cadres since their freshman year. Those 
happy few made the most out of the unique opportunities offered by the student cadre 
experience in terms of boosting their future career.  
By focusing on these student leaders, we can understand how their several years as 
student cadres contributed to strengthen their commitment to a political career. I highlight how 
the student cadre experience progressively restricts their social circles, excluding students who 
have not chosen the same path. At the same time, student cadres multiply their personal links 
with other student cadres and officials, which can range from friendship ties to mentorship ones. 
I argue that these ties are key to get ahead in the student cadre hierarchy, but highly valuable 
when starting a political career. In addition to personal ties, I show how the social role and 
status student leaders take on further shapes their political commitment process. By and large, 
they already present themselves as officials to be. 
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A -  Commitment and social networks on campus 
In the first part of this chapter, I show that those who rise in the student cadre hierarchy 
are engaged in a progressive screening and selection process, which is demanding in terms of 
time and energy. Only the most committed stay on this path. Only a few eventually rise to the 
top of the student cadre hierarchy and become student union chairmen. This election and the 
title that goes with it mark the end of a long initiation process. Through this rite de passage, 
students are publicly recognized as being part of a special elite. This is in line with the “election 
effect” described by Bourdieu.808  
This long process also alters student cadres’ socializing practices, which tend to be 
narrowed down to other student cadres and officials on campus. In turn, the transformation of 
their social circles strengthens the student cadres’ commitment itself, by harnessing their social 
life to their loyalty to the path. 
1)  From student cadres to student leaders 
a)  A progressive commitment process 
When they eventually become student union chairmen, students have already been 
cadres for a long time and appointed to a variety of positions. The trajectory of one of my 
interviewees exemplifies this phenomenon. In her first year of college, she became class leader. 
Her class’ student counsellor, with whom she had a good relationship, then suggested she 
became a low-level cadre in the university CYL. During her second and third years, she worked 
at various positions within the university CYL, as well as in the university level student union. 
                                                 
808 Bourdieu, La Noblesse d’Etat: grandes écoles et esprit de corps [The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field 
of Power], 143. 
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During her fourth year, she became the student union chairman.809 As this individual trajectory 
shows, the student cadres who rise to the top of the hierarchy go through a variety of positions, 
alternatively in the CYL and the student union. As a result, they share increasingly similar 
experiences and profiles. I now turn to a detailed enumeration of what happens year after year.  
In the first year of college, a lot of students want to become student cadres. During the 
first weeks of the academic year, student counsellors and student leaders advertise the 
experience in classes and dormitories, and try to detect the most appropriate students. They 
focus on their “eloquence” (koucai, 口才) and “people skills” (dairen jiewu nengli, 待人接物
能力).810 They also go through their personal files to see if they had an experience as student 
cadre in high school. Having an experience as class leader or CYL student cadre while in high 
school is not a fundamental criterion in order to be selected but it can signal a students’ interest 
in such activities. Also, most of the students in elite universities, such as the ones I focus on, 
have had such an experience since it is generally correlated with academic achievements in high 
school. 811 
During the first year, the new student cadres serve at the class level or as lower level 
cadres in the faculty or university level organizations.812 At this echelon, the selection process 
                                                 
809 Interview with student 17. 
810 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, these skills are further developed through the student cadre experience 
as they get used to deal with large groups of people and interact with officials. 
811 Interviews with cadre 3, cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41. 
This process is also developed in: Lü Lili (吕丽莉), “Study on the Democratic Construction of College Student 
Organizations (gaoxiao xuesheng zuzhi de minzhu jianshe, 高校学生组织的民主建设),” 33. 
812 At the class level, the CYL branch secretaries as well as the class leaders are elected by students but the 
candidates are preselected by the class director. Regarding the student union at the university or faculty levels, the 
student cadres can go through a selection process by the student union leaders and join at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. To become basic CYL student cadres, they are selected by CYL officials (Interviews with cadre 6, 
student 16, cadre 30, and cadre 41). 
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is not very strict and most applicants have a chance of becoming lower level student cadres.813 
At Tsinghua University for instance, almost 50% of the 3,300 freshmen end up as student cadres 
during the first year, including the ones in various student associations. 814  At Nanjing 
University, each department of the university level student union counts more than 30 students, 
mainly first years doing a variety of small tasks.815 While such a large number of student cadres 
is not actually needed, the CYL pushes for broad recruitment in the student union and student 
associations among the first years, in order to increase participation in the organizations it 
controls. As a result, most student cadres are only given petty tasks, such as moving tables for 
an event. A lot of them find it uninteresting and do not invest more of their time in these 
organizations. Most freshmen also try different organizations all at once, and they only start to 
focus on one or two the following year.816  
The situation evolves during the second, third and fourth years of college. Student cadres 
go through various selection processes to obtain higher positions and only the most committed 
remain in place. Among Tsinghua University’s third and fourth year students for instance, only 
200 student cadres remain in the CYL and the student union at the different levels.817 Those 
who keep on as student cadres while entering their second year of college are generally the ones 
                                                 
813 Interviews with cadre 6, student 16, cadre 30, and cadre 41. 
814 I did not obtain clear figures regarding the number of student cadres in the various universities. Source for 
Tsinghua: interview with cadre 41. 
815 Interviews with student 7 and student 8. 
816 Interviews with cadre 7, student 7, cadre 8, and student 8. 
817 In addition, around 200 students head the various student associations managed by the CYL (interviews with 
cadre 17 and cadre 41). 
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who rise in the hierarchy.818 In most universities, they must pass short written tests regarding 
the organization and the university, as well as a recruitment interview.819  
Those who are still student cadres during the third year of college have gone through 
yet another round of selection. They can, for example, become CYL deputy secretary at the 
faculty level. In that case, they are selected by the CYL secretary and the faculty level CCP 
leadership. As CYL leaders, they must be CCP members. They can also head a department of 
the university student union, or become a student union chairman at the faculty level. The 
university student union department directors are selected by the union’s secretaries with the 
agreement of CYL officials and especially the student union office secretary.820 At the faculty 
level, the selection process for the student union chairman varies from one faculty to another. 
The two most common practices highlighted by Lü Lili are a direct selection by the faculty 
CYL or an election by students. 821  These various methods have been confirmed by my 
interviewees.822 In any case, the CYL exerts ample influence over the faculty student union. 
Candidates for this position have generally been student cadres for several years and have good 
relationships with the faculty CYL officials. Former faculty student union chairmen can also 
be influential in the selection process as they can advise the CYL on the candidates they deem 
                                                 
818 They can for instance become department director of the faculty student union or deputy director at the 
university level. In that case, they have to be selected by the student union chairman and deputy chairmen at the 
relevant level, with the agreement of the CYL. They can also get similar positions within the faculty CYL 
committee going through a similar selection process, this time managed by the CYL cadres themselves (interviews 
with cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41). 
819 Interviews with cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41. 
820 Interviews with cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41. 
821 Lü Lili (吕丽莉), “Study on the Democratic Construction of College Student Organizations (gaoxiao xuesheng 
zuzhi de minzhu jianshe, 高校学生组织的民主建设),” 33. 
822 In the case of Nanjing University for instance, the Foreign Languages Faculty organizes a direct election by the 
students and officials for the student union chairman. To guarantee that students do not elect someone at odds with 
the faculty’s officials, their votes count five times less. By contrast, in the History Faculty, the student union 
chairman is directly selected by the CYL. There used to be elections, but after a candidate who was not supported 
by the faculty CYL mismanaged some activities, very few students showed up and they were cancelled (interviews 
with student 7, student 8, and cadre 30). 
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fit to replace them.823 While being a CCP member is not mandatory, most student union leaders 
at the faculty level in the various universities are (or are at least probationary members).824 
Finally, only a handful of students remain student cadres while in their fourth year of 
college. If they do, it means they have been through very competitive processes to reach the top 
leadership positions, in particular as chairman or deputy chairman of the university level student 
union. The selection process also varies from one university to another. Still, the overall process, 
common to the various universities under study, is laid out by the All-China Student 
Federation’s charter. Every two years, a congress of students’ representatives is assembled. A 
number of representatives are sent by the different faculties according to their size. They are 
generally selected by the chairmen of the faculty level student unions. The representatives select 
a presidium (zhuxituan, 主席团) composed of a chairman and several deputy chairmen, which 
manages the union during one year. 825 A Standing Committee (changwu daibiao weiyuanhui, 
常务代表委员会) is also formed, based on representatives sent from the different faculties. It 
is in charge of supervising the union’s work before its next congress. 826 The student unions are 
largely organized along the same lines as the CYL and the CCP.827 
The process appears very systematic on paper, but is less clear in practice. First, the 
student union congresses are assembled every two years but actually the union chairmen rotate 
every year. When the congress is not assembled, the presidium is selected by the student union’s 
                                                 
823 Interviews with student 7, student 8, and cadre 30. 
824 Interviews with cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41. 
825 “Charter of the All-China Student Federation (Zhonghua quanguo xuesheng lianhehui zhangcheng, 中华全国
学生联合会章程),” All-China Student Federation, 25 August 2010. 
826 Ibid. 
827 This is also put forward here : Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political Culture : Official Student 
Politics at Beijing University,” 404. 
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Standing Committee after a pre-selection by the CCP and the CYL. The candidates are chosen 
within the different faculties by fellow students and screened by the CYL. The actual process 
is relatively obscure and varies from one faculty to the other. A CYL deputy secretary is 
commonly very implicated in it and selects the candidates with the help of former student union 
chairmen and deputy chairmen. The candidates to the presidium usually have to be CCP 
members. The CYL prevents the unreliable individuals from running, in particular the ones who 
are critical of the university administration or simply not obedient enough.828 Overall, the CYL 
highly influences the selection process. Some debates have emerged regarding a potential 
democratization of these elections, yet since 1989 only one university tried to implement direct 
elections by the students.829  
b)  The cost of commitment 
The student cadre experience is a perfect example of the early stages of a sponsored 
mobility process. It is a way to select the most motivated and reliable students, that is those 
who invested the more time and energy in their task as student cadres. Following Kanter’s 
cognitive-continuance commitment, or Klandermans’ analysis of “continuance commitment” in 
the case of social movements, such intense personal investment in an activity makes it hard to 
                                                 
828 Interviews with cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41. 
829 In 2008, Sun-Yat Sen University in Guangzhou organized direct elections for the student union chairman. The 
33,123 undergraduate students were to select directly the chairman among four candidates preselected by the CYL. 
They conducted a true election campaign through the internet and the media. Still, the experience was not pursued 
nor reproduced. It was judged potentially disturbing for campus life and the university leaders had no incentives 
in pushing for it (interviews with academic 6 and student 16). See also on the topic : He Haining (何海宁), “Full 
Record of the Student Union Chairman Direct Election (xueshenghui zhuxi zhixuan quan jilu, 学生会主席直选
全记录),” Southern Weekend, November 13, 2008. 
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give up.830 In the case of student cadres, it is coupled with the potential rewards they can obtain 
from pursuing that path, as highlighted in the previous chapter. 
However, commitment is not costless. An article from 2001 underlined the costs of 
commitment from the perspective of university student cadres. It emphasized how much of their 
time and energy went into their tasks as student cadres. They confessed being tired and 
overwhelmed with the multiplicity of what they saw as useless tasks. They reported having 
meetings every day of the week at the class level, the faculty level and in link with the various 
organizations. These meetings could last from one hour to much more. During the week-end, 
they had to prepare the activities for the coming week and advertise them. This was perceived 
as a waste of time by students, which could potentially impact their studies. The difficulty to 
manage both academic pressure and their work as cadres was advanced as a major reason for 
student cadres to withdraw from their position. Numerous student cadres in fact abandon after 
a year or two, just before they would have to get more seriously involved. 831 Along this line, 
most respondents (65%) in an opinion survey conducted among 100 student cadres in the city 
of Qinhuangdao in Hebei Province, believed that their work as student cadres had a strong 
impact on their academic studies.832  
                                                 
830 On investment-based commitment, see the Introduction. Kanter, “Commitment and Social Organization: A 
Study of Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities”; Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of 
Protest (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 97. 
831 Qi Fujuan (戚甫娟), “Thoughts on the Phenomenon of Higher Education Student Cadres Asking to Withdraw 
(dui gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu gaotui xianxiang de sikao, 对高校学生干部告退现象的思考),” Youth Studies 4 
(2001): 41. 
832 Wang Xueting (王雪婷) et al., “Analysis on the Effective Role Played by Students Cadres (guanyu qieshi 
youxiao de fahui xuesheng ganbu zuoyong de yanjiu fenxi, 关于切实有效的发挥学生干部作用的调研分析)” 
(Collected works from the eleventh academic congress on Chinese youth information and management (dishiyi 
Zhongguo qingnian xinxi yu guanli xuezhe dahui lunwenji, 第十一届中国青年信息与管理学者大会论文集), 
Chongqing, 2009), 75–83. 
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According to my interviews, this is mostly a problem for student leaders, the most 
committed ones, rather than for the majority of student cadres.833 While they do not necessarily 
have major academic problems, student leaders rarely have the best grades among a cohort. 
They spend a lot of time on the job and therefore study less. As underlined by some interviewees, 
at a certain point one has to choose between being part of the “academic” (xueshu, 学术) circle 
or the “political” (zhengzhi, 政治) one on campus.834  
To mitigate their commitment and the opportunity costs that go with it, numerous 
students limit their ambition to faculty level student leaders. Instead of trying to do as much as 
possible to become university level student leaders, they aim at best at becoming chairman or 
deputy chairman in their faculty, a less stressful and time consuming position. Rising in the 
hierarchy at the university level, by contrast, leaves no time for vacation. Pressure can also be 
very high if one falls under the supervision of an ambitious department director who wants to 
run for the next election and who hence pushes his subordinates to their limits as to show his 
efficiency.835 This tendency for student cadres to aim for less ambitious positions at the faculty 
level is also put forward in Qi Fujuan’s study.836 
This progressive commitment is overall a key aspect of the student cadre experience for 
those who remain on this path. Building on the idea of “continuance commitment,” I argue that 
                                                 
833 Interviews with cadre 7, student 7, student 8, cadre 8, cadre 10, student 15, student 17, and cadre 41. According 
to a large-n survey, nearly 75% of student cadres have grades above the mean of the student body. Jiang Zhibin 
(江志斌), “A Research on the Instruction of College Student Cadres in the New century (xin shiqi gaoxiao 
xuesheng ganbu duiwu jianshe yanjiu, 新时期高校学生干部队伍建设研究)” (PhD Dissertation, Southwest 
University, 2011), 72. 
834 Interviews with student 12 and student 16. 
835 Interviews with student 12, student 14, student 15, and student 16. 
836 Qi Fujuan (戚甫娟), “Thoughts on the Phenomenon of Higher Education Student Cadres Asking to Withdraw 
(dui gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu gaotui xianxiang de sikao, 对高校学生干部告退现象的思考),” 41. 
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this experience is self-strengthening: the more student cadres personally invest in an activity, 
the less likely they are to quit, since it would mean losing their previous investment.  
2)  The transformation of the cadres’ social network 
a)  Narrowing their social circle 
Throughout the four years of college, the social circle of student cadres progressively 
narrows. As stated above, only the most committed stick to the path over such a long period. 
For instance, in large institutions such as Peking University and Tsinghua University, several 
hundred freshmen become student cadres every year in the university level student union. But 
less than a hundred are still part of the organization during their second year. The figure goes 
below twenty for the third and fourth year students. Being only a handful in each of the 
organizations at the various levels, the student cadres who managed to stay on tracks for several 
years get to know each other very well. While for freshmen, joining the student union can be a 
way to meet new people and widen one’s social circle on campus, this is less and less true as 
years go by. Starting from the third year in particular, most student cadres have risen to 
leadership positions and their sociability circles become extremely limited.837  
In addition to being a narrow group of people, student cadres spend most of their time 
together and with university officials. They participate in numerous meetings, which take up 
most of their time outside classes.838 Overall, at the university level, student union leaders 
                                                 
837 Interviews with student 15, student 16, and student 21. 
838 The multiplicity of meetings at the various levels is extremely complicated to list but for instance the key 
meetings for university student union leaders are: The union’s congress every two years, the union’ Standing 
Committee meetings every year, as well as the yearly meetings which bring together the heads of the different 
university level student organizations. The university CYL and CCP leadership are present at these meetings.  
More frequent meetings, such as the weekly presidium meetings, can also include CYL officials (Interviews with 
student 12 and student 22). 
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interact among themselves every day, and meet at least once a week with CYL officials.839 
Between the management of the activities themselves and these recurrent meetings, student 
leaders have very little time for socializing outside their organizations.  
My interviewees stressed that the intense commitment of student cadres to their job had 
a strong impact on their friendship relationships but also romantic ones. It can lead some 
relationships to end, especially when the partner is not part of these organizations. Student 
cadres tend therefore to pursue romantic relationships among themselves,840 or to remain single 
during college.841 The issue is so widespread, that it has become a matter of concern for the 
central CYL, which now publishes articles on “single student cadres” through its propaganda 
apparatus. A recent publication, for instance, put forward how hard it is for student cadres to 
develop romantic relationships as they are highly absorbed by their task. It reiterated that 
student cadres must be fully committed to their position and must be ready to cancel projects 
or dates at the last minute if required by their superiors. By underlining how common the 
phenomenon was, the publication attempted at reassuring student cadres about their personal 
situation.842  
This transformation of the student cadres’ social circles is close to what Shirk described 
regarding the shift in sociability of the high school students who turned to activism during the 
Mao era.843 Similar transformations in sociability have also been highlighted in the case of other 
                                                 
839 Interviews with student 12 and student 22. 
840 Education-based homogamy has been increasing since the 1980s, especially in the urban areas. Student cadres 
marrying each other’s select from an even narrower group within the already restricted pool of college educated 
people. Source on homogamy : Hongyun Han, “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage in China from 1970 
to 2000,” Demographic Research 22, no. 24 (April 2010): 733–70. 
841 Interviews with student 12 and cadre 38. 
842 “Student Cadres, Why Are You Single? (Xuesheng ganbu, ni weishenme danshen?, 学生干部,你为什么单
身?),” Central CYL WeChat Account, November 11, 2015. 
843 Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 87. 
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political organizations. Focusing on contemporary French youth political organizations, Bargel 
underlined that personal identification to the organization is highly linked to an exclusive 
sociability within it and an exclusion of outsiders from one’s social circles. She showed for 
instance that members tend to date almost exclusively within the organization. She stressed that 
even friendship and romantic relationships take on a political meaning as socializing within the 
organization is usually held as proof of one’s commitment to it. Accordingly, members also 
often detach themselves from former friends who do not share their commitment.844 
In the Chinese case, this phenomenon is strengthened by the various training programs 
cadres have to go through. The training of student cadres has become increasingly important in 
the post-1989 era. Following the instructions of the “Opinion regarding the strengthening and 
improvement of the political education of university students” or Document 16, issued by the 
Party-State in 2004,845 a “Plan for the training of university student cadres (2006-2010)” was 
put in place.846 The variety of training programs established at that time further shapes the 
sociability of the student leaders who take part in them. 
  
                                                 
844 Bargel, “Apprendre un métier qui ne s’apprend pas. Carrières dans les organisations de jeunesse des partis 
[Learning a trade which cannot be learned. Careers in the parties’ youth organizations].” 
845 “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the Political Education of University students 
(guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin daxuesheng sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu de yijian, 关于进一步加强和改进大学生
思想政治教育的意见),” Document 16, State Council, 14 October 2004. 
846 “Plan for the Cultivation of University Student Cadres 2006-2010 (gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu peiyang guihua 
2006-2010, 高校学生干部培养规划 2006-2010),” Central CYL, 29 August 2006. 
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b)  Training programs and selective sociability 
As part of the plan initiated in 2006, the central CYL launched one year later the 
“Marxism training program for youth” (qingnian Makesi zhuyi peiyang gongcheng, 青年马克
思主义培养工程 ). 847  It implies trainings at three different levels: within the various 
universities, at the provincial and at the central level.848 While these trainings include people 
from different universities, the groups remain homogenous since they are mostly constituted of 
highly ranked student cadres. Once again, these trainings keep student cadres within narrow 
social circles. 
For the most part, at the university level, this program furthers what had already been 
put in place since the 1980s. Taking Peking University as an example, a CYL school was 
established in 1982, when Li Keqiang was the university CYL secretary. The trainings were 
progressively formalized, especially after 1989, in order to strengthen the student cadres body. 
In 1997, a special training was for instance created for faculty level CYL secretaries. The same 
year, another program was established for t student associations leaders.849 Around that period, 
the university also initiated its “High level CYL school” (gaoji tuanxiao, 高级团校), in which 
around three hundred student cadres take part every year. These are mostly third or fourth year 
student cadres holding highly ranked positions in the CYL, the student union, or in university 
                                                 
847 In addition to full time CYL cadres and young researchers, it pushed for the establishment of training programs 
for “student backbones” (daxuesheng gugan, 大学生骨干), meaning student cadres as well as CCP members and 
students remarked for their involvement in cultural activities and sports for instance. The group is therefore slightly 
extended beyond student cadres. As underlined by Walder, in the case of factory workers, the “backbones” are 
seen as the stable and loyal elements on which the Party-State can rely. They are good at what they do and support 
the official line as they benefit from it (Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese 
Industry, 151. Still on campus, the student cadres constitute most of the group (interviews with student 15, student 
16, and student 21). 
848  “Implementation Outline for the Marxism Training Program for Youth (Qingnian makesi zhuyi peiyang 
gongcheng shixing gangyao, 青年马克思主义培养工程实行纲要),” CYL Central Committee, 16 October 2007. 
849  Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 160. 
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level student associations, such as the campus unit of the Red Cross. They are sent by the 
various organizations as well as the different faculties, in agreement with CYL officials. They 
are organized as an actual class and follow half-day trainings every two or three weeks.850 
The trainings offered to student cadres intensified in the mid-2000s in link with 
Document 16 and the new program from the central CYL. In 2005, was initiated the “Peking 
University student union backbones training school” (Beijing daxue xueshenghui gugan peixun 
xuexiao, 北京大学学生会骨干培训学校), which advocates that student union leaders at 
various levels, around a hundred people, be brought together for half-day training sessions five 
times a year, in presence of CYL officials. 851  Also in 2006 were initiated the “Student 
backbones training camps” (Xuesheng gugan xunlian ying, 学生骨干训练营), which bring 
together around sixty high level student cadres for a week of fieldwork. While at the beginning 
the program had a strong military component (students were sent to train in an army camp),852 
it has now become more focused on social and volunteering work as well as visiting historical 
sites. In 2008 for instance, for the 30th anniversary of the reform and opening up policy, they 
visited Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, presented as a symbol of China’s recent 
transformations. My interviewees who took part in this program described it as a good way to 
have fun with their classmates. It appeared to them more as a summer camp than an actual 
training program. It also strengthened the personal ties among them.853  
                                                 
850 Interviews with Student 16 and student 24. 
851 Interviews with student 12, student 16 and student 22.  
852 “Peking University Holds the 2006 Student Backbones Training Camp (Beida juban 2006 nian xuesheng gugan 
xunlian ying, 北大举办2006年学生骨干训练营).” Website of Peking University, July 13, 2006. It can be 
accessed here: http://www.pkucet.com.cn/news.asp?id=1777&d=%B1%B1%B4%F3%D0%C2%CE%C5 
(Consulted on 20 May 2016). 
853 Interviews with student 16 and student 24. 
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These study trips are not new in Peking University, as the CYL school started organizing 
some for student cadres in 1988,854 but they became much more formalized after 2006. The 
“Plan for the training of university student cadres (2006-2010)” pushed universities to organize 
such activities for student cadres during academic vacations.855 
The trends I have illustrated in the case of Peking University are also true of the other 
institutions I studied. Each of them developed their own training programs under different 
formats.  For instance, Tsinghua established in 2001 a training program called “When you drink 
water, think of its source: serve society” (Yinshui siyuan fuwu shehui, 饮水思源 服务社会). 
Around thirty students from various grades are selected every year to join this program for three 
years. While it is not explicitly made for student cadres, they make up most of the participants, 
since, once again, the selection is made by student counsellors and CYL officials who work 
with them daily. The program features regular training sessions over the semester, as well as 
study trips during the vacations. During these trips students go to various places together with 
CYL officials. The first year they generally go to a poorer region of the country in the inner 
lands, to visit farms for instance. The second year they travel to the most developed parts of the 
country to visit factories, research units, or military facilities. The third year they are sent to 
Hong Kong to expand their “international horizon” (guoji shiye, 国际视野). This program was 
further developed in 2007, with the creation of a special section dedicated to highly ranked 
student cadres, and in particular the student union and CYL leaders.856  
                                                 
854  Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University 
(Gongqingtuan zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 124. 
855 “Plan for the Cultivation of University Student Cadres 2006-2010 (gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu peiyang guihua 
2006-2010, 高校学生干部培养规划 2006-2010),” Central CYL, 29 August 2006. 
856 Interviews with student 21 and cadre 41. See also the presentation of the program: “Special Training Plans 
(Zhuanxiang peiyang jihua, 专向培养计划 ),” Tsinghua University Website. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/xtw/4794/ (Consulted on 20 May 2016).  
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Over these three years, the students who take part in the program at Tsinghua University 
get to know each other very well. An official in charge of supervising this program underlined 
how strong are the relationships built there and how useful they can be for a student’s future 
career.857 Cadres in charge of similar programs at Nanjing University confirmed such statement. 
Regarding the study trips more specifically, they mentioned that they eventually had to forbid 
alcohol as student drank too much in the past. This anecdote further demonstrates the 
socializing function of these trips.858 
The “Marxism training program for youth” also entailed the creation of training 
programs at the provincial level by local student federations and CYL organizations. They 
organize a one-week training session once a year, involving both classwork and fieldwork. It 
usually brings together the student union chairmen, or graduate union chairmen, of the biggest 
and highest ranked universities in the province. It generally includes fifty people or more 
depending on the size of the province.859 
A similar training program was established in 2007 at the central level, the “National 
university student backbones training school” (Zhongguo daxue xuesheng gugan peiyang 
xuexiao, 北京大学学生会骨干培训学校). Every year, the central CYL and the All-China 
Student Federation bring together the student union chairmen from the two hundred or so best 
universities in the country. The program includes one week of training at the Central CYL 
School and one or two weeks of study trip, often in important sites of the Chinese revolution. 
It also sometimes implies a trip abroad. The central CYL secretaries take part in the training 
                                                 
857 Interview with cadre 41. 
858 Interviews with cadre 6 and cadre 30. 
859 Interviews with cadre 6 and student 18. Regarding the Beijing Student Federation, see: “Looking Back at the 
Marvels of the Beijing Student Federation in 2014-2015 (Beijing Xuelian 2014-2015 niandu jingcai huigu, 北京
学联2014-2015年度精彩回顾),” WeChat account of the Beijing Student Federation, April 28, 2015.  
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and students are accompanied by central CYL officials in their study trips.860 For instance, 
during the eighth edition which took place in 2014-2015, 204 students participated in a one-
week study session at the Central CYL School in December 2014. The CYL Central Committee 
First Secretary Qin Yizhi gave a speech regarding the new CCP and CYL policies. Other central 
CYL leaders also took part in the training sessions. In August 2015, during the summer 
vacations, the students, together with central and provincial CYL officials, went for eleven days 
of fieldwork in Jiangsu Province.861 
A comprehensive multi-leveled training structure was therefore established in 2007 
through the “Marxism training program for youth.” On its first year, 208 students took part in 
the national training, 5000 in provincial ones, and more than 100,000 at the university level.862 
While provincial and national trainings might appear as a way for students to meet various 
people from other universities, such multiplicity of training programs actually amplifies the 
segregated social practices of student cadres. They spend the little free time they have, their 
vacations in particular, with other cadres. This is particularly true of the student cadres who join 
the central level trainings, as they also generally take part in the ones within their university 
and province.863 
                                                 
860 Interviews with student 17 and student 18. See also : Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach 
Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国
共青团), 120. 
861 “The National University Student Backbones Training School Eight Edition’s Week of Theoretical Training of 
Comes to an End (Zhongguo daxuesheng gugan peiyang xuexiao di ba qi xueyuan lilun xuexizhou huodong jieshu, 
中国大学生骨干培养学校第八期学员理论学习周活动结束),” China Youth Daily, December 25, 2014; “The 
National University Student Backbones Training School Eight Edition’s Practical Training in Jiangsu Comes to 
an End (Zhongguo daxuesheng gugan peiyang xuexiao di ba qi xueyuan Jiangsu shijian duanlian huodong jieshu, 
中国大学生骨干培养学校第八期学员江苏实践锻炼活动结束),” China Youth Daily, August 18, 2015. 
862 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 120. 
863 A student union chairman of a highly ranked university, and who is invited to the national level training for 
student cadres, will also be invited to the provincial level training and the ones in his own university (interviews 
with student 17 and student 18). 
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Initiated by the Document 16 of 2004, the development of such a multiplicity of training 
program is a conscious effort from the Party-State to influence student cadres on a theoretical 
basis but also to transform their sociability. It ensures that they spend most of their time with 
other cadres and officials. In line with scholarly understanding of commitment, the Party-State 
has well understood that securing one’s commitment implies reinforcing one’s ties with other 
cadres and detaching oneself from people who do not share this commitment. 
It echoes what has been reported regarding Communist Parties’ practices elsewhere. In 
the case of the French Communist Party during the interwar years, militants and cadres 
explicitly analyzed, and consciously transformed, their own personal social practices in order 
to make sure that their commitment to the Party was reflected in their narrow socializing within 
the organization.864 Shirk put forward that activists in the Mao era were also very careful about 
who they included in their social circle since they were being judged on it. They could not 
afford to be close to politically unreliable people.865 To a certain extent, it is still the case. 
Several interviewees have expounded that it is common for student cadres to stop a relationship 
with someone to preserve their own reputation among campus officials.866 
This level of commitment, to the point of transforming one’s personal relationships, is 
mostly true for the most engaged student cadres and especially the university level student 
union leaders. The result is a widening gap with the rest of the student body, which pushes them 
to develop a specific identity as student cadres, and eventually reinforces their commitment to 
the path.  
                                                 
864 Claude Pennetier and Bernard Pudal, “ Du parti bolshevik au parti stalinien [From the Bolshevik Party to the 
Stalinist Party],” in Le siècle des communismes, ed. Michel Dreyfus et al. (Paris: Editions de l’Atelier/ Editions 
ouvrières, 2000), 507. 
865 Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 120. 
866 Interview with academic 2 and student 12. 
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B -  Developing a vocation for office 
Over the years, student cadres develop a specific identity and take on the attributes of the 
role linked to their position. Through a first immersion in the world of officials, they absorb the 
rules of the political game and learn what is expected from them as cadres. They also learn how 
to speak and behave like officials. Those who remain student cadres during the years of college 
participate in various activities and build a network of friends within the organization. Most 
importantly, they learn to enjoy such activities and to value the specific status it gives them on 
campus, compared to other students. They therefore become interested in maintaining such a 
status by pursuing a professional career as officials. In a nutshell, they begin to cultivate a 
vocation for political office. 
Political vocation is here understood pragmatically as a commitment to the role itself, in 
line with Max Weber’s classic distinction between living off or for politics. If one lives for 
politics, beyond the material rewards one gets off it, one has to enjoy the role itself and develop 
a vocation.867 The development of a vocation is the result of a process through which young 
recruits interiorize their life project as part of an elite and are given the idea that they are both 
competent and legitimate to attain power positions. The vocation is what makes political 
professionalization both possible and desirable.868 Instead of a purely ideological or normative 
commitment to a political career, the vocation logically derives from the commitment process 
initiated by the student cadre experience. 
                                                 
867 Weber, The Vocation Lectures, xlix. 
868 See for instance: Bargel, “S’attacher à la politique. Carrières de jeunes socialistes professionnels [Becoming 
attached to politics. Careers of young professional socialists].”  
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1)  Cultivating one’s role as a cadre  
a)  Understanding the rules of the game 
Through the various meetings and trainings sessions described in the first part of this 
chapter, student cadres learn their role. In parallel to their educational function, these meetings 
are to be understood as a “test in bourgeoisie:” students must show their ability to fit in a specific 
social setting. This expression was used by Eymeri to described the compulsory internships 
designed for students of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (National school of 
administration, ENA) in France. He highlighted that the internships were mostly a way to test 
students’ social skills and their ability to navigate the social environment of French high-level 
administration.869 
During training sessions, they are taught the basics of the contemporary Chinese 
approach to Marxism, as well as the overall narrative of the country’s evolution from the Party’s 
standpoint. During the fieldwork linked to the training sessions, they are supposed to get a sense 
of the country’s diversity and learn to behave as student cadres in their dealings with the rest of 
the people. The official aim is for them to develop an “affection towards the popular masses” 
(yu renmin qunzhong de ganqing, 与人民群众的感情).870 
The various meetings with officials have a more indirect training function. In the most 
important meetings with campus officials, student cadres only listen and do not take an active 
part.871 Still, the content of the meetings frames what they learn to see as mainstream knowledge 
                                                 
869 Eymeri, La fabrique des énarques [Making enarques], 127. 
870 The goals and contents of the training and fieldwork sessions are developed in this document : “Implementation 
Outline for the Marxism Training Program for Youth (qingnian makesi zhuyi peiyang gongcheng shixing gangyao, 
青年马克思主义培养工程实行纲要),” CYL Central Committee, 16 October 2007. 
871 Interviews with student 16 and student 18. 
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among officials and as the normal topics to mention. It gives them access to the rules of the 
game. Such on-the-job training is common to every political organization.872  
In addition to official meetings, student cadres are sometimes also invited to take part 
in informal gatherings with other cadres and university officials. They take place in restaurants 
on campus or outside. In these settings, student cadres mimic their superiors, generally CYL 
officials. They learn where everybody should be seated depending on rank, what conversation 
and tone are proper or not, and importantly they get used to the drinking habits of officials. Not 
used to drinking alcohol in large quantities and navigating a context where they had to stay in 
control, some students would train themselves or find ways to limit the effects of alcohol before 
such events. Some ate large quantities of yogurt before dinner or used certain Chinese medicinal 
herbs. 873 In particular they learn how to propose a toast and with whom they are supposed to 
toast first and how, depending on the respective ranks. 874  To a certain degree I myself 
experienced this learning process while participating in such meetings. I witnessed the degree 
of formality hidden behind rather pleasant moments. Guided by my interviewees, I had to learn 
where I had to seat and with when to toast based on my perceived status within the group. I 
learn, at my expense, that I should toast only scarcely and limit the amount of baijiu drunk.  
Students can already be familiar with such socializing experiences when having dinner 
with their parents’ friends for instance, but it is rare for them to have access to such level of 
officials. Most importantly, in these meetings, student cadres have to prove they are worthy of 
the attention given to them, which separates them from other students. 
                                                 
872 In the case of French party youth organizations, Bargel highlighted how, through the numerous meetings they 
take part in, the militants learn to behave and to speak in these settings and get used to interact with other militants 
(Lucie Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique, 2009 (Paris: Dalloz, 
2009), 352). 
873 Interviews with student 12 and student 24.  
874 Interviews with student 12 and student 16. 
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Beyond what they get from these various meetings in terms of understanding the 
informal rules of the world of officials, student cadres also understand over the years how to 
present themselves within the frame of their role. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, this can 
later be useful in a recruitment setting. The specific way in which students conform to the 
expectations attached to their role is best apparent in the student unions’ publications which 
introduce the candidates running for office in the various universities. For instance, in a WeChat 
post, listing the candidates for the Nanjing University Graduate Student Union Presidium, the 
various contenders had to fit their personal experience into formatted tables in order to best 
advertise their qualities and convince students to vote for them. 875  As the figure below 
demonstrates, the selected categories are very specific and revealing of what is expected from 
them. 
                                                 
875 “Record of the Selection for the 2014 Teams of the Nanjing University Student Union and Graduate Student 
Union (2014 nian Nanjing daxue xueshenghui, yanjiushenghui huanjie xuanba ceji, 2014年南京大学学生会、
研究生会换届选拔侧记),” Nanjing University Student Union WeChat account, May 30, 2014. 
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The candidate’s formatted resume includes eight categories. First, the number of 
positions he held at the various levels in the CYL and student union. In this case, he held six 
positions. Second, the number of large activities he organized personally at the faculty or 
university levels. He organized four. Third, the number of his appearances in the media, within 
and outside campus. In this case, 600 appearances. 877  Fourth, the number of academic 
exchanges he participated in, in other parts of the country or abroad. He did one. Fifth, the 
                                                 
876 Ibid. 
877 The number of media appearances could seem extremely high but one must keep in mind that this includes all 
social media platforms, which are actively used by student organizations on campus.  
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number of competitions won at the university level or above (provincial or central level for 
instance). He won five. Sixth, the number of prizes and awards, such as the “excellent student 
cadre award”, that he received at the university level and above. He won twenty. Seventh, the 
amount of money he managed to raise from outside donors for student union activities. He 
gathered in total 1,320,000 RMB. Finally, the number of research projects or papers he 
completed. In his case, he did twenty-two. 
 Through this personal presentation, the candidate wants to picture himself as an 
overachieving student having acquired a lot of experience in the student union and the CYL, 
and who ultimately can deliver. In particular, he shows his ability to gather large amounts of 
money from the outside as well as to organize large events. Overall, he presents himself more 
as an efficient official than an actual student representative. One could imagine that a student 
representative would put forward the concessions he obtained from the administration, or more 
broadly what he did in favor of students rather than highlighting his own personal achievements.  
Student cadres learn over the years how to cultivate an image of good organizers, and 
in fact of good potential officials. They show that they understand well the functioning of the 
CYL and the student union on campus and that they achieve what is needed for the development 
of these organizations, which is close to what is expected from actual officials. Student cadres 
hence become proficient in the mechanisms of Party-type organizations. Such skills can be 
highly valuable if they later choose to become officials.878 
  
                                                 
878 Interviews with student 16 and academic 23.  
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b)  Embodying their role as future officials  
The function played by student cadres on campus, who lie at the center of the student 
management structure, as well as their constant interactions with university officials, give them 
a particular status compared to other students. This status is reinforced by what Bourdieu called 
the “election effect.”879 The fact that they have been selected and given an official title publicly 
sanctions their elite status and associated skills. It marks that they have been initiated into the 
closed circle of cadres. Those who remain active and eventually become student leaders are the 
ones who enjoy this specific status and the role they play within the university. 
Such phenomenon is far from unique and already existed during the Mao era. Unger 
stressed that for high school students, entering the CYL meant joining a specific social circle 
and enjoying a privileged status. Being able to wear the badge and share the secrets of the 
organization, even though at a very low level, was for the students a matter of status symbol 
and embodiment. As in the case of student cadres, their spare time was mostly spent within the 
organization, reinforcing their feeling of belonging. 880  Chan has also underlined how 
cultivating a role as an activist through one’s behavior and language was highly self-reinforcing. 
Individuals value the status their activism gives them.881 Similar situations have also been 
highlighted in the case of elite clubs on American campuses. As put forward by Grousset-
Charrière in her work on clubs at Harvard University, students are also cultivating an elite status 
                                                 
879 Bourdieu, La Noblesse d’Etat: grandes écoles et esprit de corps [The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field 
of Power], 143. 
880 Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 93. 
881 Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation, 214. 
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through secret activities and elitist daily behavior, which sets them apart from the rest of the 
student body.882  
In China, the case of student cadres is original because their status is highly related to 
the one of campus officials and more broadly Party-State officials. As developed in Chapter 
One, the CYL and the student union, for which the student cadres work, are organized similarly 
to the CCP.883 By cultivating a specific role as student cadres on campus, they therefore develop 
the premises of an identity as Party-State officials. Several of my interviews explicitly told me 
how this experience gave them the feeling of being “like leaders” (xiang lingdao, 领导).884 
This is particularly clear in the way they have mastered “bureaucratic jargon” (guanhua, 
官话) and make wide use of it in their speech. This was put forward in several of my interviews 
with lower level student cadres when describing their superiors and comrades, and I could 
experience it in my encounters with student leaders themselves. Chen Wei, a professor at 
Renmin University, also gave the example of one of his students who was “original and naïve” 
at first, and who started to have “the mouth full of bureaucratic jargon” once he became student 
union chairman.885 Language is a strong sign of one’s status on campus. In Chapter Six I further 
explore the linkages between language and ideology in the world of officials.  
Beyond language, student cadres are also transformed physically by the experience. 
Being part of an elite group implies a specific bodily hexis, certain behaviors and tastes which 
                                                 
882 Stéphanie Grousset-Charrière, La face cachée de Harvard: la socialisation de l’élite dans les sociétés secrètes 
étudiantes [Harvard’s hidden face: elite socialization in student secret societies] (Paris: La documentation 
française, 2012). 
883 Interviews with student 16 and academic 23. See also : Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student Political 
Culture : Official Student Politics at Beijing University.” 
884 Interviews with student 13, student 20 and student 24. 
885 Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 
学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).”  
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highlight one’s affiliation.886 Studying this issue in details, Fretel showed that every political 
organization leads its members to behave in a unique fashion. They all learn to behave in a 
certain way as members of a common corps.887 In the case of student cadres, those who remain 
on this path after several years and attain top positions, start physically mimicking officials. It 
is, for instance, visible in the way student union election candidates present themselves in 
electoral handouts, such as the one below. 
 
  
                                                 
886 Pierre Bourdieu, “Les rites comme actes d’institution [Rites as Acts of Institution],” Actes de la recherche en 
sciences sociales 43, no. 1 (1982): 62. 
887  Julien Fretel, “Habiter l’institution. Habitus, apprentissages et langages dans les institutions partisanes 
[Inhabiting the institution. Habitus, learning processes and languages in party institutions],” in Sociologie de 
l’institution, ed. Jacques Lagroye and Michel Offerlé (Paris: Belin, 2011), 195–217. 
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Figure 4.2: Handout for the election campaign of a faculty level graduate student union 




                                                 
888 In the case of this faculty level student union elections, handouts were distributed by candidates to all the student 
representatives who were to vote in the election. I obtained this hand out through one of my interviewees who was 
one of these representatives. 
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The candidate depicted here is a master student who ran for chairmanship in a faculty 
graduate student union at Peking University. In the front page of the handout, he appears before 
the Weiming lake and its adjacent pagoda, symbols of Peking University. It is striking how this 
graduate student already looks like a Party-State official, by contrast to most students, who 
dress in a very casual fashion. He wears the white short-sleeved shirt, as well as the dark pants 
and belt which are worn by almost every official. The resemblance is striking with Figure 4.3, 
a picture of Xi Jinping visiting Peking University in 2012 few months before he became the 
leader of the CCP. The only noticeable difference between their uniform is that the student does 
not wear a watch. 
Figure 4.3: Xi Jinping (in the middle) visiting Peking University889 
 
                                                 
889  Source: Ministry of Education Website. It can be accessed here: 




Coming back to the handout, Figure 4.2, the text on the front page is also revealing of the 
way the student wants to advertise himself. Through the four figurative expressions on the top, 
he wants to underline that he is the “product of his education” (chunfenghuayu, 春风化雨), that 
he “embellishes things discreetly” (runwuwusheng, 润物无声 ), that he “manages things 
delicately” (chushiyixi, 处事以细), and that he “treats people with honesty” (dairenyicheng, 待
人以诚). He presents himself as an efficient, moral, and humble servant of the organization, 
like a Party official should be. In the remnant text, he succinctly presents himself as the current 
student union office director, and further develops his qualities and how he will positively 
influence the organization’ future. Among other things, he highlights that he is “responsible at 
heart” (zerenzaixin, 责任在心) as well as “diligent and tireless” (zizibujuan, 孜孜不倦). 
Their classmates often present student cadres as overdoing it in their adoption of 
“bureaucratic jargon” and behavior. They appear almost as actors.890 But as Unger highlighted, 
the Party-State has a certain tolerance for acting. During the Mao era, officials tended to believe 
that by acting, that is faking behaviors and values which are deemed positive, activists would 
eventually interiorize them. The cultivation of certain patterns of behavior was therefore 
emphasized.891 This was also put forward by Walder in his conceptualization of biaoxian (表
现), which can roughly be translated as performance. Focusing on factory workers during the 
Mao era, he showed how they always had to actively display the virtues and talents expected 
from their superiors. More than conformity to an overarching ideology, it meant actively 
                                                 
890 Interviews with student 1, student 2, student 16 and academic 23. 
891 Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 98. 
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showing one’s obedience to fit the leaders’ subjective expectations.892 Similarly, studies on 
religion stressed that behavioral conformity can lead to faith.893 This is well summarized in this 
quote from the French singer Georges Brassens, bending Blaise Pascal words:  “kneel, pray and 
implore, soon you will believe.”894 
 In the post-Mao era, ascriptive signs of loyalty to the regime, such as class label, became 
less relevant in political selection. Behavioral signs of loyalty, including such displays of 
commitment, have replaced them as a key criterion.895 As a result, Party-State officials have 
become even more tolerant towards people acting loyal as it is often the main way they have to 
evaluate their commitment. In fact, the officials in charge of student cadres repeatedly put 
forward how they behave more maturely than other students.896 
As developed in the Introduction, adherence to a holist Maoist ideology has become less 
relevant to political selection in the post-Mao era.897 Thus, the distinction between “phony 
activists” (jia jiji, 假积极) and “genuine activists” (zhen jiji, 真积极), which was key in the 
Mao era,898 was never put forward by my interviewees. They did not oppose cynical student 
cadres to idealist ones. All my interviewees, student cadres, professors and officials on campus, 
highlighted the career incentives linked to this experience, without condemning it as an amoral 
goal. What mattered was more the way they behave and displayed their commitment to their 
                                                 
892 Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, 134–160. 
893 See in particular : Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 63. 
894 Song by George Brassens, Le Mécréant [The unbeliever], 1960.  
895 Walder, “The Political Dimension of Social Mobility in Communist States: China and the Soviet Union.” 
896 Interviews with cadre 3 and cadre 16. 
897 On the decreased importance of ideology in post-Mao China, see: Misra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism. 
898 Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation, 20; 
Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 13. 
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role as student cadres, than their actual motivations. In this context, commitment to a role, or 
vocation, ceases to be normative and does not fundamentally rely on one’s dedication to a cause 
or moral standard. As such, it differs widely from ideological-based commitment.  
I now turn to a description of student cadres’ behavior. I show that their propensity to 
mimic actual officials affects their relationship with other students, which in turns reinforces 
their isolation. 
2)  A deviant minority 
a)  The “bureaucratization” of student cadres 
Most of my interviewees, who generally had an experience as lower level student cadres, 
portrayed student leaders in a rather negative light. The student union chairmen and deputy 
chairmen at the university level, in particular, are largely depicted as bureaucratic and corrupt 
by fellow students. They consider themselves as different from lay students and are disliked for 
it. They also behave as a separate group from the rest of the students, having their own social 
activities and not mixing with them for lunch. Also, most students envy their privileged access 
to grants or graduate programs, and consider it as unfair.899 In a survey conducted among 820 
students in three universities, most respondents (53.9%) held negative opinions about student 
cadres.900  
The bad image of student cadres is partly due to their perception as highly bureaucratic. 
Like in other Party-related organizations, hierarchy is very strong within the student union. The 
                                                 
899 Interviews with student 1, student 2, student 7, student 8, student 10, student 12, student 16, student 17, student 
20, student 22, student 23, and student 24. See also : Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of 
University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
900 Jiang Zhibin (江志斌), “A Research on the Instruction of College Student Cadres in the New century（xin 
shiqi gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu duiwu jianshe yanjiu, 新时期高校学生干部队伍建设研究),” 87. 
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chairman easily gives orders without discussion to the other student cadres. This also applies to 
matters unrelated to the functioning of the organization. For instance, he can ask his subalterns 
to pick up and pay for his food, charge his phone…901 As a result, a lot of students find such 
cadres too dictatorial in the way they interact with them. According to a survey made in the city 
of Qinhuangdao, their authoritarian and bureaucratic behavior is the main reason why ordinary 
students dislike student cadres.902 The problem of the “bureaucratization” (guanliaohua, 官僚
化) of student cadres is in fact emphasized in Chinese studies on the matter.903 
The social image of student cadres is very similar to what Shirk, Chan, as well as Unger, 
described regarding the relationship between activists and non-activists in schools during the 
Maoist era. Chan described that in primary school already activists acted in a patronizing 
manner towards other students, and were vilified for being arrogant and acting as teachers’ 
pets.904 In high schools, activists were also kept “at arm’s length” by other students, as Shirk 
put it. Theirs was a difficult position, situated in-between their professors and classmates. They 
generally took the professors’ side, as they decided of their future as activists, and were strongly 
disliked for it. In addition, a contradiction lied at the very heart of their role, since they 
simultaneously had to encourage other students to be politically active and strove to keep their 
group relatively small to maintain their privileges. To prevent the recruitment of more activists, 
one strategy was to exaggerate the shortcomings of their fellow students during “criticism 
                                                 
901 Interviews with student 1, student 2, student 7, student 8, student 10, student 12, student 16, student 17, student 
20, student 22, student 23, and student 24. See also : Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of 
University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
902 Qi Fujuan (戚甫娟), “Thoughts on the Phenomenon of Higher Education Student Cadres Asking to Withdraw 
(dui gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu gaotui xianxiang de sikao, 对高校学生干部告退现象的思考).” 
903 See for instance : Bao Zhigang (包志刚) and Siriguleng (斯日古楞), “A Preliminary Discussion on the Existing 
Problems of the Student Union (qiantan gaoxiao xueshenghui zuzhi cunzai de wenti, 浅谈高校学生会组织存在
的问题),” Intelligence 8 (2013): 13. 
904 Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation, 25. 
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sessions” or in their reports to teachers.905 Unger also highlighted that while some student 
activists, perceived as more loyal to their classmates, were more respected than others, their 
overall image was negative. Consequently, some students chose not to become activists because 
they did not want to be ostracized from their peers.906  
Just like back then, being a student cadre today comes with a bundle of social costs. In 
addition to being portrayed as “bureaucratic,” student leaders are also perceived as corrupt by 
lower level student cadres and the broader student body. At Peking University, student union 
leaders are sometimes described as a “bunch of gangsters” (heibang, 黑帮) by students.907 Such 
depreciated image is due to the clientelist practices sometimes associated with their positions. 
Rumors of vote buying or misappropriation of unions’ funds have a very negative impact on 
the cadres’ reputation. It is well known that some student leaders accept different forms of petty 
corruption, such as getting invited for dinner for instance, in order to speak in favor of a student 
to university officials. They also can develop parochial practices, favoring people from their 
region over other students. 908  Rumors of massive corruption also surrounds the Peking 
University Student Union elections. 909 I return to this issue later in this chapter. In consequence, 
and as already explained at the beginning of this chapter, lower level student cadres are 
                                                 
905 Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 85. 
906 Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, 92. 
907 Interviews with student 2, student 3, and student 16.  
908 Interviews with student 2, student 3, student 16, and academic 23. See also : Guo Ming (郭明), “Why Do 
Student Union Chairmen Have Difficulties Joining the Party: On the Training and Function of Student Cadres 
(weishenme xueshenghui zhuxi nan rudang : tan xuesheng ganbu de peiyang yu shiyong, 为什么学生会主席难
入党  : 谈学生干部的培养与使用),” Exam Weekly 9 (2008): 196; Qi Fujuan (戚甫娟), “Thoughts on the 
Phenomenon of Higher Education Student Cadres Asking to Withdraw (dui gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu gaotui 
xianxiang de sikao, 对高校学生干部告退现象的思考),” 41. 
909 Such cases where reported by the press. See for instance: Jin Ying (金颖), “An Election Campaign in Peking 
University (Beijing daxue de yi chang xuanzhan, 北京大学的一场选战),” News Weekly, September 28, 2004. 
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sometimes rebutted by the ill practices of their leaders and choose to leave the student union or 
to remain cadres at the faculty level instead of aiming for higher positions.910  
b)  Antagonism reinforces their segregation 
High level student cadres are seen as deviant by other students, and are socially 
stigmatized for being arrogant, bureaucratic and corrupt. The concept of “deviant career,” first 
developed by Howard Becker in the case of drug users, is useful to understand how they learn 
to accept the stigma.911 Bargel also used this concept to describe the path chosen by militants 
in youth political organizations in contemporary France. The student cadre experience, which 
is negatively viewed by a large part of other young people, progressively sets them apart and 
reinforces their narrow sociability, as already described. At the beginning of a deviant career, 
leisure activities and social interaction within the group are important in order to accept the 
stigma and progressively take part in more political activities. With time, the deviants’ social 
practices become more and more different from the ones of other students, and they learn to 
accept and value their deviance. The deviant career is self-reinforcing in that way.912 
A main difference with other deviant groups, such as drug users, is that student cadres 
are in constant interaction with mainstream groups. They cannot isolate themselves but have to 
constantly interact, even superficially, with other students while organizing extracurricular 
activities and taking part in campus life.  
                                                 
910 Interviews with student 12, and student 16. See also : Qi Fujuan (戚甫娟), “Thoughts on the Phenomenon of 
Higher Education Student Cadres Asking to Withdraw (dui gaoxiao xuesheng ganbu gaotui xianxiang de sikao, 
对高校学生干部告退现象的思考),” 41. 
911 Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. 
912 Bargel, Jeunes socialistes, jeunes UMP: lieux et processus de socialisation politique [Young socialists and 
young UMP: Sites and processes of political socialization], 330. 
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This situation is similar to what Walder described regarding Chinese factories in the 
Mao era. He highlighted that a minority of workers were given a specific status as activists and 
derived benefits and privileges from their clientelist relationship with management. Their 
unique status was regularly marked publicly, in meetings and documents, which progressively 
drew the antagonism of other workers. Like with Walder’s workers, the split between student 
cadres and other students is a direct consequence of the vertical links they develop with 
university officials, which give them unique advantages and ultimately changes their personal 
status and behavior. They also function as a “lightning rod for dissatisfaction” and become the 
focus of all the resentment the students may have towards officials.913 As a result of their 
isolation from other students, student cadres are more closely bound to each other and to 
officials, which also echoes Walder’s findings.914  
While making it costlier, the increased isolation of student cadres strengthens the 
importance they give to their specific role and status. In turn, the more they value their status 
and publicly proclaim it, the more isolated they become. The development of a political 
vocation both results from and reinforces one’s progressive commitment process. Such 
feedback loop mechanism is a key feature in explaining one’s commitment to the student cadre 
path, and potentially to a future official career. In line with the bureaucratization process noted 
earlier, student cadres also start to identify with the Party-State establishment. Student cadres 
are progressively instilled with the idea that they are legitimate to pursue a political career. In 
our interviews, the highly ranked student cadres rarely hide their political ambitions.915 
                                                 
913 Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, 25. 
914 Ibid., 164. 
915 Interviews with student 4, student 13, student 14, student 17, student 21, and student 22.  
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Beyond the increasing gap with other students, the strong ties developed with officials 
outside and on campus, who can subsequently become mentors, are also key in securing the 
first steps of a political career. I now turn to this dimension by highlighting the case of China’s 
two best universities, Peking University and Tsinghua University.  
 
C -  Finding a political mentor 
In this chapter, I have described how student cadres are repeatedly screened and 
evaluated by officials on campus, and how they eventually get close to them. I now demonstrate 
how these relationships eventually take the form of mentorship ties, strengthening their 
vocation and training as student leaders. I highlight how these ties can even help student cadres 
to start a professional career as officials, with long term effects on their trajectories. The 
political importance of mentoring relationships is far from specific to China. It has been 
highlighted by Camp in the case of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime in Mexico, 916  
which held hegemonic power for over seventy years (1929-2000). Camp showed how the 
support of a mentor was decisive in starting a political career under the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party’s rule. The mentor acted at the same time as a “recruiter,” a “networker,” 
and a “socializer.” In addition to first recruiting disciples, generally within universities as 
Mexican officials often held positions in higher education institutions, the mentor would 
introduce them to influential friends and ultimately influence the way they saw their own 
future.917  
                                                 
916 Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 27. 
917 Ibid., 27. 
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Coming back to the Chinese case, I stress in the third part of this chapter how developing 
strong mentorship relations with officials on campus is one of the structuring factors that shapes 
student cadres’ trajectories. I also develop how potential mentors scout and spot the right 
candidates, sometimes through informal meetings. Considering their personal background, 
including gender, family social status and social circles, they assess their ability to rise up in 
the student cadre hierarchy and win student union elections, as well as the extent to which they 
can be trusted as long term protégés.  
In order to explain how these relationships unfold and eventually play out in university 
settings I focus on China’s best two universities: Peking University and Tsinghua University. 
These two schools provide the most officials to the Chinese Party-State, who often get promoted 
to very high ranks, and as such are key places for political networking.918 Comparing these two 
institutions enables me to see how university officials keep control over the Union in various 
settings, and develop mentoring relationships with students.   
1)  Elections and mentorship on campus 
a)  Controlled elections in Peking University  
Like in other universities, Peking University Student Union is composed of a School-
wide Congress of Student Representatives (quanxiao xuesheng daibiao dahui, 全校学生代表
大会 ), a Standing Committee (changwu daibiao weiyuanhui, 常务代表委员会 ), and a 
presidium (zhuxituan, 主席团 ). The congress is constituted of around three hundred 
                                                 
918 According to the website of the “Chinese Universities Alumni Association” (Zhongguo xiaoyou hui, 中国校友
会), in 2007 Tsinghua University had the most alumni within the current political elite with 41 officials within the 
CCP Central Committee or at the ministerial level and above. Peking University was second with 34 alumni in 
such positions (Wang Qian (王骞), “Beida Graduates in the Political Arena (zhengzhi wutai shang de Beida 
biyesheng, 政治舞台上的北大毕业生)”). 
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representatives sent from the various faculties based on their size. 919  According to my 
interviewees, the faculties sending the most representatives are the Institute for Computer 
Science and Technology and the Health Science Center. A large medical school attached to 
Peking University only since 2000, the Health Science Center holds a specific status in the 
student union: it sends a large number of representatives to the congress and many leadership 
positions are reserved for its students. The ways in which the representatives sent by the 
faculties are selected is highly nontransparent and varies from one faculty to another. They are 
sometimes elected by the students, sometimes directly selected by the faculty level student 
union chairman. In any case, they need the agreement of the faculty CYL secretary, who has a 
strong influence over the process.920  
The congress meets once every two years to review the union’s work, occasionally 
amend the union’s charter, and select the new leadership.921 While on paper it is the union’s 
most important institution, its influence remains limited and it mostly functions as a 
rubberstamp. It mainly plays a role in the selection of the new team which will manage the 
student union. 922 It also approves the Standing Committee members sent by the faculties and it 
takes part in the selection of the presidium.923 
As the congress is in session only once every two years, it is the union’s Standing 
Committee which is in charge of supervising the union’s work in the interval. The Standing 
                                                 
919 “Charter of Peking University Student Union (Beijing daxue xueshenghui zhangcheng, 北京大学学生会章程),” 
Peking University Student Union Congress, May 2010. 
920 Interviews with student 12, student 16 and student 23. 
921 “Charter of Peking University Student Union (Beijing daxue xueshenghui zhangcheng, 北京大学学生会章程),” 
Peking University Student Union Congress, May 2010. 
922 Interviews with student 12, student 16 and student 23. See also: Francis, “The Institutional Roots of Student 
Political Culture : Official Student Politics at Beijing University,” 410. 
923 “Charter of Peking University Student Union (Beijing daxue xueshenghui zhangcheng, 北京大学学生会章程),” 
Peking University Student Union Congress, May 2010. 
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Committee members are sent by the various faculties. Each faculty sends one representative, 
who cannot be at the same time the faculty student union chairman. In total, they are around 
forty.924 These representatives are selected by the faculty union chairman with the agreement 
of the faculty CYL.925 
In most universities, the Standing Committee has mostly a “supervision” (jiandu, 监督) 
function. It makes sure that the union’s leadership follows the rules established by its charter, 
and audits the union’s expenses. At Peking University, the Standing Committee elects its own 
leadership in parallel of the presidium, which gives it more weight than in other universities.926 
It is composed of a Standing Committee President (huizhang, 会长) and two or three vice-
presidents (fuhuizhang, 副会长), among which one at least must be from the Health Science 
Center. This is a unique feature for this university.927 The position of Standing Committee 
President was created in 1979 under the pressure of Li Keqiang and his friends the year when 
he ran for Peking University Student Union Chairman. 928 He himself became the first Standing 
Committee President. While most of my interviewees presented it as a political innovation 
aiming at more checks and balances within the student union,929 some also underlined that it 
was probably a way to provide a springboard to this promising student, who had not been 
                                                 
924 Ibid. 
925 The CYL has a strong influence on the selection of faculty level student union chairmen and can as a result 
easily influence the selection of the representatives (interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24). 
926 While the Tsinghua University Student Union established its Standing Committee (changshe daibiao huiyi, 常
设代表会议) in 1986, it does not have a president. Lü Lili (吕丽莉), “Study on the Democratic Construction of 
College Student Organizations (gaoxiao xuesheng zuzhi de minzhu jianshe, 高校学生组织的民主建设),” 34.  
927 “Charter of Peking University Student Union (Beijing daxue xueshenghui zhangcheng, 北京大学学生会章程),” 
Peking University Student Union Congress, May 2010. 
928 Li Keqiang was a student at Peking University, which he entered in 1978. In 1982, he became Peking University 
CYL Secretary. He is currently The PRC’s Premier. 
929 Interviews with cadre 3, cadre 10, student 12, student 16, student 20, academic 23, student 23, and student 24.  
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elected as union chairman.930 Even in this configuration, the Standing Committee has only a 
limited power and does not manage the union’s activities. They can only investigate the work 
done by the union’s presidium by requesting activity reports.931 In case of disagreements, the 
university CYL is the final judge, but overall the presidium retains the most power.932  
The presidium manages the student union activities. It actually runs the organization. It 
is composed of a chairman (zhuxi, 主席) and between three to six deputy chairmen (fuzhuxi, 副
主席), including at least one from the Health Science Center. The presidium manages the 
various union’s departments which oversee routine work, as shown in the previous chapter.933 
Presidium members are elected every year through a complex system which alternates between 
“big elections” (daxuan, 大选) on the years the congress is gathered, and “small elections” 
(xiaoxuan, 小选), when it is not. 
Every two years it is time for a “big election.” It is organized in two rounds. During the 
first round, the congress and the Standing Committee select around seven people among fifteen 
candidates or so. They constitute the presidium. During the second round, the Standing 
Committee members select a chairman within the newly elected members of the presidium. The 
others become deputy chairmen. At the same time, the former presidium and student union 
                                                 
930 Interviews with student 12 and academic 23. 
931 The chairman is supposed to present a report to the Standing Committee at least once a year, but when the two 
institutions do not see eye to eye, the latter can ask for more regular meetings. In these cases, the chairman would 
often send one of his deputies instead of going himself to deliver the report, in order to not publicly lose face 
(interviews with student 12 and academic 23). 
932 Interviews with student 12 and academic 23. 
933 “Charter of Peking University Student Union (Beijing daxue xueshenghui zhangcheng, 北京大学学生会章程),” 
Peking University Student Union Congress, May 2010. 
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chairmen from different faculties are assembled in an Executive Committee (zhixing 
weiyuanhui, 执行委员会), which assists the representatives in their choice.934 
When the congress is not assembled, a “small election” is organized. In that case, it is 
the Standing Committee members who vote during the two rounds, selecting first the presidium 
and then the chairman. In both cases, the presidium later on selects the department directors.935 
Candidates to the presidium are suggested by the different faculties. In practice, they 
must be CCP members, or at least probationary members. They also need to have a previous 
experience as student cadres, generally as university level student union department directors 
or faculty level student union chairmen. Their overall grades need to remain above a certain 
level and they cannot have failed any classes. According to my interviews, the required 
academic level is not hard to achieve, as more than 80% of the students have such grades and 
above.936 
Most importantly, candidates need to obtain the approval of the student union office 
secretary, who is a CYL official. CYL officials favor the more obedient candidates and they 
sometimes refuse to grant a candidate the authorization to participate in the election. This 
happened to one of my interviewees, who presented himself as particularly outspoken and in a 
good position to win. According to him, the office secretary was probably bribed by his 
competitors to remove him from the race.937 To be sure, situations rarely reach that point, since 
CYL officials usually manage to convince the students they deem inappropriate for the position 
not to run. The candidates put forward by the faculties are also often fit for the task from the 
                                                 
934 Interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24. 
935 Interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24. 
936 Interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24. 
937 Interview with student 23.  
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CYL’s standpoint, as they already are high level student cadres and therefore have been through 
a variety of screening processes. If needed, the CYL can also influence the election itself 
through the Standing Committee members who are sent by the different faculties.938 The CYL 
has indeed a variety of means to influence student union elections.  
Despite all this, elections at Peking University are largely seen as more competitive than 
in other universities. There is a relatively large number of candidates, generally between ten 
and fifteen, and they campaign actively. The candidates put up campaign posters on campus, 
visit the representatives and give them handouts describing themselves and their objectives.939 
They also each give a speech right before the representatives’ vote.940  
Tsinghua University’s student union has a more controlled election process. The overall 
structure is the same as in Peking University with a congress every two years, and hence “big 
elections” and “small elections” alternatively. A main difference is that during “small elections,” 
the union presidium is elected by the faculty level student union chairmen, instead of other 
representatives from the faculty level unions like in Peking University. It guarantees even more 
control on the CYL side.941 Contrary to Peking University, candidates for the university student 
union presidium need to have high grades for the CYL to let them run. They need to be at least 
among the better half of their class. Also, they must be CCP members.942 It allows for additional 
screening of potential candidates. Overall, all my interviewees from Tsinghua University, 
                                                 
938 CYL officials can, for instance, push them to vote in a certain way, by mentioning that doing otherwise could 
negatively affect their chance of getting a “direct admission to graduate school.” As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, CYL officials are key decision makers in this matter (interviews with student 12, student 13, student 23, 
and student 24). 
939 See pictures of the posters visible on campus during the 2014-15 campaign in Appendix III.  
940 Interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24. 
941 The CYL has a strong influence on the selection of faculty student union chairmen (Interviews with cadre 8, 
cadre 14, and cadre 41). 
942 Interviews with cadre 8, cadre 14, and cadre 41. 
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including officials in charge of the process, recognized that the elections were less competitive 
than in Peking University.943 In addition to Tsinghua University, this is also true of Nanjing 
University and Nanjing Normal University. In these cases, elections are organized but the 
winning candidate is generally already selected by the university CYL with the assistance of 
the former chairman.944 
The process is also less competitive in Tsinghua University because the position of 
student union chairman is less valued in this school. It is mostly a way among others, albeit 
rather prestigious, to become a student counsellor. At Tsinghua, the student union elections take 
place only at the end of the first semester, whereas at Peking University they take place at the 
beginning of the academic year. Thus, the elected chairman holds his position only for half a 
year, after which he generally becomes a graduate student and a student counsellor. This is far 
less automatic in Peking University. In Tsinghua University, the position of student counsellor 
is reserved for graduate students rather than hired university officials, and it is a great asset in 
terms of future career prospects. The opportunity to become a student counsellor tends therefore 
to overshadow the position of union chairman itself and the elections carry less weight than in 
Peking University. 945  Chapter 5 further delves into the student counsellor experience at 
Tsinghua and the opportunities that come with it. 
  
                                                 
943 Interviews with cadre 8, cadre 14, academic 22 and cadre 41. 
944 Interviews with cadre 6, student 6, student 7, student 12, student 15, cadre 15, student 18 cadre 30 and cadre 
35. 
945 Interviews with cadre 8, cadre 14, cadre 16, and cadre 41. 
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b)  The “Henan clique” and campus-based networking 
The relative competitiveness of Peking University Student Union elections allows for a 
variety of tactics. Candidates often run as a group in order to maximize the chances of having 
at least some of them among the selected presidium members. In that case, it is important to 
include in the coalition people from various faculties since students largely vote for their own. 
It is crucial to create alliances with candidates from the Health Science Center, as this faculty 
sends a lot of representatives and has quotas for positions in the presidium. The alliances are 
generally formed to pass the first round of the election. Candidates might then turn against each 
other in the second round to secure a position as chairman.946  
Building such a network is a long-term process. Having the elections in mind, ambitious 
students start working as student cadres for the university level student union in their first or 
second year of college. Throughout that time, they try to impress their leaders by being very 
active and resourceful. Some student union departments are especially relevant in order to 
display one’s skills. For instance, by working in the Liaison Department, one can use one’s 
network and relational skills to raise large amounts of money for the union. The departments in 
charge of organizing the union’s main events are also good platforms to show one’s 
organizational abilities and zeal. On the contrary, being in the Propaganda Department, which 
does not organize its own activities, is a lesser option since it does not offer the possibility to 
stand out.947  
The second year is also the time to find a potential mentor among current department 
directors. If one of them runs for the Union’s election the following year, he needs to build a 
                                                 
946 Interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24. Such alliances in Peking University are also put forward 
by Chen Wei : Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an 
de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
947 Interviews with student 12, and student 24. 
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team with the student cadres he likes. An ambitious student cadre would therefore try to be part 
of this team. If a department director does not display the will or ability to run or win the 
elections, ambitious student cadres will try to change department or find another mentor. This 
can be done through personal connections, for instance by contacting the potential mentor 
through a classmate. 948  They will try to get close to these potential mentors by placing 
themselves at their service (by buying them lunch for instance). Their hope is that, when comes 
the time to run for elections, the mentor might solicit them to be part of his team.949 
Alliances have become highly important in Peking University Student Union elections. 
To the point that one coalition has extended its web to include former chairmen as well as CYL 
officials, thereby becoming hegemonic. According to my interviews, Liu Kai, who was the 
Peking University Student Union Chairman in 2005-2006, has been able to develop a network 
on campus which has exerted a very strong influence over elections since then. 950  After 
graduating college in 2006, he started a Master’s program in Marxism and Philosophy at Peking 
University. At the same time, he became the assistant of the university CYL secretary. When 
he graduated in 2010, he became deputy secretary of the university CYL. At the end of 2010, 
he left campus to become CYL Secretary of Chaoyang District in Beijing. He is since 2015 
Lingtai County CCP Secretary.951 
                                                 
948 Among the student associations, the “regionalist associations” (tongxianghui, 同乡会) or high school alumni 
associations can in particular play an important networking role on campus (interviews with student 1 and student 
12). 
949 Interviews with student 12, student 23, and student 24. 
950 Liu Kai worked in the university student union from the first year on. Starting as basic cadre in the student 
union’s Cultural Affairs Department he helped organize massive events. He was also noticed for publishing several 
articles about the history of student organizations in Peking University while in college (interviews with student 
12 and student 24). 
951 Liu Kai’s resume can be found here: 
http://www.lingtai.gov.cn/zwgk/page_zhengwu_01.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=1454&wbne
wsid=10954 (consulted on 26 May 2016). 
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Table 4.2 : Career of Liu Kai952 
953 
                   2006   College graduation (23 years old) 
         2006—2010   Graduate Studies at Peking University (23 years old)  
2007—2010   Assistant of Peking University CYL Secretary (24 years old) 
2010—2010   Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of Peking University (27 years old) 
2010—2011   Secretary, CYL Committee of Chaoyang District, Beijing (27 years old) 
2011—2015   Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Lingtai County, Gansu (35 years old) 
2015—Now    Secretary, CCP Committee of Lingtai County, Gansu (39 years old) 
 
After he left the Student Union, Liu Kai remained highly influential. As a key player in 
the university CYL, and thanks to his large network on campus, he was able to hold sway over 
the elections in the years that followed. He recruited potential candidates through personal ties 
and helped them get elected. My interviewees designated his group as the “Henan clique” 
(Henan pai, 河南派), since Liu Kai is from this province. Between 2007 and 2010, when he 
was in the university CYL, the four chairmen who were elected also came from Henan. Liu 
also supported another chairman who is not from this province but was introduced to him 
                                                 
952 Liu Kai’s resume can be found here: 
http://www.lingtai.gov.cn/zwgk/page_zhengwu_01.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=1454&wbne
wsid=10954 (consulted on 26 May 2016). 
953 Source: http://baike.baidu.com/pic/刘凯
/7188882/0/faf2b2119313b07e5fdfaa340ed7912397dd8ca8?fr=lemma&ct=single#aid=0&pic=faf2b2119313b07
e5fdfaa340ed7912397dd8ca8 (Consulted on 31 august 2016). 
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through a family friend. Relying on this hegemonic network, Liu Kai became an indispensable 
mentor for ambitious student cadres during this period. 954 
In that case, mentorship ties connect a campus-wide clientelist network, involving 
multiple actors. The Henan clique, built around its mentor Liu Kai, helps student cadres to get 
elected to the presidium. In return, by supporting young ambitious students who will probably 
have a successful career as officials or else, Liu Kai establishes personal connections that might 
become useful in the future. The relationship goes both ways, and the mentor’s investment is 
not without implications for the protégé. The situation is quite similar to what Oswald Hall 
described in the case of sponsorship relationships in the American medical field: the protégé is 
under pressure to live up to the sponsor’s expectations, if he exits or is unsuccessful in the 
organization, the sponsor’s image, and their relationships, will be affected.955 
This clientelist network includes current and former student leaders. They recruit 
potential candidates starting from their first and second year in college. Candidates must be 
introduced through mutual personal relationships, generally through people coming from 
Henan. It is to be noted that provincial origin is not important per se, as some members of the 
clique are not from Henan, but it makes it easier for people to get in touch. Provincial origin 
also works as a proxy for mutual trust as individuals are often embedded in overlapping social 
circles. 956 
The student cadres who are part of the clique organize leisure activities such as sports 
or poker games to get to know the new recruits. Dinner parties are also thrown with the most 
important members of the network, and in particular Liu Kai. These dinners are a good way to 
                                                 
954 Interviews with student 12 and student 24. 
955 Oswald Hall, “The Stages of a Medical Career,” American Journal of Sociology 53, no. 5 (1948): 327–36. 
956 Interviews with student 12 and student 24. 
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test the new recruits, whose family background and ability to provide connections and access 
to family wealth is evaluated through mundane discussions. Also, the recruits must show that 
they know how to behave, speak, and drink in such settings. This way, they can signal that they 
have the necessary social skills to potentially make a career, and that they are worth betting 
upon. For instance, they can show that they know the rules of the game by paying the bill before 
anybody else, 957 showing at the same time that money is not a problem for them, which is 
important in a context where union elections are not cheap. The monetary cost of running for 
student union elections should not be underestimated. Even when leaving corruption aside, the 
printing of handouts and posters alone can cost around 4000 RMB, which is not negligible for 
most students, who generally have to rely on their family’s money to run.958 
When the time is ripe, the Henan clique collectively chooses a team which will run for 
elections. Its members must be both loyal to the clique and relatively popular among students. 
They train them and occasionally financially support them. The clique uses its relationships 
within the CYL to provide its candidates with a maximum of advantages and push aside the 
most dangerous competitors. The Henan clique also establishes solid connections with the 
incoming faculty student union chairmen every year, to make sure that the Standing Committee 
members they send will vote as instructed. Consequently, the clique holds tremendous sway 
over the elections’ results, especially during the “small elections” where the Standing 
Committee is all powerful. During the “big elections,” the votes of the more numerous congress 
representatives are harder to control but can still be partially influenced through their faculties’ 
CYL leaders. 
                                                 
957 Interviews with student 12, student 16 and student 24. 
958 Interviews with student 12, student 13, and student 24. 
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Because of this multilayered control, the university had to wait 2012 -when Liu Kai was 
no longer working on campus -  to see someone outside the Henan clique elected. It is hard to 
assess how much influence Liu Kai and the Henan clique currently retain on campus elections, 
but according to my interviewees they are still present and their candidate won the 2013 
elections again.959 The outsider from 2012 was all the more original because he did not come 
from the university level student union but was a faculty level union chairman. Candidates who 
do not have a previous experience in the university level union are in fact very rare. One of my 
interviewees, for instance, found external support in an unusual way. He was the classmate of 
the ex-girlfriend of a former student union deputy chairman, who accepted to meet him and to 
introduce him to his former chairman. Thanks to the support of these former leaders, who 
retained strong ties on campus, and his own popularity among students, he won the “big election” 
against the clique’s candidate.960 
 Yet, the newly elected chairman was quickly accused by some students of having bribed 
the representatives and officials in charge of supervising the election. The rumor was that he 
had spent around 500,000 RMB.961 Some of my interviewees had heard stories about his family 
wealth. They also heard that he had promised to offer iPads to the representatives who would 
vote for him. But some also noted that corruption is not rare in these elections and that his 
denunciation was probably orchestrated by the Henan clique.962 Several cases of vote buying 
in Peking University Student Union elections have in fact been reported by the press in the 
                                                 
959 Interviews with student 12 and student 24. 
960 Interview with student 12. 
961 This blogpost illustrates these corruption rumors : Hu Lele (胡乐乐), “A Perspective on University Student 
Union Based on Vote Buying for Peking University Student Union Chairman Elections (cong Beida xueshenghui 
zhuxi gouxuan kan daxue xueshenghui, 从北大学生会主席贿选看大学学生会),” Hu Lele’s Blog, August 28, 
2012, http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-604217-606752.html (Consulted on 2 July 2016). 
962 Interviews with student 12 and student 24. 
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past.963 Some rules have also been established by the student union to prevent voters from being 
bought with money or favors. For instance, during the campaign, candidates are not supposed 
to meet with representatives outside of the meetings set by the union. A proof of wrongdoing 
could lead to a candidate being disqualified. Moreover, a campaign budget has to be submitted 
to the Standing Committee. But the system is far from full-proof according to my interviews. 
For example, the submitted budgets are often false and transformed to look fair.964  
At Tsinghua University, corruption cases are even harder to come by, indicating either 
that it is less common, since elections are less competitive, or that the secret is best kept, which 
in both cases shows the control of the CYL over the process. Some interviewees mentioned that 
such corruption exists but on a much smaller scale than in Peking University. They mentioned 
amounts around 20,000 RMB, far from the 500,000 RMB cited earlier.965 Beyond corruption, 
it seems that large clientelist networks like the Henan clique are not very common in other 
universities where competition is more controlled (or where information about corruption is not 
released, which is also a sign of better control).  
In any case, personal connections are key in all settings. As for Tsinghua University, 
the university CCP deputy secretary in charge of student affairs, currently Shi Zongkai,966 is 
very involved in the overall selection of student leaders. It is therefore important to develop a 
good relationship with him.967 The importance of entertaining nice interactions with CYL 
cadres to secure a position as student leader, has also been stressed in the other universities I 
                                                 
963 See for instance : Jin Ying (金颖), “An Election Campaign in Peking University (Beijing daxue de yi chang 
xuanzhan, 北京大学的一场选战).” 
964 Interviews with student 12, student 16 and student 24. 
965 Interviews with cadre 18 and cadre 41.  
966 For Shi Zongkai’s resume, see: http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/newthu/newthu_cnt/about/about-5.html# 
(consulted on 1 June 2016). 
967 Interviews with cadre 16, cadre 18 and cadre 41. 
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studied.968 The effect of relationships among officials were also highlighted. For instance, if a 
faculty level CYL secretary is particularly close to university level officials, student cadres from 
this faculty student union are more easily selected as candidates for the university level union.969 
While local configurations may vary and affect student cadres’ tactics, developing 
mentorship ties with strategic actors, and in particular CYL officials, is key in any context. The 
case of Peking University is extraordinary as the multiple mentorships ties linking student 
cadres and lower level officials to Liu Kai created a multilayered clientelist network, which 
allowed him to remain influential even after he left campus. In the following section, I show 
that mentorship ties built on campus can also be decisive to find a job outside campus, giving 
student cadres a clear advantage. A survey of new graduates in Beijing in 2001 and 2002, in 
which students rated the university administration and professors as most valuable than family 
ties to find a job, showed the importance of these connections.970 
  
                                                 
968 Interviews with student 7, student 8, student 14, student 22, and cadre 35. See also : Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student 
Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
969 Interviews with student 7 and student 8.  
970 Wu Qing (吴庆), “2002 Report Regarding the Employment Situation for University Students in the Beijing 
Area (2002 nian beijing diqu daxuesheng jiuye zhuangkuang diaocha baogao, 2002年北京地区大学生就业状况
调查报告),” Journal of China Youth College for Political Sciences 22, no. 2 (March 2003): 26–31. 
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2)  A head start in politics 
a)  Chains of mentoring ties in elite universities 
The previous chapter was devoted to showing that student cadres possess many 
advantages in terms of future career prospects. In particular, the mentorship ties they established 
with campus officials, who often subsequently become local or central Party-State cadres, 
constitute a major asset for their career, especially if they plan to engage in a similar path. 
Looking in detail at the careers of former student union chairmen from Peking 
University and Tsinghua University, it becomes apparent that an important number became 
officials, and often at a high level. Combined, the two universities produced 61 student union 
chairmen between 1978 and 2008.971 Among them, 28 (that is 46%) worked as officials at the 
university, local or central level right after graduating. To give an idea of the difference with 
lay students in terms of career achievements, in 2014 only 19.1% of Tsinghua’s new graduates 
who found a job were employed in an administration or a university (which also includes the 
academic positions). The ratio was 17.9% in the case of Peking University in 2014. 972  
Interestingly, the ratio is almost the same (18%) for Peking University graduates with a CCP 
                                                 
971 Several name lists for the chairmen can be found on the internet, I cross examined them and verified them with 
university officials. See in particular for Tsinghua University: http://baike.baidu.com/view/3751112.htm; and for 
Peking University: http://baike.baidu.com/view/2394305.htm (both Consulted on 1 June 2016). The analysis is 
based on their career data which could be found in their official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on the ones 
compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, at the condition that their positions where sourced from 
media reports and official websites. I found at least partial career data for 45 of the chairmen. If I was not able to 
find their career data, there is a high probability that they did not become high level officials, even though they 
might have worked at the lower ranks of the Party-State hierarchy. For more clarity, I treat them as if they did not 
have a career as officials. I stopped the analysis at 2008 as the student union chairmen of the following years are 
not old enough to have gotten high in the administration, and no data is available for them. 
972 “Report on the Employment of the 2014 Graduates of Tsinghua University” (Qinghua daxue 2014 nian 
biyesheng jiuye zhiliang baogao, 清华大学2014年毕业生就业质量报告),” Tsinghua University, December 2014. 
It can be accessed here: http://career.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/career/8155/20141231180513432393010/2014.pdf 
(Consulted on 12 August 2016). 
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membership. 973  This highlights that the student cadre experience is important on its own, 
beyond the fact that most of the student leaders are also CCP members.  
Such difference in the probability of becoming an official after graduation can obviously 
be explained by student cadres’ higher willingness to pursue this path. As a matter of fact, and 
as highlighted above, they often already behave and see themselves as officials. Yet, even 
compared with student union chairmen from other institutions, who should value this path just 
as much, the ones from Tsinghua University and Peking University have a higher chance of 
becoming officials. This discrepancy brings to light the specific opportunities offered to student 
leaders in these two schools.  
Looking at the career data of the 140 All-China Student Federation Chairmen and 
Deputy Chairmen between 1979 and 2005, 34 of them (24.3%) became officials right after 
graduating, at the university, local or central level. The All-China Student Federation leadership 
changes every five years. It is composed of the student union or graduate student union 
chairmen from around thirty universities.974 While China’s nine best universities are always 
among them, others rotate. Still, they mostly come from “211 project” universities, which 
include the 100 or so best higher education institutions in the country. Also, one seat is kept for 
a student from a national minority, generally from a university in Xinjiang or Tibet.975 
                                                 
973 Data for the whole period could not be found. Sources: “Annual Report on the Employment of the 2014 
Graduates of Peking University (Beijing daxue 2014 nian biyesheng jiuye zhiliang niandu baogao, 北京大学2014
年 毕 业 生 就 业 质 量 年 度 报 告 ),” Peking University, December 2014. It can be accessed here: 
http://career.pku.edu.cn/document/20141229093213311775.pdf (Consulted on 12 August 2016). 
974 The sample does not include the chairman and the deputy chairmen selected in 2005. Source for the name list 
of the different All-China Student Federation Presidiums : Li Yan (李艳) and Min Xiaoyi (闵小益), Compilation 
of Historical Documents from the Past Congresses of the All-China Student Federation (quanguo xuelian lici 
daibiao dahui shiliaoji, 全国学联历次代表大会史料集).  
975 Interviews with student 17, cadre 18, cadre 12, cadre 14. 
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The ratio of 24.3% is far below the 46% featured in the Tsinghua University and Peking 
University cases. However, these student leaders still have higher chances of becoming officials 
than common students. A figure is impossible to come by for the whole period, but on an 
indicative basis, in 2008, only 14% of the graduates from all the “211 project” universities 
directly secured a position in a Party-State administration or an academic institution, which 
includes both administrative and academic posts.976 While student union leaders in general have 
a high tendency to become officials, the ones from Peking University and Tsinghua University 
have an even stronger advantage in doing so.  
As the best universities in the country, Peking University and Tsinghua University 
provide many high ranked officials to the Party-State.977 The ties student leaders build on 
campus can become highly valuable if the students or officials they personally know get 
promoted to important positions. It is especially true of the mentoring relationships described 
earlier. The student leaders who have established strong connections on campus can therefore 
follow their mentors throughout their careers and benefit from their rising influence. The 
following examples illustrate this phenomenon. 
In the case of Peking University, two former student union chairmen, Zhu Shanlu and 
Lu Hao, seem to have developed a solid bond. In 1982, Zhu Shanlu was elected student union 
                                                 
976 The figure goes down to 13% for universities outside “211 project” and 5% for vocational higher education 
institutions. Source: Cheng Changqun (成长群), “Research on the Issue of Employment of University Students: 
Survey on the Issue of Hubei University Student Employment as a Case (daxuesheng jiuye wenti yanjiu: yi Hubei 
daxuesheng jiuye diaocha weili, 大学生就业问题研究 :以湖北大学生就业调查为例)” (PhD Dissertation, 
Wuhan University, 2010), 98. 
977 Since 1982, 9% of the CCP Central Committee members have a degree from Beijing university of Tsinghua 
university, as well as 15% of the politburo members (Source: Data base compiled by Victor Shih et. al. (2012), 
which can be found here: http://faculty.washington.edu/cadolph/index.php?page=61). Also, according to the 
website of the “Chinese Universities Alumni Association” (Zhongguo xiaoyou hui, 中国校友会 ), in 2007 
Tsinghua University had the most alumni within the current political elite with 41 officials within the CCP Central 
Committee or at the ministerial level and above. Peking University was second with 34 alumni in such positions 
(Wang Qian (王骞), “Beida Graduates in the Political Arena (zhengzhi wutai shang de Beida biyesheng, 政治舞
台上的北大毕业生)”). 
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chairman.978 He then stayed on campus as an official and became Peking University CYL 
Secretary in 1985, a position he retained until 1988. Lu Hao was elected chairman of the student 
union in 1987.979 As previously noted, the CYL has a strong control over the union and Lu Hao 
needed to have a good relationship with Zhu in order to obtain this position. This relationship 
paid off, since Lu Hao subsequently followed his mentor Zhu Shanlu from one administration 
to the next. After several years spent in working for SOEs, Lu became, in 2001, CCP deputy 
secretary of Haidian District in Beijing, while Zhu Shanlu was the secretary. In 2002, Zhu 
joined the Beijing CCP Standing Committee and the next year Lu Hao was promoted Beijing 
Deputy Mayor. Lu Hao eventually went faster than his mentor and became a full member of 
the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2012, while Zhu Shanlu became only an alternate member. 
Lu’s progression is exceptional as he was also among the few fifteen officials born after 1965 
who made it to a provincial CCP Standing Committee in 2013.980 
The promotion of these two officials may also have been facilitated by the influence of 
another former student leader, Li Keqiang. After being the Peking University Student Union 
Standing Committee President, Li was appointed as university’s CYL secretary after graduating 
in 1982.981 He was in this position when Zhu Shanlu was elected student union chairman. Li 
also had the same graduate advisor as Lu Hao, professor Li Yining.982 Li Keqiang may have 
                                                 
978 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Zhu_Shanlu/career (consulted on 1 June 
2016). 
979 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Lu_Hao|4863/career (consulted on 1 June 
2016). 
980 “Already 15 Officials Born After 1965 Are Members of Party Provincial Standing Committees (‘65 hou’ 
shengji dangwei changwei yida 15 ren, “65后”省级党委常委已达15人),” Xinhua Daily, June 7, 2013. 
981 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Keqiang/career (consulted on 1 June 
2016). 
982 “The Economist Li Yining, He Had Among His Students, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and Others” (Jingji xuejia 
Li Yining: xuesheng zhong you Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao dengren, 经济学家厉以宁：学生中有李克强、李源
潮等人),” Chengdu Evening Post, April 13, 2013. 
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taken a part in their further promotions, having recently entered the Politburo Standing 
Committee when Lu Hao became first secretary of the central level CYL in 2008 – a position 
Li himself had occupied ten years earlier - and when Zhu Shanlu became Nanjing Mayor in 
2008. Similar trajectories, featuring student leaders following their mentors, will probably be 
visible in the case of the Henan clique mentioned above but for now the students implicated are 
too young to have a clear career trajectory. The only relevant information I gathered from my 
interviews is that most of them were assisted by Liu Kai and the CYL to go through the “student 
work-related direct admissions to graduate school.”983 
 
Figure 4.4: A Mentorship Chain Originating from Peking University984 




                                                 
983 Interview with student 12.  




(consulted on 12 September 2016).  
Li Keqiang Zhu Shanlu Lu Hao 
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In the case of Tsinghua University, the bond existing between Chen Xi and Yang Yue 
is also akin to a similar mentoring relationship. Yang Yue became student union chairman in 
1990 while Chen Xi was the university level CYL secretary. 985 Chen Xi then became the 
university CCP deputy secretary and Yang Yue stayed after graduation to work as a student 
counsellor. Yang became in 1997 the university CYL secretary, while Chen was still in his 
position.986 In 2002, Chen Xi became Tsinghua University Party Secretary. Chen is said to be 
close to Xi Jinping, as they were classmates is Tsinghua University,987 and might therefore have 
helped Yang Yue in his later career. Chen has been able to do so since he became in 2013 the 
executive deputy director of the central level CCP Organization Department. This might partly 
account for Yang Yue’s very successful career. After becoming a local CCP official, he was 
appointed in 2005 CYL Central Committee Executive Secretary and in 2011 became the Mayor 
of Fuzhou, capital of Fujian Province. When he entered the Standing Committee of Fujian, in 
2008, he was the youngest member of a provincial CCP Standing Committee.988 
Like the chain of mentorship ties established between Li Keqiang and Zhu Shanlu, and 
then Zhu Shanlu and Lu Hao, Yang Yue has himself become a mentor for student cadres. 
According to one of my interviewees, he has been particularly supportive of another student 
leader, Shen Yue, who became Tsinghua University Student Union Chairman in 2000, while 
he was the university CYL secretary.989 Shen originates from the same province (Liaoning) as 
                                                 
985 Chen Xi’s resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Xi/career (consulted on 1 
June 2016).  
986 Yang Yue’s resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Yang_Yue/career (consulted on 
16 September 2016). 
987 On this relationship between Chen Xi and Xi Jinping, see: Zhiyue Bo, “The Rise of a New Tsinghua Clique in 
Chinese Politics,” The Diplomat, April 27, 2015. 
988 “Already 15 Officials Born After 1965 Are Members of Party Provincial Standing Committees (‘65 hou’ 
shengji dangwei changwei yida 15 ren, “65后”省级党委常委已达15人).”  
989 Interview with cadre 41. 
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Yang Yue. A very charismatic person, Shen Yue also stood out for being the first female 
chairman in the university’s history. She attracted the attention for a speech she delivered at the 
90th anniversary of Tsinghua University in April 2001, before thousands of students and 
important national leaders such as then PRC President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji.990 
Shen Yue’s case leads us to the issue of gender among student leaders. The previous 
chapter noted that no clear gender imbalance was visible among student cadres. Yet, female 
student leaders are rare. Only 22 of the 140 All-China Student Federation Chairmen and Deputy 
Chairmen between 1979 and 2005 were in fact women (15.7%). In a study of Peking University 
and Renmin University, Chen Wei also underlined how infrequently women get elected as 
union chairmen. Officials also make systematic references to their physical appearance and 
actually count on it to make activities more attractive.991 Such gender gap and stereotypes can 
be explained by the fact that the Chinese political system is widely dominated by male cadres 
while women have fewer promotion chances.992 The next chapter, which addresses the issue of 
female campus officials, demonstrates that this generates self-censorship mechanisms among 
female student cadres, who are often led to curb their own ambitions. 
Coming back to Shen Yue’s trajectory, she became Tsinghua University CYL Deputy 
Secretary in 2001, while she was still a graduate student.993 It is the highest ranked position a 
graduate student can secure in the CYL. Later she moved to the CYL committee of Fengtai 
District in Beijing, and became its CYL secretary in 2007. In 2010, she became Beijing CYL 
                                                 
990 Interviews with cadre 31 and cadre 41. 
991 Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui yin’an de yi jiao, 
学生会：大学最阴暗的一角).” 
992 There is little systematic research regarding female officials in China. On this topic, see : Didi Kirsten Tatlow, 
“Women Struggle for a Foothold in Chinese Politics,” The New York Times, June 24, 2010; Shih, Adolph, and Liu, 
“Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” 
178. 
993 Her resume can be found here: http://baike.baidu.com/view/2412947.htm (consulted on 1 June 2016). 
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Organization Department Director. She then moved to the Yangtze Three Gorges Technology 
and Economy Development Company, of which she is the CCP secretary since 2013. 
Interestingly, the chain of mentoring ties lasted overtime as another student leader from 
Liaoning, Wang Songtao, followed exactly the same path. After becoming Tsinghua University 
Student Union Chairman in 2003, while Shen Yue was in the university CYL, he too became 
university level CYL deputy secretary. He was then appointed in 2008 as the Fengtai District 
CYL Secretary, right after Shen left.994  
 




                                                 
994 Interviews with cadre 14 and cadre 31. See also: “The CYL Secretary of Fengtai District Wang Songtao Goes 
to the Fengtai District Education Commission in order to Inspect CYL Work (Fengtai qu tuanwei shuji Wang 
Songtao fu fengtai jiaowei diaocha gongqingtuan gongzuo,  丰台团区委书记王松涛赴丰台教委调研共青团工
作 ),” Website of the Fengtai District government, December 5, 2011. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.ftedu.gov.cn/2011NianXinWen/2011-12/11447.htm (consulted on 1 June 2016). 
995  Sources for the pictures ： http://baike.baidu.com/pic/ 陈 希
/7588/0/d4239b35755e044891ef397a?fr=lemma&ct=single ; http://baike.baidu.com/pic/ 杨 岳
/12067/0/29381f30e924b8999f88a83a6c061d950a7bf678?fr=lemma&ct=single ; http://baike.baidu.com/pic/申跃
/4799428/0/58ee3d6d55fbb2fbeafde54a4a4a20a44723dc90?fr=lemma&ct=single ; http://baike.baidu.com/pic/王
松 涛 /5418327/0/6159252dd42a2834a07bb81d5fb5c9ea14cebfc3?fr=lemma&ct=single (consulted on 12 
September 2016).  
Chen Xi Yang Yue Shen Yue Wang Songtao 
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It is hard to demonstrate empirically that these ties forged on campus shaped student 
leaders’ trajectories. However, the serial character of their promotions suggests that mentorship 
facilitates the future career of protégés.996 My research demonstrates that it is actually one of 
the factors explaining the exceptional political rise of student leaders hailing from Peking 
University and Tsinghua University. 
 
b)  An elite within the elite: student leaders from Peking University 
and Tsinghua University 
Many student leaders from Tsinghua University and Peking University have reached 
high level official positions since 1978. To illustrate this, I compiled in Table 4.1 the names of 
the former student union chairmen from both universities who later in their career reached 
ministerial or deputy ministerial ranked positions in the Party-State.  
 
  
                                                 
996 While my interviewees did not provide any hard evidence regarding the impact of the specific ties I described 
in terms of protégés’ future careers, they all had heard rumors and tended to take them seriously (interviews with 
student 12, student 24, cadre 31, and cadre 41). 
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Table 4.2: Former student union chairmen from Peking University and Tsinghua University 
who reached ministerial and vice-ministerial positions (post 1978)997 
Name University Major Year in 
office 
















Philosophy 1982 none Party Secretary of 
Peking University 
Lu Hao Peking 
University 







Physics 1980 Chairman Deputy Party 






Engineering 1984 none Party Secretary of 
the University of 
Xiamen 
Yang Yue Tsinghua 
University 




                                                 
997  Source: these officials’ resumes can all be found on the Chinavitae Website 
(http://www.chinavitae.com/index.php, consulted on 1 July 2016).  
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The six cadres listed in Table 4.1 graduated between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, 
at the height of the CCP’s rejuvenation policy. Still, the importance of the student cadre 
experience for future promotion is not only restricted to this period. Looking at the trajectories 
of Tsinghua’s student leaders from the Mao era, three of them became ministerial level cadres 
or above: Zhang Fusen,998 Xu Rongkai,999 and Zhu Rongji.1000 In addition, the experience 
remained valuable for ambitious young people in the post-Tiananmen period. In Table 4.2, I 
compiled the names of former student leaders from the 1990s and 2000s who have become 
leading cadres in grassroots administrations and who are therefore in a good position to access 
high level Party-State positions in the future.  
  
                                                 
998 Zhang Fusen was Tsinghua University Student Union Chairman in 1964, and became Minister of Justice in 
2000. 
999 Xu Rongkai was Tsinghua University Student Union Chairman in 1965, and became Governor of Yunnan in 
2002. 
1000 Zhu Rongji was Tsinghua University Student Union Chairman in 1951, and Premier of the RPC in 1998. 
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Table 4.3: Former student union chairmen from Peking University and Tsinghua University 
who became grassroots political leaders (post 1990) 








Highest ranked position 
in 2016 




2002 none CYL secretary of 






Geology 2003 none CYL secretary of 








1993 none CCP deputy secretary of 






Management 1999 none CCP deputy secretary of 
the Beijing University 
Of Civil Engineering 
And Architecture1004 




2002 none National Academy of 
Innovation Strategy 
Deputy Director1005 
Liu Kai Peking 
University 
Philosophy 2005 Chairman CCP deputy secretary of 
Lingtai County in 
Gansu Province1006 
                                                 
1001 Source: “Ceremonious Opening of the Fifth CYL Congress of the Beijing’s Tongzhou District (Gongqingtuan 
Beijing shi Tongzhou qu di wu ci daibiaodahui lonzhong zhaokai,   共青团北京市通州区第五次代表大会隆重
召 开 ),” Website of Tongzhou District government, May 6, 2014. It can be accessed here: 
http://btcbd.com/fc/2014/102535.html (Consulted on 1 June 2016). 
1002 Source: “The CYL Secretary of Fengtai District Wang Songtao Goes to the Fengtai District Education 
Commission in order to Inspect CYL Work (Fengtai qu tuanwei shuji Wang Songtao fu fengtai jiaowei diaocha 
gongqingtuan gongzuo,  丰台团区委书记王松涛赴丰台教委调研共青团工作).” 
1003 His resume can be found here: 
http://www.nanchong.gov.cn/10000/10003/10219/14284/14286/2014/06/13/10107207.shtml (consulted on 1 
June 2016). 
1004 His resume can be found here: http://baike.baidu.com/view/2925275.htm (consulted on 1 June 2016). 
1005 His resume can be found here: http://www.nais.com.cn/html/about/xrld/2015/1219/432.html (consulted on 1 
June 2016). 
1006 His resume can be found here: 
http://www.lingtai.gov.cn/zwgk/lingdao_index.jsp?urltype=tree.TreeTempUrl&wbtreeid=1454 (consulted on 1 
June 2016). 
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 highlight two striking features. First, the even representation of 
students from Peking University and Tsinghua University. While some authors have put 
forward the existence of a “Tsinghua clique” at the top echelon of the Party-State in post-Mao 
China, 1007  data shows that student leaders from Tsinghua University do not have a clear 
advantage over student leaders from Peking University. Second, the distribution of majors 
among student leaders follows the schools’ respective traditions. Peking University is mostly 
renowned for social sciences and humanities, and, unsurprisingly the large majority of the 
student union chairmen elected since 1978 come from these majors. On the contrary, Tsinghua 
University is famous for science majors, whose ranks produce the largest number of a student 
union chairmen. Student leaders’ majors simply reflect the image of their university and the 
relative importance of each faculty within it. 
This goes against the argument that majors have a very strong influence on Party-State 
officials’ political career. In fact, despite their differences, Tsinghua University alumni who 
studied engineering and Peking University alumni who studied humanities have strikingly 
similar career trajectories as former student cadres. This contrasts with scholarship establishing 
that the major they studied distinguishes Chinese officials into specific groups, the engineers 
being technocrats by definition for instance.1008 
Another striking element is the number of student leaders who started their career as 
officials on campus. Among the 28 former student leaders from Peking University and 
Tsinghua University who became officials after graduation (1978-2008), 17 of them remained 
                                                 
1007 Li, “University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China’s Leadership,” 1–30; Balme, Entre soi: 
l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in contemporary China], 260–
267. 
1008 Cheng Li in particular developed this view that the major they studied is key in understanding the cadres’ 
careers. See for instance : Li, “The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-
Mao China”; Cheng Li, “The Rise of the Legal Profession in the Chinese Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, 
no. 42 (2012). 
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cadres on campus. This is also true of other universities: among the 34 former All-China 
Student Federation leaders who were appointed officials after graduation (1979-2005), 15 were 
university cadres. This comes hardly as a surprise as we already described the strong ties 
developed by student leaders within the university administration, which obviously facilitates 
their recruitment. I come back in the next chapter to these first jobs as university officials in 
more detail and demonstrate how they operate as political career accelerators. 
Many former student leaders also have in common their working experiences in the 
CYL, at the local or central level. They often remain in the CCP youth organizations at the 
beginning of their career. Among the 28 former student union chairmen from the two 
universities who became officials after graduation, 12 were later appointed as CYL officials at 
the local or central level. This is also true of 8 of the 34 former All-China Student Federation 
leaders who became officials after graduation. More specifically, the two youngest officials in 
Table 4.1, Lu Hao and Yang Yue, were appointed in 2008 respectively as the CYL Central 
Committee First Secretary and CYL Central Committee Executive Secretary, the two most 
important positions in the CYL. In the case of Yang Yue in particular, this promotion can be 
linked to the networks he built while he was All-China Student Federation Chairman between 
1990 and 1995. In the following lines, I stress that chance has nothing to do with the fact that 
half the officials in Table 4.1 claim an experience in the All-China Student Federation, which 
is a great networking opportunity. 
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c)  The All-China Student Federation as a networking platform 
Since 1956, the All-China Student Federation Chairman rotates every five years 
between Peking University and Tsinghua University.1009 Under this configuration, while the 
student remains chairman at the university level for only a year, he stays chairman at the 
national level for five years. For instance, the chairman selected in 2015 was the Peking 
University Student Union Chairman of the corresponding year and he should stay in his position 
at the national level until 2020. It is not a full-time position and student chairmen can continue 
their studies or start a job while in office. They mostly to represent the federation at meetings 
and ceremonies. Even if it is mostly a representation function, the position is valued by students 
as it affords national visibility and the opportunity to meet numerous senior officials. According 
to my interviews, the elections held on the corresponding year in Peking University are 
particularly competitive.1010 
Student leaders from Peking University and Tsinghua University already have a 
privileged access to national leaders. They accompany them when they visit the campus,1011 
and can interact them during specific ceremonies.1012 But among them, the All-China Student 
Federation Chairmen are the ones with the easiest and most regular access. Throughout their 
                                                 
1009 Source for the name lists of the All-China Student Federation Presidium since 1949: Li Yan (李艳) and Min 
Xiaoyi (闵小益), Compilation of Historical Documents from the Past Congresses of the All-China Student 
Federation (quanguo xuelian lici daibiao dahui shiliaoji, 全国学联历次代表大会史料集). 
1010 Interviews with student 12, student 13, student 23, and student 24. 
1011 My interviewees underlined that for instance during then Xi Jinping’s last visit to Peking University, the 
student union leaders were chosen to accompany him (interviews with student 1, student 2, and student 23). Chen 
Wei recalled that when he was a student in this same university, Jiang Zemin visited and the student leaders were 
surrounding him (Chen Wei (陈伟), “Student Union: The Shadiest Part of University (xueshenghui: daxue zui 
yin’an de yi jiao, 学生会：大学最阴暗的一角)”).   
1012 We have seen in the case of Shen Yue that she met Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji at Tsinghua University’s 90th 
anniversary ceremony. Similarly, Lu Hao when he was Peking University Student Union Chairman met Hu Jintao, 
then CYL Central Committee First Secretary, at an official event (interviews with cadre 2, academic 2, and cadre 
9). 
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five-year position, they have numerous meetings with CCP and CYL leaders.1013 The CCP 
Central Committee General Secretary, other key CCP leaders, and the CYL Central Committee 
First Secretary are, for instance, present at the All-China Student Federation Congress, which 
take place every five years. The elected chairman is then introduced to them.1014 The CYL 
Central Committee First Secretary and other central CYL leaders are also present at more 
frequent meetings, such as the All-China Student Federation Presidium which takes place once 
a year.1015 The All-China Student Federation Chairman is also at the same time the All-China 
Youth Federation Deputy Chairman and therefore participates in similar assemblies with the 
All-China Youth Federation.1016  
In addition to these numerous meetings, over this five-year representation position, the 
chairman, generally spends one year actually working full-time for the All-China Student 
Federation, as executive chairman (zhixing zhuxi, 执行主席). As the federation’s offices are 
part of the central CYL administration, this year equals an internship at the central CYL. It is a 
very efficient way to develop connections in the organization. Some All-China Student 
Federation Deputy Chairmen can also have similar opportunities.1017  
Being All-China Student Federation Chairman creates a lot of networking opportunities, 
which can facilitate one’s career. The developed networks are strong within the central level 
CYL as they spend most of their time with its officials. They then get positions in the CYL 
                                                 
1013 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 6, academic 6, cadre 9, student 17, and student 23. 
1014 See for instance: “End of the 12th Congress of the All-China Youth Federation and of the 26th Congress of the 
All-China Student Federation (quanguo qinglian shi’er jie quanweihui quan xuelian ershiliu da bimu, 全国青联
十二届全委会全国学联二十六大闭幕),” China Youth Daily, July 26, 2015. 
1015 See for instance: “The 5th meeting of the 25th All-China Student Federation Presidium Opens in Beijing 
(quanguo xuelian di ershiwu jie zhuxi tuan di wu ci huiyi zai Jing zhaokai, 全国学联第二十五届主席团第五次
会议在京召开),” WeChat account of Beijing CYL, December 17, 2014. 
1016 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 6, academic 6, cadre 9, student 17 and student 23. 
1017 Interviews with cadre 6, academic 6, cadre 9, cadre 14, and student 17. 
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more easily. Among the six All-China Student Federation Chairmen in my dataset (1978-2008), 
four were later appointed CYL officials at the local or central level. Two of the most successful 
cadres I have mentioned so far, Yang Yue and Liu Kai are among them. They became All-
China Student Federation Chairmen, respectively in 1990 and 2005. As mentioned earlier, Yang 
Yue became later the CYL Central Committee Executive Secretary and then the youngest 
member nationwide of a provincial CCP Standing Committee. Liu Kai was appointed CYL 
Secretary of Chaoyang District in Beijing after leaving Peking University in 2010. The next 
year, he moved to Lingtai County in Gansu and became at 28 years old the country’s youngest 
county leader.1018 
These phenomena are reproduced, on a smaller scale, at the local level. The student 
union chairmen from the best universities in a province form the presidium of the provincial 
level student federation. The position of chairman is generally monopolized by the same 
university, the province’s best one. For instance, in Jiangsu Province, the Nanjing University 
Student Union Chairman always heads at the same time the provincial level student 
federation.1019 These student cadres therefore can meet important provincial leaders. A member 
of the provincial level CCP Standing Committee, as well as the provincial CYL secretary are 
for instance present at the congresses of the provincial level student federation every five 
years.1020 These student leaders also have the opportunity, along with the deputy chairmen, to 
become provincial level student federation executive chairmen and intern at the provincial level 
                                                 
1018 “The 28 Years Old Peking University PhD Liu Kai is Appointed as Governor of Lingtai County in Gansu (28 
sui Beida boshi Liu Kai zhensgshi dangxuan Gansu Lingtai xian xianzhang ceng, 28岁北大博士刘凯正式当选
甘 肃 灵 台 县 县 长 曾 ),” People’s Daily website, October 26, 2011. It can be accessed here: 
http://blog.csdn.net/guoxiaoqiang88/article/details/6919707 (Consulted on 1 June 2016).  
1019 Interviews with student 17 and cadre 30.  
1020 See for instance: “The Jiangsu Student Federation Holds its 9 th Congress (Jiangsu xuelian di jiu ci daibiao 
dahui juxing, 江苏学联第九次代表大会举行),” China Youth Daily, August 29, 2012. 
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CYL for a year.1021 While to a lesser degree than at the national level, an experience as local 
student federation leader can hence be valuable for students who envision themselves as 
officials in the future. 
d)  The exception that proves the rule: student leaders who did not 
follow the political path.  
I have shown that rising to the top of the student cadres’ hierarchy is often a way towards 
officialdom, especially for students from Peking University or Tsinghua University. But 
nothing is automatic and individual trajectories can still take very different directions. For a 
variety of reasons, some student leaders simply do not choose, or do not manage, to become 
Party-State officials later in their life. The 1989 uprising and its repression proved an interesting 
moment in that regard. It changed the trajectory of student leaders who might have become 
officials after graduating. The case of Xiao Jianhua is particularly illustrating. At the time of 
the 1989 demonstrations, he was Peking University Student Union Chairman, which was the 
most active school in the movement. While he never opposed the government, his student union 
was not able to prevent students from creating parallel organizations to manage their 
mobilization. Caught in the middle of events, his nascent political career came to a halt. 
However, his experience and loyalty ultimately paid off as the university supported him while 
he became a successful businessman. He also used the connections he built in the political world 
to become a prosperous financier.1022  
The Tiananmen events strongly impacted the career not only of student cadres but also 
campus officials. The CYL secretaries of Peking University and Tsinghua University at the 
                                                 
1021 Interviews with cadre 6, student 17, and cadre 30. 
1022 David Barboza and Michael Forsythe, “With Choice at Tiananmen, Student Took Road to Riches,” The New 
York Times, June 3, 2014. 
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time had to leave the country for some years and wait for the atmosphere to calm down. As 
heads of the CCP’s youth organization in universities highly active during the protests they 
were perceived as having partly failed at their job of managing students.1023  Zhang Laiwu who 
was then the Peking University CYL Secretary left to the US for five years to follow a graduate 
program. When he came back, he first found a job at Peking University and later became a local 
cadre in Ningxia Province. In 2008, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Science and 
Technology.1024 The case of Chen Xi, who was the Tsinghua University CYL Secretary at the 
time, is more exceptional because he still managed to have a particularly brilliant career. After 
studying for two years in the US (1990-1992), he came back to Tsinghua as a university official 
and rose ranks within the institution. In 2002, he became Tsinghua University CCP Secretary. 
He then became a Party-State official in the Ministry of Education and was appointed in 2013 
CCP Organization Department Executive Director, a major position in the Party apparatus.1025 
Chen Xi was a former classmate of Xi Jinping and his personal connection with the current 
PRC President might have helped him in attaining high level positions.1026 
Beyond the fracture of Tiananmen, such disruptive trajectories still exist. One of my 
interviewees, for instance, was a high-level student cadre prevented from running in the Peking 
University Student Union elections by the CYL officials. Instead of pursuing a political career, 
which might have interested him at first, he went abroad and became a successful 
entrepreneur.1027 While it can be seen as a preparatory step for officialdom, being a student 
                                                 
1023 Interviews with academic 6, cadre 9, and student 17. 
1024 His resume can be found here: http://gbzl.people.com.cn/grzy.php?id=121000855 (consulted on 20 June 2016). 
1025 His resume can be found here: http://cpc.people.com.cn/gbzl/html/121000519.html (consulted on 20 June 
2016). 
1026 On this relationship between Chen Xi and Xi Jinping, see: Bo, “The Rise of a New Tsinghua Clique in Chinese 
Politics.” 
1027 Interview with student 23. 
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leader is therefore not an automatic step towards it. These trajectories underline both the 
diversity of individual choices but also the existence of alternative options for resourceful 
students hailing from elite universities in post-Mao China. In the case of Xia Jianhua and the 
last interviewee I mentioned, they became successful businessmen. But this was only their 
second choice, after they could not pursue a political career anymore. The student cadre 
experience itself and the various commitment building we mentioned first led them towards a 
political path.   
*** 
 
This chapter has described the transformation that students raising to the top of the 
student cadres’ hierarchy undergo at the hands of the organization. Student cadres alter their 
behavior and the way they envision their future, eventually developing a vocation for political 
office. It also transforms their social circles and the way they present themselves, setting them 
apart from the main student body. The organizational setting suggests that it is an overall Party 
strategy to reshape the students’ socialization. By design, they are led to spend most of their 
time with other cadres and officials, which increases their political commitment.  
The students’ opportunities inside and outside campus are also shaped by the personal 
ties they manage to develop. Mentorship ties prove overall indispensable for them to get to the 
top of the hierarchy, due to the way the student union is supervised by campus officials. These 
mentoring relationships can often include more than two actors, as a protégé can in turn become 
mentor after serving as campus official, or as one mentor can even develop an overall clientelist 
network through his control over student union elections. This mentorship ties can also highly 
influence the students’ future outside campus, in particular, when student leaders get to interact 
with central level CYL officials through the All-China Student Federation and its local replica.  
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As stressed in the previous chapter, becoming a student cadre can in itself be an important 
phase in one’s trajectory towards officialdom. The process of becoming a student leader is an 
even more formative step. Student leaders cultivate a personal taste for political activities and 
develop an exclusive sociability. They also establish contacts that will prove useful for the first 
steps of their political career, which often starts with an official position on campus, as I now 




Chapter 5: From school to politics 
After graduating from university, numerous student cadres stay on campus as officials. 
They generally start as student counsellors and rise in the hierarchy. As the youngest officials 
on campus, they often occupy leadership positions in the CYL, at the faculty or university level, 
and can use the CYL as a fast track in the university administration’s hierarchy.  This chapter 
focuses on this first professional experience and sets forth that, for some, it is a further step in 
a sponsored mobility towards a political career.  
By highlighting the evolution of campus officials’ role in the post-Mao era I show that 
they are a key element in the student management apparatus, but also constitute a recruitment 
pool for the Party-State. These officials have numerous advantages in terms of further 
advancing their education or being promoted rapidly to highly ranked positions. Becoming a 
university official, and in particular within the CYL hierarchy, can be used as a shortcut towards 
leadership positions in the Party-State. It can paradoxically be a better strategy than directly 
becoming a local level official after graduation. In the continuation of the rejuvenation policy 
developed in Chapter Two, specific programs have even been put in place in elite universities 
to facilitate such trajectories. University CYL officials have for this reason a unique position in 
the Chinese Party-State, even when we compare them to CYL officials in SOEs or high schools.  
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A -  University as a political talent incubator 
To best analyze what a first professional experience as an official on campus can mean 
for a recent graduate, I first detail the evolution of the system of counsellors. I highlight how 
Tsinghua University played a key role in the development of this system. I show in this chapter 
how the term “counsellors” designates various profiles depending on the universities and their 
recruitment channels. They can be in their twenties and still graduate students, but also above 
30 years old and full-time officials. But overall it designates low level political workers on 
campus, in charge of student management. The counsellors are a key element of the student 
management control system presented in Chapter Three. Their role evolved in the post-
Tiananmen era, as they found new ways to manage students, using new technologies, or 
apparently depoliticizing their role. The first part of this chapter aims at unveiling the key role 
they play on campus and how this position can be an important formative experience leading 
to a rapid promotion within the university administration.  
1)  The institutionalization and generalization of the system of 
counsellors 
a)  The birth of the counsellors system and its development  
In 1952, the Ministry of Education called for the development of a system of “political 
counsellors” (zhengzhi fudaoyuan, 政治辅导员) in pilot higher education institutions. 1028 
Tsinghua University was the first school to develop this system, starting in 1953. At first, 25 
fourth-year students were selected to stay one more year on campus as political counsellors. 
                                                 
1028 “Instructions Regarding the Higher Education Institutions which Importantly will Experiment with a Working 
System of Political Counsellors (guanyu zai gaodeng xuexiao you zhongdian de shixing zhengzhi fudaoyuan 
gongzuo zhidu de zhishi, 关于在高等学校有重点的试行政治工作制度的指示),” Ministry of Education, 28 May 
1952. 
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They had to be CCP members. Their main duty was to manage the student body and the student 
organizations. They generally were at the same time the CYL secretaries in their respective 
faculties. This system lasted until 1966 in Tsinghua University. It was later resumed in 1977, 
after the end of the Cultural Revolution.1029 The political counsellor system was also developed 
in some other universities. However, it is only in the late 1970s, after Deng Xiaoping endorsed 
the model and pushed for its spread, that it became universal across higher education 
institutions.1030 
Jiang Nanxiang, who headed Tsinghua University from 1952 to 1966 was very active 
in the creation of the political counsellor system. According to a former Tsinghua University 
official, cited by Cheng Li, Jiang Nanxiang selected himself the first group of political 
counsellors and their first meeting was held at his home.1031 Jiang’s idea was to cultivate a 
group of young talents capable of “carrying with both shoulders” (shuangjiantiao, 双肩挑), 
meaning that they would be both technical experts and political leaders. 1032  The political 
counsellors system became a major promotion channel for Party-State officials in the Mao era. 
It allowed numerous Tsinghua University alumni to become high level officials.1033 The former 
                                                 
1029 Fang Huijian (方惠坚) and Zhang Sijing (张思敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 
清华大学志), 1:229–230. 
1030 Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class, 223. 
1031 Li, “University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China’s Leadership,” 1–30. 
1032 Research team on the political counsellors system (xuesheng zhengzhi fudaoyuan zhidu yanjiu ketizu, 学生政
治辅导员制度研究课题组), “Looking Back and Investigating 40 Years of the Political Counsellors System 
(xuesheng zhengzhi fudaoyuan zhidu sishi nian de huigu yu tansuo, 学生政治辅导员制度四十年的回顾与探索),” 
Tsinghua Journal of Education 1 (1993): 3–7. 
1033 Interviews with cadre 16, cadre 41, and student 24. On this issue, see in particular : Li, “University Networks 
and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China’s Leadership,” 1–30; Xie Zheping (谢喆平) and Wang Sunyu (王孙
禺), “Student Political Instructors and Governance of China by ‘Red Engineers’ (xuesheng fudaoyuan zhidu yu 
hongse gongchengshi zhiguo, 学生辅导员制度与“红色工程师治国“),” Tsinghua Journal of Education 6 (2013): 
18–29. 
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PRC President Hu Jintao was for instance a political counsellor at Tsinghua in 1964-1965.1034 
Between 1952 and 1966, 682 counsellors were trained in Tsinghua University. Many of them 
became high level cadres within the university and beyond. 1035   
Following the decreased political attention given to political control over universities in 
the 1980s, the positions as political workers on campus, including the counsellors, became less 
attractive for young graduates. Zhao Dingxin underlined that while it was, in the Mao era, one 
of the best jobs one could get after graduation, this was no longer true in the 1980s.  Compared 
to professors or businessmen, they had less financial incentives and less chances to go abroad. 
After the 1989 demonstrations, the Party-State implemented a variety of measures to increase 
control over student activities. Among others, it developed the political counsellor system and 
increased the status of political workers. 1036 
Several official documents were issued in the 1990s to improve control over student 
activities on campus and to strengthen the body of political workers.1037 In June 2000, a political 
work meeting was organized by the central CCP focusing on political counsellors more 
                                                 
1034 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Hu_Jintao/career (consulted on 8 June 
2016). 
1035 In 1984, 77 of them had reached the rank of deputy division director within the university (Xie Zheping (谢喆
平) and Wang Sunyu (王孙禺), “Student Political Instructors and Governance of China by ‘Red Engineers’ 
(xuesheng fudaoyuan zhidu yu hongse gongchengshi zhiguo, 学生辅导员制度与“红色工程师治国“),” 20. 
1036 Zhao, “The Decline of the System for Controlling Students in Universities,” 111–112. 
1037 See in particular : “Opinions Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of Party Building and Political 
Work in Higher Education Institutions under the New Circumstances (guanyu xin xingshi xia jiaqiang he gaijin 
gaodeng xuexiao dang de jianshe he sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo de ruogan yijian, 关于新形势下加强和改进高等
学校党的建设和思想政治工作的若干意见),” CCP Organization Department and Propaganda Department, 
August 1993. Regarding the other documents on the matter, see: Gong Chunlei (龚春雷 ), “Study on the 
Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan 
zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题研究)” (PhD Dissertation, East China Normal 
University, 2011), 17–24. 
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specifically.1038 Following this meeting, the Ministry of Education issued a document laying 
out some common rules to standardize the political counsellor system across the country. It 
emphasized the training function of this position and, in order to guarantee turnover, established 
age limits (40 years old) as well as term limits for the counsellors (four to five years for full-
time positions).1039 Since then, the counsellors system has been gradually institutionalized 
though additional rules. The Document 16 of 2004 went one step further in that direction. In 
particular, it established that every class should have a dedicated counsellor, who should be at 
the same time the class director. Also, every faculty must have one dedicated counsellor for 
each of the yearly cohorts (nianji, 年级).1040  
The rules managing the counsellor system were then clarified in the Document 24 of 
2006. In addition to the previously mentioned rules, it stipulates that there should be one 
counsellor for every two hundred students in universities.1041 The Document 24 also clarifies 
the status of counsellors, leading to a standardization of their recruitment across most 
universities. The counsellors are managed by their faculty’s CCP committee and by the 
university’s Student Work Department (xuesheng gongzuo bu, 学生工作部).1042 Their basic 
                                                 
1038 Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs 
Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题
研究),” 19. 
1039 “Opinion on Further Strengthening the Construction of Political Work teams in Higher Education Institutions 
(guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang gaodeng xuexiao xuesheng sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo duiwu jianshe de ruogan yijian, 关
于进一步加强高等学校学生思想政治工作队伍建设的若干意见),” Ministry of Education, 3 July 2000. 
1040 “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the Political Education of University students 
(guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin daxuesheng sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu de yijian, 关于进一步加强和改进大学生
思想政治教育的意见),” Document 16, State Council, 14 October 2004. 
1041 “Regulation on the Building of Corps of Political Instructors in Ordinary Higher Education Institutions (putong 
gaodeng xuexiao fudaoyuan duiwu jianshe guiding, 普通高等学校辅导员队伍建设规定),” Document 24, 
Ministry of Education, 23 July 2006.  
1042 Beyond the guidelines of Document 24, this was verified in my interviews. Tsinghua University has a peculiar 
situation as its CCP organization has established its own Student Work Bureau (xuesheng gongzuo chu, 学生工
作处), parallel to the university one, to deal with the counsellors (Interviews with academic 2, cadre 10, cadre 12, 
student 12, student 18, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41). 
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salary follows provincial’s scale for Party-State officials, with an additional part depending on 
the university.1043 While the Document 24 only requires an undergraduate diploma to become 
counsellor, in practice most of them have a graduate degree.1044   
According to my interviews, the counsellors are largely recruited among young 
graduates who decide to “stay in the university” (liuxiao, 留校). They must take an exam 
organized by the university and to go through interviews. This “service unit exam” (shiye 
danwei kaoshi, 事业单位考试) is widely seen as easier than the civil service exam.1045 The 
recruited counsellors are generally CCP members.1046 Also, they are supposed, according to 
Document 24, to have a previous experience in student management.1047 As a result, most of 
them are former student cadres.1048 
Tsinghua University remains a unique case in that it has kept a system in which graduate 
students take the role of counsellors. The counsellors in Tsinghua University are therefore not 
                                                 
1043 This system is for full-time counsellors hired as university officials. For instance, counsellors’ salaries in 
Shanghai’s universities varied in 2010 between 2000 and 4000 RMB a month (Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on 
the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan 
zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题研究),” 47. 
1044 In a survey conducted in 2010 among 164 counsellors in thirteen universities in Shanghai, 70% had a Master 
degree (Ibid., 42). This was verified in my interviews (interviews with academic 2, cadre 10, cadre 12, student 12, 
student 18, and cadre 35). 
1045 Interviews with student 12, student 18, cadre 35, cadre 10, academic 2, and cadre 12. 
1046In a survey conducted in 2010 among 164 counsellors in thirteen universities in Shanghai, 89% were CCP 
members (Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student 
Affairs Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业
化问题研究),” 41. This was verified in my interviews (interviews with academic 2, cadre 10, cadre 12, student 
12, student 18, and cadre 35). 
1047 “Regulation on the Building of Corps of Political Instructors in Ordinary Higher Education Institutions (putong 
gaodeng xuexiao fudaoyuan duiwu jianshe guiding, 普通高等学校辅导员队伍建设规定),” Document 24, 
Ministry of Education, 23 July 2006. 
1048 Interviews with academic 2, cadre 10, cadre 12, student 12, student 18, and cadre 35. 
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actual officials hired by the university.1049 Every year, around a hundred graduate students are 
selected to become counsellors, amounting to a total of around four hundred working at the 
same time. They are generally selected among the ones who worked as student cadres and who 
benefited from a “direct admission to graduate school.” They must be CCP members and have 
satisfactory grades. They are recommended by faculty professors or officials and the final 
selection is made by the faculty CCP committee. As a result, they often become counsellors, at 
least for the first year, in the same faculty where they did their college.1050 While Tsinghua 
University is not the only university to use graduate students as counsellors, it is the only one 
which does so exclusively.1051 
Since the 1990s, the counsellor system has been institutionalized, and expanded to 
universities across the country. In 2008, there were 91,808 full-time and 29,329 part-time 
counsellors.1052 As I suggest in the following lines, the actual work of the counsellors has also 
profoundly changed. Since the Document 16, they are designated as “student counsellors” 
(xuesheng fudaoyuan, 学生辅导员) rather than political counsellors as they used to.1053 It 
underlines the diversification of their role beyond classic political control.  
                                                 
1049 As such, they do not get a full salary but only a stipend while they do their graduate studies. It amounts to 
around 1,000 RMB per month for Master students and 1,500 for PhD students (interview with cadre 41). 
1050 Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, cadre 18, and cadre 41. 
1051 In Peking University for instance, some counsellors are recruited through the “two plus two” framework 
(Erjiaer, 二加二), part of the “direct admission to graduate school” system. The recruits are young graduates who 
are hired to work on campus for two years before starting a two years Master’s program. They often at the same 
time serve as faculty level CYL deputy secretary. They have an intermediary situation between students and actual 
officials (Interview with cadre 10, student 24, and cadre 41). 
1052 Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs 
Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题
研究),” 30. 
1053 “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the Political Education of University students 
(guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin daxuesheng sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu de yijian, 关于进一步加强和改进大学生
思想政治教育的意见),” Document 16, State Council, 14 October 2004. 
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b)  From political counsellors to student counsellors 
Some university officials I interviewed emphasized the similarities between the 
counsellors in Chinese universities and the tutors in Anglo-Saxon college campuses. 1054 
However, this comparison minimizes the political function of the counsellors. At the class level, 
the counsellors are in charge of managing the CCP branch and its activities. For instance, they 
organize the Party classes, compulsory for new CCP recruits. They are also in charge of the 
faculty level CYL. Some are appointed as faculty level CYL deputy secretaries and the most 
experienced counsellors, because they already have worked in that position for some years or 
because they had a substantive experience as student cadres, become CYL secretaries. The 
selection is made by the university CCP leadership after interviews. This position is voluntary 
for the counsellors and they do not get an additional salary for it. However, it can be a good 
way to be promoted further in the university CYL organization.1055 In Tsinghua University for 
instance, around 70 of the overall 400 counsellors are CYL leaders at the same time.1056  
The counsellors also have propaganda functions on campus. In particular, they manage 
the online information regarding on-campus activities, and especially university’s internet 
forums. They monitor postings on these forums and can eventually commission counter posts 
to student cadres, to promote the official narrative on a variety of issues. University websites 
and forums are in fact a key information channel on campus, through which the news regarding 
classes or extracurricular activities are distributed to students. The forums, are also an important 
discussion platform where students can talk about, and sometimes criticize, certain university 
                                                 
1054 Interviews with cadre 14, cadre 17, and cadre 41. 
1055 Interviews with cadre 13, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 14, cadre 17, cadre 30, and cadre 41. The Document 24 
also underlined that counsellors can in parallel to their position hold the positions of CCP branch secretary and of 
faculty CYL secretary (“Regulation on the Building of Corps of Political Instructors in Ordinary Higher Education 
Institutions (putong gaodeng xuexiao fudaoyuan duiwu jianshe guiding, 普通高等学校辅导员队伍建设规定),” 
Document 24, Ministry of Education, 23 July 2006). 
1056 Interview with cadre 41. 
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activities or programs. Monitoring them is a key function of the counsellors.1057  
The counsellors also play a key role on campus during the “critical and sensitive periods” 
(min’gan qi, 敏感期), defined by the State and the university administration in case of major 
social-political events (the anniversary of the June Fourth Movement of 1989 or a large 
international summit hosted in Beijing for instance), or in cases of specific crises (the SARS 
epidemic of 2003 for example). In this situation, the counsellors are supposed to organize more 
activities through the CCP and CYL organizations and reach out directly to students who are 
missing or who might organize a political action. The activities set up by student groups outside 
the student union is also restricted.1058  
Beyond traditional political control, the counsellors spend an increasing amount of time 
managing students through less obviously political ways. Mental health monitoring has become 
a key function of the counsellors and a major instrument in dealing with students. Mental health 
is defined very widely and its monitoring includes the surveillance of behaviors and political 
ideas perceived as deviant. Against this background, unruly students who do not completely 
follow campus rules can, for instance, be considered as having a mental health issue. The 
counsellors interact with students daily and occasionally report abnormalities.1059 A document 
issued by the Ministry of Education and the central CYL insisted on the role the CYL must play 
in mental health monitoring.1060 The implication of the Party’s main youth organization in this 
                                                 
1057 Interviews with student 12, student 18, and student 24. 
1058 Interviews with student 12, student 18, and student 24. See also : Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian 
Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 507–508; Perry, “Citizen Contention and Campus 
Calm,” 213. 
1059 Interviews with student 2, student 3, and cadre 41. See also : Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian 
Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 504. 
1060 “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the CYL Construction in Higher Education 
Institutions (guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin gaodeng xuexiao gongqingtuan jianshe de yijian, 关于进一步加
强和改进高等学校共青团建设的意见),” Document 15, Ministry of Education and CYL Central Committee, 8 
April 2005. 
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document’s redaction stresses its political value. According to Gong Chunlei, this function is 
now more important in the daily schedule of student counsellors than the traditional political 
activities such as CCP branch events and political education. When recruited, the counsellors’ 
abilities to conduct mental health monitoring is also an important criterion.1061  
In addition to political work per se, most of the counsellors’ time is dedicated to 
managing students’ daily problems at the class level, such as schedule or grades issues.1062 They, 
for instance, take attendance in class or organize tutoring sessions. At the class level, the 
counsellor oversees extra-curricular activities, and he works closely with the student 
organizations at the faculty level. The students know very well their class’ and faculty’s 
counsellors and can go to them to solve various personal issues. They also must deal with 
emergencies, such as disappearances or suicides. To carry out this multiplicity of tasks, they 
rely on the student cadres in their class and faculty. In some universities, they are required to 
live in the student dormitories as to maintain a daily contact.1063  
As they spend a lot of time with them and help them in numerous occasions, the 
counsellors are in the best position to influence students.  In a survey organized among 133 
university CYL cadres in Henan Province, a large majority of respondents (79.1%) saw daily 
interactions, such as responding to personal needs and organizing cultural activities, as the most 
effective way to influence students. Propaganda and ideology by contrast were put forward as 
key channels of influence by only a minority of cadres, respectively 38,8% and 44,8%.1064 
                                                 
1061 Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs 
Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题
研究),” 43–45. 
1062 Interviews with student 2, student 3, and cadre 41. See also : Ibid., 43. 
1063 Interviews with student 1, student 2, student 7, student 8, cadre 12, cadre 17, cadre 18, and cadre 41. See also : 
Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 499. 
1064 Sun Tinan (孙体楠), “Research Report on the Current State of the Development of Political Education by 
University Youth League Cadres  (guanyu gaoxiao tuan ganbu kaizhan sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gongzuo 
 329 
Overall, the counsellors are key brokers between the school administration and the students and 
a fundamental element of the student management system.  
2)  Developing political capital on campus 
a)  Counsellors as officials in training 
A position as student counsellor is seen as a good training ground for university officials 
and cadres more broadly. 1065 In addition to being trained on the job, the counsellors have a 
large range of opportunities to further develop their skills. Short training programs are set up 
for them on a regular basis. Tsinghua University has been organizing an annual training 
program for counsellors since 1960.1066 The counsellors who are at the same time CYL officials 
enjoy even more training opportunities.  Since 1989 in particular, the central CYL has pushed 
for further training of CYL officials on campus and developed specific programs.1067 They are 
granted the opportunity to follow training programs in the CYL schools, which include 
theoretical and more practical formations. A specific program for university CYL secretaries 
takes place at the Central CYL School several times a year. In addition to more job-related 
content, they are briefed on new policies and laws. The trainings also bring numerous 
networking opportunities with CYL officials from other universities but also central level CYL 
                                                 
xianzhuang de diaocha baogao, 关于高校团干部开展思想政治教育工作现状的调查报告),” Evolutions in 
Research on Political Work 18 (2009): 21–23. 
1065 Interviews with cadre 18 and cadre 41. See also : Xie Zheping (谢喆平) and Wang Sunyu (王孙禺), “Student 
Political Instructors and Governance of China by ‘Red Engineers’ (xuesheng fudaoyuan zhidu yu hongse 
gongchengshi zhiguo, 学生辅导员制度与“红色工程师治国“),” 18–29. 
1066 Ibid., 20. 
1067 See : “Opinion Regarding CYL Work in Universities in the Current Period (guanyu dangqian gaodeng xuexiao 
gongqingtuan gongzuo de ji dian yijian, 关于当前高等学校共青团工作的几点意见),” CYL Central Committee, 
13 August 1989; “Opinion Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the CYL Construction in Higher 
Education Institutions (guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin gaodeng xuexiao gongqingtuan jianshe de yijian, 关于
进一步加强和改进高等学校共青团建设的意见),” Document 15, Ministry of Education and CYL Central 
Committee, 8 April 2005. 
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leaders. 1068 The local CYL organizations have also developed their own training mechanisms. 
The Beijing CYL Committee has, for instance, developed an annual training of four days for 
the CYL leaders of the city’s best universities.1069 
The counsellors also have unique opportunities in the pursuit of their academic studies. 
The education of counsellors has been particularly emphasized by the Party-State. For instance, 
the “2006-2010 plan for the training of counsellors in ordinary higher education institutions” 
put forward a four-year plan for one thousand counsellors to follow master programs in political 
education in thirty universities. 1070  A similar program was initiated in 2008 for PhD 
students.1071  
Beyond these specific plans, the political cadres on campus can follow graduate 
programs while they work. Due to their position as university officials, they can get into the 
programs without taking the national admission exam for graduate schools. The universities 
develop their own admission criteria for these specific admissions. In most cases, they just have 
to pass an interview.1072 While entering grad school, the counsellors generally choose the same 
                                                 
1068 See for instance : “The 2015 First Special Training Class for University CYL Secretaries to Study the Essence 
of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Series of Important Speeches is Held in Beijing (2015 nian shouqi gaoxiao 
tuanwei shuji xuexi Xi Jinping xilie zhongyao jianghua jingshen zhuanti peixun ban zai Jing juxing, 2015年首期
高校团委书记学习习近平总书记系列重要讲话精神专题培训班在北京举行),” China Youth Daily, March 17, 
2015.  
1069 The CYL secretaries and deputy secretaries of the twenty-six “211 project” universities in Beijing join the 
program. See for instance: “The Training Class for the CYL Secretaries of the Capital’s Universities was Held 
Successfully (shoudu gaoxiao tuanwei shuji peixunban chenggong juban, 首都高校团委书记培训班成功举办),” 
WeChat account of the Beijing CYL, October 28, 2014. 
1070 “2006-2010 Plan for the Training of Counsellors in Ordinary Higher Education Institutions (2006-2010 nian 
putong gaodeng xuexiao fudaoyuan peixun jihua, 2006-2010年普通高等学校辅导员培训计划),” Ministry of 
Education, 30 July 2006. 
1071 Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs 
Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题
研究),” 24. 
1072 The situation is of course different in Tsinghua University as the counsellors are selected among the graduate 
students (interviews with student 1, student 2, student 24, and cadre 35). 
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major they already studied as undergrads. Only a minority changes towards a major more 
related to their political commitment. 1073  For example, all six Tsinghua CYL Committee 
Secretaries appointed since 1997 obtained a graduate school while they were counsellors. 
Among them, only one switched majors to public policy.1074 
The position as counsellor is overall a good training ground and, as I now turn to show, 
it opens many promotion opportunities. For this reason, the positions as student counsellors are 
highly valued by students and the competition is fierce.1075 
b)  Getting promoted on campus 
Being a counsellor is of course a highly formative position, but its administrative 
ranking is also advantageous for young cadres. Administrative positions in universities, which 
are service units, follow the same ranking and salary system as the Party-State administration. 
As such, their situation is parallel to the one of Party-State officials which makes it easy to 
compare. The counsellors are young on average and start relatively high in the official ranking 
system. 1076  According to a survey conducted in 2010 among sixty-one higher education 
institutions in Shanghai, 56% of the 4,868 counsellors who responded were less than thirty 
years old, way below the official maximum of forty. Also the large majority of them (68%) 
                                                 
1073 Interviews with student 1, student 2, student 24, and cadre 35. 
1074 Several name lists for the CYL secretaries can be found on the internet (See in particular for Tsinghua 
University: http://baike.baidu.com/view/3751112.htm). I cross-examined them and verified them with university 
officials. The analysis is based on their official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on the ones compiled by 
baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, at the condition that their positions where sourced from media reports 
and official websites. 
1075 Interviews with student 16, cadre 16, and cadre 35. 
1076 See the “civil service system” entry in the glossary regarding the difference between cadres working in service 
units and civil servants. 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were at the deputy section director level (fu keji, 副科级), the first rank for leading officials.1077 
There is some variation from one university to another but this is the starting rank for 
counsellors in the universities I studied.1078 Being less than thirty years old and already ranked 
as deputy section director is very positive for one’s future career, as compared to the standard 
age-based promotion path presented in Chapter Two of this dissertation (see Table 2.1). They 
are therefore up to good start to be promoted to relatively high level positions. 
In a few years, they can rise from lower level counsellors to key positions on campus. 
This is especially true in Tsinghua University, where this position is particularly valued. Indeed, 
between 1953 and 1993, 1,600 counsellors were trained in Tsinghua University. Around half 
of them stayed on campus working for some years after1079  and a lot of them got promoted to 
relatively high level positions.1080  
In the various universities I studied, the counsellors have numerous promotion 
opportunities. Most student counsellors remain at this initial hierarchical level for two to three 
years, by opposition to the normal five-year terms in office for Chinese officials.1081 They can 
then rise in the hierarchy, becoming top level counsellors. They often at the same time hold a 
                                                 
1077 Gong Chunlei (龚春雷), “Study on the Professionalization and Specialization of College Student Affairs 
Administrators in China (gaoxiao fudaoyuan zhiyehua zhuanyehua wenti yanjiu, 高校辅导员职业化专业化问题
研究),” 56. 
1078 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41. 
1079 Xie Zheping (谢喆平) and Wang Sunyu (王孙禺), “Student Political Instructors and Governance of China by 
‘Red Engineers’ (xuesheng fudaoyuan zhidu yu hongse gongchengshi zhiguo, 学生辅导员制度与“红色工程师
治国“),” 28. 
1080 In 1993, 45.1% of the 129 officials in the university, and its related organizations, who were ranked division 
director and above used to be counsellors. Among the 12 most highly ranked university officials, 9 had such an 
experience (Research team on the political counsellors system (xuesheng zhengzhi fudaoyuan zhidu yanjiu ketizu, 
学生政治辅导员制度研究课题组), “Looking Back and Investigating 40 Years of the Political Counsellors 
System (xuesheng zhengzhi fudaoyuan zhidu sishi nian de huigu yu tansuo, 学生政治辅导员制度四十年的回顾
与探索),” 6. 
1081 See Chapter two regarding term length for Chinese officials.  
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position of faculty CYL secretary. In major universities such as the ones I studied, this is a 
position ranked section director (zheng keji, 正科级) and therefore a good step towards future 
promotion. 1082 They can then become director of university level CYL department, which has 
the same rank but opens more opportunities than staying at the faculty level. It can allow them 
to come back to the faculty level as a CCP deputy secretary or to become university level CYL 
deputy secretary, both positions being ranked deputy division director. The most successful 
ones then become CCP secretary at the faculty level or university level CYL secretary, an 
important position on campus, generally ranked as division director. They take an exam internal 
to the university to reach this rank.1083  
The university CYL leadership positions are particularly competitive. A university level 
CYL congress is organized every five years on campus and, following the framework of the 
National CYL Congress, every faculty sends representatives. While on paper they elect the 
CYL secretary and the deputy secretaries,1084 the selection is actually made beforehand by the 
university CCP Standing Committee. The CYL congress simply validates the CCP leadership’s 
choice which manages these promotions. Most appointments of CYL leaders actually happen 
without the congress’ intervention as they often stay less than five years in office. The CYL 
                                                 
1082 This is true of all the “211 project universities”, including the four I focused on. For details on the Chinese 
Party-State ranking system, see Chapter Two.  
1083 Three of the universities I studied (Tsinghua University, Beijing University and Nanjing University) are elite 
universities administratively directly under the Ministry of Education. In these three cases, the university president 
and the CCP secretary are ranked as deputy ministers (fu buji, 副部级). In a given administrative unit, the CYL 
leader is theoretically one full rank below the CCP leader, he should therefore be ranked deputy bureau director 
(fu tingji, 副厅级), equaling the rank of the deputy mayor of a medium sized city. However, being too young and 
not experienced enough they in practice almost never have this rank. The CYL secretaries then remain ranked as 
division director like in most other high level universities (interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, 
cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41). For a list of the deputy minister level universities, see: “A list of 
China’s 31 deputy minister level universities (Zhongguo 31 suo fubuji gaoxiao mingdan,中国31所副部级高校名
单)”, Rednet.cn, 9 March 2009. It can be accessed here: http://learning.sohu.com/20090309/n262683167.shtml 
(Consulted on 15 June 2016).  
1084 In the universities I studied, there were three to four university CYL deputy secretaries.  
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secretary is generally selected among the previous deputy secretaries, as having a working 
experience in the CYL is a key criterion. The number of candidates on campus is limited: they 
should be in their early-thirties, already be ranked deputy division director and have a previous 
working experience in the CYL. Also they need to have a graduate diploma and often a PhD, 
which they generally got while working as officials on campus.1085 In addition, they need to 
have good relationships with the university CCP leadership in order to get appointed. Thus, 
they most of the time graduate from the university where they are hired and have a student 
cadre experience.1086 
According to my interviewees, the most important for the young cadres is to move rather 
quickly from one position to the next, at least every four or five years. Their trajectories are 
particularly quick compared to their equivalent outside campus. Whereas they sometimes have 
the opportunity to rise in rank every two years, it is much more complicated in Party-State 
administrations as the officials there must stay a full five-year term in each position before they 
can be promoted. Such rules are less fully implemented in service units such as universities.  1087  
Some universities even institutionalized such a fast path for young political cadres, 
accelerating their promotion within the university. In 2008, Peking University established for 
example a “three-year plan” (san nian jihua, 三年计划) for two or three student counsellors 
                                                 
1085 The pool of candidates for the position of university CYL secretary is particularly narrow in Tsinghua 
University as he must have the academic credentials to be an assistant professor at the same time. Since 1989, all 
the CYL secretaries had a PhD. In addition, the academic standards often imply having a PhD or a post-doc from 
a foreign university. At the time of my fieldwork the CYL secretary was not assistant professor at the same time 
because the school could not find a suitable candidate (interviews with cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 31, cadre 41). 
1086 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41. 
1087 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41. Regarding the 
term length rules, see Chapter Two.  
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selected by the university CCP leadership.1088 The officials changed position every year, each 
time going up a rank. In three years they reached a deputy division director position. It was a 
way to promote quickly some recent graduates to a position where they could leave the 
university and become directly relatively high level officials. The CYL organizations in Beijing 
and its districts were then looking for cadres born after 1980 to renew the ranks. They could for 
instance become deputy secretary of a CYL committee in one of Beijing’s districts. However, 
other universities also developed similar programs and it created an oversupply of cadres with 
similar backgrounds and rank. The program was cancelled in 2012 as it became hard to find 
positions for them.1089 While rather unsuccessful, this program underlines the opportunities 
young university officials can get if they choose to pursue a career outside campus.  
 
  
                                                 
1088 According to my interviews, the selection was far from transparent and several sons and daughters of officials 
were given this unique opportunity (interviews with student 16 and student 24). 
1089 Interviews with student 16, student 24, and cadre 41. 
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B -  Taking the risk of politics 
I noted in the previous chapter that a number a student leaders stay on campus after they 
graduate. I have also shown that many of them actually aim at becoming a Party-State official 
and often manage to do so. One could therefore wonder why choose to stay on campus and not 
directly pass the civil servant exam. How can it help them in their future career? To tackle this 
issue, the second part of this chapter is dedicated to the university officials who choose to 
abandon their position in order to start a career in the Party-State outside campus. I focus more 
precisely on the CYL officials on campus, since, as stated above, the organization provides 
many high ranked positions on campus to ambitious officials.  
I stress that while campus CYL officials can often rely on their experience on campus 
as a springboard for a future career, only part of them take that risk. I unveil the mechanisms 
which push some campus CYL officials to take the risk of a political career and the unequal 
opportunities they are presented with. There is a clear difference between the ones who fully 
persevere in a politically committed path and the ones who do not take the risk of leaving a 
comfortable position on campus. Beyond the fact that some are simply disillusioned by their 
first experience outside campus, I show that gender in particular can be a determining factor. 
No statistic is available regarding the ratio of female CYL officials in the various universities. 
I gathered from my interviews that there is no clear gender imbalance in the recruitment and 
that there is no clear gender-based distinction in terms of job contents.1090 However, I underline 
that, compared to their male counterparts, female officials tend to tone down their political 
ambitions. CYL officials from different universities also have unequal access to a future 
political career. 
                                                 
1090 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41. 
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While most campus CYL officials continue to work in higher education, the ones who 
choose to pursue a political career have a strong advantage compared to officials who would 
have taken the civil service exam after graduation, and especially if they come from a Beijing-
based elite university. To question the specificity of these officials, I compare their situation 
with that of CYL officials in high schools and State-owned enterprises, for whom such a 
trajectory is rarer.   
1)  Youth League officials leaving campus: a worthwhile bet 
a)  A rewarding strategy 
As stated above, the student cadres who stay on campus can become counsellors and 
eventually rise in the CYL hierarchy at the faculty and university levels. Thus, many use this 
as a fast track to leave campus, when they already have a rather high rank, and get directly 
appointed as local leading cadres. According to my interviews, it becomes a good option when 
the official has reached a ranked of deputy division director or division director, such as 
university CYL deputy secretary or secretary for example. At this level, they can transfer to a 
leadership position in a local CYL committee. Numerous CYL secretaries from Peking 
University or Tsinghua University have in fact relocated to become district level CYL 
secretaries in Beijing.1091  
Yang Yue is a good example of such a successful trajectory. He was the Tsinghua 
University Student Union Chairman in 1990-1991. After graduating from Tsinghua University, 
he stayed on campus as a political instructor while doing his graduate studies. Ten years later 
he became the CYL secretary of the university and was then transferred to a leadership position 
in a Beijing district. He later pursued his career going back and forth between CYL and CCP 
                                                 
1091 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 16, cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41. 
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posts. In 2008, he became the younger official seating at a provincial level CCP Standing 
Committee.1092 He indeed got promoted very fast at every step of his career and at an early age. 
The difference in terms of age of promotion is striking if we compare his trajectory to the one 
of a normally successful cadre as illustrated in Table 2.1. Instead of the common 50 years old 
promotion age for a deputy bureau director position, he got there at 30 years old as CCP Deputy 
Secretary of Tongzhou District in Beijing.  
Table 5.1: Career of Yang Yue1093 
1094 
                     1990   College graduation (22 years old) 
1990—1991   Chairman, Tsinghua University, Student Union (22 years old) 
1990—1995   Chairman, All-China Students' Federation 
1991—1997   Political Instructor, Tsinghua University (23 years old) 
1997—2000   Secretary, CYL Committee of Tsinghua University (29 years old) 
2000—2001   Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Tongzhou District (30 years old) 
2001—2004   Secretary, CYL Central Committee (31 years old) 
2005—2008   Executive Secretary, CYL Central Committee (35 years old) 
2008—2016   Member, CCP Standing Committee, Fujian Province (38 years old)  
2012—Now   Alternate Member, 18th CCP Central Committee (42 years old) 
2016- Now    Vice-Governor, Jiangsu Province (46 years old) 
                                                 
1092  “Already 15 Officials Born After 1965 Are Members of Party Provincial Standing Committees (‘65 hou’ 
shengji dangwei changwei yida 15 ren, “65后”省级党委常委已达 15人).” 
1093 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Yang_Yue/career (consulted on 14 
September 2016). 
1094 Source: http://baike.baidu.com/item/杨岳/12067 (consulted on 31 August 2016). 
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In addition to being promoted more rapidly than other cadres, starting one’s career on 
campus is also a way to avoid taking the civil servant exam. When recruited, they take an exam 
organized by the university and are therefore already considered officials in a service unit. 
When they reach a leadership position rank, they can directly transfer to an equally ranked 
position outside campus without taking an exam. They are already part of the overall Party-
State system.1095 This is especially common at the rank of division director, which equals the 
rank of most county leaders across the country.1096  
The transfer of university officials can also be facilitated by going through a “temporary 
transferred duty” (guazhi duanlian, 挂职锻炼). Under this framework, commonly practiced by 
Party-State officials, a dispatching unit transfers a cadre to a receiving unit for a certain period, 
generally a year.1097 The dispatching unit remains responsible of the official and his salary. The 
goal is to train the official in a different setting. The practice has been progressively formalized 
since the 1990s, in particular through two documents issued by the central CCP Organization 
Department, respectively in 1994 and 2000.1098 However, some universities have started to send 
officials for temporary transferred duty since the late 1980s. Tsinghua University started for 
instance in 1989.1099 
                                                 
1095 See the “civil service system” entry in the glossary regarding the difference between cadres working in service 
units and civil servants, as well as on the status of CYL cadres in the system.  
1096 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 10, cadre 12, cadre 16, cadre 17, cadre 18, cadre 35, and cadre 41. 
1097 I come back to the uses of this framework beyond campus officials in Chapter Six. On the framework, see : 
Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP 
Cadre Appointment System,” 163. 
1098 “Notice Regarding the Issues Concerning the Training of Cadres Through Temporary Transferred Duty 
(guanyu ganbu guazhi duanlian gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi, 关于干部挂职锻炼工作有关问题的通知),” 
Central CCP Organization Department, 29 September 1994 ; “Program Regarding the Deepening of the Reform 
of the Cadre Personnel System (shenhua ganbu renshi zhidu gaige gangyao, 深化干部人事制度改革纲要),” 
Central CCP Organization Department, 23 June 2000.  
1099 Fang Huijian (方惠坚) and Zhang Sijing (张思敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 
清华大学志), 1:833. 
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This system is particularly useful for university students as it allows them to get used to 
a completely different working environment for a short period, and be tested at the same time. 
If the receiving unit’s leaders are satisfied with their work, they can be fully appointed in the 
position at the end of the temporary transferred duty. 1100 The CYL is especially active in 
organizing such transfers, pushing CYL cadres to do it. In particular, CYL officials from 
various universities are selected by the central CYL every year for temporary transferred duty. 
They are generally sent to rural counties where they hold leadership positions in the CYL 
committees for at least a year. They are selected by the university CCP with the agreement of 
the local CYL and the Ministry of Education.1101 For example, in 2012, 2,473 university CYL 
officials were sent for temporary transferred duty to county level CYL committees.1102 
Interestingly, a temporary transferred duty can also be a very difficult experience, 
leading some university officials to rethink their career options. They realize how harsh the job 
of a local official can be and how protected they are on campus. This is in particular true of 
officials transferred to poor regions of China, as stressed by my interviewees.1103 An article 
published by the China youth Daily highlighted the difficulties of university CYL officials sent 
to Tibet as local officials. In addition to not being used to rural life and lack of comfort, they 
realized that local CYL work can be much more intense than the equivalent on campus.1104 
                                                 
1100 Interviews with cadre 11, student 16, and cadre 35.  
1101 See for the year 2015: “Notice Regarding the 2015 Selection of University CYL Cadres and Young Teachers 
to be Sent for Temporary Transferred Duty in County Level CYL Committees (guanyu 2015 nian cong quanguo 
gaoxiao xuanpai tuanganbu he qingnian jiaoshi dao xianji tuanwei guazhi gongzuo de tongzhi, 关于2015年从全
国高校选派团干部和青年教师到县级团委挂职工作的通知),” Central CYL, 12 June 2016. 
1102 Central Communist Youth League, Yearbook of the Chinese Communist Youth League 2012 (Zhongguo 
Gongqingtuan nianjian 2012, 中国共青团年鉴 2012), 198. 
1103 Interviews with cadre 11 and cadre 35. 
1104 “The Jiangsu University CYL Cadres Enjoy a ‘Sudden Maturation’ at the Grassroots (Jiangsu gaoxiao tuangan 
jiceng xiangshou ‘chengchang tuji’, 江苏高校团干基层享受’成长突击’),” China Youth Daily, January 1, 2012.  
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Overall, temporary transferred duty is often an opportunity to leave campus and work 
for the first time in a local administration. But when confronted to the actual work, some 
university cadres realize that it is not for them and reevaluate their career. Positions on campus 
are largely seen as more comfortable and only a minority leave them to follow the political path 
I described. In the following lines, I focus on the reasons why someone would stay on campus 
or not and the different opportunities they get.  
b)  Risk avoidance and unequal opportunities  
Working in the university’s administration right after graduation is a popular choice 
among young graduates. It is seen as stable, relatively well paid, and, as I already stressed, these 
positions have become increasingly valued due to rising unemployment among young 
graduates. While some may use this experience as a springboard for a future career in the Party-
State, others simply value the position itself and want to remain in the university.1105 
While not exclusively, female interviewees were overall more interested in keeping a 
job in the university administration rather than transferring to the local level. They put forward 
how stable and comfortable a job on campus was. These positions are seen as less stressful than 
working in a local administration. They also underlined the advantages which come together 
with a position in a university, such as enjoying university vacations or being able to send one’s 
children to the affiliated kindergarten. They have also an easier access to the primary schools 
and high schools affiliated to the universities. Schools affiliated to the country’s elite 
universities, such as the “high school attached to Tsinghua University” (Qinghua daxue fushu 
                                                 
1105 Interviews with cadre 6, student 7, student 8, cadre 10, student 16, and cadre 35. 
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zhongxue, 清华大学附属中学), are considered as among the best. Thus, holding a position as 
counsellor or as CYL official is widely considered as a perfect situation to have children.1106  
The position’s stability was particularly emphasized by female interviewees. In contrast 
to university ones, local level officials often have to transfer regularly from one place to another 
in order to advance their career. This can be particularly complicated for female officials as the 
social pressure is very strong for them to get married and follow their husbands where the job 
takes them rather than the other way around. 1107  More broadly, female officials have less 
chances of promotion in the Chinese system, which is widely dominated by male cadres.1108 As 
a result, they tend to curb their political ambitions. To be sure, such considerations are by far 
not only put forward by female officials and several male interviewees also stressed how they 
value the stability of a university position or how they decided not to take a local Party-State 
position for family reasons.1109   
Beyond their willingness to leave campus and to become Party-State officials, university 
officials face very different situations and have various opportunities depending on the 
institution they come from. According to my interviews, officials from universities which are 
directly managed by the Ministry of Education, rather than a provincial government, have more 
transfer opportunities. They have a direct contact with the Central CCP Organization 
Department and have more opportunities to meet relevant officials. Among the universities I 
focused on, this is the case of Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Nanjing 
                                                 
1106 Interviews with academic 2, cadre 6, student 12, student 16, student 17, and cadre 41. 
1107 Interviews with academic 2, cadre 6, student 12, student 16, student 17, and cadre 41. 
1108 There is little systematic research regarding female officials in China. On this topic, see : Tatlow, “Women 
Struggle for a Foothold in Chinese Politics”; Shih, Adolph, and Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: 
Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” 178. 
1109 Interviews with cadre 10, cadre 15, cadre 35.  
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University.1110 By contrast, my interviewees from Nanjing Normal University emphasized how 
rare it was for their CYL officials to become local officials. Even if they go through a temporary 
transferred duty, most of them come back afterwards and stay on campus.1111 
Even among the top-level universities, Peking University and Tsinghua University stand 
out. Many of their cadres become local Party-State officials. It is particularly true of CYL 
officials who, as shown before, are in a good position to be transferred. The two schools had 
altogether 25 CYL secretaries between 1978 and 2012. Among them, only 7 remained on 
campus right after and 15 became local officials, mostly in Beijing.1112  
In addition to coming from the country’s best universities, these cadres have wide 
networking opportunities. The CYL secretaries from Tsinghua University and Peking 
University are members of the CYL Central Committee.1113 They can therefore meet the most 
important CYL leaders who also seat in the committee.1114 Thus, 8 of the 25 CYL secretaries 
from these two schools (1978-2012) got positions in the CYL, in Beijing or at the central level, 
                                                 
1110 Interviews with academic 2, academic 3, academic 6, cadre 10, academic 11, cadre 12, cadre 16, cadre 18, 
academic 21, academic 22, cadre 30, cadre 31, and cadre 35. 
1111 Interviews with academic 2, academic 11, and cadre 35. 
1112  Several name lists for the CYL secretaries can be found on the internet (See in particular ：
http://blog.renren.com/share/36924648/3903186873, consulted on 1 June 2016), I cross examined them and 
verified them with university officials and older lists published by the two universities (Fang Huijian (方惠坚) 
and Zhang Sijing (张思敬), Local Records of Tsinghua University (Qinghua daxue zhi, 清华大学志), 1:879; 
Peking University Youth League Committee, The Communist Youth League in Peking University (Gongqingtuan 
zai Beida, 共青团在北大), 358–388. The analysis is based on their career data which could be found in their 
official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on the ones compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, 
at the condition that their positions where sourced from media reports and official websites. I found at least partial 
career data for all of the CYL secretaries between 1978 and 2012. I started the analysis at 1978 because at that 
time the CYL organization was being redeveloped on campus. I stopped at 2012 since, at the time of the analysis, 
no CYL secretary from neither school had been since then transferred to another position.  
1113 The list of CYL Central Committee members can be found here: “Previous sessions of the central CYL (lijie 
tuan zhongyang, 历届团中央).” I cross-analyzed it with the name lists of Peking University and Tsinghua 
University CYL secretaries. 
1114 In addition to central CYL leaders, the secretaries of the provincial level CYL committees are also for example 
members of the CYL Central Committee (Source: “Previous sessions of the central CYL (lijie tuan zhongyang, 历
届团中央)”). 
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later in their career.  By comparison, the CYL secretaries from Nanjing University have much 
less networking opportunities in the CYL organization as they are only members of the Jiangsu 
Province CYL Committee.1115  
The networking opportunities of the officials from Peking University and Tsinghua 
University were largely put forward by my interviewees. They also underlined that there is a 
certain path dependency as large numbers of officials come from these universities and favor 
alumni when recruiting.1116 Former Tsinghua University officials are presented as having a 
uniquely strong alumni culture, cultivated through the university’s particularly developed 
counsellor system. Tsinghua University alumni are in fact numerous among high level cadres 
and many of them have a student counsellor background.1117 For instance, there were four 
Tsinghua University alumni among the 16th CCP Politburo, among whom three had an 
experience as counsellors. 1118 
Working on campus, and in particular within the CYL, can overall become a 
springboard towards a future political career for a minority of university officials. To assess the 
specificity of the university setting, I now turn to comparing this phenomenon with the situation 
of CYL officials in other organizations, in high schools and State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
as to see if they can enjoy similar opportunities and career trajectories. 
                                                 
1115 Interview with cadre 6.  
1116 Interviews with academic 3, academic 6, cadre 10, cadre 16, cadre 18, academic 21, academic 22, and cadre. 
1117 Interviews with cadre 16 and academic 22. 
1118 Xie Zheping (谢喆平) and Wang Sunyu (王孙禺), “Student Political Instructors and Governance of China by 
‘Red Engineers’ (xuesheng fudaoyuan zhidu yu hongse gongchengshi zhiguo, 学生辅导员制度与“红色工程师
治国“),” 18–29. 
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2)  Internal promotion channel: League officials in high schools and 
State-owned enterprises 
a)  High school Youth League officials largely remain in the school 
system 
To question the exceptionality of university CYL cadres in terms of career options, I 
conducted interviews among CYL officials in two high schools in Nanjing. Both are elite high 
schools and not representative of the national situation. Focusing on high level institutions was 
a way to see what high school CYL officials can expect in terms of career, in the best possible 
situation. In particular, my objective was to assess whether they can use this experience as a 
springboard for a political career, like in universities. I concluded that it is largely not the case. 
High schools in general do not have full-time CYL cadres. The high school CYL 
secretary is only a part-time position. The CYL secretary generally heads at the same time the 
office in charge of student affairs. While part-time, CYL secretary is an important position 
within the school organization. He is a school official, paid by the school administration and 
selected by the school CCP leadership. He has to deal with CYL recruitment, and the first steps 
of CCP recruitment for the older students. For example, the CYL supervises the “preparatory 
CCP school” (yubei dangxiao, 预备党校), i.e.  classes regarding CCP ideology and history for 
“activists entering the Party.”1119  
The CYL organizes cultural and sports activities, as well as volunteering work for 
students. In some elite high schools, students now have to validate a certain number of hours 
of volunteering work per year to pass, which takes up a lot of their vacation time. This can take 
place in the city or in poorer parts of the province for instance. The CYL also supervises the 
                                                 
1119 Interviews with cadre 5 and cadre 8. For more details on Party recruitment procedures, see Chapter Three. 
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student associations and in particular the high school’s student union. The CYL manages the 
budget of these associations and selects the union’s leadership. The CYL overall supervises all 
extra-curricular activities on campus. In elite high schools, the large majority of students are 
CYL members (more than 95% in the two high schools I studied). As a result, the CYL targets 
the whole student body in its activities.1120   
Being a CYL secretary is seen by the cadres as a good training position to be further 
promoted within the school or to transfer to another high school. They are rather young and 
have a lot of responsibilities. After a few years, they can be appointed as a school’s deputy 
director for example. Training programs can also be organized for these officials, at the local 
or central level, emphasizing the promotion function of CYL positions. However, it is rare for 
them to leave the school system and to pursue a political career, since they have very little 
connections with cadres outside the school.1121 
  
                                                 
1120 Interviews with cadre 5 and cadre 8.  
1121 According to my interviews, the situation is similar for vocational higher education institutions. These schools 
are often rather small and cannot afford a full-time CYL official. They generally pursue their career in the school 
system (interviews with cadre 4, cadre 5 and cadre 8). 
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b)  State-owned enterprises: the Youth League is at the firm’s 
service 
In addition to high schools, I conducted interviews among CYL officials from four 
different SOEs based in Beijing, Nanjing, and Guiyang. One is a central level SOEs while the 
three others are provincial level ones.1122 While the sample is not representative of all the 
different SOEs which can be found nationally, an analysis of their situation can give an idea of 
the career options open to CYL officials in rather high level SOEs. 
By comparison to the situation in a university or a high school, the CYL activities are not 
key to the functioning of a SOE. The firm is, first of all, concerned with its profitability. Extra-
activities such as the ones the CYL offers are only a secondary concern. In addition, young 
employees, and even more CYL members, often represent only a minority of the workforce. As 
a result, there is generally no full-time CYL position.1123 The CYL secretaries are often at the 
same time in charge of political work more broadly or of social responsibility. CYL work itself 
takes up less than a quarter of their working time.1124  
Despite CYL work being seen as of secondary importance, being CYL secretary in a 
large SOE is a formative position for young cadres. The CYL secretary is selected by the firm’s 
CCP leadership and it is often a way to test young officials before further promotion. They have 
                                                 
1122  There are different categories of State-owned enterprises depending on which level of government is 
responsible for their supervision. Around a hundred SOEs are managed at the central level by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Guowuyuan guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui  国务
院国有资产监督管理委员会 ). A list can be found here: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/ 
(Consulted on 21 June 2016).  
1123 This is true even in the very large firms. According to a survey conducted in 2010 among 285 former CYL 
officials from 70 central SOEs, only around half of the central SOEs had full-time CYL secretaries (Xu Gaofeng 
(许高峰) et al., “Research on Team Building among Central State-Owned Enterprises Youth League Cadres 
(zhongyang qiye jituanji tuan ganbu duiwu jianshe yanjiu, 中央企业集团级团干部队伍建设研究),” China Youth 
Studies 6 (2010): 49). 
1124 Interviews with cadre 7, cadre 25, cadre 26, cadre 36, cadre 40. 
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to organize a number of large scale activities and therefore demonstrate their “organization 
abilities” (zuzhi nengli, 组织能力 ). The CYL cadres are mostly evaluated by the CCP 
organization on how satisfied employees are regarding the activities, and how many participate. 
Having no power over the employees’ career or pay, they must find ways to attract them. They 
are therefore in a good position to learn how to influence and manage large groups of employees.  
Beyond political activities, such as discussion groups regarding new Party-State policies, 
the CYL mostly organizes leisure activities for the employees below 35 years old, generally 
without taking into account whether they are CYL members or not. While not directly related 
to the firms’ production, the various activities organized by the CYL have a team-building goal, 
which is supposed to indirectly improve the employees’ productivity. This echoes the evolution 
of Party activities in firms. Patricia Thornton has indeed stressed how the Party cells in 
companies are increasingly developing activities turned towards “corporate culture” and “team-
building.”1125 The CYL organizes for example sports competitions to create a more relaxed 
work environment. It can also organize English language competitions to push the employees 
to master this language. In some firms, it puts in place volunteering babysitting so the 
employees learn to support each other in their family life. In addition, the CYL sometimes 
organizes dating events for the employees who are single.1126  
A major mission of the CYL is also to survey the young employees regarding their views 
on work conditions. It regularly gives reports to the firm’s leadership on this regard. Compared 
to other young cadres in the firm, the CYL secretary has in fact a privileged access to the 
                                                 
1125 Patricia M. Thornton, “The New Life of the Party: Party-Building and Social Engineering in Greater Shanghai,” 
The China Journal, no. 68 (July 2012): 58–78. 
1126 Overall, the activities organized by the CYL in SOEs is very similar to what Ekman described regarding CYL 
events in administrations. It that case also it mostly has a team building function (Alice Ekman, “The Shaping of 
National Diplomatic Practices : Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy as a Case Study” (PhD dissertation, Sciences 
Po, 2013), 104. Interviews with cadre 7, cadre 25, cadre 26, cadre 36, cadre 40. 
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leadership.  In particular, he has a direct relationship with the CCP secretary who gives 
directives for CYL activities.1127 The CYL secretary also generally seats, without a voting-right, 
at the meetings of the SOE’s CCP team (dangzu, 党组) which includes the firm’s most 
important leaders.1128 
As a good training ground and a perfect situation to develop close relationships with the 
SOE’s leadership, CYL secretary is considered a perfect position to get promoted in the 
company. 1129 The SOEs CYL secretaries also have numerous training opportunities which can 
help them advance their career.1130 According to my interviews, they often get promoted to key 
managing positions within the firm, and in particular in its CCP organization. A survey 
conducted in 2010 among 285 former CYL officials from 70 central SOEs in fact shows that in 
most cases (70%) they get promoted to political and management positions, rather than 
production oriented ones.1131  
Yet, pursuing a political career outside the company is much rarer for SOEs CYL 
secretaries. The ones who do so generally leave the SOE later in their career, using the CYL 
                                                 
1127 Like in other organizations, the CYL is under the leadership of the CCP. Its funding also comes in large part 
from the SOE’s CCP organization. For specific activities, other departments or other companies can also help 
sponsoring (Interviews with cadre 7, cadre 25, cadre 26, cadre 36, cadre 40). 
1128 Interviews with cadre 7, cadre 25, cadre 26, cadre 36, cadre 40. 
1129 Interviews with cadre 7, cadre 25, cadre 26, cadre 36, cadre 40.  
1130 According to survey conducted in 2010 among 285 former CYL officials from 70 central SOEs, 80% of the 
central SOEs CYL secretaries have participated in a training program at least once a year (Xu Gaofeng (许高峰) 
et al., “Research on Team Building among Central State-Owned Enterprises Youth League Cadres (zhongyang 
qiye jituanji tuan ganbu duiwu jianshe yanjiu, 中央企业集团级团干部队伍建设研究),” 51). Also, a training 
program is organized for central SOEs CYL secretaries by the central CYL. Beyond the training itself, it allows 
them to meet cadres from other firms and the central CYL leadership (“The 2015 National Training Class for 
Backbones in Charge of Firm CYL Organizations was Satisfactorily Completed   (2015 nian quanguo gugan qiye 
tuan zuzhi fuzeren peixunban yuanman jieshu, 2015年全国骨干企业团组织负责人培训班圆满结束),” China 
Youth Daily, June 4, 2015). 
1131 Xu Gaofeng (许高峰) et al., “Research on Team Building among Central State-Owned Enterprises Youth 
League Cadres (zhongyang qiye jituanji tuan ganbu duiwu jianshe yanjiu, 中央企业集团级团干部队伍建设研
究),” 50. 
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experience first as a promotion channel within the company. Rather than the CYL experience 
itself, it is then the close relations between SOEs and the Party-State which can facilitate their 
transfer to a position as an official.1132  Researchers have stressed the rotating doors existing 
between the SOEs and local administrations for high level cadres.1133 In this configuration, a 
CYL experience is mainly a way to promote someone within the SOE itself to a managing 
position. 
The career of Xu Jinrong, former CYL secretary of Jiangsu and vice-governor of the 
province since 2012, is a good illustration of such a trajectory. She was in 1978-1980 the CYL 
deputy secretary of a SOE in Jiangsu. This might have helped her political career later on, but 
it was mostly a way to get ahead in the SOE itself. It is only after becoming the SOE’s CCP 
deputy secretary that she moved to a CYL position at the provincial level. Like for Yang Yue, 
if we compare Xu Jinrong’s professional trajectory with the one of a normally successful cadre, 
as illustrated in Table 2.1, we can notice the large gap in terms of age of promotion. For example, 
instead of the supposed promotion age of 55 years old for a bureau director position, she got 
there at 40 years old as Jiangsu CYL Committee Secretary.  
                                                 
1132 Like university CYL officials, they can also start to enrich their experience and their network while in a CYL 
position, through the opportunities they often have for a “temporary transferred duty” in a local administration 
(Interviews with cadre 7, cadre 25, cadre 26, cadre 36, cadre 40). 
1133 See in particular : Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in 
Control?,” The China Quarterly 211 (September 2012): 624–48. 
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Table 5.2: Career of Xu Jinrong1134 
1135 
1975—1978 Worker, Changzhou Plastic factory (Jiangsu) (19 years old) 
1978—1980 Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of the Changzhou Plastic company (22 years old) 
1980—1983 Training for cadres at the Nanjing Institute of Chemical Industry (24 years old) 
1983—1984 Head, Technical Department of the Changzhou Plastic company (27 years old) 
1985—1987 Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of the Changzhou Plastic company (29 years old) 
1987—1988 Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of Changzhou City (Jiangsu) (31 years old) 
1988—1990 Secretary, CYL Committee of Changzhou City (32 years old) 
1990—1996 Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (34 years old) 
1996—1999 Secretary, CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (40 years old) 
1999—2001 Deputy Director, Jiangsu CCP Committee United Front Work Department (43 years old) 
2001—2003 Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Wuyi City (Jiangsu) (45 years old) 
2003—2008 Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Zhenjiang City (Jiangsu) (47 years old) 
2008—2012 Secretary, CCP Committee of Zhenjiang City (52 years old) 
2012—Now Vice-Governor, Jiangsu Province (56 years old) 
 
Xu’s case is particularly interesting since she did not go to college when in age of doing 
so during the late years of the Cultural Revolution. Instead, she followed various trainings 
reserved for officials at the local and central levels. In particular, she followed two training 
programs at the Central Party School, where she finally obtained a master degree in 2001, while 
                                                 
1134 Her official resume can be found here: http://gbzl.people.com.cn/grzy.php?id=121001036 (consulted on 7 
March 2016). 
1135 Source: http://gbzl.people.com.cn/grzy.php?id=121001036 (consulted on 7 March 2016). 
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she was Jiangsu Province CYL Committee Secretary.1136 As I demonstrate in the next chapter, 
it is common for CYL officials, to use this position in order to further their education. 
Coming back to the broader picture, the trajectories of CYL officials in high schools and 
SOEs contrast with the specificity of university CYL officials. While it is perceived as a training 
position and can accelerate one’s career within the institution, it is rarely used as a direct 
springboard for a political career. By contrast, the opportunities offered to university CYL 
leaders stand out as unique. In addition to the specific importance given to the CYL organization 
in higher education institutions, it aligns with the individual strategies of a large number of 
these officials. After a considerable experience as student leaders, working on campus is often 





The second part of this dissertation has shed light on the major role played by universities 
in Chinese politics. I highlighted the importance of the student cadre experience, in particular 
for those who pursue this path during most of their education and become student leaders, in 
terms of political vocation and commitment building. Chinese campuses are key networking 
platforms for these students. The specific relationships they entertain with professors and 
officials, which sometimes evolve into solid mentorship ties, are key to their success as student 
cadres, and eventually later on as campus officials. As counsellors and CYL officials, they can 
then build on these relationships to rise within the campus hierarchy, and even find a leadership 
                                                 
1136 Her official resume can be found here: http://gbzl.people.com.cn/grzy.php?id=121001036 (consulted on 7 
March 2016). 
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position outside campus, a good start for a political career. In parallel, they can also develop 
their own mentorship networks among new student cadres.  
The political role of universities is far from being a Chinese specificity. A cross-national 
study by Weinberg and Walker showed how the political recruitment of students is widespread 
in centralized political systems, including France for instance.1137 In addition, in countries 
where institutions highly rely on sponsored mobility, universities play an important political 
recruitment role. In the United Kingdom for instance, Oxford University and Cambridge 
University are key elite cultivation platforms and some organizations, such as the debating 
group Oxford Union Society, play a more specific role in channeling future politicians.1138 I 
also mentioned how universities used to be a major recruiting and networking hub for the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party politicians in Mexico.1139 
While in most cases the differences in terms of political regimes lead to rather limited 
analogies, the comparison with the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party regime is 
particularly relevant to our study of post-Mao China. The Institutional Revolutionary Party is a 
revolutionary party which was progressively institutionalized into a ruling administration. 
Functioning as a Party-State, it held hegemonic power for over seventy years (1929-2000).1140 
In addition, the Institutional Revolutionary Party relied heavily on sponsorship recruitment, 
targeting in particular college students, which makes the parallel all the more valuable. Camp 
has underlined the networking role played by institutions of higher education and how 
                                                 
1137 Ian Weinberg and Kenneth N Walker, “Student Politics and Political Systems: Toward a Typology,” American 
Journal of Sociology 75, no. 1 (1969): 77–96. 
1138 On sponsored mobility in the British education system, see : Turner, “Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the 
School System.” On the Oxford Union Society more precisely, see : David Walter, The Oxford Union: Playground 
of Power (London: Macdonald, 1984). 
1139 Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century, 27. 
1140 On the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime, see : Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic 
Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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education was used as “a vehicle for enhancing political contacts leading to recruitment into 
this elite. 1141”A key difference with the Chinese case is that in Mexico, the increasingly 
important role played by universities in political recruitment went hand in hand with a decline 
of the Party’s role in this matter.1142 In the Chinese case, by contrast the two are closely 
intertwined as the Party and its youth organization are jointly structuring the sponsored mobility 
of future officials.  
The Chinese specificity resides in the level of structuration displayed by youth political 
organizations on campus. As a result of its Leninist blueprint, the Party’s main youth 
organization, the CYL, enjoys a monopoly over student politics. This unique organization and 
its subsidiaries oversee the recruitment and cultivation of young cadres across the country’s 
universities, creating a highly-managed system of political mobility. While each personal 
experience remains unique, the overarching presence of the CYL channels the ambitious cadres’ 
individual tactics into a widely standardized sponsored mobility framework. The same 
organizational framework englobes and links the student cadres who start working for the youth 
organizations while finishing their studies, the young CYL officials on campus, and the CYL 
officials outside campus. This organizational continuity facilitates the constant screening and 
selection of cadres and constitutes a springboard for the career of the most committed ones.  
 
                                                 
1141 Camp, Political Recruitment across Two Centuries: Mexico, 1884-1991, 82. 
1142 Camp, “The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System.” 
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III. L’Enfance d’un Chef 
 
This final part of the dissertation is titled after a short story by Jean-Paul Sartre, L’enfance 
d’un chef (childhood of a leader), which was published in the collection Le Mur in 1939. It is 
the story of a cute and puny young boy, Lucien, who follows his ambition by any means 
necessary. He decides he wants to become a “leader” and progressively cultivates this role, 
mimicking the professors and adults he admires. The political themes touched upon and the 
historical periods are largely different from my study. However, Lucien’s trajectory is a good 
illustration of the CYL cadres’ paths in link with personal ambition and with the necessity to 
develop a role of leader-to-be, but also in their complexity. 
After analyzing the first steps of the political career on campus, both before and after 
graduation, I turn now to the local and central CYL officials themselves. I focus in particular 
on the CYL leaders, secretary and deputy secretaries at the different levels, who have much 
more career opportunities than their subordinates. They are in a good position to get promoted 
to leadership positions within the Party-State. The CYL can then become a key nexus in the 
political trajectory of an official, often in continuity of the first step of the career presented in 
the previous part of the dissertation. While clear statistics are not available, all my interviewees 
underlined how, since the 1990s, most CYL leaders had an experience as student cadres on 
campus.1143  
This continuity illustrates the specific trajectories of leading cadres in the Chinese system, 
by opposition to the multitude of lower level officials. In line with the elite dualism literature, 
                                                 
1143 Regarding these trajectories, see also : Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational Capital and Political 
Party Survival – Analytical Perspective on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi 
ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政
党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个考察视角),” 161. 
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these two paths are increasingly separated.1144 The studies on the evolution of Chinese officials 
often overlook this distinction. They focus on the development of the civil service system and 
the implementation of civil service exams,1145 which rarely concern the generalist leading 
cadres, by opposition to specialized mid-level officials.1146 They instead take other paths, such 
as the ones described so far for graduates: starting their career on campus or in an SOE before 
transferring to a leadership position or taking the “assigned graduates” exam, which accelerates 
their promotion.1147 Other organizational shortcuts are also available to them, as I develop in 
this Third Part.  
A leadership position in the CYL is often an important step in these trajectories. They 
can use this position, to get promoted faster than their counterparts from outside the CYL 
following the age rules developed in Chapter Two, but also to train themselves and develop a 
social role as future leaders. Rotating from one position to the next, these young leading cadres 
develop a multiplicity of personal ties which can become useful in their career. They enter a 
tight network of reciprocity among cadres, of crosscutting ties, which, I argue, strengthen on 
the long run their commitment to the Party-State. 
This last part of the dissertation is largely based on my fieldwork. As explained in the 
Introduction, I focused on the different administrative levels of the CYL and the trajectories of 
                                                 
1144 While it stresses the increasing separation between technical positions and political ones, the elite dualism 
literature I reviewed in the Introduction presents the difference between State jobs and Party jobs as embodying 
this position. By contrast, I develop that the distinction between leading cadres and non-leading ones, within the 
State or the Party, is a far more crucial distinction. 
1145 Burns and Wang, “Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Servants’ Behaviour.” 
1146 The article 4 of the Civil Servant Law underlines the specific status of leading cadres, whose appointment 
remains in the hands of the Party (“Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo gongwuyuan fa, 中华人民共和国公务员法),” National People’s Congress, 27 April 2005). This 
opposition is also put forward by : Tsai and Kou, “The Party’s Disciples: CCP Reserve Cadres and the Perpetuation 
of a Resilient Authoritarian Regime.” 
1147 On the variety of trajectories for leading cadres, see : Pan Teng (潘腾), “A cohort of young CCP officials 
(Zhonggong nianqing ganbu tidui, 中共年轻干部梯队),” Phoenix Weekly, Vol 6, N°463, 2013. 
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its cadres in Beijing, Jiangsu and Guizhou. Through the comparative study of these two 
provinces I can account for similarities and make general claims regarding the recruitment and 
promotion processes, but I can also see how the organization adapts itself to local specificities. 
To present comprehensively the role played by the CYL in career trajectories, this part 
is divided in two chapters, with almost competing perspectives. One stresses the specific nature 
of the CYL and how it makes it an ideal training ground for officials, how it turns cadres into 
political leaders. The other puts forward the multiplicity of experiences and personal ties 
developed during a cadre’s career, stressing that the CYL is often one step among others, one 
network among others, even though rather important. By underlining the complexity of cadres’ 
trajectories I can also better dissect a Party-State often seen as monolithic or constituted of large 
and unified political groups and factions.    
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Chapter 6: Youth League officials as political managers 
I now move to the issue of the uniqueness of the CYL experience for young officials. I 
argue that, in link with the generalist content of CYL work, and the unique status of the 
organization in the Chinese political system, its officials develop a specific identity in their eyes 
and in their colleagues’. Focusing on CYL leaders in particular, both at the central and local 
levels, I show that the generalist feature of their job sets them apart from more specialized 
officials, working in sectorial administrations for instance. While underlining the survival of 
generalist cadres in the Chinese system by opposition to the literature describing an overall 
technocratization of the regime, 1148  I also stress how the younger cadres differ from the 
traditional political cadres. They have a stronger educational background and importantly they 
now work and evolve in a socio-economic environment highly different from the Mao era.  
The CYL officials are overall similar to the “political managers” that Jowitt saw 
emerging in the Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist regimes, in the post-Stalin era. 
Against a static vision of Communist regimes, Jowitt underlined the progressive evolution of 
the political elite and the ways in which they dealt with a broader society. The revolutionary 
cadres, specialists in ideology and coercion techniques, were progressively replaced by 
“political managers.” More technically trained than their predecessors, the managers relied less 
on coercion and more on their relational and entrepreneurial skills. 1149  They were better 
equipped to deal with a variety of social and economic situations. While Jowitt described this 
elite-change focusing on the skills of these different types of officials, I think it could also be 
analyzed through the lens of political roles. Indeed, in addition to focusing on what the CYL 
                                                 
1148 On the technocratization of the Chinese regime, see in particular : Li, “The Rise of Technocracy: Elite 
Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao China”; Xiao, “The Rise of the Technocrats.” 
1149 Jowitt, New World Disorder. the Leninist Extinction, 98. 
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cadres do and how it shapes their status compared to other officials, I also analyze the way they 
present themselves and try to valorize their experience in order to get promoted in the Party-
State hierarchy.  
A -  Organizational flexibility and individual ambition 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the organizational features of the CYL which 
make it a good training ground for ambitious young cadres. The CYL followed the Party’s 
evolution, especially in its core missions which are propaganda and organization. It targets new 
sectors of society, which emerged with the economic reforms of the 1980s, in order to recruit 
members and find new ways to reach them. More broadly, it evolves towards a hub-like 
organization, taking advantage of its networks of support within and outside the Party-State to 
develop projects.  It is a way to make up for its financial and organizational weaknesses. 
Paradoxically, these weaknesses of the CYL can also be used to their advantage by the cadres 
in order to train themselves and build their reputation as uncorrupt officials.  
1)  At the front-line of Party transformation 
a)  The Party and the League follow the society’s diversification  
In Chapter One, I stressed the organizational similarities between the CYL and the CCP. 
Beyond the overall structure, the CYL also follows the CCP’s recent evolutions. This is 
particularly striking when focusing on the changes in organization and propaganda work, the 
two pillars of Party work which consist in the development of the organization itself and its 
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membership on one side, and on the political education of its members as well as the 
advertisement of its policies and values on the other.1150  
After the Tiananmen movement and its repression, the CCP issued in December 1989 a 
document calling for a strengthening of Party control over its three major mass organizations: 
the Federation of Trade-Union, the Federation of Women and the Communist Youth 
League.1151 Regarding the CYL, the little autonomy it had, and which was supposed to be 
expanded by the reform project of Zhao Ziyang, was constrained.1152 It led in particular to a 
model of organizational development under which “Party-building leads League-building” 
(dangjian dai tuanjian, 党建带团建). The League must follow the Party’s strategy in terms of 
organizational expansion and the recruitment of new members. It must go where the CCP goes. 
This new model was finally engraved in the CYL charter at its Fifteenth National Congress in 
2003.1153  
The CYL followed the Party in its strategy to expand its coverage over the new 
organizations which started to develop with the reform and opening up policy. Since the 1990s, 
the Party has targeted in particular the “two new” (liangxin, 两新) organizations created since 
the reforms, meaning the new economic organizations, such as private companies, and social 
                                                 
1150  On organization and ideology as the two key pillars of the Chinese Party-State system (I understand 
propaganda as “ideology in action” in Shurmann’s terminology) : Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in 
Communist China. 
1151 “Notice Regarding the Strengthening and Improvement of the Party’s Control over the Work of the ACFTU, 
the CYL and the Women Federation (Zhongong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang he gaishan dang dui gonghui, 
gongqingtuan, fulian gongzuo lingdao de tongzhi, 中共中央关于加强和改善党对工会，共青团，妇联工作领
导的通知),” CCP, 12 December 1989. 
1152 Regarding Zhao Ziyang’s reform project, see Chapter One.  
1153 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 26 July 2003. 
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organizations.1154 In 1993 the first CYL branch in a private company was established in Beijing. 
In 1999, 197 Beijing-based companies had CCP units and they all also had CYL cells.1155  
The “two new” organizations became an increasingly important sector of CYL 
expansion.  Between 2003 and 2007, CYL members within such organizations went from 3.1 
to 3.6 million (4.7% of the total CYL membership), while the number of CYL members in 
SOEs decreased. 1156  Reflecting this new trend, the CYL committees established specific 
departments to deal with these structures. For example, the CYL of Haidian District in Beijing 
opened in the 2000s a Non-Public Organizations Department (feigong zuzhi bu, 非公组织部) 
to make the link with CYL units in private enterprises and associations.1157  The central CYL 
also pushed for the strengthening of local CYL units, at the sub-district (jiedao, 街道) or 
township (xiangzhen, 乡镇) levels in particular, to supervise membership expansion in the “two 
new” organizations but also in the businesses and associations too small to have their own CYL 
branches. In that case they would be directly affiliated with the local CYL rather than within a 
CYL branch in their unit. The local CYL committees also have to deal with an increasing 
number of moving CYL members (liudong tuanyuan, 流动团员), who are not attached to a 
CYL branch in a firm or a university. They were 7.6 million nationwide in 2007.1158 In Beijing, 
a program for sub-district CYL cadres was initiated in 2000 to train them in dealing with these 
                                                 
1154 Regarding the Party’s policy to expand in the “two new” organizations, see in particular : Thornton, “The New 
Life of the Party: Party-Building and Social Engineering in Greater Shanghai”; Patricia M. Thornton, “The 
Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?,” The China Quarterly 213 
(March 2013): 1–18. 
1155 Beijing Communist Youth League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), 
ed., Chronicle of the Youth Movement in Beijing 1919-2004 (Beijing Qingnian Yundong Jishi 1919-2004, 北京青
年运动纪事 1919-2004) (Beijing: People’s Press, 2004), 79–80. 
1156 An Guoqi (安国启), A research report on contemporary communist youth league work in urban areas 
(dangdai chengshi Gongqingtuan gongzuo yanjiu baogao, 当代城市共青团工作研究报告), 63. 
1157 Interview with cadre 2. 
1158 Ibid., 66. 
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new trends.1159 The CYL overall followed the evolution of the Party’s expansion to new sectors 
of society. 
The CCP and the CYL also modernized their propaganda apparatus using modern 
technology. The CYL Central Committee established its website in 1998 and provincial level 
CYL committees followed. The Beijing CYL Committee created its own in 1999.1160 Online 
propaganda expanded in the 2000s as to reach young people through new means.1161 The central 
level CYL initiated in 2007 a “Project for the construction of an internet for young people” 
(Qingshaonian wangluo jianshe gongcheng, 青少年网络建设工程). The project aimed at 
establishing several educational platforms and propaganda websites. The official goal was to 
suggest “healthy cultural online products for young people” (jiankang de qingshaonian 
wangluo wenhua chanpin, 健康的青少年网络文化产品) and to promote CYL activities.1162  
The Party and the Youth League also became active on social network websites. The 
Party issued a decision in 2011 advocating for more implication in the internet as to develop a 
“healthy online culture” (jiankang de wangluo wenhua, 健康的网络文化).1163 In the months 
                                                 
1159 Beijing Communist Youth League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), 
Chronicle of the Youth Movement in Beijing 1919-2004 (Beijing Qingnian Yundong Jishi 1919-2004, 北京青年
运动纪事 1919-2004), 81. 
1160 Ibid., 100. 
1161 Young people below thirty constituted the majority of Internet users in China, 57% as to June 2015. “The 36th 
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (di 36 ci Zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuanghuang tongji 
baogao, 第 36 次中国互联网络发展状况统计报告),” China Internet Network Information Center, July 2015. 
1162 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 118. 
1163 “Central CCP Decision Regarding the Deepening of the Reform of Cultural Institutions to Propel the Great 
Development and Great Flourishing of Socialist Culture (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi 
gaige tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua dafazhan dafanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding, 中共中央关于深化文
化体制改革推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣若干重大问题的决定),” CCP Central Committee, 18 October 
2011. 
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that followed the CCP Propaganda Department pushed for cadres to use Weibo1164 as to have 
more impact on the content of the internet. As a result, in late 2012, over 100,000 Weibo 
microblogs where hosted by government institutions.1165 The CYL was very active in this 
development. The CYL unit of the official press agency Xinhua was the first to open a Weibo 
account as soon as June 2011.1166 In 2015, CYL units and cadres had over 60,000 Weibo 
accounts.1167 Training programs were also set up starting in 2011 for CYL to learn how to better 
use this technology.1168 In my interviews, CYL cadres stressed the transformation brought by 
social network websites in terms of propaganda work: the spreading of information regarding 
activities or policies goes much faster than with paper publications or even traditional internet 
websites. It therefore makes their job much easier.1169  
b)  Towards a hub-like organization  
The CYL also followed the Party’s evolution regarding its ways to interact with other 
organizations more broadly. Thornton showed how the Party evolves towards a “hub-like” 
organization, trying to stay in touch with the various groups and structures emerging in an 
evolving society. It finds new frameworks to expand its membership in new types of 
organization but also increasingly serves as platform linking various actors to organize 
                                                 
1164 Weibo is a microblogging platform. It is very similar to the American website Twitter.  
1165 Ashley Esarey, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Cadres as Microbloggers in China,” Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs 44, no. 2 (2015): 69–103. 
1166 “Using Online Thinking to Improve CYL Work (yong hulianwang siwei tisheng gongqingtuan gongzuo, 用互
联网思维提升共青团工作),” China Youth Daily, July 13, 2014. 
1167 “How the CYL Organizations in Universities use the New Media (gaoxiao tuan zuzhi ruhe wan zhuan xin 
meiti, 高校团组织如何玩转新媒体),” China Youth Daily, April 14, 2015. 
1168 See for instance : “Jiangsu: the CYL Uses New Media to Lead the New Youth (Jiangsu: wanshuan xin meiti  
yinlingxin qingian, 江苏：玩转新媒体 引领新青年),” China Youth Daily, April 18, 2012. 
1169 Interviews with cadre 20 and cadre 40. 
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activities and projects. 1170 The CYL evolves in the same direction, which highly influences the 
work of CYL cadres. They become “generalists” as defined by Nay and Smith, meaning that 
they facilitate the interaction between various organizations and sectors, both in practice but 
also in terms of framing common goals and bringing together different organizational 
cultures.1171 
The CYL organizes its own political and cultural activities as developed in Chapter One 
but it also increasingly sets up projects together with other actors. In these cases, it provides a 
management platform and functions as a communication channel with the Party-State 
administrations. It interacts with very different actors, depending on which echelons of the CYL 
are implicated. At the provincial level, it interacts with large universities and SOEs for instance, 
whereas at the county level it mostly deals with smaller firms or associations. The various 
departments of the CYL also differ in their interlocutors. 1172  For example, the Schools 
Department connects with education institutions, while the Propaganda Department is in touch 
with cultural organizations, such as press agencies or publishing houses, and the Urban Youth 
Work Department with urban firms.1173 
Local CYL committees are particularly active in bringing various actors together, both 
to improve local economy and to keep control over emerging sectors. Since the 2000s, the 
Haidian District CYL Committee organizes, for instance, start-up competitions, connecting 
potential investors and young entrepreneurs. It also organizes employment forums to help 
graduates contacting potential employers, as well as training programs with new technologies 
                                                 
1170 Thornton, “The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?,” 1–18. 
1171 Olivier Nay and Andy Smith, eds., Le gouvernement du compromis: courtiers et généralistes dans l’action 
politique [Compromise Government: brokers and generalists in political action] (Paris: Economica, 2002). 
1172 Interviews with cadre 1, cadre 2, and cadre 27. 
1173 Interviews with cadre 1, cadre 2, and cadre 27. For a detailed list of the central CYL departments, which are 
largely reproduced at the lower levels of the organization, see Figure 1.1 in Chapter One. 
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companies for unemployed young people. At the same time, it has set up various regular 
meetings and clubs for young people in the area. The clubs focus on specific hobbies or are 
made for people from the same province to meet. The Haidian District CYL Committee has 
created a youth center where such meetings can take place and where young people can also 
find legal or job-related advice.1174 Similar activities are organized by the CYL in the various 
locales.1175  
To better fulfill its function of coordination platform, the CYL has also been setting up 
numerous associations or companies to reach out to different sectors of society. In addition to 
traditional structures such as its press agency, China Youth Press, which was established in 
1951,1176 or the Central CYL School, founded in 1948,1177 it created numerous new ones such 
as the China Youth Development Foundation in 1989,1178 or Youth Business China (Zhongguo 
qingnian chuangye guoji jihua,中国青年创业国际计划 ) in 2003. 1179  These latter two 
structures symbolize the project-oriented coordination between the CYL and the business sector. 
The China Youth Development Foundation developed the “Project Hope” that I described in 
Chapter One. With an initial funding from the People’s Bank of China, among others, its goals 
                                                 
1174 Interviews with cadre 1 and 2. 
1175 Interviews with cadre 1, cadre 2, cadre 16, cadre 27. To have an idea of the variety of similar activities 
organized by the Beijing CYL Committee, see: Beijing Communist Youth League Committee (Gongqingtuan 
Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), Records and Documents of Beijing’s Youth Organizations 
(Beijing Qingnian Zuzhi Zhiwengao, 北京青年组织志文稿), 365–373. 
1176 Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue 
shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 39. 
1177 Ibid., 58. 
1178  Wang, “Project Hope and the Hope School System in China: A Re-Evaluation.” On the China Youth 
Development Foundation also see Chapter One.  
1179 Thornton, “The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?,” 9. 
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is to develop primary education in the poorest provinces of China. 1180 Youth Business China 
was established in coordination with the Prince’s Trust Enterprise Leadership Conference and 
the UK-based Youth Business International. It aims at facilitating entrepreneurship among 
Chinese youth. It organizes training seminars and internships for young entrepreneurs.1181  
The local CYL committees developed their own sub-organizations following a similar 
pattern.1182  In addition to the organizations it directly manages, the CYL also has collaboration 
or supervision ties with a very large number of social organizations. In 2002, among the 8 
million social organizations officially registered in China, 2.47 million were linked to the 
CYL.1183 
Most of CYL projects are the same from one locale to another. However, through its 
sub-organizations it can partially adapt its activities to the local context. 1184 The “Chunhui 
Project” (Chunhui xingdong, 春晖行动) developed in Guizhou is a good example of such 
adaptation. In 2004, the Guizhou Province CYL Committee launched this poverty relief project, 
especially targeted at rural and national minority areas. An office in the provincial level CYL 
was set up to supervise the implementation. It became in 2007 the Guizhou Province Chunhui 
Project Development Center (Guizhou sheng Chunhui xingdong fazhan zhongxin, 贵州省春晖
行动发展中心). Through its own organizational network, its branches in the various villages 
                                                 
1180 Hu Xianzhong (胡献忠), The CYL in a transforming society (shehui biange zhong de gongqingtuan, 社会变
革中的共青团), 43; Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the Communist Youth League 
(zhengzhixue shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 103. 
1181 Thornton, “The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?,” 9. 
1182 For more details regarding the organizations managed by the Beijing CYL, see : Beijing Communist Youth 
League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), Records and Documents of 
Beijing’s Youth Organizations (Beijing Qingnian Zuzhi Zhiwengao, 北京青年组织志文稿), 90–110. 
1183 Shaoguang Wang and Jianyu He, “Training Ground for Democracy : Associational Life in China,” in State 
and Civil Society the Chinese Perspective, ed. Zhenglai Deng (Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific, 
2010), 271–310. 
1184 Interviews with cadre 1, cadre 2, cadre 16, and cadre 27. 
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of Guizhou, the CYL could contact key actors in villages and to put them in touch with charity 
organizations or investors. It led among other things to scholarship programs for students from 
these villages or support packages for local entrepreneurs.1185  
Among the organizations supervised by the CYL, the All-China Youth Federation 
(ACYF) and its local equivalents play a particularly important role. As described in Chapter 
One, the All-China Youth Federation is mainly an advisory body composed of young 
representatives from the CYL and from unrelated organizations from various sectors of society, 
such as economic, intellectual or religious elites. It serves as an interface between the CYL and 
these groups. Through this institution, the young representatives can voice their concern 
regarding the CYL activities in link with their sector. According to my interviews, its practical 
effect at the national or local level is very limited and it therefore mainly functions as a 
networking platform for the representatives themselves. Most of them become members for the 
networking opportunities and the prestige it offers. They can also use it as a training ground in 
order to later become representative in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
or the National People’s Congress.1186 From the CYL’s perspective, the ACYF is a way to 
expand its network of influence beyond its members and to create contacts with potentially 
successful businessmen or religious leaders. It is often also used as a public relations tool as the 
CYL use the ACYF’s name to appear more neutral politically.1187 The ACYF has developed 
                                                 
1185 Beijing Communist Youth League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), 
Records and Documents of Beijing’s Youth Organizations (Beijing Qingnian Zuzhi Zhiwengao, 北京青年组织志
文稿), 264–276. 
1186 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, and cadre 32. 
1187 For examples of exchanges organized by the Beijing Youth Federation, see : Beijing Communist Youth 
League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团北京市委员会), Records and Documents of 
Beijing’s Youth Organizations (Beijing Qingnian Zuzhi Zhiwengao, 北京青年组织志文稿), 400–417. 
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exchanges with Taiwan since the early 1990s1188 and organizes regular delegations to a variety 
of countries.1189  
Beyond building relationships with the business sector or overseas organizations, the 
CYL also develops its links to the State itself. As a mass organization managed by the Party, 
the CYL helps in practice in the implementation of the Party-State policy but until recently it 
was not officially defined as a state instrument. It was with the promulgation in 1991 of the 
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Minors that, for the first time, the 
CYL was cited as having to help the State in implementing its policies.1190 Since then, the CYL 
established a hotline and more broadly has been functioning as a key communication and 
coordination platform among the administrations concerned with the protection of minors. It 
also started to send delegations of young people to meet with representatives from the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference or the National People’s Congress, so they can 
discuss their needs and grievances.1191 Beyond protection of minors specifically, the role of the 
CYL as a State instrument has been included in its charter in 2003: it must “actively assist the 
                                                 
1188 In 2011 for example, seven large forums or cultural events have been organized with Taiwanese delegations 
(Central Communist Youth League, Yearbook of the Chinese Communist Youth League 2012 (Zhongguo 
Gongqingtuan nianjian 2012, 中国共青团年鉴 2012), 227. 
1189 In 2011 for instance, the All-China Youth Federation organized exchanges of delegations with a variety of 
countries: North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Indonesia, Brazil, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Saudi 
Arabia, Nepal, Italy, Russia, Portugal, Turkey, France, Germany, UK, Cuba, US, Australia (Ibid., 228–235). 
1190 The Chinese version is : Zhonghua renmin gongheguo weichengnian ren baohu fa, 中华人民共和国未成年
人保护法. 
1191 Interview with cadre 16. See also : Shen Jianping (沈健平), A Political Science Approach Towards the 
Communist Youth League (zhengzhixue shiyexia de Zhongguo Gongqingtuan, 政治学视野下的中国共青团), 109; 
Hu Xianzhong (胡献忠), The CYL in a transforming society (shehui biange zhong de gongqingtuan, 社会变革中
的共青团), 141. 
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government in managing youth affairs” (jiji xiezhu zhengfu guanli qingnian shiwu, 积极协助
政府管理青年事务).1192 
Local CYL committees have experimented further in developing relationships with the 
State. In coordination with the CYL, the government of Zhabei District in Shanghai has 
established in 2005 a Department of Youth Affairs. This governmental department is in practice 
managed by the local CYL, which hence gain in administrative power.1193 This experiment 
stresses the current evolution of the CYL, increasingly serving as a hub-like organization 
linking the Party, the State and various sectors of society.  
2)  The strength of a weak organization 
a)  Doing the job with little means 
The evolutions I have just stressed show the close relationship between the CCP and the 
CYL. The latter follows the former in its transformation towards a hub-like organization.  But 
the CYL does not have the Party’s political power and therefore has a stronger need of finding 
other organizations to set up projects with. As largely underlined by CYL officials, the CYL 
has “no power and no money”, thus it needs to coordinate with other actors to get things done, 
in particular to fund activities. We have seen in Chapter One that in 2015 the budget of the 
central level CYL equaled only 26.5% of the All-China Federation of Trade-Unions’ one. At 
the local level, the annual working budget for a county level CYL committee often does not 
reach 50,000 RMB, with which they can mainly pay the cadres’ salaries and offices’ operating 
                                                 
1192 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 26 July 2003. 
1193 Interview with cadre 2. See also : Ni Jin (倪瑾), “The Functional Position of the Communist Youth League: 
Integration of Organizational Mobilization and Resources (Gongqingtuan de gongneng dingwei : zuzhi dongyuan 
he ziyuan zhenghe, 共青团的功能定位：组织动员和资源整合 )” (PhD Dissertation, Huadong Normal 
University, 2014), 108–109. 
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fees and not much more, 1194  this despite new provincial regulations in 2011 which set a 
minimum annual budget of 100,000 RMB for a county level CYL.1195 
Interestingly, CYL cadres entertain a certain pride in the weakness of the organization. 
For them it is a sign that they can do a lot with little means. All the CYL cadres I interviewed 
stressed these weaknesses and contrasted them with the numerous projects they handle. This is 
also put forward by Chinese academics studying CYL work.1196 For CYL officials, underlining 
this contrast is a way to legitimate themselves, especially compared to other officials from 
Party-State departments with more means. This is particularly clear for CYL cadres in poorer 
parts of the country, such as Guizhou, or for the ones working at the county level CYL and 
below, as they are the ones with the less funding. 1197  A cadre in the Guiyang City CYL 
Committee for example stressed how they had less funding than a Community Resident 
Committee (shequ jumin weiyuanhui, 社区居民委员会) in the city and, at the same time, 
organized far more activities.1198 According to my interviews, having worked in less wealthy 
parts of the country is seen as positive when promoting an official to high level positions.  1199 
                                                 
1194 Interviews with cadre 23 and 24. See also : Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational Capital and Political 
Party Survival – Analytical Perspective on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi 
ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政
党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个考察视角),” 162. 
1195  “Upgrading the Organizational Framework, Grabbing the Water Source (chuangxin zuzhi geju zhuazhu 
huoshui yuantou, 创新组织格局, 抓住活水源头),” China Youth Daily, February 8, 2012.  
1196 Interviews with academic 16, academic 17, academic 21. See also: Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠 ), 
“Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical Perspective on the Political Function of the 
Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo Gongqingtuan zhengzhi 
gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个考察视角),” 159; Li Wei 
(李伟), Reflections on the Position Transfers of Former Communist Youth League Cadres (huimou Gongqingtuan 
suiyue: zhuanyehou de sikao, 回眸共青团岁月：转业后的思考) (Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation 
Press, 2011), 27. 
1197 Interviews with cadre 20, cadre 22, cadre 27, cadre 28, and cadre 29. 
1198 Interview with cadre 29. 
1199 Interviews with cadre 12, cadre 14 cadre 22, cadre 27, and cadre 29. 
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For instance, they insist on the example of former PRC President Hu Jintao who was promoted 
in the 1980s from a local CYL leadership position in Gansu Province to the Central CYL 
Secretariat.1200 
Local CYL officials in general emphasize their organization’s limited resources much 
more than university CYL cadres. As shown previously, the CYL is a major organization on 
campus and has a key role in supervising students’ extracurricular activities in general. It is 
much less central in the case of a local administration. Young people are only a part of the 
constituency. In addition, CYL officials who moved from the university to the local level 
stressed how their work became more complicated and demanding. Instead of interacting 
mainly with students, they now have to deal with young people from very different sectors of 
society and often with less means.1201  
As to legitimate their position, CYL officials stress in particular how the organization’s 
weakness creates a perfect training situation. The less resources they can access, the more they 
have to rely on their own work and skills to find potential collaborators. In addition to actually 
organizing the activities, they have to be able to find funding for the various projects, from 
Party-State administrations or firms, and to advertise them. It pushes them to develop their 
“coordination skills” and to learn how to convince and develop useful relationships across a 
variety of organizations and sectors, which was often referred to as “charisma” (meili, 魅力). 
In general, CYL cadres stress how they must develop strong public relations skills, which they 
learn on the job itself rather than in school.1202  
                                                 
1200 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Hu_Jintao/career (consulted on 7 July 
2016). 
1201 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 31, and cadre 41.  
1202 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 3, cadre 11, cadre 14, cadre 20, cadre 27, cadre 28, and cadre 29. 
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However, it is not only a question of skills. In practice, accepting to collaborate with 
CYL officials in developing certain specific projects can be seen, from another cadre’s point of 
view or a businessman’s, as an investment: the CYL cadre that one helps out by funding his 
activity might become in the future an important official able to return the favor. 
CYL officials stress their generalist abilities to counter the common discourse among 
Party-State officials regarding their lack of technical skills, as they do not work in a specialized 
administration, and lack of experience, as they are often young for their rank.1203 They put 
forward their public relations skills, and the “generalist” (zonghe, 综合) abilities they train 
while developing a variety of projects with very different actors. To compensate for their lack 
of experience, they stress their youth and their ability to innovate, for instance to be active on 
social network websites.1204 They overall develop a discourse based on the limitations of their 
organization, which they have to compensate by their own work, in order to counter the critics.  
b)  An “uncorrupted government office” 
CYL officials also put forward how little corruption can be found in the organization, 
compared to most Party-State administrations. This idea is also largely spread in the Chinese 
and Foreign media.1205 While some cadres emphasize the high moral standards of the CYL 
                                                 
1203 Interviews with academic 4 and academic 21. On the lack of technicity and experience, see also: Zhang Hua 
(张华), Studies on the functions of the Communist Youth League of China (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan 
zhineng yanjiu, 中国共产主义青年团职能研究), 167; Li Wei (李伟), Reflections on the Position Transfers of 
Former Communist Youth League Cadres (huimou Gongqingtuan suiyue: zhuanyehou de sikao, 回眸共青团岁
月：转业后的思考), 60–70. 
1204 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 3, cadre 11, cadre 14, cadre 20, cadre 27, cadre 28, and cadre 29. See also : Li 
Wei (李伟 ), Reflections on the Position Transfers of Former Communist Youth League Cadres (huimou 
Gongqingtuan suiyue: zhuanyehou de sikao, 回眸共青团岁月：转业后的思考), 34. 
1205 See for example : “CYL Officials Focus their Appointment on Key Government Positions (Gongqingtuan 
ganbu jizhong churen zhengfu yaozhi, 共青团干部集中出任政府要职),” 21st Century World Herald, March 3, 
2003; Keith Zhai, “Seven Rising Stars Tipped to Lead Sixth Generation of China’s Leaders,” South China Morning 
Post, October 1, 2012. 
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officials and the legacy of Hu Yaobang or Song Defu, both former CYL Central Committee 
First Secretaries reputed to be incorruptible, the interviewees generally came down to the lack 
of corruption opportunities in the CYL. By opposition to a “fat position” (feizhai, 肥宅), they 
described the CYL as an “uncorrupted government office” (qingshui yamen, 清水衙门), using 
an expression referring to imperial times. With “no power and no money”, the CYL cadres have 
little avenues for corruption, they do not handle large infrastructure projects or do not give 
administrative licenses.1206  
An article by Gu Yali argues, on the contrary, that the weak position of the CYL cadres 
can push them to try and buy their way out, bribing their superiors to get a promotion. She gives 
examples of cadres arrested on different accounts of corruption. 1207  CYL cadres are no 
exception as corruption is largely practiced in the Chinese bureaucracy. Office selling in 
particular is a common practice. Several authors have underlined how the decentralized but 
concentrated framework under which appointment and promotion decisions are made in the 
Chinese system facilitates such practices. The decisions are decentralized in the sense that they 
are taken at the local level but the final say is also highly concentrated in the hands of few Party-
State leaders who can easily manipulate the process, in particular the Party secretary and the 
Director of the Organization Department.1208 Yan Sun argues that the appointment procedures 
encourage systematic office selling, despite various innovations supposed to make procedures 
more transparent and democratic.1209  
                                                 
1206 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 3, cadre 11, cadre 14, cadre 20, cadre 27, cadre 28, and cadre 29. 
1207 Gu Yali (古雅丽), “On the Passive Corruption of Youth Leaders: Some Issues (qianyi jiceng Gongqingtuan 
ganbu de xiaoji fubai wenti, 浅议基层共青团干部的消极腐败问题),” Journal of Guangxi Youth Leaders College 
20, no. 4 (August 2010): 43–46. 
1208 Yan Sun, “Cadre Recruitment and Corruption: What Goes Wrong?,” Crime, Law and Social Change 49, no. 
1 (February 2008): 61–79; Smith, “Political Machinations in a Rural County”; Hillman, Power and Patronage: 
Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China. 
1209 Sun, “Cadre Recruitment and Corruption: What Goes Wrong?,” 68–70. 
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The corrupt CYL officials are therefore only cases among others, highlighting that they 
know the rules of the game. Like other cadres, some of them engage in corrupt practices, even 
though it remains generally on a small scale, due to the limited opportunities they have in that 
regard. However, this petty corruption is mostly the fact of cadres with little options and career 
prospects: my interviewees stressed that if such opportunities  can always be found, it was not 
a good bargain for CYL cadres who were often at the beginning of their career and would risk 
their future ambitions on small sums of money.1210 In line with the idea that this position is 
often only a career starting point, in the next part of this chapter I show that the CYL cadres 
learn to know their place and their role in the system, that they are future leaders par excellence.   
 
B -  The making of future leaders 
After having stressed the evolution of the CYL and its specific features as a dependent 
organization, I now turn to how this influences its cadres, and to what extent they are in fact 
leaders in their childhood. Beyond the skills they may cultivate and the legitimizing discourse 
they develop around it, appointing young officials to an organization with little means appears 
as a good way to test them, both in terms of commitment and abilities.  
The CYL learn to give a certain image of their work and of themselves, to embody a 
role as officials which can give weight to their political ambitions. As defined by Lagroye, the 
role is understood as the set of behaviors which are linked to a specific position and which make 
it palpable to others.1211 The role is therefore made of the public expectations towards an 
individual in this position, but also of the individual’s own views on what it implies. The role 
                                                 
1210 Interviews with cadre 14 and cadre 27. 
1211 Lagroye, “Être du métier [Insiders].” 
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is progressively interiorized by the actor and becomes both constraints on his behavior but also 
models which enable his actions.1212  
As argued by Briquet, the role should not only be seen negatively as a constraint: it 
could also be used strategically by the actors. 1213  In fact, the CYL officials through their 
embodiment of the role of future leaders reflect that they are fit for the job. Through their 
performance, they show that they are part of a specific elite group. Beyond the role they embody, 
I also show that CYL leaders are largely treated as future leaders: they are provided with 
prestigious training opportunities and the Party makes sure they have the right diverse and 
generalist working experience to be considered as fit for leadership. Promised to top positions 
in the Party-State, the profiles of CYL leaders evolve overtime in line with the regime’s 
transformations.  
1)  Cultivation of a role as politician 
a)  Individual tactics to stand out 
Since the 1980s, the cadre management system has progressively been developed to 
integrate precise methods and criteria in the evaluation of officials’ work. As I have developed 
in the Introduction, this was brought further with new regulations in 1993 and eventually the 
Civil Service Law of 2005.1214 Local officials are evaluated based on their performance, looking 
                                                 
1212 Ibid., 5–15; Lefebvre, “Se conformer à son rôle. Les ressorts de l’intériorisation institutionnelle [Conforming 
to One’s Role. The Mecanisms of Institutional Internalization],” 219–247. 
1213 Jean-Louis Briquet, “Communiquer en actes. Prescriptions de rôle et exercice quotidien du métier politique 
[Communicating through Actions. Role and the Daily Exercice of Power],” 25. 
1214 “Temporary Regulation Regarding Civil Servants (guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli, 国家公务员暂行条例),” 
State Council, August 1993 and “Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo gongwuyuan fa, 中华人民共和国公务员法),” National People’s Congress, 27 April 2005.  
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for instance at the GDP growth when evaluating the local Party-State leaders.1215 Evaluation 
criteria are far less strict in the case of CYL officials, including CYL leaders.  
The CYL officials are evaluated based on yearly objectives regarding the projects and 
activities of the organization. They must report on their work twice a year. The leaders of a 
CYL committee, the secretary and deputy secretaries, are evaluated by the CCP leadership at 
the corresponding level. Lower CYL cadres have to report to their superiors within the CYL. 
But beyond the organization of the activities themselves no clear criteria are set concerning the 
impact these activities must have. The evaluations are not based on any clear quantifiable target. 
The only figure they can use is how many people turned out to the different events organized 
by the CYL, but this does not say much about their actual impact. The performance targets for 
CYL cadres are therefore far less clear that in the case of Party leaders. In addition, as I develop 
in the next chapter, the CYL leaders often rotate so quickly to another position that they cannot 
be evaluated on the impact of their projects few years later as they are already not in their 
position anymore. Moreover, the policies and projects suggested by the central level CYL do 
not always have to be implemented by the local CYL committees as they follow first the local 
CCP committee’s orders. As described in Chapter One, the upper level CYL committees have 
little power over the cadres’ promotions, which prevent the establishment of a strong evaluation 
system within the organization.1216  
In the absence of clear performance targets, the CYL officials mainly have to please 
their superior, to make their work look convincing in their eyes. My interviewees stressed the 
subjective nature of evaluation, as different leaders have different priorities, and the importance 
                                                 
1215  Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township 
Perspective”; Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC,” China: An International 
Journal 10, no. 2 (2012): 69–83. 
1216 Interviews with cadre 9, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 27, cadre 31, cadre 42.  
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of being able to present well one’s own work. They put forward the importance of personal 
rhetorical and writing skills at the time of the reports. The officials stress their personal abilities 
rather than the actual content of their projects.1217 Like Walder described regarding workers’ 
evaluation in the Mao era, the cadres have to understand clearly what their superior is expecting 
and “display” (biaoxian, 表现 ) their obedience and zeal, which includes making a good 
personal impression.1218 In this configuration, what is key for CYL officials is to be noticed by 
their superior in order to be in a good position for further promotion. In the case of CYL leaders, 
the relationship they develop with the CCP leadership at the corresponding level is particularly 
important as its members would decide of their further promotions within the locale.1219  
Organizing major events is often a good way to get noticed.1220 For instance, the CYL 
organizations in Nanjing took part in setting up the Nanjing 2015 Youth Olympic Games. The 
CYL was in charge of recruiting and managing volunteers: 103,000 young people applied and 
around 20,000 served as volunteers for the events.1221 In order to deal with these large numbers, 
the Nanjing City CYL Committee set up a special office. The team included around 400 staff 
members, among which officials sent by the CYL but also by the city government’s 
departments, such as the Education Department or the Sports Department.1222 This type of large 
events can then lead to a certain degree of competition among CYL committees in order to get 
                                                 
1217 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 3, cadre 9, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 27, cadre 31, and cadre 42. See also : Li 
Wei (李伟 ), Reflections on the Position Transfers of Former Communist Youth League Cadres (huimou 
Gongqingtuan suiyue: zhuanyehou de sikao, 回眸共青团岁月：转业后的思考), 40. 
1218 Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, 134–160.  
1219 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 27, cadre 31, and cadre 42. See also : Li Wei (李
伟), Reflections on the Position Transfers of Former Communist Youth League Cadres (huimou Gongqingtuan 
suiyue: zhuanyehou de sikao, 回眸共青团岁月：转业后的思考), 53. 
1220 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 16, cadre 9, cadre 27, cadre 18, cadre 31, and cadre 42. 
1221 “Volunteering Work for the Nanjing Youth Olympics Advances Steadily (Nanjing qing’aohui zhiyuanzhe 
gongzuo wenbu tuijin, 南京青奥会志愿者工作稳步推进),” China Youth Daily, June 4, 2016. 
1222 Interviews with Student 5 and cadre 37. 
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the honor of managing it. If well managed, the event puts the cadres in charge under the 
spotlight and might facilitate further promotions. In the case of the Nanjing Olympics, 
interviewees from the Nanjing CYL told me that the Jiangsu CYL was trying to get some 
control over the organization of the event as to share the spotlight.1223 
Another way to get noticed by superiors is by advertising one’s projects and more 
broadly the work of the CYL committee. CYL leaders for instance publish articles regarding 
their CYL committee’s activities in internal Party-State publications and the media. For them 
it is a way to advertise their work but also to show their writing skills and their mastery of 
official language and policies. It is an efficient way to get noticed.1224 It also shows that they 
know the rules of the game and fully embody their role as officials, using a specific language 
and propaganda tools. I now stress how important the CYL experience is for young cadres as 
to learn how to speak and behave like officials and future leaders.  
b)  Embodying the “organizational charisma” 
I have stressed how the limited means available to CYL officials in order to implement 
their projects force them to rely on their ability to convince other actors to collaborate with 
them. The cadres hence develop their skills of persuasion. These abilities are also key in the 
evaluation process and therefore necessary for them to get promoted. They need to speak and 
write well, using the right terms to stress their political correctness. As shown by Oksenberg, 
communication and persuasion skills were already important to rise in the Party-State hierarchy 
during the Mao era.1225 These skills remain key.  
                                                 
1223 Interviews with cadre 6 and cadre 37. 
1224 Interviews with cadre 2, academic 6, cadre 9, and academic 19. 
1225 Oksenberg, “The Institutionalisation of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve 
of the Cultural Revolution.” 
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As stressed by Putnam, the ability to convince and maneuver small groups of people is 
a basic political skill in any system.1226 The politicians develop these abilities through practice, 
the process of competing for positions in itself trains them in many of the competences required 
by the system.1227 Lagroye stressed that politics is a unique profession, as most of it has to be 
learned “on the job”.1228  
CYL leaders have in particular to give a number of speeches and write reports on various 
topics in link with the generalist nature of the organization. It places them apart from leaders of 
functional departments in the Party-State, who generally have to intervene on a limited set of 
issues. In that regard, their position is similar to the one of Party-Leaders, such as a city level 
Party secretary or a mayor, who can be expected to talk about almost everything. The difference 
is that, apart from the central level CYL leadership, CYL leaders do not have office secretaries 
to write speeches or reports for them. They develop de facto their speaking and writing skills 
and learn to adapt them to a variety of interlocutors.1229 
The CYL officials learn to master the “bureaucratic jargon” (guanhua, 官话) that they 
encounter through their meetings with other cadres, training programs and the official 
documents they have access to depending on their rank. 1230  The cadres’ mastery of the 
“bureaucratic jargon” underlines two things: their ability to follow political and ideological 
trends and their capacity to speak in the name of the group, to act as representatives of the Party-
State.  
                                                 
1226 Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 68. 
1227 Ibid., 70. 
1228 Lagroye, “Être du métier [Insiders],” 5–15. 
1229 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 22, cadre 42.  
1230 Interviews with cadre 6, cadre 9, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 27, cadre 31, and cadre 42. 
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In Communist regimes in particular, a cadre’s ability to decrypt the political language 
and to use it properly reflects his ability to understand and follow the official political line.1231 
Welsh showed in the case of the Soviet Union how the ideology, understood as a specific type 
of language, progressively became increasingly about displaying one’s commitment to the 
Party line rather than actually giving it content. From a cadre’s perspective, using the right 
ideological terminology was a way to show that they understood what was expected from them 
rather than displaying that they actually believed in the content. 1232 It is highly similar to 
Wedeen’s analysis of Syrian propaganda under Hafez Al-Assad. She argued that ideological 
rituals did not really aim at convincing people to believe in the content of the message, but 
rather at ensuring their compliance. The message appeared as phony to both the officials and 
the population but it gave the framework within which public discourse had to be limited.1233 
Yan Xiaojun drew the parallel with post-Mao China. 1234  Through their mastery of the 
bureaucratic jargon and its ideological terminology, the cadres in fact display their 
understanding of the political line and their compliance, rather than their personal belief in the 
content of the message. 
Beyond compliance to the Party-State, the use of bureaucratic jargon is also a way for 
cadres to display their status to colleagues or people from outside the Party-State. By using a 
certain tone and vocabulary, they show that they represent more than themselves, that they 
speak in the name of their administration, their CYL committee and, more broadly, the Party-
State. For instance, the CYL officials refer to what is good for the “masses”, meaning people 
                                                 
1231  Bourdieu, “La représentation politique. Éléments pour une théorie du champ politique [Political 
Representation. Elements for a Theory of the Political Field],” 5–6. 
1232 Welsh, “The Comparative Study of Political Leadership in Communist Systems.” 
1233 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
1234 Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 
502. 
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outside the Party-State, and what they do for them.1235 As such they position themselves apart 
from the “masses” and as representatives of a ruling elite.1236 Overall, this elitist discourse 
shows that what they say and do is in the name of these institutions. It is what Bourdieu called 
the “oracle effect”.1237  
Among smaller groups of colleagues, the use or misuse of bureaucratic jargon is also a 
sign to show one’s position within the group. During the dinners among officials which I was 
able to assist to, the most ranked officials were the one taking the liberty to explain specific 
official expressions and mottos and even to laugh about it, while their subordinates would not 
dare taking the initiative. The “Mass line educational campaign” (Qunzhong luxian jiaoyu 
shijian huodong, 群众路线教育实践活动) launched in 2013 was, for example, a major topic 
at the time of my fieldwork.1238 The CYL leaders discussed for instance to what extent it 
actually concerned the “masses” or not, which could appear as rather unorthodox to someone 
from outside their circles.1239 One’s ease in handling bureaucratic jargon in that case displays 
one’s position in the hierarchy. As Link underlined, playing with the jargon is often a sign that 
the speaker in fact accepts its rules and masters them.1240  It is a way for the officials to 
demonstrate that they are, as Pieke put it, “privy to the main manifestations and metonyms of 
the exercise of power within the party: policies, documents, opinions, speeches, exhortations 
                                                 
1235 The term “masses” (qunzhong, 群众) refers to people who are not members of the Party, or affiliated 
organizations, such as the CYL or the “democratic parties.” On this distinction in the Chinese system, see: Barnett, 
Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, 39. 
1236 Interviews with cadre 16, cadre 9, cadre 27, cadre 18, cadre 31, cadre 42. 
1237 Bourdieu, “La délégation et le fétichisme politique [Delegation and Political Fetishism].” 
1238 The campaign aimed at transforming the officials’ workstyle, by fighting against the “four (bad) work styles”: 
formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance. On the Mass line campaign, see: Doyon, “The End of the 
Road for Xi’s Mass Line Campaign: An Assessment.” 
1239 Observation at dinners with officials, in Nanjing in February 2015 and Shijiazhuang in July 2016. 
1240 On Official Chinese Language, see : E. Perry Link, An Anatomy of Chinese Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 239–348. 
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and gossip.”1241 Bourdieu also stressed that the experienced politician must be capable of 
playing with different registers, and always knowing what is expected from him in a certain 
setting, what is the limit not to cross, what is not to be said.1242 Through their use of bureaucratic 
jargon, the CYL leaders therefore mark their position in the hierarchy and their potential future 
as Party-State leaders.  
Beyond language, CYL officials also show their status through their specific behavior. 
As stressed by Pieke, being a cadre is linked to a certain “technique of the self”, meaning 
specific ways to behave, speak, eat, smoke, walk...1243 Pieke showed in particular how the Party 
schools play a major role in transforming administrators into political elites who embody “the 
charisma of the party and its ideology.”1244 Through their daily job and interactions with Party-
State leadership, the CYL leaders develop the same features. Just like Lagroye highlighted in 
the case of contemporary France, formal and informal meetings with more experienced 
politicians are often a key source of inspiration and information for the newcomers.1245 The 
CYL officials have, as I have underlined, a frequent access to Party-State leaders in particular, 
giving them numerous opportunities to mimic and learn from them. 
Among other things, CYL officials learn how to reflect the organizational hierarchy 
through their behavior, to act as leaders. I could observe in official dinners how the hierarchy 
transpired from where people seated around the table, but also from how they interacted with 
each other, beyond the discussion itself. The younger and lesser ranked officials were seated 
                                                 
1241 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 16. 
1242  Bourdieu, “La représentation politique. Éléments pour une théorie du champ politique [Political 
Representation. Elements for a Theory of the Political Field],” 6. 
1243 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 16. 
1244 Ibid., 18. 
1245 Lagroye, “Être du métier [Insiders],” 5–15. 
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the farther from the leader and had little interaction with him. They mostly talked to the leader 
when drinking to his health. The intermediate level cadres sat next to the leader and were 
interacting constantly with him. It showed how close they were from him but also underlined 
their subordination, as they for instance filled his glass or lit his cigarette. The leader himself 
was the most comfortable with the situation.1246  
The CYL leaders overall behave like young Party-State leaders, following similar codes. 
The role they embody could be seen as disproportionate as compared with the limited power 
and means of the organization itself. In practice they are already seen as leaders-to-be by their 
colleagues and they behave as such. Through their behavior they embody the organizational 
charisma of the Party-State which both gives presence to the institutions and in return 
legitimates their own position of power, or future position.1247 It propagates the idea that they 
are legitimate to rule. 
2)  From League leadership to Party leadership 
a)  The perfect reserve cadres  
As developed in Chapter Two, a “third echelon” policy was developed in the early 1980s 
to bring to power a new generation of better trained Party-State leaders. The practice to train a 
pool of candidate for leadership positions progressively extended to the different echelons of 
the Party-State. It led to a comprehensive “reserve cadre” (houbei ganbu, 后备干部) system. 
The basic idea is to have a list of young officials from which the Party-State leaders should be 
selected. This system is managed by the Party Organization Department, parallel to the civil 
                                                 
1246 Observation at dinners with officials, in Nanjing in February 2015 and Shijiazhuang in July 2016. 
1247 Regarding the link between social roles and institutions, see : Lefebvre, “Se conformer à son rôle. Les ressorts 
de l’intériorisation institutionnelle [Conforming to One’s Role. The Mecanisms of Institutional Internalization],” 
220. 
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service system dealing with non-leading cadres.1248 For each leading position, at least two 
reserve cadres must be listed. In addition to rules regarding minimum levels of education, the 
reserve cadres must be below a certain age, generally around ten years below the actual age of 
ineligibility for the related position. For example, an official must be below 40 in order to be 
on the reserve list for a division director position, the rank of a county Party secretary, and the 
age of ineligibility for the position is 50 years old.1249  
Due to their age advantage, CYL leaders are reserve cadres par excellence, and 
generally make their way into the lists. For instance, in order to be a reserve cadre for a bureau 
director position, such as the mayor of a medium city, a cadre has to be at the same rank or one 
below and be less than 45 years old. A provincial CYL committee secretary is in perfect position 
to be put on the list: he is already ranked as bureau director and is generally below 40 years 
old.1250 As a result, among the 76 provincial CYL secretaries appointed since 2003 who already 
transferred to another position, 34 did as city CCP deputy secretaries. According to Pan Teng, 
this is the most common transfer position for provincial CYL leaders. 1251 Looking at the 
trajectories of the provincial level CYL secretaries of Jiangsu, Guizhou and Beijing, among 29 
secretaries for the period 1978-2014, 18 were directly appointed to a position of leader of deputy 
leader of a city, or a similarly ranked locale.1252  
                                                 
1248 See the entry “civil service system” in the glossary regarding the distinction between leading and non-leading 
cadres, and for more information on the civil service system. 
1249 On the reserve cadre system and age-related rules, see: Tsai and Kou, “The Party’s Disciples: CCP Reserve 
Cadres and the Perpetuation of a Resilient Authoritarian Regime,” 1–20. 
1250 Between 2003 and 2013, the age mean for CYL provincial leaders across the country was 38 years old (Pan 
Teng (潘腾), “A Cohort of Young CCP Officials (Zhonggong nianqing ganbu tidui, 中共年轻干部梯队).”  
1251 Pan Teng (潘腾), “A Cohort of Young CCP Officials (Zhonggong nianqing ganbu tidui, 中共年轻干部梯
队).” 
1252  Source: several name lists for the CYL secretaries can be found online (See in particular: 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=6CkeCdHdacpTUzcNsK2ISVUojtAD-t39uPIfjnDQS3UWnuTKkAPDsHv-
5f0S3mbWR-f066pgqR5DJGxlE3PhGnIBeUTm5MGfWmpsOva9VWG). I cross-examined them and verified 
them with local officials. The analysis is based on their career data which could be found in their official resumes, 
available on Xinhua.cn, or on the ones compiled by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, at the condition 
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 They often at the same time hold a position of CCP leader in a district or county below 
the city administration. This phenomenon shows that they are still in training as young leaders: 
they can hence experience to be a county leader and a city vice leader at the same time.1253 
Overall many CYL officials become local CCP leaders. Between 2001 and 2005, 37.82% of 
the members of provincial CCP committees had a working experience in the CYL at various 
levels. 1254  More recently, when looking at the official resumes of the provincial Party 
secretaries and governors in charge by March 2015, 45% of them had such an experience in the 
CYL.1255  
Being a reserve cadre goes together with training opportunities, unavailable to basic 
cadres. Since the 1980s, training programs have been developed for young officials and reserve 
cadres, such as the “young cadre training courses” (zhongqingnian ganbu peixunban, 中青年
干部培训班) created by the Central Party School in 1980 and attended by provincial level 
reserve cadres. The reserve cadres generally follow trainings of six months to a year, to develop 
their understanding of central policies, but also their skills in management or economics.1256 
This is true in particular for CYL officials. Many CYL leaders take part in extensive training 
program, from three months to two years, while holding their position. Between 1982 and 2013, 
                                                 
that their positions where sourced from media reports and official websites. I found at least partial career data for 
all of the provincial level CYL secretaries between 1978 and 2014. 
1253 Pan Teng (潘腾), “A Cohort of Young CCP Officials (Zhonggong nianqing ganbu tidui, 中共年轻干部梯
队).” 
1254 Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical Perspective 
on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo 
Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个
考察视角),” 147. 
1255 Data sources: the official CVs of the cadres found on Xinhua. 
1256 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 65–71. 
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at least 19 of the 49 central-level CYL secretaries did so, generally going to the Central Party 
School.1257 
The central level CYL secretaries also take part in specific study sessions organized by 
the CYL. They follow the template of the CCP Politburo study sessions, which have been 
standardized since 2002. 1258 The sessions take place every one or two months and focus on a 
timeline topic, generally presented by an external speaker. In addition to central level CYL 
secretaries, the leaders of central CYL departments and some subsumed units, such as the 
Central CYL School, also join. To give an example of the topics studied, Table 6.1 lists the 
study sessions which took place in 2014, as well as the main speaker. The central CYL 
secretaries are treated as leaders on the making, with their own study sessions, same as CCP 
Politburo members.  
  
                                                 
1257 Some information can be missing in their resumes regarding the training programs they followed. The number 
of cadres who followed a program is therefore probably higher. Source : name list for central CYL secretaries can 
be found here : “Previous sessions of the central CYL (lijie tuan zhongyang, 历届团中央).” Their CVs can be 
found on Xinhua.cn. 
1258 On the CCP Politburo study sessions, see : Alice Miller, “Politburo Processes under Xi Jinping,” China 
Leadership Monitor 47 (July 2015): 10. 
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Table 6.1: Study sessions for the CYL Central Committee Secretariat in 20141259 
Date Session Main Topics Main Speakers 
10.01.2014 
(6th session 




Study of the Third Plenum of 
the 18th CCP Central 
Committee 
Yang Weimin, Central Finance Small Leading 
Group Office Deputy Director 
24.03.2014 
(7th) 
Study of the handbook for 
officials, “Fifty Years of 
International Socialism” (Shijie 
shehui zhuyi wushinian, 世界
社会主义五百年) 
Gu Hailiang, National Academy of Education 
Administration Chairman and editor of “Fifty years 
of international socialism” 
11.04.2014 
(8th) 
Study of the handbook for 
officials, “Ten Speeches of 
Marxist Philosophy” (Makesi 
zhuyi zhexue shijiang, 马克思
主义哲学十讲) 
Yang Geng, Beijing Normal University Deputy 




Theory and practice of the 
socialist core values 
Dai Mucai, Deputy Director of the Research 




Study of the second central 
meeting on Xinjiang 
 
Li Zhao, Deputy Director of the Coordination team 
on Xinjiang issues 
30.07.2014 
(11th) 
Youth in a society in transition Lian Si, University of Foreign Trade’s Graduate 
School Deputy Director 
08.10.2014 
(12th) 
Study of the evolution in the 
CYL’s role in implementing 
government policies. 




Study of the Fourth Plenum of 
the 18th CCP Central 
Committee 
Zhang Laiming, Deputy Director of the 
Development Research Center of the State Council 
                                                 
1259 “The 6th Study Session is Held for the 17th Central CYL Secretariat (tuan shiqi jie zhongyang shujichu juxing 
di liu ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行第六次集体学习),” China Youth Daily, January 10, 2014; “The 7th 
Study Session is Held for the Central CYL Secretariat (tuan zhongyang shujichu juxing di qi ci jiti xuexi, 团中央
书记处举行第七次集体学习),” China Youth Daily, March 25, 2014; “The 8th Study Session is Held for the 17th 
Central CYL Secretariat (tuan shiqi jie zhongyang shujichu juxing di ba ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行
第八次集体学习),” China Youth Daily, April 14, 2014; “The 9th Study Session is Held for the 17th Central CYL 
Secretariat (tuan shiqi jie zhongyang shujichu juxing di jiu ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行第九次集体学
习),” China Youth Daily, May 27, 2014; “The 10th Study Session is Held for the 17th Central CYL Secretariat (tuan 
shiqi jie zhongyang shujichu juxing di shi ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行第十次集体学习),” China 
Youth Daily, July 1, 2014; “The 11th Study Session is Held for the 17th Central CYL Secretariat (tuan shiqi jie 
zhongyang shujichu juxing di shiyi ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行第十一次集体学习),” China Youth 
Daily, July 30, 2014; “The 12th Study Session is Held for the 17th Central CYL Secretariat (Tuan shiqi jie 
zhongyang shujichu juxing di shier ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行第十二次集体学习),” China Youth 
Daily, October 9, 2014; “The 13th Study Session is Held for the 17th Central CYL Secretariat (Tuan shiqi jie 
zhongyang shujichu juxing di shisan ci jiti xuexi, 团十七届中央书记处举行第十三次集体学习),” China Youth 
Daily, December 2, 2014. 
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 Local CYL leaders also have special training opportunities, in particular at the Party or 
CYL schools. Between 1978 and 2014, out of the 29 CYL secretaries of Jiangsu Province, 
Guizhou Province and Beijing, at least 10 followed an intensive training while holding their 
post, generally at the Central Party School.1260  
The Central Youth League School is very active in training CYL cadres and leaders. 
Between its creation in 1948 and 1997, 42,000 CYL officials were trained, including 15,868 
officials ranked as CYL county secretaries and above. The training particularly accelerated 
since the late 1980s and the Party-State’s emphasis on rejuvenating the cadres corps.1261 In 1991, 
the “Opinion regarding the strengthening of the training of cadres at the Central CYL School” 
gave clear targets to be met. For example, 50 provincial level CYL secretaries and deputy 
secretaries were to be trained every year, as well as 400 city level CYL leaders.1262 The targets 
were later renewed: the “2006-2010 National plan for the education of Youth League cadres” 
                                                 
1260 Some information can be missing in their resumes regarding the training programs they followed. Source： 
several name lists for the CYL secretaries can be found on the internet (See in particular: 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=6CkeCdHdacpTUzcNsK2ISVUojtAD-t39uPIfjnDQS3UWnuTKkAPDsHv-
5f0S3mbWR-f066pgqR5DJGxlE3PhGnIBeUTm5MGfWmpsOva9VWG). I cross-examined them and verified 
them with local officials. For Tsinghua University: http://baike.baidu.com/view/3751112.htm. And for Peking 
University: http://baike.baidu.com/view/2394305.htm (Both Consulted on 1 June 2016). The analysis is based on 
their career data which could be found in their official resumes, available on Xinhua.cn, or on the ones compiled 
by baidu.baike, a Chinese version of Wikipedia, at the condition that their positions where sourced from media 
reports and official websites. I found at least partial career data for all of the CYL secretaries between 1978 and 
2014. 
1261 On the history of cadre training in the Central CYL School, see: Central Communist Youth League School, 
ed., Records of the Central CYL School 1948-1998 (Gongqingtuan zhongyang tuanxiao zhi, 共青团中央团校志 
1948-1998) (Beijing: Reform Press, 1998), 96–142. 
1262 “Opinion regarding the strengthening of the training of cadres at the Central Youth League School (Guanyu 
jiaqiang zhongyang tuanxiao ganbu peixun gongzuo yijian, 关于加强中央团校干部培训工作意见)”, Central 
CYL, 04 January 1991. 
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stressed that every year, 50 provincial level CYL leaders have to be trained in the Youth League 
and Party schools every year, as well as 1,000 city level CYL leaders.1263  
Training in the CYL schools followed the same evolution as for Party schools. Since 
the reform and opening up policy, the programs became shorter and the content evolved.1264 
While ideological content is still part of the curriculum, the schools give an increasingly 
important weight to practical skills.1265 Following the business school model, they provide case-
study based teachings and they emphasize management as well as negotiation skills.1266 I come 
back in the next chapter to the trainings at the different levels and their networking value.  
In addition to actual training programs, the reserve cadres are often also given practical 
working experiences through the “temporary transferred duty” framework.1267 They are sent by 
their unit to work in other locales or administrations for generally a year. They can therefore 
experience other working conditions and train themselves. “Temporary transferred duty” is also 
good for an official’s resume and they often get promoted after such an experience.1268 It is in 
particular a good way for city or provincial level officials to get a working experience at the 
                                                 
1263 “2006-2010 National Plan for the Education of Youth League Cadres (2006-2010, nian quanguo tuan ganbu 
jiaoyu peixun guihua, 2006－2010年全国团干部教育培训规划),” Central CYL, 15 January 2007. 
1264 Central Communist Youth League School, Records of the Central CYL School 1948-1998 (Gongqingtuan 
zhongyang tuanxiao zhi, 共青团中央团校志 1948-1998), 100–107. 
1265 On the evolution of the Party school curriculum, see : Emilie Tran, “École du parti et formation des élites 
dirigeantes en Chine [Party school and ruling elite formation in China],” Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 122, 
no. 1 (2007): 123–44; David L Shambaugh, “Training China’s Political Elite: The Party School System,” The 
China Quarterly 196 (2008): 827–44. 
1266 Interviews with cadre 2, academic 6, academic 23 and cadre 42. 
1267 See the glossary on the “temporary transferred duty” framework. 
1268 Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP 
Cadre Appointment System,” 164. 
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grassroots, or the other way around. It can also be a way for officials from a rural area to get a 
urban working experience and vice versa.1269  
b)  From revolutionaries to political managers 
The CYL officials, are generally depicted as “generalist” cadres. This is linked to 
specific status of their position, made for future Party-State leaders. They are in that sense set 
apart from specialized civil servants who often continue their career in the same sector or 
administration, in a specific functional ministry for example. Different studies have described 
the increasing specialization of Chinese officials1270 and the development of the civil service 
system, which manages these specialized officials.1271 But little have been written regarding the 
generalist cadres destined to leadership positions and how their background evolved in the post-
Mao era. Most of the literature on the topic focused on the evolution of their educational 
background, which, as I have noted in Chapter Four, does not tell us much about their actual 
career trajectories.1272 Looking at the trajectories of CYL leaders, as trainees for future Party-
State leadership, can shed light on this evolution, unveiling what a “generalist” cadre means at 
different period of times.  
During the Mao era, central level CYL secretaries were revolutionary cadres, who 
joined the CCP during the civil war and whose previous career was mostly as local CCP and 
                                                 
1269 Interviews with cadre 29, cadre 43 and cadre 44.  
1270 This is especially clear in the dual-elite literature presented in the Introduction. See : Andrew G Walder, Bobai 
Li, and Donald J Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the 
Urban Chinese Elite, 1949 to 1996,” American Sociological Review 65, no. 2 (2000): 191–209; Zang, Elite 
Dualism and Leadership Selection in China. 
1271 I developed this literature in the Introduction. See: Burns and Wang, “Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts 
on Civil Servants’ Behaviour.” 
1272 See in particular : Li, “The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao 
China”; Li, “The Rise of the Legal Profession in the Chinese Leadership.” 
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CCP leaders or in charge of organization and propaganda.1273 They were classical revolutionary 
cadres in Jowitt’s sense, specialist in propaganda and coercion.1274 The central CYL leadership 
started to become more diverse after it restarted its activities in 1978.  
Wang Zhaoguo, who became the CYL Central Committee First Secretary in 1982 was 
directly transferred from a SOE position. He had a university diploma and was previously the 
CCP secretary of an automobile factory. He hence had a very different background than the 
classic revolutionary cadres who preceded him, such as Hu Yaobang. He could be seen as a 
“political manager” in Jowitt’s terminology, a technically trained cadre with entrepreneurial 
skills.1275 However, remnants of the Maoist past could still be found in the central level CYL 
leadership at the time. Following the important role given to the military in the latter phase of 
the Cultural Revolution, some People’s Liberation Army officers had been promoted to the 
central CYL.1276 Among the 14 members of the 10th Central CYL Secretariat (1978-1982), 2 
were directly appointed from the military: Chan Haosu and He Guangwei.1277 This tendency 
persisted for some years as in 1983 Song Defu was transferred from the Air Force to CYL 
secretary. He then became CYL Central Committee First Secretary in 1985. After Song, no 
more officers were promoted to the central level CYL leadership and the political managers 
became the norm. 
An increasing number of central CYL leaders came from outside the organization and 
had a certain technical expertise, as they for instance worked in SOEs. While some former CYL 
                                                 
1273 The eleven officials who were part of the 6th Central Youth League Secretariat, between 1949 and 1953, 
exemplify this tendency: Hu Yaobang, Xu Shiping, Liu Daosheng, Song Yiping, Luo Yi, Feng Wenbin, Liao 
Chengzhi, Jiang Nanxiang, Li Chang, Rong Gaotang. Source: official CVs found on Xinhua.cn. 
1274 Jowitt, New World Disorder. the Leninist Extinction, 98. 
1275 Ibid. 
1276 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, academic 13, and academic 18. 
1277 Source: official CVs found on Xinhua.cn. 
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secretaries already had previous experiences in SOEs, as we have seen with Wang Zhaoguo, 
this became increasingly true in the late 2010.1278 Four of the seven members of the 17th CYL 
Central Committee Secretariat, appointed in 2013, have such a background. 1279  Another 
tendency is to appoint directly as first secretaries cadres with no or little experience in the CYL. 
This is the case for the last three: Hun Chunhua appointed in 2006, Lu Hao appointed in 2008, 
and Qin Yizhi, appointed in 2013. They all have been directly transferred from a local CCP 
leadership position, and the two latter had previous working experiences in SOEs.1280 The fact 
that they have a diverse career background is valued, making them high level generalist 
cadres.1281 Cadres who did most of their career within the CYL are on the contrary rarer among 
the central level CYL leadership. In this regard, Li Keqiang, who was CYL Central Committee 
First Secretary in 1993-1998, stands as an exception as he spent all his previous career within 
the central level CYL administration.1282 
The CYL leaders increasingly fit the political manager model. They are appointed to 
this key position as the multiplicity of their experiences and their technical skills are valued by 
the Party-State. As argued by Shen, the officials who are transferred across a variety of positions 
and administrations show that they are “inter-transferable” and have strong managerial skills. 
They are therefore perfect material for leadership positions.1283 In that respect they are similar 
                                                 
1278 It was the case of Wang Zhaoguo, Hu Jintao, and Liu Yandong. Chen Liangfei (陈良飞), “From SOEs to the 
Central CYL (cong guoqi dao tuanzhongyang, 从国企到团中央),” Xinmin Weekly, August 14, 2013. 
1279 It is the case of the CYL Central Committee First Secretary Qin Yizhi, as well as He Junke, Xu Xiao, and Fu 
Zhenbang (Ibid.). 
1280 Source: official CVs found on Xinhua.cn. 
1281 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 14, and academic 18. 
1282 His CV can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Keqiang/career (consulted on 30 June 
2016).  
1283 Shen, “A Policy-Driven Elite Transformation and Its Outcomes a Case Study of the New Local Elites in China.,” 
65. 
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to the  high level officials Suleiman studied in contemporary France, who constantly move 
across very different positions in the State administration, and hence show they adaptability 
and generalist skills.1284 
In addition to their generalist features and managerial skills, the CYL cadres’ status 
within the system also lies on more traditional attributes, such as classical displays of loyalty. 
Beyond their relative youth I already mentioned, they all have joined the CCP very early, often 
within two years of their eighteenth birthday, the minimum age for joining.1285 Having joined 
at such a young age is a proof of commitment to the Party-State and to their career. They also, 
for a lot of them, have cultivated their commitment while they were student cadres in college, 
following the mechanisms I developed in the Second Part of the dissertation. In fact, four of the 
seven members of the 16th CYL Central Committee Secretariat were previously student union 
chairmen. 1286  They therefore started very early their professionalization process and have 
proven their commitment to the Party-State, which legitimize their position as future leaders.  
  
                                                 
1284 Suleiman, Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival, 174. 
1285 Looking at the different first secretaries since Wang Zhaoguo: Wang Zhaoguo joined the CCP at 23 years old, 
Hu Jintao joined at 21, Song Defu joined at 19, Li Keqiang joined at 20, Zhou Qiang joined at 18, Hu Chunhua 
joined at 20, Lu Hao joined just before turning 18, Qin Yizhi joined at 19. Source: official CVs found on Xinhua.cn. 
1286 It was the case of Lu Hao (Peking University), Yang Yue (Tsinghua University), Wang Xiao (University of 
Science and Technology of China), Lu Yongzheng (Wuhan University) (“The CYL Chooses the First Female 





I have unveiled in this chapter how the evolution of the CYL reflects the evolution of 
the Party-State and of its leaders, going from classical revolutionary cadres to political 
managers. I have stressed the specificity of the CYL experience as a cradle for future Party-
State leaders. CYL leaders are put on a specific promotion path within the Party hierarchy, 
benefitting from all the advantages of being “reserve cadres”. Getting into the details of their 
working experience, I showed that in addition to the managerial skills and the image of 
generalist they develop on the job, the CYL leaders are trained to act and behave as future Party-
State leaders. The CYL plays for this reason a key role in the Chinese polity: it turns cadres 
into leaders. After having underlined this specific role played by the CYL in a sponsored 
mobility framework towards political leadership, the next chapter replaces it in a broader 
context. It puts the uniqueness of the CYL experience into perspective, by showing that, if 
important, it often remains a professional experience among others, in complex career 
trajectories which imply a variety of personal experiences and networks.   
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Chapter 7: Complex careers, networks and political 
commitment 
This last chapter of the dissertation aims at situating the CYL experience in the broader 
context of the Chinese Party-State cadres’ trajectories. It stresses the variety of positions cadres 
go through and the multiple networks they develop in their career. The goal is not to minimize 
the importance of the League as a promotion channel but to contextualize the role it plays in 
the Chinese political system. I also underline the gap within the CYL between leading cadres 
and non-leading cadres, which entails very different personal trajectories. The leading cadres 
have a strong advantage and can often use the Party-State’s rules to their advantage. They also 
develop particularly diverse personal networks as they rotate quickly from one position to the 
next. In particular, I argue that the multiple experiences these cadres have lead them to develop 
various cross-cuttings personal ties, across administrations and locales, making it harder to 
organize in unit-based factional groups with clear common interests. 
A -  Individuals tactics and multilayered careers  
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the personal tactics Party-State officials can 
develop in order to advance their career in a highly formalized Leninist hierarchy. It highlights 
the various organizational shortcuts, in terms of recruitment procedures or gender quotas for 
instance, which can be used by young ambitious officials and in particular by CYL leaders. 
These individual tactics are shaped by the opportunities officials can access to, depending on 
their position. Despite the system’s strictness, I show that the actors can play with the rules, 
taking advantage of them and especially of their grey areas.    
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By illustrating the variety of career trajectories which can be found among CYL cadres, 
I stress the fundamental inequality which exist between leading cadres and non-leading cadres 
within the CYL, in their ability to use organizational shortcuts to their advantage and more 
broadly in their chances to be promoted. CYL leaders are in a unique position: they are favored 
by the Party-State in the current configuration, and they make sure to use it. They sometimes 
bend the rules so shamelessly that they get singled out and fall from grace. 
1)  Playing with the rules 
a)  A Leninist recruitment process and its shortcuts 
Since the mid-1980s, the Party-State has adopted a system of cadre management “one 
level downward” (xia guan yi ji, 下管一级), meaning that appointment power resides in the 
administration one rank higher. For example, a city level CCP secretary is managed by the 
provincial CCP leadership. Or, in the case of the Youth League, a city level CYL secretary is 
appointed by the city CCP leadership. By opposition to the previous system, in which the local 
appointments were managed by higher administrative levels, this one leads to more 
decentralization and local autonomy. At the same time, it gives local leaders a lot of 
appointment power over the cadres right below them.1287 According to Shen, this framework 
has led to the development of local clientelist networks. 1288 
Against this framework, Sun stressed how the Party-State developed since the 1990s, 
various procedures to try and make appointments more transparent and fairer.1289 In parallel to 
                                                 
1287 On the “one level downward” cadre management system, see: Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in 
China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era, 88; Zeng, “Democratic Procedures 
in the CCP’s Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences.” 
1288 Shen, “A Policy-Driven Elite Transformation and Its Outcomes a Case Study of the New Local Elites in China,” 
200. 
1289 Sun, “Cadre Recruitment and Corruption: What Goes Wrong?” 
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the development of the civil service exams for basic cadres, it started to experiment in the 1990s 
with the “open selection” (gongkai xuanba, 公开选拔) of leading cadres.1290 This practice, 
along with “competitive appointments” (jingzheng shanggang, 竞争上岗 ), were both 
formalized by the “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and 
Government Cadres” of 2002 (a revised version of the same regulation dating from 1995).1291 
These two methods imply the public announcement of vacant positions, open procedures for 
candidates to submit job applications and to take the related exams and evaluations. 1292 
Following the 2002 document, “competitive appointments” became the main procedure for 
promotions within an administration, whereas “open selection” became the rule for 
appointment of external candidates, such as cadres from another locale.1293 “Open selection” is 
generally limited to positions ranked as bureau director and below.1294 
Overall, these new procedures are presented in vague language, leading to large regional 
disparities in their implementation, and making them easy to manipulate.1295 In practice, the 
procedures do not drastically limit the appointment power of the local CCP leaders, and can 
even be used to cover up abuses. When drafting the job offer, the CCP leaders can for instance 
                                                 
1290 See the entry “civil service system” in the glossary regarding the separation between leading and non-leading 
cadres.  
1291 “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres (dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 23 July 2002. 
1292 On these two methods, see : Sun, “Cadre Recruitment and Corruption: What Goes Wrong?,” 63; Pieke, The 
Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 168; Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small 
Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System,” 166–168; 
Zeng, “Democratic Procedures in the CCP’s Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences,” 78. 
1293 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 29, and cadre 44. See also : “Work Regulation for the Promotion and 
Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres (dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo 
tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 23 July 2002; Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite 
Training and State Building in Today’s China, 168. 
1294 Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP 
Cadre Appointment System,” 167. 
1295 Zeng, “Democratic Procedures in the CCP’s Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences,” 78. 
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get into so much details that only a handful of people can apply, reserving the position for a 
specific person. Appointment power over leadership positions remains largely in the hand of 
the local CCP secretary.1296   
While it does not fundamentally alter the concentration of power in the hands of CCP 
leaders, the mechanism of open selection can be used by ambitious young officials in order to 
accelerate their career. Any cadre who fulfils the conditions on the job description can apply to 
the position. The conditions generally include a minimum administrative rank (the selection 
process is only for people already in the system), a maximum age, a minimum level of education 
and a certain professional experience. Any cadre who fulfils the criteria can apply, leading 
sometimes to the appointment of individuals who were not already on the reserve cadre list for 
a position, because they were based in another locale for instance.1297  
Open selection also often facilitates “non-regulation promotions” (poge tiba, 破格提
拔). Non-regulation promotions are cadre transfers which do not follow tenure regulations. In 
particular, it happens when a cadre is promoted to a higher ranked position before having 
completed his five-year term at the lower level, as normally mandated.1298 Open selection is 
one of the main ways to circumvent these rules and to get promoted faster in the Party-State 
hierarchy. For example, a young official is often allowed to candidate to an open selection 
process for a division director ranked position, even though he has only worked for a year or 
two in a deputy division director position.1299 The CYL officials being young and often highly 
                                                 
1296 Interviews with cadre 2 and cadre 9. See also : Sun, “Cadre Recruitment and Corruption: What Goes Wrong?,” 
68. 
1297 Tsai and Kou, “The Party’s Disciples: CCP Reserve Cadres and the Perpetuation of a Resilient Authoritarian 
Regime,” 16. 
1298 See Chapter Two regarding the tenure regulations for officials. 
1299 Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP 
Cadre Appointment System,” 166. 
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ranked for their age, they are in a perfect position to use this organizational shortcut. According 
to my interviews they very often do so.1300  
In addition to open selections, other Party-State regulations can be tactically used to 
accelerate one’s career. In particular, gender quotas for officials have been institutionalized in 
the Party-State hierarchy since the early 2000s. While mechanisms have been set up to push for 
the recruitment of female CCP members and cadres since the 1950s, it is in 2001 that a 
document formalized the use of gender quotas.1301 The “Opinion regarding the improvement of 
the training and promotion of female cadres and the development of female CCP members” 
established that the leadership teams of CCP committees and government organs, at the various 
echelons of the Party-State, must include at least one female official. It also set minimum ratio 
of female officials to be included in reserve cadres list: they must for instance represent 20% 
of the lists at the county level.1302 These quotas being relatively recent, they mainly impacted 
the ratio of women among young leading cadres, and in particular within the CYL. There were 
22.4% female among the provincial CYL secretaries between 2003 and 2013, whereas the ratio 
was below 10% according to Pan Teng for equivalent positions in other administrations.1303 
The document also insists on the promotion of female officials from an ethnic minority 
and who are not CCP members, meaning generally that they are members of one of the eight 
                                                 
1300 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. See also: Ibid., 166. 
1301 Xiajuan Guo and Yongnian Zheng, “Women’s political participation in China”, The University of Nottingham 
China Policy institute, Briefing Series, Issue 34, January 2008. 
1302 “Opinion Regarding the Improvement of the Training and Promotion of Female Cadres and the Development 
of Female CCP Members (guanyu jinyibu zuohao peiyang xuanba nü ganbu, fazhan nü dangyuan gongzuo de 
yijian, 关于进一步做好培养选拔女干部、发展女党员工作的意见),” Central CCP Organization Department, 
2001. 
1303 Pan Teng (潘腾), “A Cohort of Young CCP Officials (Zhonggong nianqing ganbu tidui, 中共年轻干部梯
队).” 
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democratic parties.1304 Quotas in fact also exist for many subgroups and to be part of several of 
them at the same time is particularly positive for promotion.1305 This can shape individual 
tactics. A female interviewee, who is also part of an ethnic minority, explained that it was not 
a good strategy for her to become a CCP member. Instead, she applied to membership in one 
of the democratic parties as to better fit the quotas and get appointed more easily as an official. 
By recruiting her, an administration would check three boxes at a time.1306 This testimony is a 
perfect example of how cadres play with the rules to their advantage. 
b)  Rocket promotions and public opinion scrutiny 
Some officials climb so quickly the Party-State hierarchy, using the organizational 
shortcuts I described, that they attract the attention of the public and the media. The “rocket 
promotion” (huojian tiba, 火箭提拔) of Sun Jingjing is a good example. At 25 years old she 
became in 2009 deputy CYL secretary of Taizhou City in Jiangsu, a deputy division director 
position she reached after only two years of working experience. This case attracted a lot of 
attention online, as the forums discussing her case had more than 15,000 views in a few days, 
and internet users started to look for explanations for this extremely quick promotion. An article 
from the China Youth Daily, the CYL’s official newspaper, developed the details of her 
trajectory and the rumors which could be found online. While published by an official 
                                                 
1304 On the eight democratic parties which are part of the CCP’s united front strategy, see Chapter One. Also see: 
Groot, Managing Transitions the Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony. 
1305 Interviews with cadre 9 and cadre 29. See also : Shih, Adolph, and Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist 
Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” 
1306 Interview with student 5. 
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newspaper, the article appears balanced and reliable as it does not sugarcoat the story but widely 
presents the negative comments regarding Sun’s case. 1307  
 Coming back to Sun’s career, right after graduating from college in 2006 she passed 
the exam in order to get into the “assigned graduates” program, which I discussed in Chapter 
Three. Under this specific trainee procedure, she was sent to work in a township level 
administration, and after a few months she was promoted as county level deputy CYL secretary. 
She eventually became the county’s CYL secretary, a section director position, and from there 
applied in 2008 to the open selection process for the position of Taizhou City CYL Committee 
Deputy Secretary. The job description listed that the applicant had to be less than 30 years old, 
be female, be posted in Jiangsu Province, and be ranked as deputy section director or above. 
Sun checked all the boxes.1308 
The internet discussion reported by the China Youth Daily article revolved around her 
limited previous experiences and the selection process itself. She was selected before 
completing the minimum two full years of work in the “assigned graduates” framework. In 
addition, she was finally selected for the position among twenty candidates, even thought she 
had only the fifth best grade on the written exam. The oral interview, which counts for 60% of 
the overall grade whereas the written exam counts for 40%, brought her to the top of the list. 
Internet users questioned the objectivity of such interviews and if she had enough previous 
experience to get to such a highly-ranked position. While the selection process was highly 
criticized, some users took her defense on the forums, highlighting that there was no evidence 
of grave manipulation. They also stressed that the selection committee made interviews among 
her former colleagues to know more about their work, and appointed her with all the necessary 
                                                 
1307 “The Whole Story of the Appointment of a 25-year-old as a Deputy Division Director (25 sui fuchu renzhi 
shimo, 25岁副处任职始末),” China Youth Daily, February 4, 2009. 
1308 Ibid. 
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information. 1309  These debates highlight how the career of young officials, and rocket 
promotions especially, attract public attention. This case is also particularly interesting as Sun 
used almost all the organizational shortcuts we have so far listed, from the “assigned graduates” 
system, to the open selection, and including gender quotas.  
Rocket promotions are sometimes so exceptional that they become the target of internal 
discipline inquiries which can end a cadre’s career. This was the case of Chang Junsheng who 
became deputy CYL secretary of a county in Anhui Province at 22 years old. He got appointed 
in 2013 through an open selection process, only six months after graduating from college. His 
case also attracted a lot of attention, revealing that he did not have the necessary working 
experience as listed in the job description and that his father was a mid-level official in the same 
county. The internet users were particularly active in denouncing the apparent nepotistic 
practices, finally leading to Chang’s demise.1310 
The family background was also put forward by internet users in the case of Jiang 
Zhongyong, who at 27 years old replaced his father as vice-governor of a county in Guangdong. 
He benefitted from “non-regulation promotions” several times in a row, leading to this 
appointment in 2011. He was eventually dismissed in 2013. The same happened to Xu Tao in 
Hunan. At 27 years old, she became county vice-governor, in 2012. An investigation by the 
local authorities unveiled that both her parents were officials in the same county and that her 
resume was full of holes. These two cadres who got dismissed both had previous experiences 
in the CYL, which helped to accelerate their career.1311 
                                                 
1309 Ibid. 
1310 “The Discipline and Inspection Commission Investigates the Selection Process of a Cadre Born after 1990 in 
Wangjiang County” (jiwei diaocha Wangjiang 90 hou ganbu xuanba jingguo, 纪委调查望江90后干部选拔经
过),” China Youth Daily, May 16, 2013. 
1311 Ibid. 
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These extreme cases illustrate the ways in which young officials can use organizational 
shortcuts, and sometimes personal ties, to rotate quickly from one position to another and to 
accelerate their career. My interviews reflected this obsession with fas rotations and promotions, 
presented as the only way to overcome the age limits presented in Chapter Two.1312 Often, the 
cadres benefiting from rocket promotions only stay a short period of time in their various 
positions and cannot be evaluated on their work. When they go through an open selection 
process, they are therefore mainly appointed based on their rank, age and diplomas.1313  
Under Xi Jinping, the opportunities for rocket promotions have declined. In particular, 
the revised version of the “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading 
Party and Government Cadres”, published in 2014, reemphasizes the necessity to have a 
grassroots working experience as well as step-by-step promotions. It also narrows the scope of 
“open selections”: it can now only be used when the local Party-State units cannot find suitable 
candidates internally, and no longer to transfer candidates across provinces.1314 
Overall “non-regulation promotions” become rarer and officials deemphasize the 
importance of age in the selection process. The most recent development program regarding 
leading cadres has in fact underlined that age limits should not be used too strictly for individual 
transfers.1315 The goal put forward by my interviewees and the media is to limit the abuses 
linked to this specific appointment method, illustrated by the cases above.1316 At the same time, 
                                                 
1312 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. 
1313 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. See also: “Are Cadres Getting Younger? (ganbu 
yuelaiyue nianqing?, 干部越来越年轻?),” Southern Weekend, February 4, 2012. 
1314 “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres (dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 15 January 
2014. 
1315 “Development Program Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 2014-2018 
(2014-2018 nian quanguo dangzheng lingdao banzi jianshe guihua gangyao, 2014-2018 年全国党政领导班子
建设规划纲要),” Central Office of the CCP, 25 December 2014. 
1316 Interviews with cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. See also: “The Selection of 
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this evolution reinforces the personnel selection power of the CCP secretary at every echelon 
by limiting the use of procedures which are malleable but push for some transparency by listing 
clear selection criteria. From my interviewees’ perspective, it has a particularly negative 
influence on young officials’ careers, including CYL cadres, as it limits the opportunities to 
accelerate their promotion.1317 However, these changes are still very new and their full-fledge 
effects have yet to be felt within the Party-State hierarchy. 
2)  A variety of individual trajectories 
a)  A dual-track promotion system 
While individual cadres can develop personal tactics using the organizational rules to 
their advantage, their options largely depend on the position they already occupy. For CYL 
officials in particular, there is a clear dual track system separating the secretaries and deputy 
secretaries from other CYL officials at all echelons. The formers have much more career 
opportunities. As we have seen in Chapter One, the CYL leaders, secretaries and deputy 
secretaries are, at every administrative echelon, answerable to the CCP leadership at the same 
level. A provincial level CYL secretary is for instance selected by the provincial CCP Standing 
Committee. On the contrary, the lower ranked CYL cadres, the department directors and below, 
are managed by the organization itself. They are appointed by the CYL leaders.1318 This dual 
                                                 
Young Cadres Becomes More Severe! (Xuanba nianqing ganbu, yanle !, 选拔年轻干部，严了!),” China Youth 
Daily, August 22, 2014. 
1317 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. 
1318  See : Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠 ), “Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical 
Perspective on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu 
- Zhongguo Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治
功能的一个考察视角),” 188. 
 405 
track reflects the distinction between leading cadres and non-leading cadres which can be found 
in the entire Chinese system.1319 
The lower level CYL cadres have limited career options in this configuration. They 
cannot rely on the CCP leadership and the CCP’s Organization Department to promote them. 
Most of their promotion options are within the CYL itself. They therefore stay longer than the 
CYL leaders within the organization itself, but as they age this becomes problematic.1320 When 
they start to reach the age limits for CYL positions, they need to be transferred to another 
organization.1321 However, the CYL Organization Department often does not have the means 
to help them looking for another position and they must do it themselves. The career trajectories 
of lower level CYL cadres highly depend on the opportunities they manage to find themselves 
and on the help CYL leaders are willing to provide them, by talking about their case to CCP 
leaders for instance. However, the CYL leaders often stay in their position only for a short 
amount of time and do not develop very strong ties with their subordinates.1322 It leads to a large 
disparity in terms of career trajectories among these lower level officials.  
On the contrary, the CYL leaders can be appointed to very diverse positions under the 
control of the CCP leadership at the same level. They often benefit from the rocket promotions 
that I just developed. However, some differences can also be found even among CYL leaders. 
On the one hand, the secretaries are generally transferred to the CYL from another unit, a SOE 
                                                 
1319 On the distinction between leading and non-leading cadres, see the entry “civil service system” in the glossary.  
1320 Interviews with Cadre 2, cadre 16, academic 18, cadre 29. 
1321 On the age limits within the CYL, see Chapter Two. 
1322 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 16, and cadre 29. See also: Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational 
Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical Perspective on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist 
Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha 
shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个考察视角),” 156; Li Wei (李伟), Reflections on the 
Position Transfers of Former Communist Youth League Cadres (huimou Gongqingtuan suiyue: zhuanyehou de 
sikao, 回眸共青团岁月：转业后的思考), 165. 
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or a CCP department for example, and are often appointed from the CYL to a leading position 
in the Party-State. On the other hand, the deputy secretaries are often promoted from within the 
CYL and rotate less quickly.1323 
This diversity of individual situations is reflected in the differences of rank among 
leaders, very clear at the central level. In the central CYL, the first secretary is ranked as a 
minister, the executive secretary is ranked as a deputy minister and the other five or so 
secretaries are ranked as bureau directors.1324 As a result, these cadres have very different career 
trajectories. The central CYL first secretaries are, as described in the previous chapter, often 
transferred from another administration. Given the rank and age limits linked to the position, 
only a handful of candidates are fit countrywide. After their time in the CYL, they are appointed 
to another minister or deputy minister level position within the Party-State, most of them as 
local leaders. They all became province leaders since Li Keqiang who headed the League 
between 1993 and 1998.1325  
While to a lesser degree than the first secretaries, the executive secretaries also tend to 
have very successful career trajectories. However, they stay longer in the CYL, and often have 
a previous experience in the organization. They are in practice the real leaders of the central 
CYL, they take care of the functioning of the organization, while the first secretaries have a 
more representative function and tend to be focused on their more powerful position to 
come.1326   
                                                 
1323 Interviews with cadre 16, cadre 42, cadre 43, and cadre 44. 
1324 At the local level, the deputy secretaries all have the same rank but a parallel hierarchy exists: the CYL 
executive deputy secretary is at the same time the deputy secretary of the CYL’s “Party team” (dangzu, 党组), 
while the other CYL deputy secretaries are only members of the team. The CYL secretary is “Party team” secretary 
(Interviews with cadre 9, cadre 14, cadre 43). On the role played historically by Party teams in the different Party-
State administrations, see: Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, 16. 
1325 Source: official CVs found on Xinhua.cn. 
1326 Interviews with cadre 9, cadre 14 and academic 18. 
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Overall, central CYL secretaries and executive secretaries are set on a trajectory towards 
high positions in the Party-State hierarchy, especially as they are young for their rank. Between 
1978 and 2011, central CYL first secretaries were 40 years old on average. Other central CYL 
officials waited on average until 53 years old to get a position similarly ranked as ministerial, 
if they ever did. Executive secretaries were 40 years old on average over the period, and if they 
did, other central CYL officials generally obtained a position similarly ranked as deputy 
ministerial at 48 years old on average.1327 
b)  The Youth League as a political springboad 
The CYL is not an autonomous promotion channel within the Chinese political system. 
The CYL leaders are not selected by the organization itself and, as a result, they often come 
from outside the CYL and get transferred to another Party-State unit after a few years in their 
position. Instead of a separate promotion channel, the CYL can be used at different points in 
time as a springboard in a cadres’ career trajectory: one can be transferred to a leadership 
position in the CYL for few years by the relevant Party committee in order to further advance 
in the hierarchy. The former CYL leaders rotate rapidly from one leadership post to the next. 
Such transfers are key in order to get rapidly promoted and to not fall into the trap of age limits 
described in Chapter Two.1328  
Some cadres therefore spend only a short amount of time in the CYL, once in their 
career, as a way to access more rapidly high level positions in the Party-State. This was the case 
of Liao Fei, for instance, who has been since 2015 Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology of Guizhou Province. As we can see in Table 7.1 below, between 2002 and 2006 
                                                 
1327 Kou, “The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and Their Paths to the Top,” 148. 
1328 On this issue, see: Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age 
Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System.” 
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Liao was the Guizhou CYL Committee Secretary, without any previous experience in the 
organization. It was for him a way to transfer from a previous career in an SOE to a local 
leadership position. As a provincial level CYL leader, he became a reserve cadre for local Party-
State positions and was appointed as CCP Deputy Secretary of Qianxinan Prefecture in Guizhou. 
Liao Fei followed the common practice described in the previous chapter and participated in 
specific training programs while he was in the CYL and a reserve cadre.1329 In particular, he 
followed a one year “young cadre training course” at the Central Party School in 2004-2005.1330 
Liao Fei is a good illustration of the various backgrounds CYL cadres can emerge from.1331 
Table 7.1 : Career of Liao Fei1332 
1333 
1993  College graduation (23 years old) 
   1993—1996  Technician, Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation (23 years old) 
1996—2000   Deputy Director, Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation, Base 11, Design Institute (26 years old) 
2000—2002   Director, Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation, Base 11, Design Institute (29 years old) 
2002—2006   Secretary, CYL Committee of Guizhou Province (31 years old) 
2006—2012   Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Qianxinan Prefecture (35 years old) 
2012—2015   Governor, Qianxinan Prefecture (41 years old) 
2015—Now   Director, Guizhou Province Office of Science and Technology (44 years old)  
                                                 
1329 On reserve cadres, see Chapter Six. 
1330 His official resume can be found here: 
http://district.ce.cn/newarea/sddy/201509/25/t20150925_6585055.shtml (consulted on 7 June 2016). 
1331 On this issue, see also : Pan Teng (潘腾), “A Cohort of Young CCP Officials (Zhonggong nianqing ganbu 
tidui, 中共年轻干部梯队).” 
1332 Source: http://district.ce.cn/newarea/sddy/201509/25/t20150925_6585055.shtml (consulted on 7 June 2016). 
1333 His official resume can be found here: 
http://district.ce.cn/newarea/sddy/201509/25/t20150925_6585055.shtml (consulted on 7 June 2016). 
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Officials can also go back and forth between leadership positions in the CYL and the 
CCP at various administrative levels. For instance, CYL secretaries at the county level are often 
promoted as CCP leader of a township. From there they can get to the city level CYL committee 
and so on. Until they get to ministerial level positions they often stay within the same province 
as they are managed by the local CCP Organization Department. By rotating quickly back and 
forth between CCP and CYL positions, the cadres keep their age advantage within the Party-
State hierarchy and at the same time can develop their local leadership experiences.1334  
Chen Changxu, whose resume is summarized in Table 7.2 below, exemplifies this 
trajectory. From the village to the city level, he went back and forth between CYL and CCP 
positions at every step. Interestingly, Chen extensively used his time in the CYL as a training 
period, not only politically but also academically. Chen Changxu had no university degree when 
he started his career in 1988 but he went to several training programs while in the CYL. 
Between 1994 and 2006, he followed three long-term programs at the provincial and central 
levels Party schools. Then in 2008-2010, he followed a Master program in management co-
organized by a Canadian university. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CYL leaders 
have numerous training opportunities as reserve cadres. In addition to improve his education, 
his constant rotation allowed Chen to become Mayor of Bijie City, a bureau director level 
position, at only 42 years old.1335  
                                                 
1334 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 18, and cadre 42. 
1335 The difference with the trajectory of a normally successful cadre as illustrated in Table 2.1 is striking: the 
presumed age of promotion for such a position is 55 years old.  
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Table 7.2 : Career of Chen Changxu1336 
1337 
1988—1991   Secretary, CYL Committee of Yanping Village (Guizhou Province) (18 years old) 
1991—1993   Vice-Governor, Government of Yanping Village (Guizhou Province) (21 years old) 
1993—1995   Vice-Governor, Government of Kuankuo Township (Guizhou Province) (23 years old) 
1995—1997   Secretary, CYL Committee of Suiyang County (Guizhou Province) (25 years old) 
1997—1998   Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Wang Cao Township (Guizhou Province) (27 years old) 
1998—2000   Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of Zunyi City (Guizhou Province) (28 years old) 
2000—2001   Secretary, CYL Committee of Zunyi City (30 years old) 
2001—2002   Deputy Secretary, CCP Committee of Zheng’an County (Guizhou Province) (31 years old) 
2002—2007   Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of Guizhou Province (32 years old) 
2007—2011   Secretary, CYL Committee of Guizhou Province (37 years old) 
2011—2012   Deputy Secretary, Qian’nan Autonomous Prefecture (Guizhou Province) (41 years old) 
2012—Now   Mayor, Bijie City (Guizhou Province) (42 years old) 
 
Some officials also climb the ranks and reach leadership positions within the CYL itself, 
even though this is less common due to the organization’s lack of autonomy. They generally 
start at a lower ranked position in a specific department, by opposition to a grassroots leadership 
position, and make their way up within the organization. Wan Wenhua has taken this career 
path, having worked her way over fifteen years from a very bottom position in the Jiangsu 
Province CYL Committee, up to becoming the CYL secretary. Notably, before Wan Wenhua 
was promoted to the provincial CYL leadership, she spent the year 2009 as county level CCP 
deputy secretary in Jiangsu, through the “temporary transferred duty” framework. As we have 
                                                 
1336 His official resume can be found here: http://gbzl.people.com.cn/grzy.php?id=140400264 (consulted on 7 June 
2016). 
1337 Source: http://gbzl.people.com.cn/grzy.php?id=140400264 (consulted on 7 June 2016). 
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seen in the previous chapter, temporary transferred duty is very common for young officials, 
and reserve cadres in particular, in order to discover a new position for a few months. In the 
case of Wan Wenhua, as she was coming from a specific department in the CYL and not a 
generalist position, an experience as a local leader was a necessary step in order for her to get 
to a leadership position in the CYL.  
Table 7.3 : Career of Wan Wenhua1338 
1339 
               1996  College graduation (22 years old) 
1996—2000  Cadre, Propaganda Department of the CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (22 years old) 
2000—2001  Cadre, General Office of the CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (26 years old) 
2001—2002  Assistant to the Director, General Office of the CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (27 years old) 
2002—2003  Cadre, Urban Work Department of the CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (28 years old) 
2003—2005  Deputy Director, Youth Right Department of the CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (29 years old) 
2005—2007  Director, United Front Work Department of the CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (31 years old) 
2007—2011  Deputy Secretary, CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (33 years old) 
2011—Now   Secretary, CYL Committee of Jiangsu Province (37 years old) 
 
However, trajectories such as Wan Wenhuan’s are rare. The separation between leading 
and non-leading positions is not really permeable, especially within the CYL. By opposition to 
the secretaries who are managed by the CCP Organization Department, lower ranked cadres 
within the CYL have to be more proactive if they want to get promoted. They must be noticed 
                                                 
1338 Her official resume can be found here: http://cpc.people.com.cn/gbzl/html/130400024.html (consulted on 7 
March 2016). 
1339 Source: http://cpc.people.com.cn/gbzl/html/130400024.html (consulted on 7 March 2016). 
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by the CCP leaders in order to be appointed to a leadership position.1340 It is overall uncommon 
for CYL leaders to have spent a long and continuous period of time in the organization. In that 
respect, Li Keqiang or Jiang Daming, respectively former first secretary and former secretary 
of the central CYL between 1993 and 1998, stand as exceptions.1341 Li worked in the central 
CYL from 1983 to 19981342 and Jiang from 1982 to 1998.1343  
While it is often used as a political springboard, the CYL is generally a step in a cadres’ 
career rather than a specific and parallel promotion channel. As such, it is hard to determine a 
unique overreaching identity common to CYL cadres, which would link them together. They 
instead, are part of large networks of relationships which include the diversity of cadres they 
encounter in their career. 
  
                                                 
1340 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 18, and cadre 42. 
1341 They are exceptional compared to the trajectory of other central CYL secretaries since 1982. Source: official 
CVs found on Xinhua.cn.  
1342 His resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Keqiang/career (consulted on 30 
June 2016). 
1343 His official resume can be found here: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9684/5863436.html (consulted on 7 July 2016). 
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B -  Crosscutting ties and commitment to the Party-State 
After having presented in the first part of this chapter the complex careers of Chinese 
officials and the specific role the CYL can play in these trajectories, I now turn to the personal 
ties they cultivate throughout their career. As I have developed in the Introduction, a large 
literature focuses on the role played by personal relationships in Chinese politics. In particular, 
having personal ties to the good officials is largely presented as a key factor for promotion.1344 
However, personal relationships are also important in terms of information sharing and in 
creating mutual engagements and obligations.1345 As underlined by Sawicki and Duriez through 
the example of trade-union members in contemporary France, the relationships of mutual 
engagements one develops within an organization eventually strengthen one’s personal 
commitment to the organization itself. 1346 Exit becomes costlier as leaving the organization 
often means losing the personal network that goes with it. More broadly and as I have stressed 
in the Introduction, the denser the personal ties are within an organization, the stronger is the 
commitment to the organization. 
Through this approach, I highlight in the second part of this chapter how the officials’ 
trajectories, which are largely shaped by the organization’s rules, lead to diverse personal 
networks, which in turn transform their personal commitment to the Party-State. Focusing first 
on the CYL experience itself I show that the specific status of the organization and its 
decentralized structure lead to the establishment of relatively weak ties among the CYL officials 
                                                 
1344 See in particular : Balme, Entre soi: l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the 
power elite in contemporary China]; Shih, Adolph, and Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining 
the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” 
1345 Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie, and David L Wank, eds., Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and 
the Changing Nature of Guanxi (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Balme, Entre 
soi: l’élite du pouvoir dans la Chine contemporaine [Self-segregation: the power elite in contemporary China]. 
1346 Sawicki and Duriez, “Réseaux de sociabilité et adhésion syndicale. Le cas de la CFDT [Social Networks and 
Trade-Union Membership. the Case of CFDT].” 
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themselves. I also stress that these ties are only one part of the story, as throughout their 
complex careers the cadres develop a multiplicity of crosscutting ties linking them to numerous 
cadres, largely outside the CYL, and channeling their personal commitment to the Party-State 
as a whole rather than to the CYL itself. Overall, by focusing on these crosscutting ties among 
officials we can better analysis the overall cohesion of a segmented Party organization. 
1)  Weak ties within a decentralized organization 
a)  Superficial meetings across Youth League units 
In Chapter One I have shown that compared to CCP units at the same echelon, upper 
level CYL units have only little power over the lower ones. The CCP is in charge of the 
appointment and promotion of CYL leaders. However, CYL officials from the different levels 
meet rather frequently, which creates a network across hierarchical lines. They meet in 
particular during the CYL congresses and CYL committee plenums at the different echelons. 
At the CYL National Congress assembled every five years, around 1,500 representatives from 
the various parts of the country are brought together.1347 They are sent by the numerous CYL 
units in locales and other structures, such as universities or SOEs. They select a CYL Central 
Committee which includes around 200 full representatives and 120 alternate ones.1348 The ones 
who are selected to become part of the CYL Central Committee itself meet more often, at least 
once a year for the plenum.1349 To have a better idea of who are the CYL Central Committee 
members, I looked at the ones sent to the 10th (1978-1982), 11th (1982-1988) and 12th (1988-
                                                 
1347 See for example : “The 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingniantuan di shiqi quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十七次全国代表大会).” 
1348 The list of CYL Central Committee members can be found here: “Previous sessions of the central CYL (lijie 
tuan zhongyang, 历届团中央).” 
1349 See for instance : “The fifth plenum of the 17th Congress of the CYL  (Gongqingtuan shiqi jie wu zhongquanhui 
bimu, 共青团十七届五中全会闭幕)”, China Youth Daily, 18 January 2016. 
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1993) CYL Central Committees by the various CYL units from Jiangsu Province. It included 
each time between five and ten full members as well as around two alternate members. They 
generally included the provincial level CYL secretary, one provincial deputy secretary, and the 
Nanjing City CYL Committee Secretary. The others were sent either by CYL committees of 
smaller cities in the province or of SOEs and universities.1350  
These meetings are also reproduced at the lower level of the hierarchy, which creates 
the same kind of links within locales. The Nanjing CYL for example organizes its congress 
every five years, which include around 400 representatives. They come from the various lower 
CYL committees, including the various districts, counties, SOEs, schools as well as CYL units 
in city level administrations. They then choose a committee of around 50 full members and 10 
alternates.1351 Compared to the central level, these cadres have more chances to meet frequently 
as they often work in the same city.1352 
In addition to these major meetings, more specific ones are organized at the various 
levels of the organization, bringing together different categories of officials. The central level 
CYL organizes, for example, meetings bringing together a specific group of officials, such as 
the youngest CYL officials or the CYL provincial secretaries for example, as well as functional 
meetings on a timely topic, which bring together the central and provincial level officials in 
                                                 
1350 Compilation Committee for local records of Jiangsu Province (Jiangsu sheng difangzhi pianzuan weiyuanhui, 
江苏省地方志篇纂委员会), Local Records of Jiangsu Province - Records on Social Groups - Volume on Youth 
Organizations (Jiangsu sheng zhi - shetuanzhi - qingnian tuanti pian, 江苏省志－社团志－青年团体篇), 130–
131. 
1351 Various considerations enter in the selection of the congress representatives. Specifically, 60% of them must 
be CYL officials, while the rest are only CYL members. In addition, there should not be more than 70% of CCP 
members and there should be at least 25% of female representatives. Specific groups also have to be represented 
such as the ethnic minorities, the military, and the CYL members from non-public firms. See: “Notice Regarding 
the Selection of Representatives for the 16th Congress of the Nanjing CYL (guanyu zuohao Gongqingtuan Nanjing 
shi di shiliu ci daibiao dahui daibiao xuanju gongzuo de tongzhi, 关于做好共青团南京市第十六次代表大会代表
选举工作的通知),” Nanjing CYL, 2007. 
1352 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. 
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charge of internet or of united front policies for instance. 1353  The local CYL committees 
organize similar meetings, as well as others, including gatherings of all the CYL leaders from 
one area as to present them the overall direction taken by the local CYL.1354 Finally, the CYL 
committees at the different levels also organize exceptional ceremonies to commemorate a 
specific event. The central CYL set up for example a massive ceremony bringing together 
numerous CYL cadres for the 90th anniversary of the organization in 2012.1355 
Overall, these meetings organized by the CYL itself allow the CYL leaders from various 
units and locales to meet. Even though they do not necessarily have the time to build strong 
relationships, they become aware of each other. These meetings obviously coexist with others 
organized by the CCP, or the different units the CYL officials are part of. However, they are 
rather unique as they bring together people from various levels of administration, whereas other 
meetings are more locally focused according to my interviews.1356  
In addition to these meetings, CYL officials from various levels can also meet through 
evaluations. The upper level CYL units evaluate on a yearly basis the lower level leaders, which 
can imply visits and inquiries when they must account for the implementation of activities 
proposed by the central CYL.1357 The central CYL leaders can for instance visit a specific locale 
                                                 
1353 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. See for 
instance: “The Central Administration of the CYL Held the 38th Study and Discussion Meeting for Young Cadres 
(tuan zhongyang jiguan juban di sanshiba ci nianqing ganbu xuexi jiaoliu hui, 团中央机关举办第三十八次年轻
干部学习交流会),” China Youth Daily, September 29, 2012; “A Meeting on the CYL United Front Work is 
Convened in Beijing (Gongqingtuan tongzhan gongzuo huiyi zai Jing zhaohui, 共青团统战工作会议在京召开),” 
China Youth Daily, April 19, 2012.  
1354 See for instance : “The 2015 Meeting for City-wide CYL Work Starts (2015 nian quanshi gongqingtuan 
gongzuo huiyi zhaokai, 2015年全市共青团工作会议召开),” Beijing CYL WeChat account, March 31, 2015.  
1355 “The Commemorative Ceremony for the 90th Anniversary of the CYL is Solemnly Held in Beijing (jinian 
Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan chengli 90 nian dahui zai Jing longzhong juxing, 纪念中国共产主义青
年团成立90周年大会在京隆重举行),” China Youth Daily, May 5, 2012. 
1356 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 42, and cadre 43. 
1357 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. 
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to investigate their development and new projects. For example, Lu Hao, then CYL Central 
Committee First Secretary, visited the Guizhou Province CYL Committee for five days in 2009: 
in addition to meeting with the provincial CYL leaders, he visited districts and villages; he also 
went to CYL units in SOEs and universities, and to the office in charge of the Chunhui project, 
specific to Guizhou Province.1358  
These evaluations and visits are not determinant for the local cadres’ careers, as their 
professional fate is in the hand of local CCP leaders instead of upper level CYL units. The 
reports made by CYL units can however influence greatly the CCP leaders in one direction or 
another. 1359  The upper level CYL units also deliver prizes to CYL committees and CYL 
branches, as well as to CYL officials. These can also positively influence the way the cadres 
are evaluated by the relevant CCP organization.1360 But overall, these meetings and inspections 
remain punctual events and the CYL officials from various levels cannot really develop 
personal ties through them. Training programs are, by contrast, more important in terms of 
network building. 
  
                                                 
1358 On the Chunhui project, see Chapter Six. On Lu Hao’s visit, see: CYL Committee of Guizhou Province, ed., 
History of the Youth Movement in Guizhou (1998-2009) (Guizhou qingnian yundong shi 1998-2009, 贵州青年运
动史 1998-2009) (Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press, 2010), 197–203. 
1359 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 42, and cadre 43. See also : Kou, “The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and 
Their Paths to the Top,” 153. 
1360 The CYL Central Committee for instance selects every year a number of “national level exceptional CYL 
cadres” (quanguo youxiu tuan ganbu, 全国优秀团干部 ) and of “national level may fourth red flag CYL 
committees” (quanguo wusi hongqi tuanwei, 全国五四红旗团委). This last award is named in reference to the 
movement of May 4th 1919 (interviews with cadre 2 and cadre 7). See also : Central Communist Youth League, 
Yearbook of the Chinese Communist Youth League 2012 (Zhongguo Gongqingtuan nianjian 2012, 中国共青团年
鉴 2012), 246–248.  
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b)  Training programs as a networking tool 
I developed in Chapter Six the numerous training options CYL leaders have as reserve 
cadres. These trainings mostly take place in the CCP and CYL schools at the various levels. 
Focusing on the content of these programs, I did not yet analyze their networking value, which 
should not be overlooked. Various studies on the Party schools have stressed how strong ties 
are often developed among officials who spend together several months of training. 1361 They 
underlined that during the training programs, the students live in the dormitories of the Party 
schools and can only go back home during weekends. They also spend most of their daytime 
with one another, either in class or in team building activities.1362 These studies also stressed 
how important is this networking aspect of the training from the cadres’ own perspective.1363 
Citing one of her interviewees, Emilie Tran suggested that the secret wish of any official when 
going to a Party school was to be in the same cohort as cadres that it might be useful to know 
in the future.1364 
This networking aspect is also important in the case of CYL school trainings, which 
bring CYL officials together.1365 This is in particular true for CYL leaders, who benefit the most 
from these trainings. We have seen in the previous chapter that, starting in the 1990s, 
quantitative targets have been set for the training of CYL leaders from the various 
                                                 
1361 Shambaugh, “Training China’s Political Elite: The Party School System,” 827–844. 
1362 Emilie Tran, “From Senior Official to Top Civil Servant: An Enquiry into the Shanghai Party School,” China 
Perspectives, no. 46 (2003): 27–40. 
1363 See in particular : Ibid.; Shambaugh, “Training China’s Political Elite: The Party School System”; Pieke, The 
Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China. 
1364 Tran, “École du parti et formation des élites dirigeantes en Chine [Party school and ruling elite formation in 
China],” 137. 
1365 By opposition to the Central Party School’s “young cadre training course” for instance which brings together 
CYL leaders but also cadres from numerous Party-State administrations. 
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administrative levels. While programs for the local CYL leaders already existed,1366 they were 
more clearly formalized at the time, and especially by the Central CYL School. A program of 
one to two months was set up by the school for county level CYL leaders and other CYL cadres 
of similar rank, such as CYL leaders from schools and small SOEs. Between 1990 and 1997, 
1182 were trained. Another program of similar length was set up for city level CYL leaders, 
and other CYL cadres of similar rank. Over the same period, 528 were trained. A shorter 
training program, of ten days, was set up then for provincial level CYL secretaries. It was 
organized twice over the same seven years.1367 These different trainings are still regularly 
organized nowadays.1368 In 2012 for example, 205 city level CYL leaders came to Beijing for 
a joint training. In addition to meeting each other, this was the occasion for them to interact 
with the central level CYL leaders, who chaired the training.1369 
The Central CYL School also organizes training programs for lower level cadres on 
certain issues, or targeted at specific groups. It has for instance trainings for ethnic minority 
                                                 
1366 Training programs for county level CYL leaders existed in the 1950s and 1960s at the Central Party School 
for instance. See : Compilation Committee for local records of Jiangsu Province (Jiangsu sheng difangzhi 
pianzuan weiyuanhui, 江苏省地方志篇纂委员会), Local Records of Jiangsu Province - Records on Social 
Groups - Volume on Youth Organizations (Jiangsu sheng zhi - shetuanzhi - qingnian tuanti pian, 江苏省志－社
团志－青年团体篇), 125. 
1367 Central Communist Youth League School, Records of the Central CYL School 1948-1998 (Gongqingtuan 
zhongyang tuanxiao zhi, 共青团中央团校志 1948-1998), 129. 
1368 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. 
1369 See: “The Training Class for Newly Appointed City CYL Secretaries is Held (xin renzhi dishi ji tuanwei shuji 
peixunban juban, 新任职地市级团委书记培训班举办),” China Youth Daily, September 4, 2012. 
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CYL cadres, coming generally from Tibet or Xinjiang.1370 But overall the lower level CYL 
cadres are trained in provincial or city level CYL schools rather than in the central one.1371  
Several interviewees repeated how these various trainings were key in creating personal 
relationships among CYL officials from various levels and locales. They underlined how it 
made them feel that they belonged to a common organization, which does not always transpire 
in their daily work. During generally a month or two, they spend so much time together that 
strong ties are created. The most common framework for these programs is to have classes 
together every morning, followed by group study or activities in the afternoon. Generally the 
cadres also share rooms in the schools dormitories and have their meals together.1372 According 
to my interviewees, the network is often maintained after they graduate through yearly reunion 
                                                 
1370 The school also organizes special trainings for young cadres from different SOEs or social organizations. In 
that case, the structure asks for the training, participates in its design, and pays the school for it. Finally, the school 
organizes short trainings for youth organizations representatives from other countries, in particular from South 
East Asia. Interviews with academic 6, cadre 9, academic 19, and cadre 42. On the minority cadres trainings, see 
also : “The Central CYL School Holds a Training Class for Xinjiang CYL Cadres (tuan zhongyang juban Xinjiang 
tuan ganbu peixunban, 团中央举办新疆团干部培训班),” China youth Daily, July 30, 2015; Central Communist 
Youth League School, Records of the Central CYL School 1948-1998 (Gongqingtuan zhongyang tuanxiao zhi, 共
青团中央团校志 1948-1998), 129. 
1371 Due to lack of financial means, a lot of provinces and cities cannot keep a separate school for CYL cadres and 
the CYL schools are absorbed by the local CCP schools, which then organizes the trainings for CYL officials. 
This was the case of the Nanjing CYL School for instance (Nanjing CYL Committee, ed., A Youth without Regrets 
(qingchun wuhui, 青春无悔) (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2009), 421). Other schools 
manage to get more funding from local authorities and to survive. This is the case of the Guizhou CYL School 
(CYL Committee of Guizhou Province, History of the Youth Movement in Guizhou (1998-2009) (Guizhou 
qingnian yundong shi 1998-2009, 贵州青年运动史  1998-2009), 251). Finally, others open undergraduate 
programs, often as vocational schools, which helps them to keep afloat financially. The Beijing CYL School 
followed this path (Beijing Communist Youth League Committee (Gongqingtuan Beijing shi weiyuanhui, 共青团
北京市委员会), Records and Documents of Beijing’s Youth Organizations (Beijing Qingnian Zuzhi Zhiwengao, 
北京青年组织志文稿), 46–49). Sources: interviews with academic 3, academic 6, cadre 9, academic 19, and 
academic 21. For details on the various local CYL schools which still exist, see: Wu Qing (吴庆), Guide towards 
League Spirit 2012 (tuanqing zhinan, 团情指南 2012), 274–300. 
1372 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 42, cadre 43. For the full schedule of a one-month Central CYL School training 
in 1997, see : Central Communist Youth League School, Records of the Central CYL School 1948-1998 
(Gongqingtuan zhongyang tuanxiao zhi, 共青团中央团校志 1948-1998), 138. 
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dinners for the different cohorts.1373 Interviewees also noted that internet and social media make 
it rather easy to stay in touch among cadres.1374  
While relatively weak, as they do not know each other well and do not meet that often, 
the ties developed during meetings and trainings can eventually be useful in the cadres’ future 
career. Granovetter in fact showed that weaker and more distant ties are often key in order to 
find a job as they are a way to access more diverse information than the one they would get 
from their closer social circle.1375 
2)  Principle particularism and multiple patron-client ties 
a)  Every Party leader has his own tuanpai 
The relationships I just described among cadres within the CYL itself are hardly as 
strong as the ones the CYL officials must maintain with CCP leaders, who are their actual 
superiors. As shown in Chapter One, the CCP leaders are the ones managing the appointment 
and promotion of CYL leaders at the same level. Therefore, as developed in Chapter Six, they 
mostly have to please the CCP leaders by displaying their obedience and zeal. The promotion 
system being highly concentrated in their hands, the CCP leaders at every level can appoint to 
CYL leaderships positions the young officials they like and test their skills and personal 
commitment while on the job. They can then facilitate or not their future promotion.  
The way in which the promotion system is structured leads de facto to a clientelist 
system, with the CCP secretary at the top. This is what Walder described taking Mao era 
factories as an example. He showed that at every level of the organizational structure, the 
                                                 
1373 These reunion dinners seem to have been stopped by Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign (interviews with 
cadre 2, cadre 16 and cadre 42). 
1374 Interviews with cadre 42 and cadre 43. 
1375 Mark S Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1371. 
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supervisors determine who they think show adherence to the factory’s and the regime’s goals 
through their behavior. They hence reward the individuals who, according to them, display such 
commitment. This system evolves into a personal patron-client relationship. Walder called 
principled particularism this “clientelist system in which public loyalty to the party and its 
ideology is mingled with personal loyalties between party branch officials and their clients.”1376 
The concrete compliance of the worker to the superior’s orders is rewarded, instead of the 
conformity to ideals.1377  
CYL leaders have a specific position in the middle of this institutionalized clientelist 
system as their seats are particularly valuable for the cadres’ future career. As we have seen 
throughout the dissertation, the CCP leaders who appoint specific individuals as CYL leaders 
automatically make them reserve cadres for leadership positions, and more broadly give them 
a clear career advantage compared to their colleagues. They are on average younger than other 
cadres of similar rank.  
The CCP leaders would therefore grant this position to cadres they have already noticed 
and who are linked to them, or with whom they want to build a closer relationship.1378 This is 
particularly true as the CYL leaders have strong ties to the CCP leadership, they can seat at the 
CCP committee and Standing Committee meetings at the same level1379 and they report to them 
on a regular basis. They meet often, making it easy for the CCP leaders to test their protégés.1380 
                                                 
1376 Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, 124. 
1377 Ibid., 131. 
1378  Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 16, cadre 42, and cadre 43. See also : Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠 ), 
“Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical Perspective on the Political Function of the 
Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo Gongqingtuan zhengzhi 
gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个考察视角),” 163. 
1379 “Charter of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan zhangcheng, 中
国共产主义青年团章程),” Congress of the CYL, 20 June 2013. 
1380 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 16, cadre 42, cadre 43, and cadre 44. 
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Zheng Changzhong calls “systematic trust” (zhidu xing xinren, 制度性信任) this unique 
relationship between the CCP and CYL leaders.1381 As a result, at every level, a CCP leader 
can use the CYL to promote his affiliates and develop his network within the Party-State, 
especially as they might rise to relatively high positions in the future. In that sense we can say 
that all Party leaders can build their own “Youth League faction” or tuanpai (团派).1382  
This goes against the idea that the CYL is used to promote only individuals who are 
member of an overall faction and who have common interests. In this configuration, Party 
leaders in general also have little reason to question the specific status the CYL enjoys in the 
Chinese political system, as they all can use it as a fast track to promote young officials they 
trust. If sometimes specific CYL affiliates are targeted by local or central leaders because they 
are perceived as too close to their predecessors, as we have illustrated in Chapter Two with the 
case of Ling Jihua, it does not mean that the whole organization, and its role as a promotion 
channel, is in danger.  
b)  The multiplicity of clientelist ties 
While the ties between CYL and CCP leaders at each administrative level are strong, 
the influence of one specific personal relationship on a cadres’ career should not be 
overestimated. As described throughout the dissertation, the young officials develop a 
multiplicity of clientelist ties through the first steps of their career, and beyond. As student 
cadres they build strong links with friends, other students, or the university administration. They 
also find mentors among the older student leaders and the CYL officials on campus. By staying 
                                                 
1381 Zheng Changzhong (郑长忠), “Organizational Capital and Political Party Survival – Analytical Perspective 
on the Political Function of the Chinese Communist Youth League (zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu - Zhongguo 
Gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao, 组织资本与政党延续 - 中国共青团政治功能的一个
考察视角),” 156. 
1382 See Chapter Two on the issue of the Youth League faction.  
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in the university as CYL officials after graduation they can further cultivate their ties with 
university officials, but also with CYL cadres outside campus. It becomes an even more 
complex picture when young officials are appointed as local CYL leaders, and eventually later 
on as local CCP leaders. They interact and build relationships with very diverse actors, from 
within the Party-State administration, but not only. As shown in Chapter Six, local CYL is a 
particularly good platform to interact with very different organizations.   
These various personal ties are key in the cadres’ careers as they can be useful for 
potential promotions at various stages of their career. Their career is highly dependent on them, 
and as Howard Becker described in the case of jazz musicians, “security comes from the number 
and quality of relationships so established.” 1383  Becker stressed how it was key for jazz 
musicians to be part of various networks and cliques in showbusiness. The members of these 
networks are bound together by ties of mutual obligations as they sponsor each other for 
jobs.1384 The individuals are therefore strengthened not by being part of one clear group but by 
the multiplicity of networks they are included in.  
This multiplicity of links must be considered in order to fully grasp the complexity of 
young cadres’ careers. In addition, knowing someone does not mean that the relationship is 
positive and will be useful in the cadre’s career. These statements appear as completely obvious 
but are often forgotten in the literature focusing on informal politics in the Chinese context. As 
argued in the Introduction, the tendency to attach the individuals to the groups they are 
supposedly part of, based on their family background or the province they come from, 
overshadows this complexity.1385 Which leads us to a broader criticism of explanations purely 
                                                 
1383 Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, 105. 
1384 Ibid., 10. 
1385 On this debate, see : Walder, Fractured Rebellion the Beijing Red Guard Movement. 
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based on group identity in order to understand political choices. An approach in terms of interest 
group politics was formulated by Skilling and Griffiths regarding the Soviet Union and later 
influenced numerous scholars, such as the ones focusing on the Youth League faction that we 
mentioned in Chapter Two. For Skilling and Griffiths, the core of Soviet politics was made of 
groups based on shared attributes, which had common identities and interests that they defended 
through the Party-State institutions.1386 As we have seen, this approach hardly fits the CYL case, 
which leads us to think along with Andrew Walder that such preexisting groups are not the only 
base for political struggle in communist regimes.1387 Political competition can take place among 
various types of networks, developed through the individuals’ experiences and shaped by the 
institutions, which may include parts of these preexisting groups but not necessarily.  
Against this approach based on group identity, I followed the young officials’ complex 
trajectories and constant transfers to stress the multiplicity of personal links they develop. 
Along these lines, Pieke underlined that promotions and job rotations at the beginning of the 
cadres’ career transform their identities and local ties, it “translates and co-opts their loyalties 
and attachments to more encompassing areas and larger communities of cadre-peers.” 1388 
Beyond local identities, this is also true of familial, school or corporate ties.  
Coming back to the question of the tuanpai (Youth League Faction), the diversity and 
complexity of the CYL officials’ careers make it impossible to identified clear shared goals 
they would have or a clear common identity. The multiplicity of ties the cadres develop goes 
against the development of overarching cliques or factions with clearly defined common 
interests. CYL cadres in the different locales have various interests depending on the local CCP 
                                                 
1386 Harold Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1971). 
1387 Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, 5. 
1388 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 160. 
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leaders’ ones, they might also have a previous experience as student cadre giving them a 
specific identity, and they might after the CYL be transferred to a local CCP leadership position, 
further transforming their personal tactics. It is therefore very hard, as we have shown in 
Chapter Two, to see the CYL officials as a group of “like-minded” officials.1389 
It is also very questionable to systematically oppose officials with a CYL background 
to the so-called princelings, the sons and daughters of former revolutionary leaders. The two 
identities are far from contradictory, as shown by the case of Liu Yandong - daughter of Liu 
Ruilong a high-level cadre of the Mao era - who was a central level CYL secretary in the 1980s. 
More broadly, my interviewees highlighted that children of officials are increasingly numerous 
among CYL leaders, both at the central and local levels.1390 This contrasts with the image often 
given in the media that CYL officials come from an underprivileged social background.1391 
Rather than an overall faction with shared goals, the relationships among former CYL 
leaders, from the central and local levels, can be better understood as a network close to what 
Suleiman described regarding the grands corps de l’Etat in France, which largely date from 
Napoléon’s regime. The grand corps are elite structures within the French administration, 
which recruit only graduates from very specific schools, and in particular the École nationale 
d’administration or ENA (the National School of Administration) which was established in 
1945 as a common training and recruitment channel for the grand corps. Within each cohort, 
the ENA graduates with the best grades generally choose to enter these corps, the three most 
                                                 
1389 This factional approach was in particular developed by : Bo, China’s Elite Politics Political Transition and 
Power Balancing; Li, “New Provincial Chiefs: Hu’s Groundwork for the 17th Party Congress”; Li, “The New 
Bipartisanship within the Chinese Communist Party”; Li, “The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and 
Controlling the New Elites.” 
1390 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 16, and cadre 42. 
1391 This article is a good example of how the media propagate this image: “CYL Officials Focus their Appointment 
on Key Government Positions (Gongqingtuan ganbu jizhong churen zhengfu yaozhi, 共青团干部集中出任政府
要职).” 
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prestigious ones being the Inspection Generale des Finances (General Inspectorate of Finances), 
the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State), and the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors).1392  
By being recruited within a corps, and beyond the important role played by these 
administrations in the French State, graduates enter a very specific network. They remain part 
of this network even though they do not work in the given administration anymore, such as the 
General Inspectorate of Finances, but transfer to another high level civil servant position or 
even to the private sector, as it is very common.1393 As Suleiman put it, the corps function as 
“placement bureaus.”1394 The members of a given corps can have very diverse careers and 
personal goals, as well as political opinions, however they have a common interest in the corps’ 
reputation. To maintain it, the corps monitors what positions the member of the corps get to. 
Even though he has no administrative power over them, the corps’ head can even try to 
convince members not to accept positions that are seen as lessening and damaging to the corps’ 
reputation. 1395  
The CYL officials do not constitute a network as organized and hierarchically structured 
as the French grand corps, and in particular I have no evidence that the central CYL 
meticulously monitors where the former CYL officials transfer to. However, an interesting 
parallel can be drawn: I noticed in my interviews that most CYL officials know where the 
organization’s leaders went to. It is for them a sign of the CYL experience’s current reputation, 
and they have a shared interest in trying to improve or maintain this reputation.1396 In addition, 
                                                 
1392 Suleiman, Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival, 98–99. 
1393 Ibid., 101–125. 
1394 Ibid., 176. 
1395 Ibid., 176–197. 
1396 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 9, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, cadre 41, cadre 42 
and cadre 44.  
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the interpersonal relationships built within the CYL are close to what has been observed in the 
French corps. Like in the CYL, members of one cohort of the General Inspectorate of Finances 
do not necessarily know members of other cohorts but they develop a mutual awareness. Then, 
in the name of their common identity, they can help each other at different stages of their career, 
having the network’s reputation in mind. In both case, these specific personal ties are also 
particularly important as they have been developed at an early age and remain accessible for 
most of their career and life.1397 
  
                                                 
1397 Hooghe, Stolle, and Stouthuysen, “Head Start in Politics: The Recruitment Function of Youth Organizations 
of Political Parties in Belgium (Flanders).” 
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*** 
In the Third Part of the dissertation I have stressed the specific function played by the 
CYL as a training ground for future leaders. I have also shown the diversity of trajectories 
which can be found within the CYL and how the CYL leaders stand out and can use a range of 
organizational shortcuts, as well as personal ties, to their advantage.  
Focusing on the personal ties developed by CYL officials, we have seen how diverse 
they are, going far beyond the organization itself. If the CYL officials develop specific 
relationships among themselves, it does not lead to common policy interests or even common 
goals, given the diversity of personal trajectories. In each personal case, it cohabits with others 
groups and networks which could influence individuals in a variety of way. I have, throughout 
the dissertation, underlined the numerous personal ties developed by young officials, from 
friendship and mentorship ties in universities to the personal subordination to local CCP leaders.  
From the perspective of young cadres, their personal network might help them to get further 
promoted and to guarantee job security. As the other side of a coin, it also reinforces their 
commitment to a political career, and therefore to the survival and stability of the overall system. 
Personal networks bring together actors from the various parts of the Party-State and its 
related structures, such as SOEs and universities. The connected individuals have in common 
to be committed to their career within the system and have accepted the rules of the game in 
order to get to the position they are at. While they might have competing personal goals, they 
have a shared interest in the overall survival of the current political system as it is what 
guarantees their position. Far from unique to the Chinese Party-State, this is in line with 
Offerlé’s definition of a political party, as an arena made of politicians who compete for their 
personal ambitions but who also have a shared interest in the survival of the organization. 1398 
                                                 
1398 Michel Offerlé, Les partis politiques [Political Parties] (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2012), 15.  
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Conclusion 
A -  An ideal-typical trajectory? 
Throughout this dissertation, I have developed the progressive rise to power of young 
individuals through the Party’s youth organizations. One chapter after another, I have drawn 
what could be understood as an ideal-type sequence of the perfect “Youth League products,” 
from being recruited as student cadres in college to obtaining leading positions in the CYL.  
The career of Yang Yue, Jiangsu Province Vice-Governor since July 2016, is a perfect 
recapitulation of this sequence. Yang became a student at Tsinghua University in 1986 and was 
elected as student union chairman during his fourth year of college. Yang Yue was in parallel 
appointed as the All-China Student Federation Chairman in 1990, an ideal networking platform 
for a politically ambitious young man. Yang had to spend most of his time in various meetings, 
activities and trainings with student cadres and university officials, which eventually 
transformed his social circle. In parallel, he became recognized on campus as a young man 
equipped to realize his ambitions, as a political leader in the making. His position as student 
leader gave Yang the possibility to stay on campus after graduation and become a student 
counsellor. At the same time, he pursued his studies and obtained a PhD from Tsinghua 
University. Thanks to the close ties he developed in the university’s administration, including 
the mentorship relationship he established with Chen Xi who had been appointed in 1993 as 
the university’s CCP deputy secretary, Yang climbed the university hierarchy and became in 
1997 Tsinghua University CYL Secretary. He was not thirty and had already reached the same 
rank as a county leader. He later used his age advantage, and the personal relationships he had 
built within Tsinghua University, but also in the CYL through his experience at the All-China 
Student Federation, to rotate from one leadership position to another. He became a county level 
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leader through an open selection process, and without taking a civil servant exam. He then got 
transferred to central level CYL Secretary. He was then appointed as a provincial Party-State 
leader while not being 40 years old yet.1399 
Yang Yue’s career is close to ideal-typical: while in university he became an official, 
and as a central CYL secretary he transformed himself into a political leader. However, this 
linear trajectory does not exhaust the possibilities the CCP’s youth organizations offer to young 
and ambitious individuals. At every step of their career, they are presented with various options, 
which can influence their future trajectories. Some officials, albeit few of them, simply do not 
go to college and start working in local level Party-State administration after high school. They 
then use the CYL as a career accelerator, as well as a training ground to catch up their education 
deficit. Some others go through an experience in an SOE or a trainee program after college 
graduation. Moreover, some simply see their political career shortened, due to a personal 
decision, an external event, or because they were not able to prove their commitment to their 
superiors. The sequenced nature of the career and the decentralized structure of the polity lead 
to a multiplicity of potential trajectories, complex tomes of experiences.  
While highly diverse, the trajectories I described have in common the major role played 
by the CCP’s youth organizations in terms of political commitment building, but also training 
ground and promotion channels. Rather than a unique and isolated phenomenon, CYL leaders’ 
trajectories are illustrative of the overall functioning of the Chinese Party-State, inherited from 
the reforms of the 1980s, which gives a key importance to age in the cadre management system. 
Analyzed through the multi-level perspective of my study, what do these individual careers tell 
                                                 
1399 Yang Yue’s resume can be found here: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Yang_Yue/career (consulted on 
16 September 2016). 
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us more generally about political elite renewal and cohesion in post-Mao China? To what extent 
does it confirm my initial hypotheses? 
B -  From the Youth League to the Party 
1)  Sponsored mobility and the reward of commitment  
I show in the dissertation that the Chinese Party-State political elite is recruited through 
a sponsored mobility system which strengthen their commitment to their political career and to 
the system. Comparison with other post-revolutionary regimes, and the USSR in particular, 
allowed to highlight the Chinese specificity in that matter. It showed in particular that the role 
played by political youth organizations highly varies depending on the political configuration 
and the leadership’s strategy. I stress that the development of this system was possible because 
the interests of the leader at the specific point in time was aligned with the regime’s 
requirements in terms of elite renewal in a post-crisis situation (i.e. after the Cultural 
Revolution). By developing the circumstances which led to the development of this sponsored 
mobility system, I contribute to the literature on the diversity and flexibility of post-
revolutionary regimes, but also on the literature more broadly on political parties and the role 
played by youth organizations in leadership renewal. 
a)  The political origins of an age-based cadre management system 
The importance of the Party’s youth organizations in political mobility originates from 
post-Cultural Revolution politics. Deng Xiaoping and his allies had to cultivate a support base 
of young officials to counter the rise of young activists promoted under Mao. After ten years of 
Cultural Revolution, during which intellectuals were targeted and persecuted, he could not rely 
on the cooptation of educated professionals and specialists, like Khrushchev had done in the 
post-Stalin years. Deng therefore launched an overall rejuvenation policy to promote young 
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officials who would support him. Age-based rules were established for the recruitment and 
promotion of officials at every echelon of the Party-State. The PRC became the only Leninist 
regime to develop a strict system of age rules for its officials. The institutionalization of these 
rules made permanent the rejuvenation impetus started by Deng, even after the political need 
for young supporters was satisfied. The institutionalization of an age-based cadre management 
system established a sponsored mobility system and led, over the years, to an overall renewal 
of the Party-State elite. It prevented the CCP to become a gerontocracy. 
Under this new configuration, the CYL took an unprecedented role as a career accelerator 
for young officials. This is true in comparison to the Mao era, but also to the Soviet situation. 
While activism or lower level positions in the Komsomol, the Soviet CYL, were often formative 
experience in the soviet cadres’ careers, it never played such a key role as a promotion channel 
to leadership positions.1400 It was never a major tool in the rejuvenation of the Party-State top 
echelon. The number of Party leaders with an experience in the Komsomol even drastically 
decreased in the post-Stalin era.1401  
b)  Commitment and career building 
Beyond elite renewal itself, the sponsored mobility system established by the CCP 
facilitates elite cohesion by cultivating individual recruits’ political commitment. At every step 
of their career in the CYL, individuals are transformed by the organization. Their social circles 
are increasingly narrowed down to the organization’s insiders. In line with the concept of 
cathectic-cohesion commitment developed in the Introduction, personal attachment to the 
                                                 
1400 According to Solnick: “Top leaders often derived their only experiences in street-level bureaucracy from their 
days in the Young Communist League” (Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions, 
43. See also: Jeffry Klugman, The New Soviet Elite: How They Think & What They Want (New York: Praeger, 
1989), 22.  
1401 Gehlen, “The Soviet Apparatchiki,” 143. 
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members of the group leads individuals to remain in the organization, even though its actions 
or values change overtime. The actors I focus on also cultivate a specific social role, first as 
officials-to-be while in college, and later as future political leaders. Their behavior increasingly 
reflects their status and political affiliation: they learn to speak and behave as leading officials. 
This phenomenon echoes the concept of cognitive-continuance commitment developed by 
Kanter. The individuals invest so much of their time and energy in the organization that it 
transforms their behavior. On the long run, they become so attached to their social role that exit 
becomes unlikely.1402   
While these two forms of commitment account for one’s decision to remain part of an 
organization, they only partially explain behavioral conformity within it. To the extent that it is 
accepted by the organization, or unknown by other members, and that it does not endanger his 
membership, the individual might slightly bend or challenge the rules. This is very different 
from an ideology-based commitment, which would lead the indoctrinated members to follow, 
at all costs, the direction given by the organization and its leaders. In the case of the Chinese 
Party-State and the cadres I follow, this type of commitment linked to one’s investment in a 
role and attachment to the group, explain that they remain officials on the long run, but also 
that they sometimes indulge in corruption or nepotism for example. Through the first steps of 
the sponsored mobility process the young cadres prove their commitment to the Party, rather 
than to an overarching ideology. 
  
                                                 
1402  On these two types of commitment, see the Introduction. See also: Kanter, “Commitment and Social 
Organization: A Study of Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities.” 
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c)  The political elite plays by different rules 
Individual commitment is rewarded career-wise. The committed young recruits are put 
on a specific promotion path towards leading positions in the Party-State. This path includes 
unique training, networking and promotion opportunities. Being considered as leaders in the 
making, they transfer quickly from one leading position to the next and develop their personal 
network, but also generalist skills and political role. They use unique organizational shortcuts 
in order to rotate as quickly as possible. They rarely go through the civil servant exams, and 
often only partially follow the rules regarding step-by-step promotion and cadre tenure. The 
Party-State is rather tolerant towards rule-bending with regards to leading cadres. It is all the 
more important because, as I showed in Chapter Two, it is impossible to follow the rules and 
get to the top Party-State positions without shortcuts. The Party-State’s capacity to bend the 
rules when useful is in line with the “guerilla policy style” described by Perry and Heilmann. 
The Party-State uses its institutional plasticity in order to better adapt to changing 
configurations, like in guerilla warfare.1403  
The specific situation of these young recruits results in a dual-track system, separating 
them from ordinary cadres early in their career. It echoes the literature on elite dualism that I 
discussed in the Introduction. However, this literature separates State positions from Party ones, 
and the key divide in our case is instead between leading and non-leading cadres. The leading 
cadres are at every level, or in every unit, the few top officials, holding either Party or State 
positions. In a county level administration for example, it includes the Party secretary and 
deputy secretaries, but also the county governor and vice-governors. Political features are 
important in the selection of all Party-State officials: the ones set on a sponsored path to leading 
                                                 
1403 Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J Perry, “Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive 
Governance in China,” in Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, ed. 
Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J Perry (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center : Distributed by 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 1–29. 
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positions go through a particularly long and transformative commitment process which makes 
them highly reliable from their recruiters’ perspective. 
It is therefore the process of political commitment building they have been through that 
separates these elite cadres from the others. The political elements of the recruitment process 
should not however overshadow the constant competition these officials face at every step of 
their career. They constitute a pool among which only a handful can, for instance, rise to the 
Party’s Central Committee. While the promotion criteria are very different from an ideal 
Weberian merit-based bureaucracy, it does not mean that these officials are inapt. They may be 
less technically trained than other officials, but they have to be skillful in bureaucratic infighting. 
They must be able to convince their superiors at every echelon of their commitment but also 
their efficiency. All in all, they have to develop and showcase abilities that are close to the ones 
necessary to young politicians in an electoral democracy aspiring to be part of a ministerial 
cabinet or to rise within a party’s hierarchy.1404 
The CYL plays a key role in this sponsored mobility framework as it is often the site 
where cadres develop their commitment to a political career, and because it is widely used as a 
career accelerator. In that regard, the function played by the CYL can be compared to the 
position of “midshipman” developed by the British navy in the late 18th century. According to 
Elias, the navy created this position as a hierarchically neutral ground where young trainees 
could efficiently learn nautical skills without lowering the status of the young aristocrats. This 
was possible by playing with etiquette and posting them neither behind nor before the mast but 
at mid-ship. The navy was ready to bend the rules to meet both the young recruits’ interest in 
terms of status, but also its own objectives in training its officers.1405 The CYL plays a similar 
                                                 
1404 Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 58. 
1405 René Moelker, “Norbert Elias, Maritime Supremacy and the Naval Profession: On Elias’ Unpublished Studies 
in the Genesis of the Naval Profession,” British Journal of Sociology British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 3 (2003): 
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role in the Chinese political system: it represents an interesting opportunity from the recruits’ 
perspective as it goes together with advantageous career options, and at the same time it fits the 
Party-State’s needs in terms of cadres’ loyalty, nurtured through a long commitment process 
and the insertion in a dense network of relationships. The CYL therefore attracts young talents 
and at the same time allows the CCP to cultivate the recruits’ commitment over a long time-
period. 
2)  It all starts on campus 
By analyzing the role played by the Party’s youth organizations in college I showed how 
important higher education institutions are for political recruitment in post-Mao China. This is 
often overlooked as Chinese students have largely been described as apolitical since 1989.1406 
It is in fact in college that the sponsored mobility process for future officials generally starts, 
and especially the cultivation of their political commitment. 
While the political role of universities is far from being a Chinese specificity, its 
uniqueness resides in the level of structuration displayed by youth political organizations on 
campus. The CYL and its sub-organizations oversee the recruitment and cultivation of young 
cadres across the country’s universities. Starting from the first year of college and up to a 
potential first job as an official on campus, the individual trajectories are therefore integrated 
into a highly managed system of political mobility. This organizational continuity facilitates 
the constant screening and selection of cadres. The most committed ones are then provided with 
advantages in terms of recruitment in graduate school or starting a political career.  
  
                                                 
370–90; Norbert Elias, “Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession,” The British Journal of Sociology 1, no. 
4 (December 1, 1950): 291–309. 
1406 Yan, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China,” 2. 
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3)  The Party-State’s segmentary features 
Based on a variety of examples, I have shown, from the university level to central 
administration, that personal ties to their superiors and colleagues are key to cadres’ careers. I 
have also stressed how diverse these ties are for cadres who rotate regularly from one position 
to the next. Throughout their professional trajectories, the cadres develop multilayered personal 
networks. In addition to existing familial, friendship or dorm-based relationships, student 
cadres develop multiple ties on campus, within student organizations but also with professors 
and university officials. This can include dyadic mentorships ties between students and officials. 
Many of such ties established by one official or a couple of officials, can eventually lead to 
mentorship chains, influencing several generations of students, or even structured clientelist 
networks dominating campus politics. Beyond universities, CYL officials develop relationships 
both inside and outside the organization. For CYL leaders in particular, the ties they build with 
their colleagues from other echelons of the organization through meetings and training 
programs are often rather weak. They are based on a diffuse common interest in the reputation 
of the organization rather than a direct hierarchical relation. As such they have little influence 
on each other’s career. By contrast, the relationships built with CCP leaders at the different 
levels, which are in fact their superiors, are crucial for further advancement. Overall, the CYL 
leaders develop complex personal networks with a multitude of current and future CCP leaders. 
Throughout their career, the cadres progressively broaden their network, which makes 
it harder to remain attached to a unique subgroup. Pieke in fact had such an intuition in his work 
on the Party schools training but did not expend much on it. According to him, “as they move 
up the hierarchy, cadres continue to be local cadres, rooted in their own native place, but the 
logic of promotion and job rotation expands, translates and co-opts their loyalties and 
attachments to more encompassing areas and larger communities of cadre-peers: promotion 
 439 
quite literally expands cadres’ horizons of their service to the party.”1407 I argue that this is true 
beyond local identities. The multiple ties developed by cadres during their career imply a 
diversity of affiliations and attachments. In each personal case, the CYL affiliation cohabits 
with others groups and networks which could influence individuals in a variety of ways.  
The multiplicity of personal allegiances highlights the segmentary features of the Party-
State, which ends up being an overall network of personal networks. This is tied to the 
decentralized structure of the Chinese polity, and similar to what has been described in the case 
of other decentralized political parties.1408 As I stressed in the case of the CYL, at every level, 
the actual superior entity is not the upper level CYL but the local Party leaders, which goes 
against the creation of an overarching Youth League faction. Instead, it leads to the 
development of multiple clientelist relationships at the local level. These relationships form the 
base of the cadres’ individual network, which they develop by transferring from one position 
or one locale, to another.  
These various ties and attachments link cadres to one another but also make it harder 
for them to organize in cohesive groups. The uniqueness of every personal network, an outcome 
of the cadre’s trajectory, contrasts with an organization based on separated and uniform sub-
groups, which include a set gathering of actors. While they are imbricated, these personal 
networks never completely overlap, and cadres always have a diversity of personal allegiances. 
As a result, the cadres are not integrated in clearly defined primary groups, such as army 
regiments, which could be used as bases to organize against the broader group or to exit 
collectively.1409 Instead, the connected individuals have in common to be committed to their 
                                                 
1407 Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 160. 
1408 Sawicki, Les réseaux du Parti socialiste: sociologie d’un milieu partisan [The Socialist Party’s networks], 27. 
1409 See on this issue : Bearman, “Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil 
War.” 
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career within the system. While they might have competing personal goals, they have a 
common interest in the overall survival of the current political system as it is what guarantees 
their position. Loyalty to one’s network and one’s career leads to loyalty to the Party.  
While Lieberthal and Oksenberg stressed how the fragmentary features of the Party-
State are often inefficient in terms of policy implementation,1410 I argue that it leads to a variety 
of imbricated personal networks which contributes to holding the system together. Further 
studies could inquire in more details the implications of the segmentary features of the post-
Mao Chinese system. While studies have underlined the decentralized nature of the Chinese 
polity,1411 none have analyzed the vast implications it has regarding cadre’s careers and the 
system’s cohesion, especially in terms of the imbrication between local and central level 
networks for a cadre rising in the hierarchy.  
C -  My approach and its limits 
1)  Comparisons across time and space 
To verify my hypotheses and put them in perspective, I have developed throughout the 
dissertation a comparative approach, across both time and space. The diachronic comparison 
encompasses the first years of the CYL, the Mao era and the post-Mao period. While it allows 
me to highlight continuities overtime, in particular regarding the structure of the CYL and the 
CCP’s control over it, it also stresses transformations. These included changes in the Youth 
League’s activities, in their framing, and therefore in the cadres’ work. Comparison in time, 
more importantly, highlights how the CYL became a key promotion channel after the Cultural 
                                                 
1410 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
1411 See in particular : Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local 
Elites in the Post-Mao Era. 
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Revolution, by opposition to the Mao era. Overall, it shows that the CYL, far from an 
organizational remnant of the Maoist past, is a reinvented Leninist organizational weapon 
which becomes extremely important for the Party to attract young people and shape their 
political commitment in a situation in which it does not have the monopoly over social mobility 
anymore.  
Comparison with other political systems also proved enlightening to my research. The 
macroscopic comparisons with the post-Stalin Soviet system and the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party regime in Mexico are particularly useful to highlight the specificity of the 
Chinese case. The post-Cultural revolution political context led to the development of a 
sponsored mobility system which contrasts with the elite renewal strategy developed by 
Khrushchev in the 1950s. In addition, the imbrication of the Party’s youth organizations and 
higher education institutions in terms of political mobility contrasts with the independent 
recruitment role played by the universities themselves in the Mexican case. Micro level 
comparisons regarding the commitment-formation processes were also useful to draw parallels 
between the experience of young Chinese officials and what exists in other political parties, 
including in electoral democracies such as France. Overall constant comparisons have enabled 
me to identify the specificities of the Chinese system as a whole but also to question the alleged 
uniqueness of the elements constituting it, as parallels are often easily found.  
2)  A State-centered approach 
While my study combines three levels of analysis –  a micro perspective focusing on 
the agents, a meso one taking the youth organization itself as a unit of analysis, and a macro 
approach regarding the transformations of the Chinese regime, it remains mainly centered on 
the Party-State, its institutions, and the effect they have on individuals. This is a conscious 
decision to limit my enquiry in order to get into the details of the mechanisms at play. Still, 
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consequently, I only briefly touch upon a variety of related issues, in particular the instances of 
socialization and the personal relationships originating from outside the system. 
At the individual level, I show that familial background, gender or friendship 
relationships affect the cadres’ career in the Party-State. This is especially true during the first 
steps of the commitment-formation process. However, this is only a minor part of this study 
and, in particular, I do not develop in itself the issue of social class. Family background was a 
complicated topic to raise with my interviewees, who would fear to reveal their familial network 
and be accused of nepotism, and no overall data is available regarding student cadres or Party-
State officials. Focusing on the personal ties and social role they developed through the Party-
State institutions, I did not delve into the effect social origins might have in their choice or their 
ability to pursue a political career. Like in most political systems, privileged class status is 
largely a precondition to enter the political elite.1412 The literature on CCP recruitment stresses 
how the Party now largely targets urban middle and upper class individuals.1413 Middle and 
upper class young people have better chances to go to college, where the recruitment and 
political commitment-building process generally starts. Also their aspirations and lifestyle is 
overall more aligned with the regime’s objectives.1414 Conscious that my research only focuses 
on a specific portion of Chinese youth,1415 my goal is not to deny the importance of social class 
                                                 
1412 Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 22. 
1413 Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of the Market, 
133; Dickson, “Who Wants to Be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized Loyalty in China,” 46. 
1414 On the issue of the aspiration and values of the middle class and private businessmen, see : Tsai, Capitalism 
without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China; Jean-Louis Rocca, The Making of the Chinese 
Middle Class. Small Prosperity, Great Expectations (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). 
1415 On the other, and diverse, groups constituting Chinese youth, see in particular: Paul Clark, Youth Culture in 
China: From Red Guards to Netizens (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Alec Ash, Wish Lanterns: 
Young Lives in New China (London: Picador, 2016). On specific, marginalized, groups see in particular : Camille 
Salgues, “Ethnographie du fait scolaire chez les migrants ruraux à Shanghai [An ethnography of schooling among 
rural migrants in Shanghai],” Politix, no. 99 (2012): 129–52; Nathanel Amar, “Scream for Life. Usages politiques 
de la culture en Chine: échanges et résistance au sein de communautés alternatives. Le cas ses punks et des 
cinéastes indépendants. [Political Uses of Culture in China: Exchanges and Resistance in Alternative Communities. 
The Example of Punks and Independent Filmmakers]” (PhD dissertation, SciencesPo, 2015). 
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in political recruitment, but I focus rather on the next steps in terms of socialization. Even if the 
recruitment pool is limited to young people from certain social classes, we still have to 
understand how their political commitment is cultivated and how a very limited number of them 
eventually become part of the political elite.  
 At the level of the Party-State, I focus on the networks of officials which constitute the 
organization. However, these networks are not limited to institutional boundaries. The network 
of networks which constitute the Party-State is also what links it to society more broadly. The 
officials’ personal networks I have described go beyond the limits of officialdom to include 
local family relationships, business ties etc. These networks have been described in the 
literature focusing on the relationship between State and society in China, either as local 
corporatism1416 or as symbiotic networks tying officials to businessmen.1417 The Party-State is 
therefore “multiplied,” to borrow Chevrier’s word, in the way it deals with society but also in 
how its agents are connected to each other, highlighting its segmentary features.1418 While my 
study is largely Party-State centered, it therefore echoes and completes what has been described 
more largely in the literature regarding State-society relations in post-Mao China: the ways in 
which the Party-State incorporates its recruits in its decentralized structure parallels its 
hegemonic, yet flexible and fragmented, control over the Chinese society.  
 
                                                 
1416 Jean C Oi, “Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics 
451 (1992): 99–126. 
1417 David L Wank, Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (Cambridge 
[England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
1418 Yves Chevrier, “L’État chinois entre formation et déformation [The Chinese State in-between Formation and 
Deformation],” Revue Tiers Monde 37, no. 147 (1996): 706. 
 444 
D -  Epilogue: towards an aging Party under Xi Jinping 
Since Xi Jinping took power over the Party-State in 2012, the rules shaping the sponsored 
mobility system I have described throughout the dissertation have been slightly modified. First, 
the importance of age as a criterion in cadres’ recruitment and promotion is decreasing. The 
age-based rules for recruitment are less and less implemented at the local level according to my 
interviewees. 1419  This change is officially endorsed since the last development program 
regarding leading cadres noted that age limits should not be used too strictly for individual 
personnel transfers.1420 
Second, the procedures allowing the rapid promotion of young officials are increasingly 
constrained. The revised version of the “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment 
of Leading Party and Government Cadres,” published in 2014, reemphasizes the necessity to 
have a grassroots working experience as well as step-by-step promotions. It also narrows the 
scope for “open selections.” As we have seen, this procedure is a common career accelerator 
allowing young cadres to not follow tenure regulations and rapidly climb the hierarchy. It can 
now only be used when the local Party-State units do not find suitable candidates internally, 
and it can no longer be mobilized to transfer candidates across provinces.1421 This evolution 
highly restricts its use. 1422 The official objective is to limit the abuses linked to this specific 
appointment method, as described in Chapter Seven.1423 However, it has a particularly negative 
                                                 
1419 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 27, cadre 35, and cadre 36. 
1420 “Development Program Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 2014-2018 
(2014-2018 nian quanguo dangzheng lingdao banzi jianshe guihua gangyao, 2014-2018 年全国党政领导班子
建设规划纲要),” Central Office of the CCP, 25 December 2014. 
1421 “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres (dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 15 January 
2014. 
1422 Interviews with cadre 2, cadre 11, cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. 
1423 Interviews with cadre 16, cadre 18, cadre 19, cadre 27, cadre 37, and cadre 41. See also: “The Selection of 
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influence on young officials’ careers, including CYL cadres, as it curtails the opportunities to 
accelerate their promotion. This evolution is part of a broader downplaying of inner Party 
democracy under Xi Jinping.1424 By limiting the importance of age, but also of policy outcomes 
evaluations, the two only quantifiable criteria for promotion, Xi Jinping reinforces the 
personnel selection power of CCP secretaries at every echelon.1425 
Third, the CYL itself is the focus of an overall reform, limiting the weight of its central 
and provincial structures. It started in the framework of Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign, 
as investigation teams were sent to the central CYL at the end of 2015. The CYL was then 
accused of “becoming more and more bureaucratic, administrative, aristocratic and 
entertainment-oriented” (jiguanhua, xingzhenghua, guizuhua, yulehua, 机关化, 行政化, 贵族
化, 娱乐化).1426 Then in August 2016, a reform project regarding the League was adopted by 
the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. The “Proposal on the Reform of the Central Youth 
League” (Gongqingtuan zhongyang gaige fang’an, 共青团中央改革方案) emphasizes the 
Party’s control over the League and reforms its leadership organs. 1427  In terms of cadre 
recruitment and promotion, the main elements of this reform project are: “shrinkage at the top 
and replenishment below” (jianshang buxia, 减上补下), which implies a drastic decrease of 
the CYL full-time personnel at the central and provincial levels who will be partially replaced 
                                                 
Young Cadres Becomes More Severe! (Xuanba nianqing ganbu, yanle !, 选拔年轻干部，严了!).” 
1424 On the issue of the decreasing inner-Party democracy under Xi Jinping, see : Alice Miller, “‘Core’ Leaders, 
‘Authoritative Persons,’ And Reform Pushback,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 50 (2016); Andrew J. Nathan, 
“Who Is Xi?,” The New York Review of Books 63, no. 8 (May 2016). 
1425 Lance Gore, “Revamping the Chinese Communist Party,” East Asian Policy. An International Quarterly 7, no. 
1 (2015): 201. 
1426 “The 2nd Central Inspection Team Gives Feedback Regarding the Circumstances of the Special Inspection of 
the Central Communist Youth League (zhongyang di'er xunshizu xiang gongqingtuan zhongyang fankui 
zhuanxiang xunshi qingkuang, 中央第二巡视组向共青团中央反馈专项巡视情况).” 
1427 “Proposal on the Reform of the Central Youth League (Gongqingtuan zhongyang gaige fang’an, 共青团中央
改革方案),” Central CYL, 2 August 2016. 
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by part-time and temporary transferred cadres, and a parallel increase in personnel at the county 
level ; an expanded representation of lower level CYL cadres and members in the CYL Central 
Committee and Standing Committee ; and more weight given to local working experience in 
the promotion process, with regular compulsory stays of several months at the grassroots for 
central level CYL officials. Overall this reform limits the power of the upper level CYL 
organizations and strengthen the CCP’s control over it. The reform has already been 
experimented since 2015 in Shanghai, where it was applied to the CYL but also other mass 
organizations. A major outcome being the decreasing number of full-time officials at the 
municipal level, the increasing weight of lower level CYL units, and the slowed down 
promotion of CYL officials as their selection “should not be based only on age, education, 
status and rank” (buwei nianling, buwei xueli, buwei shenfen, buwei zhiji, 不唯年龄、不唯学
历、不唯身份、不唯职级).1428  
This reform of the CYL is largely presented as an attack on the so-called CYL faction 
supposedly led by Hu Jintao.1429 However, as developed in the dissertation, the decentralized 
nature of the Party-State and its control over the CYL does not allow for the creation of an 
overall CYL faction. Hu Jintao used the organization to cultivate and promote supporters, but 
one can hardly argue that all CYL officials, even only focusing on the central and provincial 
levels, are affiliated to him. Moreover, the multiplicity of personal ties relating officials to one 
another makes the creation of such a cohesive and overarching faction very difficult. To back 
their factional argument, the pekinologists and journalists listed other decisions allegedly aimed 
at weakening the central level CYL. They put forward the rumors that the China Youth 
                                                 
1428 “Highlights of the Shanghai Reform Project of the CYL and Mass Organizations (Shanghai quntuan gaige 
fang’an youhe liangdian, 上海群团改革方案有何亮点),” Liberation Daily, November 22, 2015. 
1429 See in particular: Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the Rise of the 
Zhejiang Clique,” China Brief 16, no. 8 (2016); Chris Buckley, “China Reins In Communist Youth League, and 
Its Alumni’s Prospects,” The New York Times, August 3, 2016. 
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University for Political Science, the college affiliated to the Central Youth League School, was 
going to stop enrolling students in 2016. However, this did not happen.1430 In addition, they 
noted that the budget of the central CYL decreased of around 50% between 2015 and 2016. Yet, 
instead of reflecting an overall weakening of the organization, it underlines a decentralization 
of its finances. Most of this decrease is due to the transfer of the financial management from 
the central to the provincial level of one of the league main projects, the “plan for university 
graduates voluntary service to the West” described in Chapter Three. In line with the reform of 
the organization, it is a step towards its decentralization rather than an indication of its overall 
decline. 1431  The budget decrease is also linked to various cuts, in conformity with the overall 
streamlining of administrative expenses under Xi Jinping.1432 
Instead of an all-out war against Hu Jintao’s faction, the reform of the CYL is to be 
understood in the context of Xi Jinping’s attempt to reform the Party-State sponsored mobility 
system. The relaxation of age-based rules, the restriction of “open selections” and the CYL’s 
reform overall limit the turn-over within the Party-State and the promotion of young officials. 
By contrast with Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang who needed to cultivate young supporters in 
the 1980s, rising young officials seem to be perceived as a threat by Xi Jinping. As the only 
post-Mao era leader not pre-selected by Deng Xiaoping, by contrast with his predecessors Jiang 
Zemin or Hu Jintao, Xi had to build his power base within his own generation of officials in 
                                                 
1430 “The China Youth University for Political Science Will Continue Recruiting College Students this Year 
(Zhongqingyuan jinnian benke zhaosheng jiang jixu, 中青院今年本科招生将继续),” Caixin, April 24, 2016. It 
can be accessed here: http://china.caixin.com/2016-04-26/100937012.html (consulted on 14 September 2016). 
1431 “2016 Budget of the Central Communist Youth League (Gongqingtuan zhongyang 2016 nian bumen yusuan, 
共 青 团 中 央 2016 年 部 门 预 算 ),” Central CYL, 15 April 2016. It can be accessed here: 
http://www.ccyl.org.cn/notice/201604/t20160415_757233.htm (consulted on 14 September 2016). 
1432 On the decreased administrative expenses in the framework of the mass line campaign, see : Doyon, “The End 
of the Road for Xi’s Mass Line Campaign: An Assessment.” 
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order to rise to power.1433 His supports, which are not targeted by the anticorruption campaign, 
take up key positions in the central and local level Party-State administrations.1434 The reform 
of the cadre system and of the CYL I have described reinforces the authority of the local CCP 
leaders, by giving them more power over appointments and by strengthening the local CYL 
organs, which they directly control. Aiming at empowering his supports and weakening 
potential competitors, these reforms of the sponsored mobility system appear logical from Xi’s 
perspective, in parallel to his highly political anticorruption campaign. However, it might be 
negative for the Party-State on the long run. This system has so far prevented the CCP from 
becoming a gerontocracy, and this could be very well reversed by Xi’s actions. Some analysts 
have wondered if Xi will implement reforms which would make him the Chinese 
Gorbachev.1435 It seems on the contrary that he follows the path Brezhnev did, favoring his 
supports without a long-term strategy. 
This short epilogue on current developments highlights how comparing regimes can be 
insightful, and especially among communist systems which are in many ways similar, but also 
that it should not mask the specificity of singular and moving political trajectories. I underlined 
the uniqueness of the Chinese case with regards to the role played by age-rules and the Party’s 
youth organizations in elite renewal. Rather than the result of a rational calculus made by a 
monolithic and omniscient Party-State, or of an overall ideological framework, the renewal and 
cohesion overtime of the Chinese political elite has been made possible by the concordance 
between the top leaders’ political interests and the long-term needs of a regime in a 
                                                 
1433 On the succession issue after Deng Xiaoping, see : Alice Miller, “The Problem of Hu Jintao’s Successor,” 
China Leadership Monitor, no. 19 (2006). 
1434 On Xi’s anticorruption campaign and his affiliates, see : Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Members of the Xi Jinping 
Clique Revealed,” China Brief 14, no. 3 (February 2014); Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China’s Anti-Graft Campaign in 
Review,” China Brief 15, no. 23 (December 2015); Lam, “The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the 
Rise of the Zhejiang Clique.” 
1435 See for example : David L Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2015. 
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Thermidorian configuration. 1436  The rejuvenation of the Chinese regime which resulted is 
unique. It shows that the role played by Leninist youth organizations evolves in time, despite 
continuity in terms of organizational structure, and that they can become highly relevant for the 
regime’s renewal even beyond the revolutionary struggle or the regime’s most orthodox periods. 
The comparative study of communist regimes therefore stresses that while they share a similar 
organizational blueprint, they have become overtime increasingly diverse in their ideological 
and political transformations. It highlightx the flexibility of the Leninist organizational structure. 
 
  
                                                 
1436 The concept of Thermidorian configuration is developed in the Introduction. See also : Bayart, “Le Concept 
de situation thermidorienne: régimes néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation économique [The Concept of 
Thermidorian Situation: Neo-Revolutionary Regimes and Economic Liberalization].” 
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Glossary 
Assigned graduates (xuandiaosheng, 选调生): This trainee program is reserved for new 
college graduates who are CCP members and have been student cadres. The candidates must 
be recommended by their university’s CCP organization. Under this program, they are send to 
a grassroots position, for instance in a township level administration, for generally two years, 
before being promoted rather quickly to a low-level leadership position. While similar programs 
have been developed at the local level since the 1980s, the assigned graduates system has been 
formalized in 2000 by the “Notice regarding the further development of the assignment of 
university graduates to grassroots positions for training.”1437  
 
Civil service system (guojia gongwuyuan zhidu, 国家公务员制度 ): Following the 
“Temporary regulation regarding civil servants” of 1993, a civil service system was 
implemented in China.1438 The system was further developed by the “Civil servant law of the 
People's Republic of China” of 2005.1439 It led to the establishment of a decentralized system 
of civil service examinations.1440 Under the civil service system, the status, wages, and ranks 
of civil servants are clearly defined. The distinction between leading and non-leading cadre 
                                                 
1437 “Notice regarding the further development of the assignment of university graduates to grassroots positions 
for training (guanyu jinyibu zuohao xuandiao yingjie youxiu daxue biye sheng dao jiceng peiyang duanlian 
gongzuo de tongzhi, 关于进一步做好选调应届优秀大学毕业生到基层培养锻炼工作的通知 ),” CCP 
Organization Department, January 2000. 
1438 “Temporary Regulation Regarding Civil Servants (guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli, 国家公务员暂行条例),” 
State Council, August 1993. 
1439 “Civil servant law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongwuyuan fa, 中华人
民共和国公务员法),” National People’s Congress, 27 April 2005. 
1440 On the civil service system and exams, see : Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China”; Pieke, The Good 
Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China, 34. 
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takes form within a structured hierarchical system including fourteen ranks. Leading cadres 
ranks start at the section leadership level (keji, 科级), the equivalent of a township leader or a 
department director in a county level government, and go all the way to the State leadership 
level (guoji, 国 级 ). While the civil service system manages official in Party-State 
administrations, by opposition to other public sector employees who work in service units 
(shiye danwei, 事业单位) such as schools or hospitals, some exceptions exist. Following the 
“Opinion regarding the management of proxy civil servants in the organs of the CYL, ACFTU, 
Women Federation and other mass organizations” of 2006, cadres in mass organizations, 
including the CYL, are incorporated within the civil service system. As “proxy civil servants” 
(canzhao gongwuyuan, 参照公务员), they are managed according to the same rules as civil 
servants.1441  
 
Open selection (gongkai xuanba, 公开选拔): This selection method for leading cadres imply 
the public announcement of vacant positions, as well as open procedures for candidates to 
submit job applications and to take the related exams and evaluations. This procedure is a 
common career accelerator allowing young cadres to not follow tenure regulations and rapidly 
climb the hierarchy.1442 The Party-State has started to experiment with this selection procedure 
for leading cadres in the 1990s and it was formalized by the “Work Regulation for the 
Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres” of 2002.1443 A revised 
                                                 
1441 “Opinion regarding the management of proxy civil servants in the organs of the CYL, ACFTU, Women 
Federation and other mass organizations (gonghui, gongqingtuan, fulian, deng renmin tuanti he qunzhong tuanti 
jiguan canzhao ‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongwuyuan’ guanli de yijian, 工会，共青团，妇联，等人民团
体和群众团体机关参照‘中华人民共和国公务员’管理的意见)”, CCP Organization Department, 2006. 
1442 On this procedure, see : Kou and Tsai, “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the 
Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System.” 
1443 “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres (dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 23 July 2002. 
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version of the “Work Regulation for the Promotion and Appointment of Leading Party and 
Government Cadres” dating from 2014 limited the use of “open selections.” It can now only be 
used when the local Party-State units do not find suitable candidates internally, and it can no 
longer be mobilized to transfer candidates across provinces.1444 
 
Temporary transferred duty (guazhi duanlian, 挂职锻炼 ): Under this framework, a 
dispatching administrative unit transfers officials to a receiving unit for a certain period of time, 
generally a year. The dispatching unit remains responsible of the officials and their salary. The 
goal is to train the officials in different settings. The practice has been progressively formalized 
since the 1990s, in particular through two documents issued by the Central CCP Organization 
Department: the “Note regarding the issues concerning the training of cadres through 
Temporary transferred duty” of 1994 and the “Program regarding the deepening of the reform 
of the cadre personnel system” of 2000.1445 
  
                                                 
1444 “Work regulation for the promotion and appointment of leading Party and government cadres (dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaolie, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例),” Central CCP, 15 January 
2014. 
1445 “Note regarding the issues concerning the training of cadres through Temporary transferred duty (guanyu 
ganbu guazhi duanlian gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi, 关于干部挂职锻炼工作有关问题的通知),” Central 
CCP Organization Department, 29 September 1994 ; “Program regarding the deepening of the reform of the cadre 
personnel system (shenhua ganbu renshi zhidu gaige gangyao, 深化干部人事制度改革纲要),” Central CCP 
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zhuyi qingniantuan di shi’er quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十二次
全国代表大会).” Website of the central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn). 
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“The 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingniantuan di shisan quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十三次
全国代表大会).” Website of the central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn). 
“The 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingniantuan di shisi quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十四次全
国代表大会).” Website of the central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn). 
“The 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingniantuan di shiwu quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十五次
全国代表大会).” Website of the central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn). 
“The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingniantuan di shiliu quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十六次
全国代表大会).” Website of the central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn). 
“The 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo gongchan 
zhuyi qingniantuan di shiqi quanguo daibiao dahui, 中国共产主义青年团第十七次全
国代表大会).” Website of the central CYL (www.gqt.org.cn). 
“The 28 Years Old Peking University PhD Liu Kai is Appointed as Governor of Lingtai County 
in Gansu (28 sui Beida boshi Liu Kai zhensgshi dangxuan Gansu Lingtai xian xianzhang 
ceng, 28 岁北大博士刘凯正式当选甘肃灵台县县长曾).” People’s Daily website, 
October 26, 2011 (http://blog.csdn.net/guoxiaoqiang88/article/details/6919707). 
“The CYL Secretary of Fengtai District Wang Songtao Goes to the Fengtai District Education 
Commission in order to Inspect CYL Work (Fengtai qu tuanwei shuji Wang Songtao fu 
fengtai jiaowei diaocha gongqingtuan gongzuo,  丰台团区委书记王松涛赴丰台教委
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调研共青团工作).” Website of the Fengtai District government, December 5, 2011 
(http://www.ftedu.gov.cn/2011NianXinWen/2011-12/11447.htm). 
“The Training Class for the CYL Secretaries of the Capital’s Universities was Held 
Successfully (shoudu gaoxiao tuanwei shuji peixunban chenggong juban, 首都高校团




Appendix I. List of Anynomized Interviewees 
 
Academics 
Reference Position Date of meetings Gender 













































Academic 8 Professor at Nanjing 
University, Nanjing 
21/06/2012 Male 
Academic 9 Professor at Fudan 
University, Shanghai 
03/06/2013 Male 
Academic 10 Professor at Fudan 
University, Shanghai 
03/06/2013 Male 





















Academic 15 Professor at Fudan 
University, Shanghai 
25/06/2013 Male 























Academic 20 Independent 
Scholar, Beijing 
12/07/2013 Male 











Academic 23 Professor at Renmin 
University, Beijing 
15/03/2015 Male 







Reference Position Date of meetings Gender 










Cadre 3 CYL cadre, Peking 
University, Beijing 
19/06/2012 Male 




Cadre 5 CYL cadre, high 
school in Nanjing 
25/06/2012 Male 











Cadre 8 CYL cadre, high 
school in Nanjing 
27/06/2012 Female 

















Cadre 12 CYL cadre, Nanjing 
University, Nanjing 
13/06/2013 Female 
Cadre 13 official, Beijing 
Youth Daily Press , 
Beijing 
21/06/2013 Male 




Cadre 15 CYL cadre, Renmin 
University, Beijing 
01/07/2013 Male 

















Cadre 19 CYL cadre, Sichuan 19/11/2014 Female 
Cadre 20 CYL cadre, 
Chengdu, Sichuan 
06/12/2014 Male 
Cadre 21 CYL cadre, Guizhou 
CYL Committee 
14/01/2015 Female 
Cadre 22 CYL cadre, Guizhou 
CYL Committee 
14/01/2015 Male 
Cadre 23 CYL cadre, Guizhou 
CYL Committee 
14/01/2015 Male 
Cadre 24 CYL cadre, Guizhou 
CYL Committee 
14/01/2015 Male 
Cadre 25 CYL cadre, SOE, 
Guizhou 
15/01/2015 Female 
Cadre 26 CYL cadre, SOE, 
Guizhou 
15/01/2015 Male 
Cadre 27 CYL cadre, Guizhou 
CYL Committee 
19/01/2015 Male 








Cadre 30 CYL cadre, Nanjing 
University 
02/02/2015 Male 






Cadre 32 ACYF delegate, 
Nanjing 
04/04/2015 Male 




Cadre 34 CYL cadre, Nanjing 
CYL Committee 
07/02/2015 Male 




Cadre 36 CYL cadre, SOE, 
Nanjing 
09/03/2015 Male 
Cadre 37 CYL cadre, Jiangsu 
CYL Committee 
10/03/2015 Male 
Cadre 38 CYL cadre, Nanjing 
CYL Committee 
11/03/2015 Male 




Cadre 40 Former CYL cadre, 
Central SOE, Beijing 
28/04/2015 Female 




Cadre 42 Cadre CYL, Hebei 
CYL Committee 
11/06/2015 Female 
Cadre 43 Cadre CYL, Hebei 
CYL Committee 
11/06/2015 Female 







Reference Position Date of meetings Gender 
























Student 6 Student cadre, 
Nanjing University 
10/06/2013 Female 
Student 7 Student cadre, 
Nanjing University 
15/06/2013 Male 
Student 8 Student cadre, 
Nanjing University 
15/06/2013 Male 
Student 9 Former student 




















Student 13 Former student 
cadre, Central Party 
School, Beijing 
27/10/2014 Male 
















































Appendix II. Chronological List of Central Youth League 
Congresses 
Congress Date Leadership 
1st Socialist Youth League 
Congress 
1922 Secretary: Shi Cuntong (施存统) 
2nd Socialist Youth League 
Congress 
1923 Secretary: Shi Cuntong (施存统) 
3rd Socialist Youth League 
Congress 
1925 General Secretary: Zhang Tailei (张太雷) 
4th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1927 Secretary: Ren Bishi (任弼时) 
5th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1928 Secretary: Guan Xiangying (关向应) 
1st New Democratic Youth 
League Congress (6th CYL 
Congress) 
1949 Secretary: Feng Wenbin (冯文彬) 
2nd New Democratic Youth 
League Congress (7th CYL 
Congress) 
1953 Secretaries: Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), Liao 
Chengzhi (廖承志), Luo Yi (罗毅), Wang 
Zonghuai (王宗槐), Rong Gaotang (荣高
棠), Qu Tangliang (区棠亮), Zhang Ze (
章泽), Hu Keshi (胡克实), Liu Daosheng 
(刘导生). Liu Daosheng was replaced by 
Liu Xiyuan (刘西元) in 1955. 
3rd New Democratic Youth 
League Congress (8th CYL 
Congress) 
1957 First Secretary: Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) 
9th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1964 First Secretary: Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) 
10th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1978 First Secretary: Han Ying (韩英) from 
1978 to 1982; Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国) 
from 1982. 
11th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1982 First Secretary: Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国) 
from 1982 to 1984; Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) 
from 1984 to 1985; Song Defu (宋德福) 
from 1985. 
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12th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1988 First Secretary: Song Defu (宋德福) 
13th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1993 First Secretary: Li Keqiang (李克强) 
14th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
1998 First Secretary: Zhou Qiang (周强) 
15th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
2003 First Secretary: Zhou Qiang (周强) from 
2003 to 2006; Hu Chunhua (胡春华) from 
2006 to 2008; Lu Hao (陆昊) from 2008 
16th Communist Youth 
League Congress 
2008 First Secretary: Lu Hao (陆昊) 
17th Communist Youth 
League Congress 




Appendix III. Peking University Student Union Election 
Posters (2014-2015) 
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